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Abstract 
 
 
Spurred by the ageing transition, many governments have made wide-ranging reforms, 
dramatically changing Europe‘s pensions landscape.  Nevertheless there remain 
concerns about future costs, while unease about adequacy is growing.  This study 
develops a comprehensive framework to assess pension system sustainability. It captures 
the effects of reforms on the ability of systems to alleviate poverty and maintain living 
standards, while setting out how reforms change future costs and relative entitlements 
for different generations.  
  This framework differs from others, which just look at generosity at the point 
of retirement, as it uses pension wealth - the value of all transfers during retirement. This 
captures the impact of both longevity and changes in the value of pensions during 
retirement. Moreover, rather than focusing only on average earners with full careers, this 
framework examines individuals at different wage levels, taking account of actual 
labour market participation. The countries analysed cover 70% of the EU‘s population 
and include examples of all system types. 
  Our estimates indicate that while reforms have decreased generosity 
significantly, in most, but not all, countries the poverty alleviation function remains 
strong, particularly where minimum pensions have improved. However, moves to link 
benefits to contributions have made some systems less progressive, raising adequacy 
concerns for women and those on low incomes. The consumption smoothing function of 
state pensions has declined noticeably, suggesting the need for longer working lives or 
additional private saving for individuals to maintain pre-reform living standards. Despite 
the reforms, the size of entitlements of future generations should remain similar to that 
of current generations, in most cases, as the effect of lower annual benefits should be 
offset by longer retirement. Though reforms have helped address the financial challenge 
faced by pension systems, in many countries pressures remain strong and further 
reforms are likely. 
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Introduction 
 
 Systems providing financial security for the old are under increasing strain throughout 
the world. Rapid demographic transitions caused by rising life expectancy and declining 
fertility mean that the proportion of old people in the general population is growing rapidly. 
Extended families and other traditional ways of supporting the old are weakening. 
Meanwhile, formal systems, such as government-backed pensions, have proved both 
unsustainable and very difficult to reform. In some developing countries, these systems are 
nearing collapse. In others, governments preparing to establish formal systems risk repeating 
expensive mistakes. The result is a looming old age crisis that threatens not only the old but 
also their children and grandchildren, who must shoulder, directly or indirectly, much of the 
increasingly heavy burden of providing for the aged. 
 Averting the old age crisis, World Bank 1994 
 Europe has started to prepare for these challenges, and encouraging progress has been 
made by some Member States…. However, without further institutional and policy changes, 
demographic trends are expected to transform our societies considerably, impinging on 
intergenerational solidarity and creating new demands on future generations. Such trends 
will have a significant impact on potential growth and lead to strong pressures to increase 
public spending…..Recent analysis confirms that there is a window of opportunity – a period 
of about ten years during which labour forces will continue to increase – for implementing 
the structural reforms needed by ageing societies. Taking no action would weaken the EU's 
ability to meet the future needs of an ageing population. 
European Commission communication to the European Parliament and Council 2009 
 The stabilisation of public pension spending can be attained also by means of reducing 
future generosity of pension benefits….The decline in the public pension benefit ratio over 
the period 2008 to 2060 is substantial, 20% or more in 11 Member States….It is very 
difficult to assess to what extent future pension benefits will be ‗adequate‘ in the 
future…The risk of a ‗too small‘ pension must not be overstated by focusing on the drop in 
the benefit ratio… 
Economic Policy Committee and European Commission, 2009 Ageing Report 
 
 These quotations illustrate what is possibly the biggest social policy issue faced by 
governments across Europe. Having set up an intergenerational social contract through which 
workers finance significant transfers to the elderly on the assumption that future workers will 
do the same, policymakers have in recent decades increasingly worried about the system‘s 
sustainability.  Spurred by the ageing transition, many governments have carried out wide-
ranging reforms in their pension systems. The public pensions landscape in Europe has 
consequently changed dramatically since the early 1990s.  Nevertheless concerns about future 
costs remain at the top of the agenda of most EU finance ministers. Yet, public resistance to 
reforms remains strong, with strikes, demonstrations and increasingly cases of reform 
reversals or modifications, reflecting concerns about the social impact of the reforms.  In this 
light, it is evident that policymakers need to develop a comprehensive framework with which 
12 
 
                    
to assess the sustainability of their pension systems. They need to have a framework which 
looks at financial sustainability and intergenerational equity but which also gives due weight 
to the impact of reforms on the achievements of their pension systems. As suggested by the 
quotations above, policymakers seem unsure of how to quantify and weigh against each other 
the different risks reforms face.   
 While projections of the economic impact of ageing and concerns about 
intergenerational equity point towards the need to reform, there are growing concerns that 
policymakers may have unduly focused on reducing projected spending on pensions without 
looking adequately at how reforms could affect the ability of systems to fulfil their roles of 
poverty alleviation and income replacement during retirement.  Moreover, in some cases, 
future generations of retirees will start shouldering risks, such as longevity, that had previously 
been shouldered by the state. This could lower significantly the living standards of future 
generations, unless individuals accommodate the change in generosity through working longer 
and/or saving more. 
 Given the growing size of the pensioner population, one could argue that if the pension 
system does not fulfil public expectations, and/or older people find that they did not make 
appropriate saving and working decisions, the state could be forced by voters to reverse 
reforms and spend more on social transfers.  Rather than focusing on the effect of reforms on 
projected spending on pensions, assessments of reforms should also attempt to understand the 
implications of reforms on pension adequacy, particularly on entitlements of those population 
groups less able to accommodate the effects of benefit cuts through behavioural changes. The 
long-term sustainability of recent pension reforms depends crucially on their impact on the 
pension system‘s ability to reduce poverty and replace pre-retirement income and also on the 
ability of individuals to change their work and saving behaviour to accommodate the effects of 
reforms. 
 The main research question of this dissertation will therefore be:  
 Are the pension reforms enacted in Europe during the last decade sustainable?  
This dissertation will attempt to re-evaluate recent pension reforms in Europe in the broad 
perspective described above. The research will be divided in three parts. The first part 
(Chapters 1 to 3) will review the current importance of pensions in reducing poverty among 
elderly people and in replacing pre-retirement income, describe the reforms which have been 
occurring and outline the existing literature evaluating these reforms. The second part 
(Chapters 4 to 7) will develop a broader evaluation framework using (and refining on) models 
and indicators of pension entitlements developed by the OECD and the Indicators Sub-Group 
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of the EU‘s Social Protection Committee. It will also provide a preliminary assessment of the 
social sustainability of pension reforms, by looking at how the outcomes of pension systems 
might change by 2050 and assess to what extent this differs from what the situation would 
have been like under unchanged systems. The third part (Chapters 8 and 9) will further 
develop this assessment by refining the modelling, so to reveal better where pressures for 
further reform might arise and investigate the required changes in saving and working longer 
for individuals to maintain the living standards of current generations of pensioners, despite 
reductions in pension system generosity. 
   This research‘s main theoretical contribution will be to delineate a broader concept of 
sustainability. Using this definition, reforms will be assessed in view of their impact on the 
ability of the pension system to achieve its set objectives, and the behavioural changes they 
necessitate in individuals to accommodate changes. This is inspired by the recognition that 
‗inadequate‘ pensions pose risks to sustainability, and carry with them the danger of ad-hoc 
policy reversal.  This research will argue that policymakers should focus on ‗social 
sustainability‘ - a long-term solution through which the aims of the system continue to be 
achieved without putting excessive pressure on system constraints. In this sense, an effective 
reform would result in the system being financially sustainable and still able to achieve its set 
objectives, and capable of adjusting to shocks in longevity, financial markets and the 
economy.      
 In terms of pension system adequacy there appear to be four concerns. From a political 
economy perspective, the adequacy of the system for the average voter needs to be ensured. If 
a system is not seen as beneficial by the electoral majority, namely by not helping them 
maintain their pre-retirement living standards, it could be voted out.  Similarly if a system is 
not seen as able to alleviate poverty, the political pressures that led to the setting up of social 
assistance to elderly people during the early part of the twentieth century might re-emerge.  
Policymakers appear to be well aware of the need to ensure that future generations of workers 
do not end up having to pay very high contribution rates in order to finance pension transfers.  
A less discussed issue is the need of adjacent generations to enjoy similar living standards. If a 
young generation finds that a previous generation had a much better pension deal, it might 
want to renege on this arrangement. 
 Thus from a theoretical perspective this dissertation will try to answer two questions: 
I) Can one develop a concept of sustainability encompassing pension system adequacy 
within a context of fiscal sustainability? 
II) Which are the best measures for judging pension system adequacy? 
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 From an empirical perspective, the dissertation will assess across a range of European 
countries:  
I) What is the current importance of state pensions in supporting living standards?  How 
do reforms impact on generosity and system design? 
II) Are the changes socially sustainable and what changes are required in saving and 
working longer for individuals to maintain living standards? 
 This study will take a broader look at pension reform, beyond public finance 
implications of changes.  To do this, we first assess how effective state pensions currently are 
in supporting the living standards of elderly people (Chapter 1). Then we try to understand 
whether there are major differences in what European pension systems are delivering (Chapter 
2). This analysis will be done using data from surveys on living conditions/incomes, mainly 
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) compiled by the 
EU‘s statistical agency, Eurostat.   
 After gauging the current importance of state pensions, the next stage is to determine 
how recent pension reforms impact on individuals. Although there have been several studies 
on reforms in particular countries, to date there have been very few attempts to come up with a 
synthetic analysis of the overall change in the European pension landscape.  Information on 
specific pension reforms will be sought from existing literature, while details on the current 
and past parameters will be ascertained from exercises such as the EU‘s Mutual Information 
System on Social Protection (MISSOC) Comparative Tables. This synthesis of European 
reforms and the causes leading to them will be set out in Chapter 3.  
 This will reveal how reforms have been driven mostly by a rather limited concept of 
sustainability conceived as reducing projected levels of future spending on state pensions, 
through cuts in generosity.  Chapter 4 will develop the broader concept of social sustainability, 
incorporating both pension system adequacy and financial sustainability.  Once this is defined, 
in Chapter 5 a framework of indicators will be set out which could be used to measure the 
extent to which reforms could achieve social sustainability.  This will build on and improve on 
existing indicators, such as theoretical replacement ratios - abstract measures of pension 
generosity based on the modelling of the benefits accruing to a stylised individual.  These 
indicators will be developed using the OECD‘s APEX cross-country pension entitlement 
model. 
 At present, most studies on adequacy deal simply with theoretical replacement rates at 
the point of retirement. However, this approach does not seem appropriate in light of the 
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continued increase in longevity. An individual in future might be getting a pension which 
provides a lower replacement rate in any one year than under current rules, but still get the 
same amount of total transfers over the whole lifetime.  This is particularly true in case of 
systemic reforms which are built on the notion that annual benefits are changed automatically 
with demographic developments. In this regard, to assess the effective impact of reforms, one 
needs to look at more sophisticated indicators of generosity, such as pension wealth – the 
value of all the prospective pension transfers received by an individual. Using pension wealth, 
one can also determine the overall liabilities faced by governments, thus providing a direct 
link between an adequacy and a fiscal sustainability indicator.  At the same time, pension 
wealth presents a better measure of pension adequacy as it takes into account changes in 
indexation and in the length of retirement, and captures the overall generosity of a pension 
system – rather than the generosity at the time of retirement.  It also captures the effects on 
entitlements of changes in the age of retirement. These new indicators will be presented in 
Chapter 6, where the current achievement of system objectives and the pressure on system 
constraints will be compared with the projected outcomes of the reformed systems in 2050. 
Chapter 7 will, on the other hand, present how these indicators would have developed had no 
pension reforms taken place. 
 The third and final stage of the dissertation will focus on measuring better the social 
sustainability of reforms. Assessments of pension system adequacy have primarily 
concentrated on men with a full contribution record of full-time employment, earning the 
mean wage. Besides this group being relatively small, this approach ignores the fact that 
adequacy is best studied by looking at the effects of reforms on those most at risk – namely 
those with broken careers and on low incomes. This is particularly important because in many 
countries reforms have sought to tighten the link between contributions and benefits.  Thus in 
Chapter 8, the research moves away from the standard full-career hypothesis and instead looks 
at a scenario more consistent with the actual labour market participation observed in these 
countries, including part-time employment and minimum pension provision. This will enable 
an assessment of the effective impact that reforms will have on pensioner poverty and the 
degree of consumption smoothing over lifetimes.  This will then be used to estimate the 
additional saving individuals would need to make to accommodate the changes in state 
pensions. Chapter 9 will further develop this theme, by looking at the impact of labour market 
participation on the sustainability indicators. This will show that if governments want to reach 
a long-term solution to the challenge of ageing societies, they cannot stop at pension reform 
but must adopt policies that ensure that individual economic behaviour is modified to 
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accommodate changes in state provision. Finally, Chapter 9 will further refine the indicators 
by trying to adjust for contribution credits awarded to the unemployed or to those with caring 
responsibilities, and by looking at the impact of socio-economic differences in labour market 
participation and longevity. It will also assess the sensitivity of pension systems to shocks in 
longevity improvement, wage and GDP growth, interest rates and employment.                 
 Throughout, the research adopts a clear policy focus, trying to show how the social 
sustainability framework could be best applied by policymakers. This framework helps to 
understand the mix of policy choices faced by governments; namely the extent to which 
benefits can be allowed to decline, state liabilities to rise, working lives extended, and private 
saving increased, in order to achieve a sustainable pension system. By looking at sustainability 
beyond the standard fiscal definition, the research will indicate areas where governments need 
to do more to ensure a smooth transition. The study will shed light on the best practice among 
reformers and set out starkly the implications of reforms. It will contribute to the existing 
literature by putting into perspective the substantial changes in pension provision that have 
taken place across Europe, assess what preliminary lessons can be learnt from the experience 
of particular countries, and explore possible ways that governments could use indicators better 
to ensure sustainability of reforms. Sustainability is only achievable through a new 
understanding between the state and individuals which creates the conditions for the 
maintenance of adequate living standards during retirement. Simply legislating away previous 
pension commitments is unlikely to result in a lasting social adjustment to the ageing process.   
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STATE PENSIONS ACROSS EU 
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RECENT REFORMS 
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1. The role of state pensions in the income of elderly people                            
across European countries 
 
The starting point of this study will be to ascertain the effective importance of state pension 
transfers for elderly people
1
 in Europe. In this way, it will be possible to determine better the 
impact pension reforms might have on individuals in different countries.  This chapter will 
introduce some of the indicators which will be used throughout this study to evaluate the 
outcomes of pension systems. Even very generous pension systems can leave high levels of 
poverty, if they do not have high coverage or system rules work against particular groups such 
as women.
2
 Therefore to understand better the possible impact of reforms, it is essential to be 
able to gauge how current systems feed into retirement income conditions. This chapter is in 
two parts: the first outlining the relative role of pension systems and the second looking at 
some of the existing literature on the income of elderly people, supplemented by some 
secondary analysis of data from cross-country surveys on living conditions/incomes, mainly 
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). 
 
1.1 The role of pension systems 
Pension plans have a long history,
3
 but became more common in the wake of industrialisation 
and urbanisation. Holzmann & Hinz (2005) portray the rise of modern pension systems as a 
reaction to the socioeconomic changes of the nineteenth century, noting that ―as individuals 
moved out of the traditional agricultural family structure, there was a need to establish formal 
risk management arrangements that could substitute for the informal arrangements that were 
eroding in the face of the transition‖.4  State income-transfer programmes to elderly people can 
be traced to the late nineteenth century, first in Germany and Denmark.  The reasons why 
pensions were established in these two countries appear to have differed significantly. In 
Germany, Chancellor Bismarck was interested in ―tying workers‘ interests to the new German 
state‖,5 while the Danish scheme was introduced as a locally administered means-tested 
scheme for needy citizens over age 60. This distinction reflects two distinctly different aims – 
                                               
1
 The term ―elderly people‖ refers to those aged above 65, even when this is not the state pension age.  The 
reason for this is that data for some indicators are only available at this age.   
2
 For instance, Portugal has one of the highest at-risk-of-poverty rates in the EU, even though the net replacement 
rate of its pension system is among the highest. 
3
 In the UK the first pension scheme for Royal Navy officers was set up in the 1670s (see BBC (2002)). 
4
 Caucutt et al (2007) also explains the emergence of social security in the US in terms of the population shift 
from rural to urban areas. This migration is deemed to have led to political support for social security as 
individuals could no longer rely on land as a source of old-age income. 
5
  See Palacios & Sluchynsky (2006).  
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in the German case: a need for income stability over the life-course, and in the Danish case: a 
need to alleviate poverty during old age. These two aims have characterised state pension 
systems throughout the decades, and while some systems remain in policy rhetoric focused on 
one particular aim, nowadays, most pension systems serve both purposes.  
 Barr & Diamond (2006) argue that ―from an individual viewpoint, income security in 
old age requires two types of instruments: a mechanism for consumption smoothing, and a 
means of insurance‖.6  The first purpose involves the transfer of consumption from productive 
middle years to retired years, allowing the individual to choose the preferred time path of 
consumption over working and retired life.  Due to the substantial uncertainties faced by 
individuals, primary among them guessing correctly their life expectancy and their resource 
needs during retirement, and market failures, this consumption smoothing requires insurance, 
which has tended to be organised centrally either by employers or the state.  Barr & Diamond 
(2006) further contend that ―a second reason for government involvement is that public policy 
generally has objectives additional to improving consumption smoothing and insurance, 
notably poverty relief and redistribution‖. Thus pensions serve as a means to target resources 
on people who are poor on a lifetime basis and also redistribute incomes on a lifetime basis 
(subsidising the consumption smoothing of low-income individuals). Pension systems can, 
moreover, be used to redistribute across generations.  
 To understand the role of pensions fully, one needs to consider that besides these 
primary objectives, policymakers usually have secondary goals mostly relating to the effect of 
pensions on labour and capital markets.  Thus if a particular system, in order to achieve its 
primary goals, results in too high tax rates, it could adversely affect employment rates.  A 
pension system that provides very generous levels of benefits may also displace private saving 
and thus result in smaller capital markets. These and similar arguments tend to be taken under 
consideration particularly when decisions are made on pension system design. 
 The main constraint on pension systems – like other areas of government spending – is 
the financial resources allocated for this purpose.  From the very beginning, this factor played 
an important role in shaping pension policy.  It is noteworthy that in most countries, when 
pensions were established governments established specific taxes or contributions to finance 
them. These concerns persisted over time, and pension systems in some countries (such as the 
UK, Netherlands and Australia) took a relatively long time to move beyond the poverty 
alleviation role or tended to involve private sector employers in income replacement.  Pre-
                                               
6
 Whitehouse (2007) makes the same argument and, in fact, classifies the pension schemes of different 
countries on the basis of these two functions.  
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funding of pension promises also tended to be common and in some British ex-colonies, such 
as Singapore and Malaysia, has survived to this day.   
 
1.11 The importance of pension outlays 
In most developed countries, pensions are the single largest item of government spending. 
Figure 1.1 shows that across the EU, state pension spending constitutes more than a fifth of 
total government outlays, equivalent to over a tenth of national output. There is considerable 
variation, with the proportion of public spending in Ireland being nearly a third that in Italy, 
but in all countries pensions feature prominently.  Moreover the Figure suggests that the 
expansion of state pensions does not solely reflect the expansion of state activity. State 
pension spending is high in countries, like Denmark and Sweden, with high overall public 
spending, but also in countries, such as Luxembourg and Poland, with a much smaller public 
sector. The similarity in pension expenditure levels is even more evident when one includes 
spending on occupational pension schemes.
7
 This suggests that there are fundamental 
determinants of the presence of collectively organised pension systems which have tended to 
lead to the decommodification of this particular economic activity in most of Europe.  
 
Figure 1.1: Government spending and the share of state pensions (2007)  
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Note: Countries arranged in order of the share pension spending has of total state spending.  
Source: Eurostat and Economic Policy Committee (2009).       
                                               
7
 For instance, data from Eurostat‘s European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) 
confirm that in the UK and the Netherlands, where provision has traditionally been allocated partially to 
employers, overall spending is comparable to that in countries with state-only provision. 
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 The OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)
8
 has comparative data on social 
spending, which cover estimates of voluntary private provision and include some major non-
EU countries. Figure 1.2 shows that most EU countries devote more of their GDP on social 
spending, on average, than the OECD average. Richer countries tend to have higher social 
spending.  However the size of social spending does not exactly match the country‘s ranking 
in terms of GDP per capita.  For instance, Ireland is the fifth-lowest spender on social services 
despite having a GDP per capita that is 38% higher than the OECD average.
9
 Conversely, 
Sweden spends much more on social services than its relative GDP per capita would imply. 
Looking at the composition of overall social spending, expenditure on pensions tends to 
consume more than a third of total outlays on average in OECD countries.  There are very 
strong variations across EU countries, with pension spending taking up around a half of all 
social spending in Greece and Italy, but only a fifth in Ireland.
10
      
 
Figure 1.2: OECD estimates of total social spending* and spending on old age (2005) 
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8
 See Adema & Ladaique (2005). Individual pension arrangements are included if they are tax-advantaged. 
9
 Ireland has been moving up the table. In 2001 it was the third-lowest spender. 
10
 However the OECD express concern on the pension data comprehensiveness for Ireland. 
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 The OECD data, depicted in Figure 1.3, also show that public spending makes up the 
bulk of pension outlays. In most EU countries, the scale of private spending is small, except in 
the UK and the Netherlands. Voluntary private provision is on the rise, however. It is 
interesting to note that having higher state spending on pensions does not preclude also having 
a significant private pension component. For example, Belgium spends much more than the 
Netherlands on state pensions, and yet its private pension sector compares well with the Dutch 
one. Nevertheless, countries with the highest levels of spending tend to do this mostly through 
state provision.  
 
Figure 1.3: Public-Private shares of social spending on old age (2005) 
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Note: Countries arranged in order of the size of pension spending.  
Source: OECD SOCX (2008). 
       
1.12: Why is there so much public provision? 
Prior to embarking on an analysis of the influence of state pensions, it is worthwhile to set out 
briefly some of the causes behind the importance of these transfers.    
 In standard neoclassical economic theory, individuals are capable of planning for old 
age provision.  The perfectly rational and forward-looking individual would smooth 
consumption throughout the life-course, seeking employment until marginal productivity is 
higher than marginal disutility of working (i.e. preference for leisure). While in employment, 
the individual would save part of income in order to provide for outlays during retirement (and 
to repay the expenditure conducted when young) and insure against longevity risk. One can 
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modify this individualistic framework by introducing interaction between different 
generations, through channels such as care and bequests. Given this framework, financial 
markets should be able to provide efficient individual pension provision with no role for the 
state (other than for redistribution – both intragenerational and intergenerational) or employers 
(other than for the purposes of motivating or retaining staff).  Nevertheless in most countries 
pension provision is collectively organised.   
 Jousten (2007) presents an excellent outline of the main reasons for this. First of all, 
like all insurance contracts, pensions are affected by adverse selection. Heterogeneous 
individuals can behave strategically and misguide pension providers by hiding their true 
characteristics.  Those with better life expectancy prospects, for instance, are more likely to 
seek to enter into annuity contracts.  Cocco & Lopes (2004) use data from the UK‘s Family 
Resources Survey to study individual pension choice between defined contribution (DC) and 
defined benefit (DB) plans, relating it to labour income characteristics. They find that 
―individuals who face income growth are more likely to choose DB final salary plans, and less 
likely to choose the DC plan‖ while ―individuals who face higher earnings volatility are less 
likely to choose DB final salary plans‖. They also find that ―individuals with shorter job 
tenures are more likely to contribute to the DB state plan or to DC plans instead of 
occupational plans‖. Self selection may result in suboptimal economic outcomes as providers 
may react by providing incomplete coverage for some groups.
11
  Compulsory coverage 
remedies this but individuals are forced to participate at average annuity rates rather than risk-
group specific rates.
12
  Nevertheless economic literature, such as Eckstein et al (1985), 
indicates that there is welfare improving potential for a compulsory pension scheme.               
 The second major reason for public intervention is the presence of moral hazard. This 
arises when individuals are able to take actions that are detrimental to the other party. So if 
individuals know that society does not allow destitution or poverty, by providing minimum 
income guarantees, they may be tempted not to provide for themselves. This would result in 
significant financial difficulties for public finances.  By forcing everyone to provide for older 
age consumption requirements, government reduces this problem and is thus able to enact a 
poverty prevention strategy – the so-called pillar zero in World Bank terminology13 – without 
                                               
11
 The UK private pension market is definitely characterised by under provision for certain groups, so much 
so that government has tried to remedy this by reforms like stakeholder pensions and auto-enrolment. 
12
 This may, for instance, disproportionately affect low-income individuals who tend to have shorter life 
spans than high income earners. 
13
 See Holzmann & Hinz (2005) for the latest version of the World Bank‘s multi-pillar pension framework. 
24 
 
                    
substantial negative incentive effects.  Having a standard retirement age for all is also, in part, 
justified in this light – as otherwise individuals may retire earlier than is economically optimal.    
 A related issue, though not driven by self-serving strategic individual behaviour, is the 
presence of myopia, or similarly the lack of perfect information. The classical example of 
myopia is when people over-consume in the short run as they do not attach an adequate value 
to their future consumption needs. Behavioural economics presents many cases which depart 
from the rational individual of neoclassical models. One such empirical case is hyperbolic 
discounting, where instead of the constant discount rate assumption of neoclassical models, 
individuals are found to have discount rates which increase as the time before payoffs grows 
shorter.
14
 More simply, since people seem to prefer smaller payoffs now rather than bigger 
ones in the future, a paternalistic government would intervene ex-ante in order to prevent sub-
optimal behaviour like under-saving and excessive early retirement.  By setting pension levels 
well in advance, governments also ensure consumption is smoothed adequately.      
 On a more technical side, it is increasingly understood that administrative and 
management costs crucially determine the eventual pension streams of individuals. While 
individual choice in most markets adds to social welfare, in pensions the benefits are less 
obvious, especially given the low financial education levels usually encountered amongst the 
population of even highly developed economies. A decentralised system increases costs both 
on an administrative level, and also on a decision-making level.
15
  Moreover operators have to 
spend resources to attract participants, and also to compete with each other for customers. 
Setting up a compulsory centralised pension saving scheme reduces these deadweight losses.  
On an empirical level, it also appears that consumers do not want to be faced by a lot of 
decisions. For instance, in the Swedish personal accounts system the large amount of 
investment choices is leading an increasing proportion of individuals to opt for the default 
fund, from one-third in 2000 to 92% in 2005.
16
 Furthermore from a social welfare perspective, 
one needs to take into account that fixed costs fall more heavily on those with small accounts.  
Frericks (2007) also argues that private schemes based on a purely contributory principle may 
reduce social welfare as they do not create incentives for socially required, but unpaid, 
activities such as caring, housework and reproduction.        
                                               
14
 Dasgupta & Maskin (2004) present several empirical cases, such as the desire of people to start saving for 
Christmas at the start of the year, which declines with time. Similarly individuals may want to save for 
retirement, but over time they might never actually do it because their discount rate changes.  
15
 Sheshinski (2003) proves theoretically how expanding choice can lead to decision errors, and also how the 
costs of making choices may outweigh benefits, in a context of bounded rationality.    
16
 Consequentially a commission appointed by the Swedish Government proposed a drop in the number of 
funds from over 700 to 100. See Premium Pension Commission (2005). 
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 Finally another reason why governments (or employers) have to step in is the absence 
in real life of perfect capital and financial markets, and the possibility of default of financial 
intermediaries. As a result, it is not possible for individuals to protect themselves adequately 
against risks such as inflation, longevity and aggregate investment risk. By pooling all 
individuals, the state can provide this cover, though the extent to which it does so depends on 
the nature of provision. Jousten (2007) notes how DB and DC plans ―translate into very 
different benefit structures, with fundamentally different outcomes in terms of risk‖.  In a pure 
DC plan, plan participants bear both the risk of longevity and investment, while in pure DB 
plans, these are borne by the provider.   
 
1.13: Objectives envisaged for pension systems 
Having reviewed the empirical importance of state pensions, and outlined the theoretical 
justifications given for their existence, it is useful to set out the fundamental roles or objectives 
that international institutions envisage that pension systems should have.   
 In Holzmann & Hinz (2005), the World Bank sets its new approach towards pension 
reform, in reaction to the criticism it received in recent years. It argues that ―pension systems 
need to provide adequate, affordable, sustainable, and robust benefits‖. By ―adequate‖ the 
World Bank intends that ―all people regardless of their level or form of economic activity have 
access to the capacity to remain out of extreme poverty in old age and that the system as a 
whole provides assurances that those individuals who live beyond the expected norms will be 
protected from the ‗risk‘ of extreme longevity‖. The World Bank also specifies that ―for a 
typical, full-career worker, an initial target of net-of-tax income replacement from mandatory 
systems is likely to be about 40% of real earnings to maintain subsistence levels of income in 
retirement‖. Lower-income workers, however, need to be provided with ―somewhat higher 
rates‖.   
 Systems that offer replacement rates above 60% are not seen as affordable by the 
Bank, as they would require contribution rates higher than 20% which would be ―quite 
detrimental‖ for middle- and high-income individuals (while for low-income countries 10% is 
seen as the upper threshold). On sustainability, Holzmann & Hinz (2005) argue that ―the 
pension program should be structured so that the financial situation does not require 
unannounced future cuts in benefits, or major and unforeseen transfers from the budget‖.  
Robust systems should also be able to ―sustain income-replacement targets in a predictable 
manner over the long-term…in the face of unforeseen conditions and circumstances‖. The 
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World Bank concludes ―most existing pension systems, including some of the recently 
reformed systems, are unable to deliver on these promises‖. 
 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has through the years led representatives 
of governments, employers and trade unions to agree on a number of conventions on pension 
provision. These conventions aim to ―guarantee protected persons who have reached a certain 
age the means of a decent standard of living for the rest of their life‖ – which is set by 
Convention 238 as a replacement rate of 45%.
17
  This needs to be maintained in view of 
changes in the cost of living subsequent to retirement.  The ILO also argues that ―statutory 
pension schemes must guarantee adequate benefit levels and ensure national solidarity‖ and 
that risks should not be borne solely by the individual but must be shared among all social 
agents.  The coverage of systems must extend to all members of society and there should not 
be gender inequality in provisions. Finally the ILO agrees that ―to be sustainable, the financial 
viability of pension systems must be guaranteed over the long-term‖.18 
 The EU through its Social Protection Committee has achieved agreement among 
Member States on common objectives on pension policy – the achievement of which is 
monitored through the open method of co-ordination (OMC).
19
 These objectives, streamlined 
into three main strands under the heading: ―Adequate and sustainable pensions‖, require that 
Member States ensure: 
(i) ―adequate retirement incomes for all and access to pensions which allow people to 
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement, in the spirit 
of solidarity and fairness between and within generations‖;  
(ii) ―the financial sustainability of public and private pension schemes, bearing in 
mind pressures on public finances and the ageing of populations, and in the context 
of the three-pronged strategy for tackling the budgetary implications of ageing, 
notably by: supporting longer working lives and active ageing; by balancing 
contributions and benefits in an appropriate and socially fair manner; and by 
promoting the affordability and the security of funded and private schemes‖;  
(iii) ―pension systems are transparent, well adapted to the needs and aspirations of 
women and men and the requirements of modern societies, demographic ageing 
and structural change, that people receive the information they need to plan their 
                                               
17
 See Humblet & Silva (2002). 
18
 See ILO (2001). Gruat (1998) describes further the ILO‘s adequacy principles for pension reform.  
19
 See Commission (2005). 
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retirement and that reforms are conducted on the basis of the broadest possible 
consensus‖. 
 
Conclusions on the role of pension systems 
This section has examined the role of state pension systems in European countries by looking 
at theoretical economic literature, comparative data on social protection expenditure and the 
objectives of pension systems as envisaged by international institutions in which European 
countries are members.  The broad conclusions are that state pension systems are widely seen 
as essential instruments to support elderly people in maintaining their previous living 
standards and to prevent poverty. Harmonised data on social spending show how despite clear 
differences among European countries on the direct role of the state, in all countries state 
pension spending is the most important government outlay.  Theoretical literature also 
suggests that this essential role for state pensions is likely to continue in the future, as state 
pensions serve to counter substantial market failures and constitute a significant improvement 
in overall welfare.     
       
1.2 Literature on cross-national comparisons of the income of elderly people 
Whereas the study of the income of elderly people started early in the development of social 
policy research, it was only recently that it was possible for it to be expanded to cross-national 
comparisons. This reflected efforts by international organisations, such as the World Bank, the 
OECD and the European Commission to create harmonised data sources on living conditions 
and incomes.  The setting up of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in 1983 marked a 
particular turning point,
20
 and now this database holds data from household income surveys 
from 30 countries.  
 While EU Member States have their own incomes surveys, data may not be strictly 
comparable on account of different survey methodologies, coverage and definitions. Mirroring 
the growing involvement in social policy by the EU, its statisticians have for several years 
been trying to come up with an adequate data source for income and living conditions. The 
first major step towards cross-European comparability was the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), which has now been replaced by the EU-SILC.
21
 While the ECHP 
was a voluntary arrangement, EU-SILC was set up by means of a Commission regulation 
                                               
20
 See Smeeding et al (1985) for the first description of the aims and scope of LIS.  
21
 Regulation (EU) No 1177 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 2003 concerning 
Community Statistics on income and living conditions. 
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agreed in the aftermath of the launch of the Lisbon process and the subsequent introduction of 
the OMC in social policy.
22
 National governments, in fact, agreed in the Laeken European 
Council of December 2001 to endorse a first set of 18 common statistical indicators for social 
inclusion, to ―allow monitoring in a comparable way of Member States‘ progress towards the 
agreed EU objectives‖.23  Annually, EU Member States submit National Action Plans on 
Social Protection and Inclusion to the Commission, using harmonised data.        
 This section looks at three particular aspects: the sources of income for elderly people 
(so as to assess the importance of pension transfers by looking at micro-data rather than the 
aggregate spending data examined in section 1.1); the income of elderly people relative to that 
of the working age population (in order to understand the extent to which pensions smoothen 
consumption and replace former income); and the risk-of-poverty among elderly people (to 
evaluate the extent to which current arrangements protect this vulnerable section of European 
society).  
 
1.21 The sources of income of elderly people 
Having looked at the size of pension spending from a macro-perspective, it makes sense to 
review evidence on the sources of income of elderly people, so as to better understand the 
extent to which they are dependent on pensions during their retirement, and what element of 
this is accountable to state pensions. 
 Peaple (2004) notes how in the largest European countries, except for the UK, there is 
heavy reliance on state pensions, which are quite generous for those with full careers. 
Smeeding (2001) presents similar findings, where despite the fact that participation in 
occupational plans is quasi-mandatory (due to collective bargaining) in both Sweden and the 
Netherlands, the proportion of income from state pensions for an elderly person at the fifth 
decile of the income distribution stands at close to 90%, compared to about 65% in the UK, 
Canada and the US. Reliance on occupational pensions rises at higher income groups. Casey 
& Yamada (2001) shows that for men public pensions are by far the most important source of 
disposable income in Finland, Germany and Italy and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Sweden, 
while private pensions are important in Canada, the Netherlands and the UK. As regards 
women, there is a predominance of public pensions throughout all countries.  Reliance on 
means-tested benefits is also quite strong in some countries, particularly at older ages (see 
                                               
22
 For an example of how EU-SILC is applied in a Member State refer to Central Statistics Office (Ireland)‘s 
manual at http://www.cso.ie/eusilc/documents/silc_manual_2005.doc.  
23
 See Eurostat (2003) for an explanation of the calculation methodology used to compute the ‗Laeken‘ 
indicators. The objectives were discussed in section 1.13. 
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Table 1.1). While this may be partly due to cohort effects,
24
 it could also reflect indexation 
rules which tend to lead to a steady deterioration in relative living standards over time. 
 
Table 1.1: Elderly people with means-tested benefits and private pensions in 1994/95 
 Age % with 
means-tested 
benefits 
% with 
private 
pensions 
Canada 60-64 18 39 
 65-69 16 59 
 70-74 19 57 
 75+ 29 48 
Germany 60-64 10 12 
 65-69 7 16 
 70-74 .. 17 
 75+ .. 11 
Netherlands 60-64 12 55 
 65-69 .. 74 
 70-74 .. 77 
 75+ 13 66 
Sweden 60-64 10 59 
 65-69 16 89 
 70-74 25 83 
 75+ 42 71 
UK 60-64 20 63 
 65-69 17 79 
 70-74 27 73 
 75+ 38 61 
US 60-64 12 39 
 65-69 11 49 
 70-74 11 51 
 75+ 11 43 
Source: Casey & Yamada (2001). 
 
 Zaidi et al (2006) present data on the income composition of two adjacent ten-year 
cohorts, that immediately prior to 65 and that immediately following, which show that upon 
reaching 65, dependence on old age benefits rises substantially. However, as Table 1.2 
suggests, there are marked differences in this transition, as in some countries, such as Italy, 
France and Greece, dependence on old-age benefits is already high among those aged 55 to 64.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
24
 Older cohorts are significantly poorer than younger ones, and had less access to private pensions.  
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Table 1.2: Income composition of adjacent age cohorts (% of total income) in 2003 
 Work Private Old age benefits* Other benefits* 
Ireland     
55-64 76.8 3.2 11.5 8.5 
65-74 28.0 6.1 62.9 3.0 
Denmark     
55-64 75.5 2.6 11.0 10.9 
65-74 13.7 8.4 71.0 6.9 
UK     
55-64 65.4 7.3 18.4 9.0 
65-74 11.8 10.3 72.1 5.9 
Finland     
55-64 63.8 10.5 8.0 17.7 
65-74 13.7 4.7 74.3 7.3 
Portugal     
55-64 53.7 5.7 32.2 8.5 
65-74 16.9 3.2 76.2 3.7 
Belgium     
55-64 56.8 9.5 24.9 8.8 
65-74 7.7 10.5 80.5 1.3 
Italy     
55-64 50.1 3.9 41.7 4.3 
65-74 10.9 3.6 81.1 4.4 
Greece     
55-64 62.8 5.9 28.9 2.5 
65-74 10.3 6.2 81.4 2.2 
Spain     
55-64 63.3 4.7 17.9 14.1 
65-74 9.2 5.3 81.8 3.6 
Luxembourg     
55-64 50.7 6.1 27.3 15.9 
65-74 3.4 8.6 83.8 4.3 
Sweden     
55-64 64.7 5.1 20.7 9.5 
65-74 7.5 4.1 85.9 2.5 
Germany     
55-64 55.4 6.1 26.7 11.8 
65-74 5.7 5.9 86.7 1.7 
Austria     
55-64 44.4 2.4 41.8 11.3 
65-74 2.3 3.1 88.4 6.2 
France     
55-64 57.2 5.2 29.9 7.8 
65-74 3.1 6.4 88.5 2.0 
Netherlands     
55-64 58.7 4.1 18.9 18.2 
65-74 2.4 3.8 90.6 3.2 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the importance of old age benefits for the 65-74. 
*Old age benefits includes all social protection transfers intended to protect against the risks of old 
age – including state and occupational pensions, survivors benefits and in kind benefits. Other benefits 
include social assistance, housing benefits and disability benefits.  
Source: Zaidi et al (2006). 
 
31 
 
                    
 The drop in the importance of income from work is even more evident when one looks 
at the income composition for those aged above 75+, shown in Figure 1.4. At older ages, 
dependence on old-age benefits rises substantially in all countries (except Belgium) to reach 
80% or more of total income.  
 
Figure 1.4: Income composition of people aged 75+ (% of total income) in 2003 
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Note: Countries arranged in order of the importance of old age benefits for the 75+. 
* Old age benefits includes all social protection transfers intended to protect against the risks of old 
age – including state and occupational pensions, survivors benefits and in kind benefits. Other benefits 
include social assistance, housing benefits and disability benefits.  
Source: Zaidi et al (2006). 
 
 Moreover as shown in Table 1.3, dependence on benefits is relatively high in all 
countries for those on low incomes, even before the age of 65. Reliance on pensions differs to 
a larger extent, reflecting early retirement policies. But even in countries like the UK and 
Denmark, which do not allow citizens to draw their state pension early, most of the income of 
the bottom income quintile of the population aged 55-64 comes from the state. The main 
cross-national difference in the importance of pension transfers lies in the middle-to-high 
income group. Countries with flat-rate pension systems, such as the UK and Ireland, provide 
considerably less income to the top quintile.  Countries with a social democratic welfare 
system, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, do not show this marked difference. This 
changes when one looks at older ages, and dependence on old-age benefits appears to spread 
more equally across income groups. 
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Table 1.3: Sources of income of elderly people by income group (% of total) - 2003 
 
55-64 
 Bottom 20% Middle 60% Top 20% 
 Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Ireland 28 0 14 58 76 2 14 8 86 4 9 1 
Finland 31 2 14 52 59 2 10 28 70 17 6 8 
Netherlands 29 4 17 51 54 2 20 24 66 6 19 9 
UK 34 8 21 37 61 5 22 11 74 9 14 3 
Portugal 43 3 29 25 59 3 26 12 50 9 38 3 
Spain  25 8 31 36 60 4 19 17 73 5 15 7 
Greece  56 3 35 7 61 4 31 3 66 8 25 1 
Italy 51 3 35 10 43 3 50 4 59 5 32 3 
Luxembourg 14 3 35 48 37 5 38 20 72 8 15 5 
Sweden 28 3 39 30 57 2 27 15 72 8 15 5 
Germany  23 4 40 34 52 3 32 13 66 10 17 6 
France  34 6 40 20 45 5 41 8 68 5 20 6 
Denmark  17 4 41 38 67 2 15 16 90 3 3 3 
Belgium 11 4 44 41 49 5 36 10 68 14 15 4 
Austria 15 2 44 38 34 2 50 14 63 3 31 3 
 
65-74 
 Bottom 20% Middle 60% Top 20% 
 Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Denmark  2 7 79 12 12 8 74 6 32 12 54 2 
Greece  10 3 82 4 9 5 84 2 13 12 75 0 
Sweden 1 2 83 14 4 3 91 2 16 7 76 1 
Portugal 5 1 85 9 17 2 77 4 23 7 70 1 
UK 2 4 85 9 8 8 76 8 23 17 59 1 
Ireland 5 2 86 8 20 4 72 4 48 11 41 0 
Austria 0 3 86 11 1 2 92 5 7 5 84 4 
Finland 3 1 86 10 9 4 79 8 26 7 62 5 
Spain  3 2 88 6 6 4 87 3 21 10 66 3 
France  1 5 89 4 3 6 90 2 4 8 86 1 
Italy 2 1 89 8 5 2 89 5 25 7 65 3 
Germany  1 3 91 4 4 4 90 1 12 10 77 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 91 7 2 6 88 4 9 19 69 3 
Netherlands 1 1 91 7 1 3 92 4 4 6 88 1 
Belgium  1 3 92 4 4 7 87 1 21 24 54 0 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the importance of old age benefits for the bottom 20%. 
* Old age benefits includes all social protection transfers intended to protect against the risks of old 
age – including state and occupational pensions, survivors benefits and in kind benefits. Other benefits 
include social assistance, housing benefits and disability benefits.  
Source: Zaidi et al (2006). 
 
Conclusion 
Existing evidence suggests pensions are the main source of income for people aged over 65. 
There are some differences as to the relative importance of the state, but this is limited to 
middle-to-high income groups. In the entire EU, low income individuals depend crucially on 
the state for support.  Having verified the importance of state pensions in determining incomes 
of elderly people, we can now pass on to assess to what extent this income currently enables 
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elderly people to maintain living standards relative to their working age counterparts, and also 
not to be at-risk-of-poverty.     
 
1.22 The income of elderly people relative to that of the working age population 
Once harmonised data were available, cross-national comparisons of the income of elderly 
people mushroomed. Hedstrom & Ringen (1985) was one of the first papers to use the LIS 
database for this purpose, and studied whether there was evidence of Rowntree‘s ‗cycle of 
poverty‘25 in a cross-national environment, and the role played by income transfer policies in 
reducing transitions into poverty at particular stages of life. The authors observed that ―among 
the elderly, Germany, Norway and Sweden make up one category with relatively high levels 
of transfer incomes; Canada, Israel and the US an opposite category; and Britain a category of 
its own in between‖. Despite transfers that reduce the drop in income substantially, the study 
found evidence of a Rowntree-type cycle in all countries, as shown in Table 1.4.
26
 
 
Table 1.4: Disposable family income in relation to the national mean (by age)* 
 >24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Canada 0.62 0.99 1.22 1.30 1.06 0.71 0.54 
Germany 0.62 0.94 1.25 1.60 0.97 0.63 0.53 
Israel 0.81 1.09 1.25 1.21 0.97 0.63 0.60 
Norway 0.68 1.09 1.33 1.27 1.09 0.74 0.51 
Sweden 0.63 1.13 1.34 1.25 1.08 0.82 0.61 
UK 0.86 1.13 1.31 1.37 1.00 0.55 0.44 
US 0.60 0.99 1.25 1.31 1.09 0.75 0.57 
* Data are for 1979, except for Sweden and Canada (1981). 
Source: Hedstrom & Ringen (1985). 
 
 Casey & Yamada (2001), similarly, find that income falls with age, and estimate that 
the incomes of people over retirement age in most countries at between 70 and 80% of those 
of working age people. Interestingly the authors found that ―regardless of the public-private 
mix of pensions and the importance or otherwise of work, the income of retirement-age 
people, relative to that of working-age people, is rather similar‖ across the nine countries they 
surveyed. However the consumption level of older singles, mainly women, was found to be 
relatively much smaller than that among elderly couples.  
 Disney & Whitehouse (2002) provides a good review of the international comparative 
work done in the 1990s in this field.  Noting that ―the simplest measure of the relative 
                                               
25
 In his classical study of poverty in York, Rowntree (1901) had observed that the standard of living of 
families fluctuated over the life course, with childrearing and old age resulting in sharp poverty. 
26
 Achdut & Tamir (1985) has similar results.  
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economic well-being of older people is to compare their average incomes with those of the 
population as a whole‖, the authors note that in 1994/95 ―averaging across the 15 countries, 
older people‘s equivalent incomes are 83 per cent of those of the population as a whole‖. 
 
Figure 1.5: Pensioners‟ disposable income as a % of population average disposable income* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Data are from 1994 and 1995, except for Italy (1993); income is adjusted for household size by 
dividing by the square root of the number of household members. 
Source: Disney & Whitehouse (2002). 
 
 Despite the advances made after the introduction of LIS, comparisons were still 
hampered by data availability and time lags.   These problems decreased with the advent of 
EU-SILC, which provides timely and harmonised EU income data. Table 1.5 presents EU-
SILC 2005-07 data by gender on the median equivalised income
27
 of elderly people compared 
to that of the working age population.  Across the EU25, elderly people have a median income 
equal to 86% that of the working age population.  There is considerable variation amongst 
countries, with those in Eastern Europe reporting high levels of relative incomes. In Poland 
those aged 65+ enjoy a higher median income than those of working age, while in Cyprus, 
median incomes drop to less than 60%. The income situation of those aged 75+ is worse than 
that of those aged 65+, but still the EU25 average is relatively high, at 82%.           
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27
 Median equivalised income is mean total household disposable income divided by its equivalent size 
according to the OECD modified scale. See European Commission (2006).   
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Table 1.5: Relative income ratios of elderly people by gender - median equivalised incomes* 
of 65+ and 75+ by gender as % of that of the working age population by gender (2005-2007) 
 65+ 75+ 
 Male Female All Male Female All 
EU25 89 83 86 85 80 82 
Cyprus 62 57 56 52 50 49 
Ireland 67 66 65 63 62 62 
Estonia 71 66 68 66 61 64 
Latvia 77 75 68 75 75 67 
Denmark 73 71 69 67 68 66 
UK 70 68 69 66 65 65 
Belgium 72 73 72 68 70 68 
Finland 79 70 72 75 65 67 
Lithuania 79 67 73 76 63 68 
Spain 75 74 73 70 71 69 
Portugal 81 75 77 69 70 69 
Sweden 84 73 77 77 66 69 
Malta 79 80 78 78 80 78 
Czech Rep 80 78 80 76 75 77 
Greece 85 79 81 76 73 75 
Slovakia 86 79 82 80 74 77 
Italy 87 82 83 83 80 81 
Netherlands 88 85 83 83 84 81 
Slovenia 92 79 84 91 75 80 
France 92 88 87 89 86 85 
Germany 89 87 88 89 85 87 
Austria 97 89 90 92 85 87 
Luxembourg 88 87 94 87 88 95 
Hungary 99 88 95 99 86 94 
Poland 110 95 103 114 95 104 
Note: Countries arranged according to the size of their relative income ratio for the 65+. Countries with an 
above EU average gap are in italics.  
*Equivalised median income is “the households‟ total disposable income divided by its „equivalent size‟, to take 
into account of the size and composition of the household, and is attributed to each household member (including 
children)”, using the OECD modified scale.    
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
  
 Relative income ratios by gender vary considerably. The new Member States have the 
largest gap, mostly reflecting the unequal pension outcomes in Poland.
28
 The gender gap 
decreases for the 75+, possibly on account of greater access to pensions at these ages – as 
women start benefiting from survivors benefits. 
 The relative income ratios utilised above are computed on a national basis. Thus, a 
higher relative income ratio in a country does not necessarily mean that an elderly person in 
that country is better off in absolute terms than one in a country with a lower relative ratio.  
Figure 1.6 compares the median income of elderly people in a country to the median income 
of working age people across the EU25. In some countries elderly people are better off than 
the average European working age individual – in Luxembourg, on average, elderly people are 
                                               
28
 Despite this, elderly women in Poland still have the highest relative income ratio in the EU. 
36 
 
                    
nearly twice as well off.  Even in countries with low relative income ratios, the elderly are 
relatively ‗rich‘ in an absolute sense. Thus though in the UK the elderly have a median income 
just 69% of their working age counterparts, they still earn as much as the average European 
working age individual.  By contrast, while Polish elderly people earn more than working age 
Poles, they have an income that is less than a quarter of that of the average European worker.  
Note that this difference in absolute terms does not exactly mirror that found in the median 
incomes for the working age population.  For example, while working age people in Ireland 
have a higher income in purchasing power terms than those in Germany, Irish people aged 65+ 
only have an income three-quarters that of their German counterparts. A similar drop occurs in 
Cyprus, Denmark and the UK. By contrast, elderly people in Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria 
and Poland are relatively better off than their working age counterparts.        
 
Figure 1.6: Median disposable income (in purchasing power parity) of the 65+ in each 
country as % of the median disposable income of the 16-64 population in the EU25 (2005-07) 
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Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 Pension generosity plays a significantly different role in consumption smoothing 
across Europe. Figure 1.7 presents data on one of the pension OMC indicators - the aggregate 
replacement ratio, which compares the median pension income of retirees aged 65-74 to the 
median earnings of employed people aged 50-59. This is a pseudo-replacement rate as the 
pensions earned by the individuals currently aged 65-74 were not determined by the wages 
earned by those aged 50-59, and there may be cohort effects.  Moreover many low earners 
leave the labour force quite early and this may bias upwards the income of the 50-59 
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category.
29
  However this indicator still provides some useful information on the importance 
of pensions in determining income of the elderly. In some countries, such as Cyprus, Denmark 
and Ireland, median pensions appear to be significantly lower than the earnings of older 
workers, while in six countries they stand at close to 60% or over.   
 
Figure 1.7: Aggregate replacement ratio (2005-2007)*  
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*Median individual pension income of retirees aged 65-74 in relation to median earnings of 
employed people aged 50-59 excluding other social benefits. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
       
Conclusion  
Prior to the advent of EU-SILC, comparisons of the relative income of elderly people tended 
to be incomplete and lacked updated data.  EU-SILC allows a more comprehensive analysis. 
This reveals that in most countries across the EU, the income of elderly people is lower than 
that of their working-age counterparts; as pensions increasingly replace only part of former 
income.  In many countries the drop seems to be more felt by women.  The analysis also 
suggests that while the drop in Eastern European countries may appear smaller in relative 
terms, in absolute terms elderly people in this part of Europe have access to very limited 
monetary resources compared to their Western European counterparts.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
29
 The employment rate above age 50 is less than two-thirds that for younger ages.  
38 
 
                    
1.23 The risk-of-poverty among elderly people 
Average income measures do not give us much information on the presence of poverty in a 
country. There are two approaches to define poverty: an absolute standard (a sort of 
subsistence income); and a relative standard (defined in comparison with societal living 
standards).
30 The most common measure in international studies is the proportion of the 
population with incomes below some ratio of average income.
31
  
 
Table 1.6: Poverty rates in OECD countries in 2000 
 65-75 76+ All ages 
New Zealand 0.4 0.5 10.4 
Czech Rep 1.3 3.5 4.3 
Netherlands 1.5 1.8 6.0 
Denmark 3.8 9.0 4.3 
Luxembourg 3.8 9.0 5.5 
Canada 4.0 5.0 10.3 
Poland 4.0 5.0 9.8 
Sweden 4.6 11.5 5.3 
Hungary 5.5 4.8 8.1 
Norway 5.5 19.9 6.3 
Finland 7.0 16.1 6.4 
Austria 7.6 11.6 9.3 
Germany 9.7 10.7 8.9 
France 9.9 11.3 7.0 
Switzerland 10.4 12.7 6.7 
Belgium 10.7 18.6 7.8 
UK 11.4 19.2 11.4 
OECD 11.4 16.5 10.4 
Italy 14.6 16.4 12.9 
Spain 14.8 9.3 11.5 
Turkey 16.7 15.3 15.9 
Japan 19.5 23.8 15.3 
US 20.3 29.6 17.1 
Australia 20.6 28.8 11.2 
Greece 22.2 28.0 13.5 
Mexico 24.1 36.6 20.3 
Portugal 25.4 35.4 13.7 
Ireland 31.1 42.6 15.4 
Note: Countries ordered according to the size of the poverty rate of their 65+ population. 
* Proportion of the people in that age group with an income less than 50% of the median equivalised 
disposable income of all individuals, where household disposable income is equivalised using the square root 
of household size. 
Source: Forster & Mira d‘Ercole (2005). 
                                               
30
 See Ravallion (1992), which presents the findings of the World Bank‘s Living Standards Measurement 
Study, or Rio Group (2006), a more recent UN effort to document best practice in poverty measurement. For 
a discussion more focused on developed countries, see Forster (1994) or Atkinson (1991), and for a more 
technical discussion of poverty measurement see Atkinson (1987).    
31
  Though some studies (e.g. Johnson (1998)) define poor older people as those in the bottom fifth of the 
overall income distribution.    
39 
 
                    
 Forster & Mira d‘Ercole (2005), focusing on income distribution and poverty in 27 
OECD countries during the second half of the 1990s,
32
 indicate a wide variation in poverty 
rates among elderly people, ranging from 0.4% in New Zealand to 31.1% in Ireland, and 
higher poverty rates for people aged 76+ (see Table 1.6). Poverty among elderly people has 
dropped significantly over recent decades. Whitehouse (2000) reports that between the mid 
1970s and the early 1990s, pensioners‘ incomes grew significantly faster than those of the 
population as a whole in the 44 countries he surveys, resulting in a marked decline in elderly 
poverty.  Forster & Mira d‘Ercole (2005), however, suggest that this improvement has stalled, 
and conclude that ―declines in the relative income of people aged 66 to 75 over the second half 
of the 1990s occurred in about half of the countries reviewed‖.     
 The main issue with these studies is the extent to which data are adequately 
harmonised.  EU-SILC has addressed most of these concerns and provides much better and 
timelier data. Table 1.7 presents 2005-2007 EU-SILC data on the percentage of the population 
living on incomes below 60% of the national median level. While the median income of the 
65+ population in the EU25 stands at nearly 90% that of the total population, nearly a fifth live 
on less than three-fifths median income.  More than half Cypriot elderly people are at-risk-of-
poverty, while around a third of those in Ireland, Latvia and Spain are in the same position.  
By contrast, poverty rates are very small in many Eastern European states, where the elderly 
appear to be less at-risk-of-poverty than those of working age. This is not the case in the old 
Member States, where the proportion of elderly in poverty is more than a third higher than that 
among working-age people.  The transition to old age appears to be quite critical in Cyprus, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and the UK, as poverty rates for the elderly are substantially higher than 
those observed among working-age individuals. The shock is more pronounced for women, 
with the gap in poverty rates increasing even in Scandinavian countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32
 This study uses data sent by Member States for an OECD questionnaire. Ritakallio (2001), by contrast, 
uses LIS to evaluate similar issues. 
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Table 1.7: Poverty rates in 2005-2007 (% with less than 60% of median equivalised 
disposable income) 
 65+ 16-64 
 Total M F Total M F 
EU25 19 16 21 15 14 15 
Czech Rep 5 2 8 9 8 10 
Hungary 7 5 9 13 14 13 
Netherlands 7 7 8 9 9 10 
Luxembourg 8 8 8 13 12 14 
Poland 8 6 9 19 20 19 
Slovakia 8 3 11 11 11 11 
Sweden 11 7 14 11 11 10 
Germany 15 12 17 13 13 14 
Austria 15 10 18 11 10 12 
France 15 14 17 12 12 13 
Denmark 18 16 19 11 11 11 
Slovenia 20 11 25 10 10 10 
Malta 20 22 19 12 10 13 
Finland 21 15 24 11 12 11 
Belgium 22 21 24 13 12 13 
Italy 22 18 25 18 16 19 
Lithuania 23 10 29 18 18 18 
Greece 26 23 27 18 18 19 
Estonia 26 15 32 16 16 17 
Portugal 27 26 27 16 15 17 
Latvia 28 17 34 19 19 20 
UK 28 25 30 16 15 16 
Spain 29 27 32 16 16 17 
Ireland 30 26 33 16 15 17 
Cyprus 51 48 54 11 9 13 
Note: Countries ordered according to the size of the poverty rate of their 65+ population. Countries 
with a poverty rate higher than the EU25 average are in italics.  
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 As can be expected, there have been various definitions of poverty in the many 
academic studies which have been conducted in this field.  Results of measures of income 
distribution and poverty risk are also quite sensitive to the choice of unit: typically, the smaller 
the unit of measurement, the higher poverty and inequality tend to observed.
33
 Most studies 
are based on household incomes, but there are exceptions such as Disney & Johnson (2001) 
which is based on ‗family‘ or ‗income‘ units, consisting of a single person or couple and any 
dependent children. Goodman, Johnson & Webb (1997), for example, report that using the 
                                               
33
 A related issue is the choice of equivalence scales. See De Vos & Zaidi (1997) for a discussion applied to 
the measurement of poverty in EU countries. 
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family unit in the UK would increase the proportion of the population with incomes below half 
the average by a third compared with household-based measures.  Living arrangements make a 
substantial difference in income distribution incomes. Casey & Yamada (2001) shows for 
instance, if the elderly in Sweden had the same living arrangements as in Japan, their gross 
income would have been boosted by a sixth, while those in the UK would see an increase of 
more than 50%. 
 Most international studies conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s defined the poverty 
threshold as an income below half of the population average income. Disney & Whitehouse 
(2002) review a number of comparative studies on pensioner poverty and find that despite 
having different definitions and poverty thresholds, results were very correlated though there 
is significant variation (particularly for the UK). Hauser (1997) also indicates that different 
poverty thresholds do not lead to significant re-rankings of countries.
34
 
 The poverty threshold of 60% median earnings has been adopted by the EU, but until 
quite recently the 50% threshold was more common. Looking at poverty rates computed using 
different thresholds gives a sense of the ‗depth‘ of poverty. EU-SILC data (see Figure 1.8) 
show that by applying a 70% threshold, the poverty rate would rise from 20% to 31% in the 
EU15 and from 10% to 19% in the NMS10. Conversely applying a 50% threshold halves the 
risk-of-poverty in both groups of Member States.  For most countries changing the poverty 
threshold makes little difference in their relative position. However there are some exceptions. 
For instance with a 50% poverty threshold, Ireland would have a poverty rate lower than the 
EU25 level, whereas with the current threshold, it is one of the countries with the highest rates. 
Conversely with a 70% threshold Denmark would have a poverty rate much higher than the 
EU average, instead of its current average position. With a 50% threshold, poverty in 
Scandinavian countries would fall to the very low levels observed in Eastern Europe.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
34
 Conversely Ravallion (2003) argues that differences in concepts and definitions (together with data sources 
and measurement assumption) are very important and often create sharply conflicting claims. 
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Figure 1.8: Poverty rates for 65+ computed at different income thresholds (2005-07) 
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Note: Countries ordered according to poverty rate of 65+ population computed using the 60% 
threshold.  
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 
 Another way of assessing the effectiveness of pension transfers involves comparing the 
poverty risk data before and after the transfer of pensions, as shown in Figure 1.9.  If one 
adopts the 60% poverty threshold, pensions account for a drop of 67 percentage points in the 
risk-of-poverty for the total 65+ population.  The effect is significantly stronger for men, 69% 
compared to 61% for women. The drop is much less pronounced in several countries, like 
Cyprus, Ireland, Denmark, Spain and Greece. It is also quite weak when looking at women in 
Portugal, Latvia and the UK. Women in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal appear to be the ones 
benefiting from the lowest pensions in Europe – they lift just a third of them out of poverty. 
By contrast, pensions in the Netherlands seem to be achieving greater results, lifting 85% of 
the 65+ population above the 60% poverty threshold.      
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Figure 1.9: Impact of pensions on the risk-of-poverty of elderly people* (2005-2007) 
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* Difference in percentage points between the poverty rate (at the 60% threshold) before and after 
pension transfers. 
Note: Countries ordered according to the size of the drop in the poverty rate.  
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 Looking at the impact of pensions at different poverty thresholds provides further 
interesting insights on how many people live close to the 60% poverty threshold. For instance, 
with a poverty threshold of 50% of median income, pensions would lift 77% of the elderly out 
of poverty in Denmark, more than the EU25 average; whereas with the 60% threshold 
pensions in Denmark under-perform significantly compared to the rest of Europe. A similar, 
though less pronounced, effect is observed in the UK, Cyprus and Ireland, suggesting that the 
relative effectiveness of flat rate pension schemes changes significantly with the poverty 
threshold that is selected. Conversely in France, the relative poverty reduction strength of 
pensions does not vary in this way. The data also show that the ‗depth‘ of poverty among 
Portuguese and Cypriot women is such that changing poverty thresholds does relatively little 
to increase the effectiveness of pension transfers.    
 When looking at international comparisons of poverty rates, one needs to keep in mind 
that while the poverty threshold of a low-income and a high-income country will be defined as 
a given percentage of median earnings, the latter‘s level will differ considerably. In absolute 
terms, the poor in a high-income country may be significantly richer than those in the low-
income country.  Figure 1.10 reproduces the at-risk-of-poverty thresholds (adjusted for 
purchasing power differences) used by Eurostat to compute national poverty rates.  This 
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indicates that even after taking into account differences in living costs, poverty thresholds vary 
considerably. A single person living in Luxembourg earning slightly less than 5 times the 
median income of the average Latvian would be considered poor in Luxembourgian terms, 
while a single person living in Latvia earning slightly more than one fifth the average income 
of a person in Luxembourg would not be considered at-risk-of-poverty in Latvian terms.           
     
Figure 1.10: Risk-of-poverty thresholds for a one-person household (60% median equivalised 
income) in Euro PPS* (2005-2007) 
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* Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is a common artificial currency, which modifies the exchange 
rate to take into account price level differences.  
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 Kangas & Ritakallio (2004) recalculate poverty rates using a common European 
poverty line – essentially treating the whole of the EU as a single polity. While this approach 
may seem inappropriate, one needs to consider that ―within-nation differences are sometimes 
more pronounced than differences between nations‖ such that the national mean is not that 
representative.  The use of a common EU poverty line increases the number of poor people 
from 54 to 63 million. As Table 1.8 shows, the poverty rate rises substantially in 
Mediterranean countries when one uses this poverty line. This reflects the lower relative 
median income of this part of the EU. Extending this analysis to include other poor EU 
countries such as Greece, Portugal and the new Member States would further change the 
ranking of poverty by country.      
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Table 1.8: Alternative poverty risk rates (% below 60% of median equivalised income)* 
 National poverty line European poverty line 
Overall 15.5 18.2 
Sweden  7.1 5.1 
Finland  7.9 4.5 
Luxembourg  10.2 0.7 
Belgium  11.0 7.5 
Netherlands  11.3 9.9 
Denmark  11.7 6.8 
Germany  13.1 9.4 
France  14.9 11.3 
Austria  16.2 14.2 
Spain  16.2 43.7 
Ireland  17.6 32.2 
Italy  18.3 27.3 
UK  20.0 19.0 
* Poverty threshold set at either 60% of national median equivalised income or at 60% of the 
European median equivalised income.  
Source: Kangas & Ritakallio (2004). 
 
 Casey & Yamada (2001) provide further absolute comparisons of wellbeing.
35
 These 
data, for the mid-1990s, interestingly indicate that countries with similar GDP per capita can 
have very different levels of absolute poverty. For instance, though GDP per capita and the 
mean disposable income of the retired population of Sweden and the UK are similar, the 
proportion of retired having less than a certain amount of income differs greatly.     
 
Table 1.9: Absolute comparisons of wellbeing in purchasing power parities (mid-1990s)*  
 Mean 
disposable 
income of 
retired 
population 
($000s) 
GDP per 
capita 
($000s) 
Mean 
disposable 
income of 
bottom 
quintile 
($000s) 
50% of 
median 
disposable 
income of 
working 
age($000s) 
% of 
retired 
with less 
than 
7,000$ 
income 
% of 
retired 
with less 
than 
10,000$ 
income 
Canada 17 21 8 10 1 11 
Finland 12 19 7 7 7 41 
Germany 14 20 7 7 8 27 
Italy 13 20 5 6 20 45 
Japan 18 23 7 9 14 26 
Netherlands 12 19 5 7 9 51 
Sweden 12 19 7 7 4 28 
UK 12 19 6 8 17 53 
US 18 26 6 10 12 27 
* Purchasing power parities adjust for differences in price levels between countries. 
Source: Casey & Yamada (2001). 
 
                                               
35
 Another example is Blackburn (1998). 
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 All the above discussion dealt with income-based poverty measures. Sierminska et al 
(2007) extend the cross-national comparative literature by looking at asset and wealth-based 
poverty measures using the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS).
36
 They choose ―a poverty 
definition of households with financial assets below one quarter of adjusted median household 
incomes (or one-half of the poverty line) for the whole population‖.  Hence households who 
cannot live above a poverty line of 50% median income for six months by running down their 
financial assets are deemed asset poor. Looking at seven countries (see Figure 1.11), they note 
that that asset poverty ―is lowest in Sweden, followed by the United States, and is 40 percent 
or more in all other nations‖.  If one combines both income and asset poverty measures, the 
US has the highest fraction of at risk older people, at about 15% compared to below 10% in 
the other nations. 
 
Figure 1.11: Income and asset poverty 
 
Conclusion 
This section looked at evidence on the risk-of-poverty among the population aged 65 and over.  
EU-SILC data confirm that in most countries, this transition results in an enhanced poverty 
risk. There are, however, significant differences among countries. Applying different poverty 
thresholds changes a bit the picture, but not that dramatically in most cases. The only major 
                                               
36
 This is similar to the LIS but focuses on the measurement of wealth and assets.  Another growing area of 
research involves the development of non-monetary poverty indicators based on the presence of material 
deprivation. See Boarini & Mira d‘Ercole (2006) for an extensive discussion.  
Figure 4: Income and Asset poverty 
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Source: Sierminska et al (2007)  
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differences occur when one applies European-wide poverty thresholds, which result in the 
Eastern European countries losing their lead.  However, the most important finding of this 
section is that pensions are a major determinant of the risk-of-poverty among the elderly, and 
that there are rather pronounced differences in their effectiveness across European countries.    
 
1.3 Conclusion 
This Chapter reviewed the role of pensions and their effective importance in sustaining the 
income of elderly people. It showed that while there are significant differences as to the size 
and design of pension systems, pensions tend to be by far the single most important 
government outlay. Pensions are mostly provided on a collective rather than individual basis.  
This reflects market failures (such as adverse selection, moral hazard, myopia and imperfect 
capital markets) but also recognition of the economies of scale which favour collective 
organisation of pension provision.  
 The review of existing literature on the income of elderly people revealed that while 
income falls with age, the drop following retirement is not dramatic despite significant state-
private differences in retirement provision across Europe.  This was confirmed looking at EU-
SILC data, which improve on previous sources by being more harmonised and timely. State 
pensions are particularly important for those on lower incomes, women and the very old. The 
data, however, indicate that there are noticeable differences in the poverty alleviation and 
income replacement effects of different state pension schemes. International comparisons 
reveal that while ―different schemes for income maintenance in old age produce very different 
anti-poverty results‖,37 having similar pension systems does not necessarily lead to similar 
income distribution or poverty. For instance, Frericks et al (2006) shows how two similar state 
systems in Denmark and the Netherlands, both providing ―work-independent universal 
pension entitlements based on duration of residence‖ end up producing different poverty risks.  
 Thus, while comparisons of data on pension spending and on the income of elderly 
people suggest substantial differences among countries, a more holistic approach needs to be 
adopted to understand better the impact of different pension systems.  In this light, the next 
Chapter will seek to integrate the data reviewed here to reflect the interaction of inputs and 
outputs of pension systems. The conclusions from this analysis will then be used to reveal 
similarities between different groups of countries and facilitate cross-country comparisons of 
current and reformed pension systems.          
                                               
37
 See Smeeding (2001). 
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2. The different pension systems of EU Member States 
 
The previous Chapter explored the aims of state pension systems and presented evidence on 
the expenditure incurred on these programmes and on the income characteristics of elderly 
people in EU countries.  It showed that while state pension systems are very important in all 
countries, there are clear differences in how successful countries are in achieving the aims of 
pension systems.  However, this review suggested that it is relatively difficult to understand 
the real differences among pension systems.  Looking at the various indicators that are now 
available through EU-SILC, one is left unsure as to the interaction between the inputs and 
outputs of the various pension systems, and consequently on how to assess how reforms may 
change their performance.   
 The indicators presented in the previous Chapter should be seen as only the starting 
point of any assessment of the effectiveness of pension systems and as inputs to more 
comprehensive assessment methods. In this light, in this Chapter we will use these indicators 
to categorise countries in a new way that facilitates analysis and cross-country comparisons of 
pension systems and the impact of reforms.     
 
2.1 Taxonomies of pension systems   
There is a very extensive literature dealing with the categorisation of welfare systems. 
Possibly the most influential research is Esping-Andersen (1990), which identifies three types 
of welfare state regimes: the liberal welfare regime, the social-democratic welfare state and the 
corporatist welfare regime.  Esping-Andersen argues that these three regimes can be 
distinguished in two main aspects: decommodification (the extent to which individuals or 
family units can achieve reasonable living standards in the absence of labour market 
participation) and stratification (the way countries structure rights). Anglo-Saxon countries are 
seen as having very low levels of decommodification, particularly when compared with the 
social-democratic countries.  By contrast levels of decommodification are more similar 
between corporatist and social-democratic regimes, but there is a substantial difference in 
stratification as the latter is universalistic whereas the former aims at sustaining the existing 
hierarchy and status divisions. Esping-Andersen‘s work spurred a large debate in this area, 
leading to several other typologies of welfare states, as can be seen in Table 2.1.
38
  
                                               
38
 Esping-Andersen‘s work has also been criticised on several fronts, particularly due to the fact the data 
underlying this classification are not publicly available and based on a single year. Moreover some authors 
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Table 2.1: An overview of typologies of welfare states 
Liberal Corporatist Social-democratic Mediterranean Radical 
Esping Andersen (1990) 
Liberal 
Low level of 
decommod-
ification; 
market 
differentiation 
of welfare 
Corporatist 
Moderate levels 
of decommodif-
ication; social 
benefits depend 
on former 
contributions & 
status 
Social-democratic 
High levels of 
decommodification; 
universal benefits 
and high degree of 
benefit equality 
  
Leibfried (1992) 
Anglo-Saxon 
Right to income 
transfers; 
welfare state as 
compensator of 
last resort and 
tight enforcer to 
work 
Bismarck 
Right to social 
security; welfare 
state as 
compensator of 
first resort and 
employer of last 
resort  
Scandinavian 
Right to work for 
everyone; universal-
ism; welfare state as 
employer of first 
resort and 
compensator of last 
resort 
Latin Rim 
Right to work 
and welfare 
proclaimed; 
welfare state as 
a semi-
institutionalised 
promise 
 
Castles & Mitchell (1993) 
Liberal 
 
Low social 
spending and no 
adoption of 
equalising 
instruments in 
social policy 
Conservative 
 
High social 
expenditures, 
but little 
adoption of 
equalising 
instruments in 
social policy 
Non-right 
hegemony 
High social 
expenditures and 
use of highly 
equalising 
instruments in social 
policy 
 Radical 
 
Achievement 
of equality in 
pre-transfer 
income, but 
little social 
spending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
suggest a number of likely errors and very limited empirical support for the ‗three worlds‘ typology in the 
decommodification data. See for instance Scruggs & Allan (2006).  
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Table 2.1: An overview of typologies of welfare states (continued) 
Siaroff (1994) 
Protestant 
liberal 
 
Minimal family 
welfare, yet 
egalitarian 
gender lab-our 
market; family 
benefits paid to 
mother but 
inadequate 
Advanced 
Christian 
Democrat 
No strong 
incentives for 
women to work, 
but strong 
incentive to stay 
at home 
Protestant social-
democrat 
 
True work-welfare 
choice for women; 
family benefits paid 
to mother; 
importance of 
Protestantism 
Late female 
mobilisation 
 
Absence of 
Protestantism; 
family benefits 
paid to father; 
universal 
female suffrage 
relatively new  
 
Ferrera (1996) 
Anglo-Saxon 
Fairly high 
welfare state 
cover-age; social 
assistance with 
means test; 
mixed financing 
system; highly 
integrated 
organisational 
framework 
public 
administrated  
Bismarck 
Strong link 
between work 
position and 
social 
entitlements; 
benefits 
proportional to 
income; 
financed by 
contributions, 
high social 
assistance, 
schemes 
organised by 
unions and 
employers 
Scandinavian 
Social protection as 
a civil right; 
universal coverage; 
generous fixed 
benefits for various 
risks; tax financed; 
strong 
organisational 
integration 
Mediterranean 
Fragmented 
system of 
income 
guarantees 
linked to work; 
generous 
benefits with-
out minimum 
social 
protection net; 
health care a 
civil right; 
particularism in 
cash payments/ 
financing  
 
Bonoli (1997) 
British 
Low % of cost 
financed by 
contributions; 
low % of GDP 
spent 
Continental 
High % of cost 
financed  by 
contributions; 
high % of GDP 
spent 
Nordic 
Low % of cost 
financed by 
contributions; high 
% of GDP spent 
Southern 
High % of cost 
financed by 
contributions; 
low % of GDP 
spent 
 
Korpi & Palme (1998) 
Basic security 
Entitlements on 
citizenship, flat-
rate benefits 
Corporatist 
Entitlements on 
occupation/ 
labour  
participation 
earnings-related 
benefits 
Encompassing 
Entitlement on 
citizenship & 
contributions, flat-
rate & earnings-
related benefits 
 Targeted 
Eligibility on 
proven need; 
minimum 
benefits 
Source: Soede et al (2004).       
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 In most cases, this literature failed to address the categorisation of Eastern European 
welfare systems.  However, the accession of most East European countries to the EU has 
changed this.  A recent example is Menahem (2007), which presents a categorisation of 
European social protection systems, including the new EU Member States, based on the notion 
of decommodified security.  Countries were compared on the basis of the ratio between social 
protection expenditure and employment income, penalised by the extent of people below the 
poverty line. This led the author to define four groups of countries, shown in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Categorisation of European social protection systems  
Countries of the 
North 
Intermediate 
countries 
Countries of the 
South 
Central and 
Eastern European 
countries 
Sweden Austria Portugal Poland 
Netherlands France Italy Latvia 
Denmark Germany Greece Slovakia 
Finland Czech Republic Spain Estonia 
 Belgium  Lithuania 
 UK   
Source: Menahem (2007). 
 
 Soede et al (2004), on the other hand, look at data on 85 traits of the welfare 
arrangements of European countries to discern clusters of countries sharing a lot of regime 
traits. They find five clusters (see Table 2.3): the Nordic regime with a high degree of scope of 
social security and a moderate extent of pensions within that; the Mediterranean regime with 
less extensive social security dominated by pensions; the Anglo-Saxon regime with residual 
pension systems but less residual social security; the Continental regime where social security 
is less universalistic than the Nordic regime; and the Eastern European regime lying between 
the Anglo-Saxon and Continental regimes.  The Netherlands was deemed as being a hybrid 
arrangement, possibly converging towards the Scandinavian regime.    
 
Table 2.3: Categorisation of European social protection systems – Institutional approach 
Nordic  
regime 
Anglo-Saxon 
regime 
East Europe 
regime 
Continental 
regime 
Mediterranean 
regime 
Sweden UK Poland Austria Portugal 
Denmark Ireland Hungary France Italy 
Finland  Slovakia Germany Greece 
  Czech Rep Luxembourg Spain 
   Belgium  
Source: Soede et al (2004). 
 
52 
 
                    
 Focusing more exclusively on pensions, OECD (2005) describes how cross-country 
analysis has typically taken three forms: 
o An institutional approach – whereby the parameters of the schemes, their underlying 
legislation and administrative mechanisms are described or compared (e.g. the SSA‘s 
‗Social Security programmes throughout the world‘). 
o An income-distribution approach – whereby household survey data are used to assess 
the income of older people (as shown in Section 1.2). 
o A fiscal sustainability approach – whereby public pension expenditures are forecast 
(e.g. European Policy Committee (2006/09), Dang et al (2001)).        
In general, representations of pension systems have used the institutional approach. World 
Bank (1994) set out the concept of three pension pillars: a mandatory tax-financed public 
programme designed to alleviate poverty, a mandatory funded, privately managed programme 
(based on personal savings accounts or occupational plans) for savings, and a supplementary 
voluntary option (through personal savings accounts or occupational plans) for people who 
want more protection.  Categorisations of pension systems, subsequently, were according to 
the following dimensions: ownership/administration (public versus private), method of 
financing (funded versus unfunded), benefit determination structure (defined contribution 
[DC] versus defined benefit [DB]) and coverage (mandatory versus voluntary). 
  
Table 2.4: Taxonomy of pension plans by EU, World Bank, ILO 
 EU World Bank ILO 
1
st
 pillar Publicly managed 
pension scheme –
DB and PAYG (by 
payroll tax) 
A relatively small 
(means tested, 
minimum pension 
or flat benefit), 
public PAYG DB 
A minimum  
pension, universal 
but means tested, 
financed through 
general revenue 
2
nd
 pillar Privately managed 
pension –  
employment-related 
Private mandatory, 
fully funded, DC 
pension  
Mandatory public 
PAYG social 
insurance pension 
3
rd
 pillar Personal pension 
plan 
Voluntary personal 
pension plan 
Fully funded 
contribution scheme 
Source: Kawinski & Stanko (2007).  
 
 The EU also adopted the three-pillar conception of pension systems but focused solely 
on the ownership/administration dimension. Thus in EU-speak, the first pillar is composed of 
all public-run pension programmes, the second is all schemes related to employment and/or to 
professional occupations, and the third pillar is constituted by all personal retirement savings 
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arrangements.
39
  By contrast, Gillion et al (2000) indicate that the ILO focuses on the method 
of financing, viewing the first tier as being all mandatory Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
programmes, the second tier as all mandatory funded tiers (irrespective if occupational or 
personal) and a zero tier represented by means-tested, minimum pension and/or flat rate 
schemes financed out of general taxation.                
 Another common categorisation of European pension schemes is between Bismarkian 
and Beveridgean systems.
40
 This harks back to two different pension schemes, that introduced 
by Bismarck in Germany where pensions are related to employment and represent a deferred 
salary, and that advocated by Beveridge in the UK where pensions are meant to reduce 
poverty.  Ferrera (1993), modifies this categorisation by focusing on the issue of coverage and 
broadens this distinction into universal and occupational models; the first (similar to 
Beveridgean) shares social risks among all citizens while in the second (similar to Bismarkian) 
risks are shared among the different occupational categories.  Natali & Rhodes (2003), on the 
other hand, visualise four pension system clusters: pure occupational systems (Austria, 
Germany), occupational plus means-tested systems (France, Italy, Spain), universal plus 
means-tested systems (Netherlands, UK) and pure universal systems (Sweden).            
 
Table 2.5: Classification of EU welfare states according to Ferrera (1993) 
Occupational welfare state Universalist welfare state 
Pure Pure 
France Finland 
Belgium Denmark 
Germany Norway 
Austria Sweden 
  
Mixed Mixed 
Italy UK 
Netherlands  
Ireland  
  
 The OECD instead adopts a taxonomy ―based on the role and objective of each part of 
the pension system‖, reproduced in Table 2.6.41 This leads to two main divisions, or ‗tiers‘: a 
redistributive (or poverty-prevention) part and an insurance (or income replacement) part.  The 
other ‗tier‘ is voluntary provision.  Within these tiers, schemes are also categorised according 
to their provider (public versus private) and the way benefits are accrued (DB, DC, notional 
defined contribution (NDC) and points systems).  Schemes within the public first tier are also 
                                               
39
 See Natali (2004). 
40
 Bonoli (1997). 
41
 The same typology is adopted in Whitehouse (2007).  The OECD has developed a similar taxonomy for 
private pensions. See Yermo (2002). 
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classified according to their entitlement rules, namely whether they are resource-tested, 
minimum pensions or basic pensions.  
 
Table 2.6: OECD taxonomy of pension systems in the EU 
 First tier Second tier 
Universal coverage, redistributive Mandatory, insurance 
Public Public Private 
Resource-
tested 
Basic Minimum Type 
Austria X   DB  
Belgium X  X DB  
Czech Rep X X X DB  
Denmark X  X   DC 
Finland   X DB  
France X  X DB + Points   
Germany X   Points   
Greece X  X DB  
Hungary    DB DC 
Ireland X X    
Italy X   NDC  
Luxembourg X X X DB  
Netherlands  X    DB 
Poland   X NDC DC 
Portugal   X DB  
Slovakia   X  Points  DC 
Spain   X DB  
Sweden   X NDC DB+DC  
UK X X X DB  
Source: OECD (2007). 
 
 Some authors have focused pension taxonomies specifically on design features, 
mirroring the institutional tradition of cross-country comparisons. Borsch-Supan (2003), thus, 
distinguishes pension systems by four dimensions: credits for contributions, accrual of interest, 
conversion to benefit, and funding.  Lindbeck (2000), by contrast, separates systems into those 
with exogenous and endogenous contribution rates. Table 2.7 presents a taxonomy of EU state 
pension systems, focusing on benefit determination features.
42
 This confirms the impression 
that the most common model is state-run earnings-related DB. 17 EU countries have this 
scheme, together with another 2 who run a (very similar) points-based DB system and the 
Netherlands where there is quasi-mandatory DB occupational pensions.  However, there has 
been a general shift away from this provision model over the years, with it being replaced in 
East Europe by personal account-based DC provision and in Western Europe by NDC or flat-
rate provision.  On an institutional approach, one would therefore divide Europe into three 
                                               
42
 Details on these features were taken from European Commission (2007). 
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blocks of systems: DB, NDC and DC personal accounts, whereas up to the early 1990s there 
was virtually only DB.     
 
Table 2.7: Benefit-determination taxonomy of state pension systems in the EU 
 Contribution-
based, 
Flat-rate 
Residence-
based, 
Flat-rate 
NDC DB Points DC 
personal 
accounts 
Austria    X   
Belgium    X   
Greece    X   
Spain    X   
Portugal    X   
Slovenia    X   
Malta    X   
France    X X  
Germany     X  
Romania     X  
Luxembourg X   X   
UK X   X   
Czech Rep X   X   
Cyprus X   X   
Lithuania X   X  X 
Bulgaria    X  X 
Hungary    X  X 
Ireland X      
Finland  X  X   
Netherlands  X  X   
Estonia  X  X  X 
Denmark  X    X 
Sweden  X X   X 
Poland   X   X 
Latvia   X   X 
Italy   X    
Note: Many countries are in some form of transition due to reforms, or to partial maturation of 
schemes. For classification purposes only rules as apply to new labour market entrants were 
considered. Only mandatory/quasi-mandatory provision was taken into account. 
Source: Own analysis using information in European Commission (2007). 
 
2.2 An alternative approach of categorising pension systems            
The previous section showed how existing pension categorisations focus on system design 
features. However, this approach, while quite useful, has a number of shortcomings.  Most 
pension systems have been reformed extensively and the process seems to be accelerating 
across Europe,
43
 making it hard to classify countries. For instance, both Sweden and Italy have 
reformed their systems for new workers from PAYG-DB to NDC, but existing pensions are 
still determined by the previous rules. Similarly there are hardly any personal account pension 
                                               
43
 Chapter 3 will discuss in more detail these changes. 
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recipients in Eastern Europe. Moreover pension systems in many countries are still not mature 
and different cohorts of pensioners are benefiting from different schemes. Thus, most 
pensioners in Cyprus and Malta are still getting the bulk of their income from flat-rate 
schemes, while dependence on earnings-related state pensions in the UK varies significantly.      
 Secondly, the reforms, themselves, suggest that what really matters when looking at 
systems is whether they are achieving their aims in an acceptable way for society.  While there 
might be some bureaucratic tendency to maintain systems unchanged, most governments 
would change their pension systems if these are seen as not fulfilling their objectives, or when 
they are seen as consuming too many resources. Thus a more long-serving categorisation of 
pension systems, rather than looking at design features, needs to concentrate on the aims of 
pension systems and the costs incurred. This would integrate the income-distribution and fiscal 
sustainability approaches to cross-country pension system analysis mentioned earlier.                 
 In this light, one can attempt to categorise pension systems according to their outcomes 
compared to the EU25 average. Three dimensions seem particularly appropriate – spending 
outlays (the financial constraint), the relative income of the 65+ compared to the working age 
population (the income replacement aim), and the poverty rate among the 65+ (the poverty 
alleviation aim). These represent three dimensions against which pension systems are usually 
assessed and which usually lead to reform pressures. In contrast to institutional features, these 
dimensions do not tend to change that much. It is hard to have a country that passes from 
being a very high spender to a very low spender in a short time. Similarly for the other two 
dimensions, it is difficult to have countries where the situation changes dramatically from one 
year to the next. Even if reforms are taking place, these will take a lot of time to have a 
distinctive impact on these three dimensions. Thus, this categorisation would be less arbitrary 
and more long-serving than the institutional approaches described previously.    
 This approach also has the benefit of being multi-dimensional, providing more 
comprehensive information on the different systems.  Being based on quantitative data 
comparisons, this approach makes it easier to understand the extent of differences among 
countries, particularly those with the same institutional features.  Thus, despite both having a 
DB system, the UK would be a low spender on pensions since the state spends just 6.6% of 
GDP on pensions, compared to the 10.4% EU average, while Austria qualifies as a high 
spender with 13.1% of GDP. This approach limits the possibility of countries being 
categorised differently, and reduces the somewhat confusing picture that emerges from the 
studies described in Section 2.1  
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2.21 The financial cost dimension 
Data on pension spending indicate a wide variation among countries (shown in Table 2.8 and 
Figure 2.1), with seven countries showing relatively high spending. These include three 
Southern European countries, three Continental countries and Poland. Amongst the low 
spenders, one finds Ireland and the UK, and also former UK colonies, Cyprus and Malta. The 
Baltic States are also squarely in this category, together with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Spending on pensions is also relatively low in Denmark and the Netherlands, which both 
operate flat-rate schemes (like the UK, but with a more universal entitlement).  
 
Table 2.8: Low vs. High Spenders (by size of difference from EU25 Average) 
High Average* Low 
Italy (IT) Hungary (HU) Ireland (IE) 
Poland (PL) Slovenia (SI) Latvia (LV) 
Austria (AU) Finland (FI) Estonia (EE) 
France (FR) Belgium (BE) Cyprus (CY) 
Greece (EL) Sweden (SW) UK 
Portugal (PT)  Lithuania  (LT) 
Germany (DE)  Slovakia (SK) 
  Netherlands (NL) 
  Malta (MT) 
  Czech Rep (CZ) 
  Spain (ES) 
  Denmark (DK) 
  Luxembourg (LU) 
* Average in a range of +/- half percentage point of GDP in spending from EU25 average 
 
Figure 2.1: Difference between national spending on pensions and the EU25 level 
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Source: Own analysis of EPC data on spending on state pensions (2005-07). 
 
 One might argue that just looking at state spending is misleading as the public/private 
mix of provision differs. Figure 2.2 compares the differences from the EU-average of spending 
58 
 
                    
on state pensions and of social protection expenditure on elderly people. The latter also 
captures other state benefits to the elderly and income from occupational pensions.
44
  While 
there are some differences in the magnitude of differences between the two indicators, 
particularly for the UK and the Netherlands, the categorisation remains similar.  
 
Figure 2.2: Differences between national spending and the EU-average (2005-07)  
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Note: Countries arranged in order of the size of the gap in their spending on state pensions.  
Source: Own analysis using Eurostat data (2005-07). 
  
 Another issue to consider when looking at this dimension is the relation between the 
size of pension outlays and the demographic structure. Countries with a higher proportion of 
elderly people will spend more on pensions than younger countries, irrespective of the type of 
pension system. Figure 2.3 plots the positive relationship between state spending on the 
elderly (% of GDP) and the share of the 65+ population in the EU25.  It is evident that the 
latter is not the sole determinant of the financial burden of pension provision, with a number of 
countries showing particularly strong deviation from the average relationship.
45
  The Baltic 
States, UK, Cyprus, Ireland and Spain spend much less, while Italy, Austria, Poland, France, 
Slovenia and Luxembourg appear to be spending much more. If one were to look at social 
protection expenditure (instead of state spending on pensions), the position of the Netherlands 
and the UK as low spenders would turn into being that of an average spender.  
 
 
                                               
44
 Eurostat express concern on their data‘s coverage of the Irish occupational sector. 
45
 Note that Eurostat data suggest that in many countries the share of pensioners exceeds by far that of the 
65+ in the population. For instance in Germany pension beneficiaries stood at 27% of the population in 2004, 
compared to the 18% aged 65+. Even larger differences exist in Italy and Eastern European countries.  
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between pension spending and size of 65+ population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat data on spending on pensions and population (2005). 
 
2.22 The income replacement dimension 
Income replacement during retirement is one of the twin aims of pension systems. However 
the importance countries attach to it differs, particularly whether this role needs to be fulfilled 
by the state. Looking at the relative income ratio of the 65+ to that of the working age 
population, depicted in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.4, one notes a great deal of variation, though 
the dispersion is lower than that observed in state pension outlays.  Poland has the highest 
relative value, with the 65+ enjoying higher incomes than their working-age counterparts. A 
close second is Hungary. On the opposite side of the spectrum one finds Cyprus, Ireland, 
Denmark and the UK, with relatively low relative income ratios among the elderly. 
 
Table 2.9: Low vs. High Income replacement (by difference from EU25 Average) 
High Average* Low 
Poland (PL) France (FR) Cyprus (CY) 
Hungary (HU) Slovenia (SI) Ireland (IE) 
Luxembourg (LU) Netherlands (NL) UK 
Austria (AU) Slovakia (SK) Denmark (DK) 
Germany (DE) Italy (IT) Estonia (EE) 
 Czech Rep (CZ) Belgium (BE) 
 Malta (MT) Latvia (LV) 
  Spain (ES) 
  Finland (FI) 
  Portugal (PT) 
  Sweden (SW) 
  Lithuania (LT) 
  Greece (EL) 
* Average within a range of +/- 5 percentage points from the EU25 average 
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Figure 2.4: Difference between National and EU25 Relative Income of 65+ (to working age) 
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Source: Own analysis of EU-SILC (2005-07). 
  
 Figure 2.5 illustrates the positive relationship between the relative income ratios of the 
elderly and the percentage of GDP spent on state pensions. Poland with the second-highest 
expenditure has the highest relative income ratio, while Ireland the lowest state spender 
reports the second-lowest.  However, this relationship, though statistically significant, explains 
only a small part in the variation.  For example, despite the highest percentage of GDP spent 
on state pensions, Italian elderly people have below-average relative income. Other factors are 
at play, particularly when looking at women‘s relative incomes the relationship is weaker.46    
 
Figure 2.5: Relationship between state pension spending and relative income levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat data on spending on state pensions and EU-SILC (2005). 
                                               
46
 Given women‘s lower labour market participation, and the fact that many state pension schemes are 
earnings-related, a more generous level of state spending on pensions is less likely to benefit women. 
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 To further assess the relative strength of the income smoothing function across 
countries, Figure 2.6 plots the national median income for those aged between 50 and 64 in 
terms of the EU25 average for that age bracket against the national median income for those 
aged 65+ expressed in relation to the EU25 average. Figure 2.6 shows there is a very strong 
positive relationship.
47
 However there is a considerable variation in the degree to which older 
people in some countries maintain their relative living standards.  For instance, while the 
average 50-64 person in Denmark has a median income which is 171% of the EU25 average 
for that same age group, the average 65+ Dane has a median income which is 131% of the 
EU25 average 65+ person.  Figure 2.6 suggests that the 65+ in Scandinavian countries, 
Ireland, Cyprus and the UK do not manage to keep up with their 50-64 counterparts to a larger 
extent than the EU25 average.
48
  By contrast, those in Luxembourg, Austria and Germany 
(amongst others) appear to manage the transition significantly better.      
 
Figure 2.6: Income as a % of the EU average for the 50-64 and 65+ age groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own analysis of EU-SILC (2005). 
 
 The influence of pension systems can also be grasped by looking at Figure 2.7, which 
presents EU-SILC data on the degree of income inequality among the population aged 0-64 
and that aged 65+ in the EU25.  On an EU-wide basis, the gap between the incomes of the top 
                                               
47
 The R-squared in this linear relationship is 94% 
48
 In countries above the trend line, the relationship between the income of the 50-64 and that of the 65+ is 
smaller than the average across all EU25 countries, and vice versa.  
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and the bottom quintile in older cohorts is substantially lower than that found among the rest 
of the population. This is particularly true in Eastern European countries, where the degree of 
income inequality among the 65+ population falls below that found in the old Member States, 
despite that it is significantly higher when one focuses on just the 0-64 population.  The UK 
and Ireland, with their flat-rate systems, also manage to reduce income inequalities 
significantly. A similar effect can be observed in Sweden and Denmark. By contrast in France, 
Slovenia and Cyprus, income inequality is higher among the 65+ population than it is among 
the rest of the population.  
 
Figure 2.7: Income inequality pre- and post-65* 
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* The ratio of equivalised disposable income received by the 20% of the population with the highest 
income to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income.  
Note: Countries organised in order of inequality for 0-64 population.  
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07).            
 
2.23 The poverty prevention dimension 
The third categorisation dimension we look at is how countries compare against the EU 
average in their pension system‘s ability to prevent poverty among the 65+ population. The 
variation in this aspect is very pronounced, as can be seen in Table 2.10 and Figure 2.8. While 
the Czech Republic and the Netherlands have a poverty rate amounting to around a quarter of 
the EU25 average, the poverty rate among the 65+ in Cyprus is two and a half times that in the 
EU.  
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Table 2.10: Low vs. High Poverty Rates (by size of difference from EU25 Average) 
High Average Low 
Cyprus (CY) Italy (IT) Czech Rep (CZ) 
Ireland (IE) Belgium (BE) Hungary (HU) 
Spain (ES) Finland (FI) Netherlands (NL) 
UK  Malta (MT) Luxembourg (LU) 
Latvia (LV) Denmark (DK) Poland (PL) 
Portugal (PT) Slovenia (SI) Slovakia (SK) 
Estonia (EE)  Sweden (SW) 
Greece (EL)  Germany (DE) 
Lithuania (LT)  Austria (AU) 
  France (FR) 
* Average within a range of +/- 4 percentage points from the EU25 average 
 
Figure 2.8: Difference between National Poverty Rate of the 65+ and the EU25 level 
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Source: Own analysis of EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 This variation is driven by a number of factors, which have an impact on the generosity 
and coverage of pension systems.  Thus countries with low female labour participation tend to 
have high poverty rates,
49
 while the Anglo-Saxon countries with their unequally spread private 
pension systems also score badly.  By contrast, poverty rates are relatively lower in Eastern 
European states (with a tradition of high female labour participation and where working-age 
individuals experienced stronger income shocks during the transition to the market system) 
and the Netherlands and Sweden, both characterised by quasi-mandatory occupational pension 
provision.     
                                               
49
 The only exceptions being Poland and Malta.  
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 Interestingly there appears to be only a weak correlation between the level of state 
pension spending and the poverty rates among the 65+ population.
50
  Looking at Figure 2.9, it 
is evident that spending a lot does not ensure poverty prevention. For instance, the top 
achievers in poverty prevention, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, spend less than the 
EU25 average on state pensions.  By contrast, while Poland and Italy spend a similar share of 
their GDP on state pensions, the poverty rate among the 65+ population in Italy is more than 
three times higher than that in Poland.  
 
Figure 2.9: Relationship between state pension spending and poverty rates of the 65+ 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat data on pension spending and EU-SILC for 2005. 
 
 There appear to be clear differences among countries on how effective they are at 
preventing poverty with the same levels of spending.  O‘Connor (2005) reports ―a very high 
correlation between percentage change in at-risk-of-poverty after social transfers and GDP per 
capita standardised for purchasing power standards…and also between social protection 
expenditure and GDP per capita when both are standardised for purchasing-power standards‖.  
However there are differences in the ―efficiency‖ of how much a country spends to achieve a 
given change in its at-risk-of-poverty rates, as shown in Table 2.11.  This reveals that South 
European countries tend to spend a lot per capita on social protection to achieve changes in 
poverty rates, in contrast with Scandinavian countries, the UK and Ireland.  
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Table 2.11: The „efficiency‟ of social protection expenditure (2001) 
 
Expenditure per capita 
for each p.p. of change 
in risk-of-poverty  
Expenditure per capita 
for each one % of 
change in risk-of-poverty 
EU15 711.7 EU15 170.8 
Sweden 416.8 Sweden 112.5 
Ireland 430.6 Denmark 125.7 
Denmark 433.6 Ireland 129.2 
UK 515.1 Finland 133.5 
Belgium 688.8 UK 149.4 
Finland 702.8 Germany 153.9 
Germany 732.9 Netherlands 155.2 
Netherlands 739.2 Belgium 158.4 
Austria 746.4 Austria 164.2 
France 807.3 France 193.8 
Portugal 911.0 Portugal 218.6 
Luxembourg 959.9 Luxembourg 220.8 
Spain 966.8 Spain 222.4 
Greece 1323.7 Greece 304.4 
Italy 2062.0 Italy 453.6 
Source: Adapted from O‘Connor (2005). Data in Euros in purchasing power parities.       
    
 Table 2.12 presents this analysis carried out on pension expenditure. The position of 
Italy, Portugal and Greece remains similar, Scandinavian countries and Ireland remain among 
the better performers, while the UK‘s ‗efficiency‘ declines significantly.   
 
Table 2.12: The „efficiency‟ of pension expenditure (2001) 
 
pp reduction in poverty for each 
pp of GDP spent on pensions  
% reduction in poverty for each 
pp of GDP spent on pensions 
EU15 5.4 EU15 6.3 
Greece 3.6 Greece 4.5 
Portugal 4.0 Austria 5.0 
Austria 4.2 Italy 5.4 
Italy 4.4 Portugal 5.5 
Spain 5.2 UK 6.0 
UK 5.5 Belgium 6.3 
Germany 5.6 Germany 6.6 
Belgium 5.8 Denmark 6.8 
Denmark 5.9 France 6.9 
France 6.5 Sweden 7.0 
Sweden 6.6 Spain 7.3 
Finland 6.8 Netherlands 7.4 
Netherlands 6.8 Finland 7.4 
Luxembourg 8.0 Luxembourg 9.1 
Ireland 8.9 Ireland 11.6 
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat data on spending and risk-of-poverty. 
 
 One key consideration affecting this efficiency appears to be the coverage of pension 
systems.  As can be seen in Figure 2.10, in some countries, such as Portugal and Ireland, 
pension transfers have much weaker poverty reduction impacts among women.   
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Figure 2.10: Reduction in poverty risk due to pensions* 
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*The difference in the risk-of-poverty for the 65+ population with pension income included and 
excluded, expressed as a percentage of the risk-of-poverty with pensions excluded. Countries arranged 
by the size of the drop in poverty risk for the total 65+ population. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005).    
 
 
 Conversely Figure 2.11 depicts a strong inverse relation between relative income levels 
and poverty.  Countries where older people, on average, have an income level close to that of 
the working age population tend to have lower poverty rates. The goals of income replacement 
and poverty prevention appear to have some degree of synergy.   
  
Figure 2.11: Relationship between relative income and poverty rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own analysis of EU-SILC (2005). 
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 Nonetheless, pension transfers and their generosity, are clear determinants of cross-
country differences in poverty rates among older people. Figure 2.12 indicates that cross- 
country differences in poverty rates for older ages do not appear to be statistically related to 
differences for those of working-age.    
 
Figure 2.12: Relationship between poverty rates for the 16-64 and 65+ age groups 
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2.3 A three-dimension categorisation of pension systems 
The previous section showed how countries differ along three dimensions.  It has also shown 
how there is a clear synergy between spending and income replacement, and also between 
income replacement and poverty rates. With this in mind, EU25 countries were allocated to 
two different categories: high and low,
51
 in these three dimensions, in order to better 
understand the interaction of these outcomes. The categorisation scheme, presented in Table 
2.13, gives rise to eight different combinations. However two of these were not peopled. In 
particular, countries with high replacement do not have high poverty, as implied by the 
statistical relationship described previously.
52
  The other empty category was the high 
spending, low replacement and low poverty category.
53
   
     
                                               
51
 To simplify matters, countries tending towards the EU25 average were allocated in these categories.   
52
 This removes the possibility of having countries with high spending, high replacement and high poverty 
and countries with low spending, high replacement and high poverty. 
53
 Sweden and Finland spend slightly higher than the average, but were treated as low spenders.  
68 
 
                    
 Table 2.13: Categorisation of countries by pension system outcomes 
 
Pension spending 
compared to EU25 
Relative income 65+ 
compared to EU25 
Poverty 65+ 
compared to EU25 
 
Group A: Systems with high replacement and low poverty 
Category 1: Systems with high replacement and very low poverty 
Hungary +2% +15% -63% 
Poland +23% +22% -60% 
Luxembourg -10% +9% -60% 
Category 2: Systems with high replacement and low poverty 
Austria +26% +6% -23% 
Germany +5% +5% -23% 
France +24% +1% -21% 
 
Group B: Systems with low replacement and high poverty 
Category 3: Low spending, low replacement, high poverty 
Ireland -58% -27% +56% 
Estonia -41% -17% +37% 
UK -37% -20% +47% 
Cyprus -37% -35% +170% 
Lithuania -35% -8% +21% 
Latvia -35% -15% +47% 
Spain -18% -15% +54% 
Belgium -2% -16% +18% 
Category 4: High spending, low replacement, high poverty 
Slovenia 0% -1% 0% 
Portugal +8% -12% +40% 
Greece +15% -8% +35% 
Italy +36% -5% +18% 
 
Group C: Systems with low replacement and low poverty 
Category 5: Systems with low replacement and low poverty 
Malta -30% -7% +4% 
Czech Rep. -22% -6% -72% 
Slovakia -33% -3% -60% 
Netherlands -31% -2% -63% 
Category 6: Systems with very low replacement and low poverty 
Sweden  -3% -10% -40% 
Finland 0% -15% +7% 
Denmark -11% -20% -7% 
    
 High spending High replacement Low poverty 
 Low spending Low replacement High poverty 
Note: Countries arranged in Group A in order of the difference in poverty rates from the EU average.  
Countries arranged in Group B in order of the difference in spending on state pensions. Countries 
arranged in Group C in order of the size of their replacement function.  
69 
 
                    
2.31 Group A: Systems with high replacement and low poverty 
The first group of countries is characterised by high relative income and low poverty, but 
currently differ as regards state spending outcomes. 
 
Category 1: Low to high spending, high replacement, very low poverty 
Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary 
 
Category 2: High spending, high replacement, low poverty 
Austria, Germany, France  
 
 Luxembourg and Hungary manage to achieve the goals of high income replacement 
and low poverty without spending very large amounts of their GDP on pensions.  However 
both countries might eventually spend a lot more than the EU average.
54
 Both, in fact, spend 
more than their share of the 65+ would imply from a European perspective (see Figure 2.3). 
The other countries placed in this Group - those usually  classified as having Continental (or 
Bismarkian) systems, together with Poland - manage to achieve both high income replacement 
and low poverty among the 65+ population, but at the cost of having higher-than-average 
spending outlays.    
 
2.32 Group B: Systems with low replacement and high poverty 
The second group of countries is characterised by higher-than-average poverty rates and by 
low relative income levels.  However there is a clear distinction in the level of spending. 
 
Category 3: Low spending, low replacement, high poverty 
Ireland, UK, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Spain, Belgium 
 
Category 4: High spending, low replacement, high poverty 
Slovenia, Portugal, Greece, Italy 
 
 The countries in the first category of this group, in fact, achieve this state in 
conjunction with low state spending on pensions, while the others are characterised by high 
public spending on pensions.  Among the low spenders one finds the Anglo-Saxon duo - the 
UK and Ireland, together with an ex-colony Cyprus. There are also the Baltic countries, 
though the classification of Estonia in this category is a bit debatable as it is only recently that 
                                               
54
 Projections made in Economic Policy Committee (2009) indicate that Luxembourg and Hungary will be 
spending 13% and 22% of GDP on pensions, respectively, by 2050, as against 12% in the EU25.  
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its poverty rate has started to exceed the EU25 average, and one could place this country 
among those of Group C.  Spain and Belgium, while they are quite similar to the 
Mediterranean countries which mainly compose the second category of this group, currently 
has relatively low pension spending, but fiscal projections imply that this will no longer be the 
case over the next decades.  One could therefore place them within Category 4.  The other 
country in this category, Slovenia, is particularly difficult to categorise, since it close to the 
EU25 average in all three dimensions. Looking at recent trends, its poverty rate has remained 
stable despite an increase across the EU25, while pension spending is on the rise.
55
  Its degree 
of income replacement is also only slightly below the EU25 average.  On the basis of these 
considerations, one might consider categorising Slovenia in Group A.   
 
2.33 Group C: Systems with low replacement and low poverty 
The last group of countries achieves low poverty and low state spending on pensions, but its 
65+ populations enjoy proportionally lower relative incomes than their working age 
counterparts.  However there is a clear distinction in the level of replacement. 
 
Category 5: Low spending, low replacement, low poverty 
Malta, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Netherlands  
 
Category 6: Low spending, very low replacement, low poverty 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark  
 
 The Scandinavian countries are more focused (and successful) on poverty prevention 
than on income replacement.
56
  In the other countries of Group C, though still limited, the 
replacement function is not so constrained.  Thus in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the level 
of relative income is not that much below the EU25 average. So they could be considered as 
being closer to Group A. However, in all three cases, state spending is quite modest by EU25 
standards, and the relative generosity of social protection expenditure on the elderly is 
significantly below average. Moreover, Figure 2.3 suggests that they spend less than their 
share of the 65+ population would imply.  Similar considerations can be made for the only 
non-Social Democratic country in this group, Malta.    
                                               
55
 Figure 3 indicates that it spends more than its share of 65+ population would imply on a EU-wide basis. 
56
 Figure 2.6 showed a significant decline in the relative income of their 65+ population compared to their 
50-64 population. 
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 The position of the Netherlands, on the other hand, is less clear – in that if one 
considers its quasi-mandatory occupational pensions, its level of spending is above the EU25 
average.  Moreover the relative income ratio for its 65+ population is only slightly below the 
EU25 average and the relative generosity of its social protection expenditure is above-average.  
One could very easily re-categorise the Netherlands into Group A.    
 
2.34 Three-dimension categorisation of pension systems 
Figure 2.13 presents the categorisation of EU pension systems along the dimensions of state 
pension spending, income replacement and poverty among the 65+. The three groups have 
been set out as three intersecting circles. Since countries in both Group B and Group C are 
characterised by low replacement rates, their circles are of the same colour. The three circles 
were, in turn, split into high and low spenders by means of a dividing red horizontal line, and 
into countries with high and low poverty by means of a dividing green vertical line. Finally 
those countries, where classification is debatable, have been placed at the intersections.
57
  
 Within each broad group there are at least two sub-groups, but only in Group B is the 
division strong enough to merit close attention.  In Group B, the Mediterranean countries (and 
Belgium) are clearly distinguished from Ireland, Cyprus and the UK on account of their higher 
spending.  Slovenia, as was argued above, seems to be converging to Group A, while the 
Baltic states which were closer to Group C in the past, are now moving more towards Group B 
as their pensioner poverty is rising.  Within Group A, the distinction between the two groups 
comprising the old continental Member States and the new continental Member States (and 
Luxembourg) is mainly in the degree of success in poverty alleviation (with the new Member 
States and Luxembourg further to the left of the ‗green‘ poverty line), as differences in 
spending between these countries seem to be disappearing. By contrast in Group C, the main 
differences are in the degree of income replacement, with new Member States dissimilar from 
the Scandinavians, in that their replacement rates are higher (which is why these countries are 
placed closer to the blue circle denoting the high replacement rates evident in countries of 
Group A).  The Netherlands, on the other hand, is placed clearly in the intersection between 
Groups A and C, as replacement rates are converging to the EU average, while taking account 
of quasi-mandatory occupational pension provision implies a much higher level of spending.  
                                               
57
 It is interesting to note that, with the possible exceptions of Poland and Cyprus, the position of the new 
Member States within this categorisation is problematic. This may reflect either the fact that these countries have 
relatively immature pension systems (e.g. Malta) or else that they are still in transition from very different 
pension systems (e.g. Estonia, Latvia). 
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Note: Groups B and C are coloured in yellow, as countries in these groups have low replacement 
rates; while those in Group A have high replacement rates. Countries placed above the horizontal line 
are high spenders, while those placed to the left of the vertical line have higher-than-average poverty.  
 
 When one compares this categorisation with the ones discussed in Section 2.1, one 
notes several differences. The main one is that whereas the standard institutional 
classifications give the impression of very distant and well-defined groups of countries, this 
quantitative approach suggests distinctions are not that clear and that certain countries are 
clearly in transition. While it tends to confirm the usual grouping of Scandinavian, 
Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems, it also indicates that there are clear 
differences among these countries. It also indicates the presence of several countries which 
cannot be neatly classified.  In the case of Eastern European Member States, this may reflect 
the fact that pension systems have changed substantially and economies are still being affected 
by the transition from socialist systems.  Rather than having three clearly defined ‗worlds of 
welfare‘ as suggested by Esping-Andersen or two broad scope categorisations as suggested by 
Ferrara, this assessment reveals smaller and less distant groups of countries.  
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 Another advantage of this classification is that it looks at all EU25 countries, and thus 
provides a more comprehensive picture than most of the comparative studies which have been 
carried out to date. This reflects the availability of EU-SILC data which facilitate cross-
country comparisons immeasurably.      
 By focusing on pension system outcomes, this categorisation provides useful 
information for those assessing the impacts of reforms. It crystallises the current position of 
the different countries in a framework which enables an effective monitoring of the impacts of 
reforms and where further pressures might arise. By contrast, existing categorisations provide 
little such scope for policy assessments and lack an important forward-looking dimension. 
     
2.4 Conclusion        
This chapter sought to understand the interaction between three important dimensions of 
pension systems: namely state spending, income replacement and the risk-of-poverty among 
the 65+ population. The choice of these dimensions was based on the observations made in 
Chapter 1 that spending on pensions is the main item on government budgets across Europe, 
and that the main goals of pension systems are income replacement and poverty alleviation.  
Existing categorisations of pension systems tend to focus exclusively on design features, and 
this makes them susceptible to frequent changes on account of reforms.  On the other hand, the 
proposed multi-dimension categorisation could enable one to understand better the impact of 
reforms on different countries as it crystallises differences in the current achievement of the 
twin goals of pension systems and the cost incurred in the process. 
 The categorisation has resulted in four relatively distinct categories of countries. These 
groupings differ in some important respects from the usually quoted categorisations, possibly 
as they are based on actual system results rather than system ideals. This contrast helps to 
indicate possible sources of system stress.  Thus, a priori, one might expect that reforms in 
countries of Group A would have focused on curbing expenditure; reforms in countries of 
Group C to have concentrated on improving income replacement; and reforms in countries of 
Group B to have been focused on two aspects: in countries with high spending – the curbing of 
spending followed by measures to tackle poverty and income replacement, and in countries 
with low spending – the expansion of the pension system.  The following Chapter will expand 
further on this, by looking at the reforms undertaken since the 1990s in European pension 
systems. 
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3. A review of recent pension reforms in Europe                                                   
and of studies assessing them 
 
The previous Chapter sought to categorise the different pension systems in the EU25 in view 
of their current outcomes in terms of spending, poverty alleviation and income smoothing.  It 
indicated that there are at least four clearly defined groups, with different potential sources of 
pressures to reform. This Chapter will focus on the significant changes in pension systems 
which were enacted over the 1990s. To a large extent, these reforms have yet to impact on the 
indicators used in Chapter 2, and thus the categorisation shown there can be seen a starting 
point for the analysis of the pension reforms of the 1990s. The aim of this Chapter will be to 
outline the main elements of these reforms, and review a number of studies which have sought 
to assess their impact.  This will enable us to then proceed to make our own evaluation of how 
reforms might affect pension outcomes, and consequently see how the categorisation set out in 
Chapter 2 could change in coming years.  
       
3.1 The arguments used to justify pension reforms 
While at their inception, pensions were seen as insurance protecting individuals against the 
risk of living beyond the time when they could work or draw on savings, today they are 
considered as an annuity enabling withdrawal from the labour market.  This change in 
perception reflects the socio-economic transformations that characterised the twentieth 
century, changes which enabled many to start enjoying periods of leisure in old age.  
Consequentially, pensions have started to feature prominently in the lives of individuals, since 
they provide by far the bulk of income during retirement, as has been shown in Chapter 1.
58
  
 However, just as pensions became more important for a growing part of society,
59
 the 
capacity of economies of providing them began to be called into question.  The main cause for 
this heightened emphasis on financial sustainability was growing concern of the impact of the 
ageing process.  Over the coming decades, the ratio of the population aged over 65 to that of 
working age (known as the old age dependency ratio) is projected to rise rapidly.  Eurostat 
forecast in 2008 that while at present this ratio stands at 26%, by 2050 it will have nearly 
doubled, as shown in Table 3.1. 
                                               
58
 Forster & Mira D‘Ercole (2005) show that in the OECD only in Turkey, Mexico, and Japan, earnings made up 
more than 50% of the income of the 65+ in 2000. By contrast, ―across the OECD countries reviewed, public 
transfers account for almost all of the disposable income of the bottom quintile of the elderly population and 
close to 80% of the incomes of the middle 60% of the distribution‖.  
59
 For instance, those who reached State Pension Age in the UK in 1951 constituted less than half of their 
generation. Current recipients, by contrast, represent more than three quarters of their generation. Of those born 
in 1985, more than 90% are expected to reach 65 in 2050. See Department of Work and Pensions (2006).        
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Table 3.1: Old Age dependency ratio (number of people aged 65+/those aged 15-64) 
 2009 2025 2050  2009 2025 2050 
EU27 25.6 34.2 50.4 Hungary  23.8 33.3 50.8 
Cyprus  17.8 24.9 37.7 Lithuania  23.2 29.7 51.1 
Luxembourg  21.0 27.1 37.8 Latvia  25.1 31.1 51.2 
UK  24.5 30.4 38.0 Portugal  26.2 33.2 53.0 
Ireland  16.5 22.3 40.4 Romania 21.3 29.1 54.0 
Denmark  24.2 34.5 41.3 Czech Rep.  21.2 33.8 54.8 
Sweden  27.1 35.5 41.9 Bulgaria 25.1 33.7 55.4 
Belgium  25.9 33.8 43.9 Slovakia  16.7 28.5 55.5 
France 25.6 35.8 44.7 Poland 18.9 32.9 55.7 
Netherlands  22.3 34.9 45.6 Germany  30.8 39.5 56.4 
Finland  25.2 40.6 46.6 Greece  27.8 35.4 57.0 
Estonia 25.1 31.9 47.2 Spain 24.3 30.2 58.7 
Austria  25.7 32.7 48.3 Italy  30.8 38.0 59.2 
Malta  20.1 35.9 49.8 Slovenia  23.5 36.2 59.4 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the old age dependency in 2050. Countries in italics are 
projected to have a dependency ratio higher than the EU27 average. 
Source: Eurostat (2008) EUROPOP 2008 Convergence scenario. 
 
During the last twenty years, life expectancy at 65 in the EU15 has risen by more than 3 years.  
Eurostat projections, presented in Table 3.2, show this trend to continue for the next 50 years, 
with life expectancy forecast to rise by 4 and a half years.  In fact, in some of the lower income 
countries, such as Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria, the increase will be even more notable, of 6 
years or more, or a lengthening of life after the age of 65 by around a half compared to now.   
 
Table 3.2: Life expectancy (period) at 65 (men) - projections 
 2008 2030 2050  2008 2030 2050 
EU27 16.5 18.9 21.0 Belgium  16.5 18.8 20.7 
Estonia 13.0 16.0 18.6 Netherlands 16.5 18.8 20.8 
Latvia 12.7 16.0 18.8 Finland  16.6 18.9 20.9 
Bulgaria 13.1 16.1 18.8 Luxembourg  16.8 19.1 21.0 
Slovakia 13.3 16.3 19.0 Greece 17.2 19.3 21.1 
Lithuania 13.1 16.3 19.0 Cyprus  17.1 19.3 21.1 
Romania 13.6 16.6 19.2 Germany  16.8 19.1 21.1 
Hungary 13.6 16.7 19.4 Spain  17.1 19.3 21.2 
Czech Rep. 14.7 17.4 19.7 Austria  17.1 19.3 21.2 
Poland 14.5 17.3 19.8 UK  16.9 19.2 21.2 
Slovenia 15.7 18.2 20.4 Sweden  17.4 19.5 21.3 
Malta  15.9 18.3 20.4 Ireland  16.8 19.2 21.3 
Denmark 16.1 18.4 20.5 Italy  17.5 19.7 21.5 
Portugal  16.3 18.7 20.7 France  17.7 19.9 21.7 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the life expectancy projected for 2050. Countries in italics are 
projected to have higher longevity than the EU27 average. 
Source: Eurostat (2008) EUROPOP 2008 Convergence scenario. 
 
 The lengthening of life expectancy testifies the success of European economies, but 
also presents them with tough challenges, as it has been accompanied by a sharp decline in 
76 
 
                    
fertility rates. While in 1960 fertility rates were above replacement in almost all countries, 
nowadays not a single country in Europe has a fertility rate that is high enough to replace those 
who will be dying.  This decline has been very rapid, particularly in the new Member States. 
Hence, depending on future trends in net migration, the proportion of the population aged 65+ 
is set to grow quite rapidly while that of people of working age is expected to start declining in 
a matter of a few years. While at present there are 4 persons of working age for every person 
aged 65+, by 2050 the ratio will have fallen to just 2. In some countries like Poland, Ireland, 
Malta, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the increase will be even more dramatic with the 
dependency ratio nearly tripling.        
 This increase in the dependency ratio will not only, other things being equal, result in a 
substantial rise in state spending on pensions (and other age-related outlays like health) but is 
also expected to have significant economic effects. Maddaloni et al (2006) suggest that in the 
absence of reforms and responses by economic agents, under the assumption of an unchanged 
rate of labour utilisation and productivity growth, demographic trends imply a decline in 
average real GDP growth in the Euro-area to around 1% in the period from 2020 to 2050, from 
the average of 2.1% per year observed between 1980 and 2005. Bosworth & Chodorow-Reich 
(2007) also show the macroeconomic linkages between national rates of saving and 
investment and population ageing, using a panel data set of 85 countries covering 1960-2005. 
The authors find ―a significant correlation between the age composition of the population and 
nations‘ rates of saving and investment‖, and suggest a decline in global saving of about 10 
percentage points of total income and a drop in global investment of about 5 percentage points 
by 2050. They conclude that industrial countries will face large current account deficits as they 
sell off assets to support consumption.  Yet, as pointed out in Pension Commission (2004) ―the 
possibility of overseas investment through the global capital market…ameliorates slightly but 
does not remove the potential return and asset price effects of demographic change‖ as 
―demographic trends towards increasing longevity and falling fertility are spreading to all 
economically successful developing countries far faster than demographers originally 
assumed‖.60      
 Yet, it is not just concern about demographic developments that has brought changes in 
pension arrangements. Increased international competition and changing attitudes towards 
government intervention appear to have decreased the capacity of policymakers to sustain the 
rise in taxation needed to finance the growth of state spending in this area.  Similarly saving 
                                               
60
 Appendix B of Pension Commission (2004) reviews the macroeconomics of ageing. 
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for retirement appears to have regressed in individuals‘ list of priorities, with participation in 
occupational plans and saving rates declining among current generations.  Furthermore despite 
increased longevity, working lives have tended to be shorter than those of earlier generations, 
though recently there has been an increase in the labour market participation of older working-
age individuals.
61
  
 At the same time, in some countries policymakers have been looking again at what 
their pension systems seek to achieve.
62
 Hering (2006) argues that ―the causes of reform are 
often not the central focus of analyses of pension politics, because many scholars assume that 
these need no further explanation‖ than restating the demographic argument. However, while 
all countries face similar demographic trends, governments have responded quite differently. 
Some have sought to just ―reproduce their pension systems, while others seek to transform 
them‖.  This suggests that reforms have also tended to reflect the preferences and options of 
governments.  Hering (2006) argues that a major cause of reform was the European Monetary 
Union, in that ―the EU‘s requirement of fiscal sustainability and its deficit and debt rules 
largely preclude the strategy of refinancing generous public pensions in the face of ageing 
populations‖. Accordingly, European governments had to opt for retrenchment and 
restructuring of state pensions, and instead rely on a mix of public and private pensions. 
 However structural change may have also been driven by other economic concerns.
63
 
Thus, reforms carried out in the former communist-bloc countries tended to focus on shifting 
the responsibility of retirement income provision from the state onto individuals, in an attempt 
to spur the growth of private enterprise and deepen financial and capital markets.  Moves 
towards notional defined contribution (NDC) schemes (e.g. Sweden) have been justified as 
resulting in actuarially fair pension systems with correct incentives for individuals to 
contribute and work.   
 
                                               
61
 Blondell & Scarpetta (1999), for instance, estimated that male retirement ages fell by 4.5 years in the UK and 
6.3 years in Italy between 1950 and 1995. During that same time, life expectancy at birth rose by 7.2 years in the 
UK and 12.8 years in Italy.   Eurostat data, however, indicate that since 2000, the average age of withdrawal from 
the labour force has risen by a year to 63 in the UK and by half a year to 61 in Italy.  
62
 For instance, Pension Commission (2005) concluded that ―it seems likely that permanently maintaining an 
earnings-related element within the PAYG system is untenable within acceptable public expenditure limits and 
will therefore tend (as it did in the 1980s and 1990s) to crowd out adequate flat-rate provision, with means-tested 
benefits growing to fill the gaps‖.  
63
 Among academics there has been a long debate on the benefits/costs of moving from PAYG to funding. 
Feldstein (1974), (1996) and (1997) sets out the argument that PAYG has significant deadweight loss as social 
security tax distorts labour supply and leads to lower saving, while PAYG‘s implicit rate of return is lower than 
the return on saving.  These arguments have been countered by Orzsag & Stiglitz (1999) and Barr (2000).    
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 De Graaf et al (2007) propose an alternative explanation of reforms. They argue that 
the reforms reflect a change in the standard life course of European citizens. The previous 
pension systems were well attuned to the male breadwinner model, in a full-employment 
economy where acquired skills lasted a lifetime. Recent reforms have sought to adjust this to 
new realities by individualising pension claims, acknowledging flexibility and giving some 
attention to care and learning. However the authors find that reforms focus ―exclusively on 
individual biographies and do not systematically take into account the various 
interdependencies characteristic of the life course, such as the interdependencies between 
activities within one life course or the interdependencies between different life courses‖. Thus 
more reforms can be foreseen in the near future, as policymakers continue to adjust the 
systems to reflect the new social realities. 
 Sefton et al (2005) develop a median voter argument to explain future trends in 
pension reforms. They compare the British, Danish and German retirement systems using a 
general equilibrium simulation model, and find that the tax/transfer system is cheapest in the 
UK and most expensive in Germany.  They argue that younger workers would prefer the UK 
system, but the older the population becomes the more preferences shift towards the German 
system. They conclude that ―as the post-war population bulge passes the age of forty-five, the 
German system is likely to become harder and harder to reform and the UK may experience 
increased pressure to move towards something similar to the German structure‖.  
 Despite the many other causes outlined above, it appears quite evident that financial 
considerations played the main part in pushing European governments to reform their pension 
systems. The possible fiscal impact that the ageing of the Baby Boom generation may bring 
about over the next half century has led many to reconsider seriously the financing of social 
security. The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme of financing pensions, which had seemed so 
attractive in the immediate post-war years, in recent years has started to be depicted as an 
attempt by the post-war generation to play a Ponzi game with the burden of paying for 
pensions being shifted irresponsibly and unsustainably to future generations.
64
  The number of 
                                               
64
 See for instance, Disney (2000). This depiction has been criticised. For instance, Hills (1995) argues that rather 
than depicting PAYG as an exploding ‗chain letter‘, one would be more correct in thinking of it as a single line of 
people passing a box of chocolates to each other. Unless someone panics in the interval between passing on their 
original box and receiving their neighbour‘s and stops the game, there would be no losers.  Thus ―provided the 
line carries on indefinitely and that no one changes the rules‖ PAYG need not be unsustainable. This does not 
necessarily apply when one has a shrinking population, as in this case the line is becoming less populated.      
79 
 
                    
studies looking at the increase in spending on pensions mushroomed, soon to be followed by 
wide-ranging reforms meant to achieve ‗sustainability‘.65  
 The EU‘s Economic Policy Committee (2009) indicates that spending on public 
pensions in the EU15 is projected to rise from 10.2% in 2007 to 12.5% of GDP in 2050. 
However an earlier study (Economic Policy Committee (2006)) noted that in 2001 the EU15 
countries had projected an increase in spending on pensions of 2.9% of GDP by 2050. Thus 
reforms carried out in 8 years managed to wipe away more than one-fifth of the projected 
budgetary impact of ageing.  This decline in projected spending occurred despite that during 
these years, forecasts of life expectancy were revised upwards considerably and the study 
states that ―public spending on pensions appears to be most sensitive to changes in life 
expectancy‖.66 
 
Table 3.3: Public pension expenditure, before taxes (as a % of GDP) – projections 
 2007 2030 2050  2007 2030 2050 
EU27 10.1 11.6 12.3 Germany  10.4 11.5 12.2 
Estonia  5.6 5.6 5.3 Finland  10.0 13.9 13.2 
Latvia 5.4 5.8 5.8 Hungary  10.9 11.1 13.3 
Ireland 4.0 5.4 8.0 Portugal  11.4 12.6 13.4 
UK 6.6 7.6 8.1 Austria 12.8 13.9 14.1 
Poland 11.6 9.5 9.1 France  13.0 14.2 14.2 
Sweden 9.5 9.5 9.1 Romania 6.6 10.2 14.6 
Slovakia 6.8 7.3 9.4 Italy  14.0 14.8 14.8 
Denmark 9.1 10.6 9.6 Belgium  10.0 13.8 14.8 
Czech Rep. 7.8 7.2 10.2 Spain  8.4 10.8 14.8 
Netherlands 6.6 9.3 10.3 Cyprus  6.3 10.8 15.5 
Lithuania 6.8 8.2 10.4 Slovenia  9.9 13.3 18.3 
Bulgaria 8.3 8.6 10.8 Luxembourg  8.7 14.2 22.1 
Malta 7.2 9.5 12.0 Greece 11.7 17.1 24.0 
Note: Countries arranged in order of their spending projections for 2050. Countries in italics are 
projected to have higher spending than the EU27 average. 
Source: Economic Policy Committee (2009). 
 
 However, it is increasingly being pointed out that policymakers have not given enough 
consideration to the impact that pension reforms will have on the elderly.
67
 A clear example of 
this shift in thinking is the World Bank‘s stance on pension reform over the last decade. 
Whereas back in 1994, the Bank had been an all-out proponent of privatisation as exemplified 
                                               
65
 See Blanchet (2005) for a description of the process in France, which started with a report published in 1986 on 
the economic consequences of ageing and culminated with the 1993 and 2003 pension reforms.   
66
 The upward revision in life expectancy added up to 2 years to the projected increase in longevity in most 
countries.   
67
 For instance, Forster and Mira D‘Ercole (2005) concluded that ―changes in the generosity of public 
transfers and taxes have played the largest role in shaping changes in poverty risks among the elderly within 
individual countries‖ of the OECD during the second half of the 1990s.   
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in its ‗Averting the Old Age crisis‘, by 2006 its Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)68 found 
that ―Bank involvement in pension reform was often prompted by concerns about fiscal 
sustainability. Yet, in doing so, there often was a neglect of the primary goal of a pension 
system: to reduce poverty and provide retirement income within a fiscal constraint‖.69         
 In response to these concerns, international institutions, such as the EU Commission 
and the OECD, have started to look more closely at how pension reforms are affecting pension 
entitlements and to what extent achieving the goal of fiscal sustainability has led to a 
marginalisation of the objective of having adequate pensions.     
 
3.2 An outline of pension reforms in Europe since the 1990s 
Though the popular press tends to characterise Europe as being an opinionated laggard in 
terms of structural reform, attached to its ‗outdated‘ social model, any objective reviewer of 
the recent history of European social policy would be struck with the extent of the reforms 
which have taken place since the 1990s. This section will give an outline of these reforms, 
showing how the pensions landscape in Europe, particularly for younger generations, has 
changed dramatically.     
 At the start of the 1990s one pension model dominated Western Europe. This model 
was run by the state, based on the PAYG funding principle and with an earnings-related DB 
benefit determination structure.  There tended to be some variants – for instance Germany had 
a points system,
70
 Ireland had a flat rate system,
71
 while the Dutch state system was supported 
by quasi-mandatory occupational provision.  However these tended to be minor exceptions in 
a broadly similar landscape.  Throughout most of the second half of the twentieth century, 
reforms in Europe had tended to move countries closer to this single pension model, with even 
Beveridgean countries, like the UK, introducing earnings-related features, and countries in 
Southern Europe moving away from traditional methods of family support during old-age and 
instead trying to adopt the state provision levels of their Northern neighbours. 
 
                                               
68
 The IEG is an independent unit within the World Bank that reports directly to the Bank‘s Board of Executive 
Directors, and acts as an auditor of the impact of policies advocated by the Bank.   
69
 The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006). The World Bank‘s approach and its insistence on 
having a mandatory fully funded second pillar has been criticised by a number of economists, such as Kotlikoff 
(1999), Orszag & Stiglitz (1999) and Modigliani & Muralidhar (2005).    
70
 Under a points system, entitlement is based on pension points accumulated. A year‘s contribution at the 
average earnings earns one point. Points are multiplied by a pension value to determine the monthly benefit. 
71
 Under a flat-rate system, all those who meet the set conditions get paid the same benefits. In an earnings-
related DB system, benefits are determined as a ratio of a set salary – the final salary, the average lifetime 
salary or an intermediate figure - on which contributions were paid.  
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 The 1990s, however, saw a departure from this trend in Western Europe and also the 
accession into the EU of Eastern European states who nearly all had transformed their systems 
away from PAYG DB. Hering (2006) notes that ―two-thirds of the 15 old EU countries 
reproduced their pension systems by enacting numerous marginal adjustment measures, 
focusing either on the refinancing or retrenchment of public pensions…but four countries—
Sweden, Italy, Germany and Austria—restructured their pension systems by cutting public 
pensions and replacing these increasingly with private ones, and thus began a gradual shift 
from the dominant pillar model to the multi-pillar one‖.  This trend occurred without the 
concerted action of the EU Commission, as despite some moves towards information 
exchange and peer-review in the area of pensions there was no effort from the Commission to 
propose an institutional model for Member States‘ pension systems – in contrast with 
developments in monetary policy, environmental policy and other regulatory policies.  In its 
first report on pensions, the Social Protection Committee – the EU institution charged with 
monitoring pension policy
72
 - had stated ―… no type of pension scheme (pay-as-you-go vs. 
funded, private vs. public, defined benefit vs. defined contribution) can be regarded as superior 
to another‖.73  By contrast the change in Eastern Europe can be said to have been mostly 
driven by the World Bank which actively promoted its multi-pillar approach.
74
    
 
Table 3.4: Structural pension reform in Western Europe, 1995-2004 
Institutional development Dominant pillar systems Multi-pillar systems 
Reproduction by 
Adaptation 
Luxembourg Denmark 
Belgium UK 
Finland Ireland 
Spain Netherlands 
Portugal  
France  
Greece  
Gradual  
Transformation 
Sweden  
Germany  
Italy  
Austria  
Source: Hering (2006). 
                                               
72
 Detailed information on the role, composition and work of the SPC can be found at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection_commitee/index_en.htm  
73
 SPC (2000). 
74
 The only concession the Commission allowed in favour of multi-pillar reforms is that their costs is taken 
into consideration when applying the excessive deficit procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact. This move 
was questioned by the European Central Bank (see Gonzalez-Paramo (2005)), which deemed it as potentially 
delaying fiscal consolidation.  Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had never been strongly in 
favour of the multi-pillar reforms championed by the World Bank.  
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 Bonoli & Palier (2007) in their review of the political processes that led to reforms in 
France, Germany and Italy argue that ―comparing the politics of these reforms shows some 
similar trends‖. They visualise four stages of reform. Until the late 1980s, there was no 
retrenchment and the main action was to increase payroll taxes to finance shortfalls. Concern 
over the level of contributions then led to some moderate retrenchment; usually changes in 
indexation. While resulting in only minor effects, the first reforms tended to be important as 
they brought pension reform, population ageing and the future of social security into the public 
debate. More radical reforms were pushed for in the early 1990s, though reforms were usually 
still negotiated on the basis of a quid pro quo: benefits were intended progressively to decrease 
in exchange for some concession, e.g. non-contributory pensions being financed from general 
tax revenues instead of through the insurance schemes. The first moves towards funded private 
provision were also made at this stage. Finally, the second wave of reforms (during the late 
1990s) brought more innovation, such as the development of voluntary private pension funds 
and moves to increase employment rates among the elderly and to stop early retirement. 
 
Table 3.5: Year of reform, full implementation and time lag for major pension reforms in 
France, Germany and Italy 
 Year of reform Full implementation Time lag in years 
France 1993 2004 11 
2003 2020 17 
Germany 1989 2012 23 
1999 2025 26 
2006 2029 24 
Italy 1992 2032 40 
1995 2035 40 
Source: Bonoli & Palier (2007). 
 
 The authors also point out that the more substantial reforms tended to have long 
phasing-in periods (see Table 3.5). This ensures that ―the large and politically influential 
cohorts of baby boomers, due to enter into retirement between 2010 and 2030, will be affected 
only marginally by the reform‖.  For instance, only about one in seven of the current Italian 
electorate will be affected fully.  While one might concede that reforms have been gradual and 
heavily negotiated, this should not be misconstrued as a claim that there has been reform 
inertia. Reviewing the last decade (see Table 3.6), OECD (2007) finds that ―the period since 
the early 1990s has been one of intense reform in OECD pension systems‖ and that ―much 
more action has been taken on both reforming benefits but also contributions to make systems 
both financially and socially sustainable than countries are often given credit for‖.  
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Table 3.6: Reforms to national retirement income systems put in place between 1990 and 
2005, selected OECD countries 
Country Pension 
eligibility 
age 
Adjusted 
retirement 
incentives 
Change of 
years in 
benefit 
formula or 
qualifying 
conditions 
Link to life 
expectancy 
and/or 
financial 
sustainability 
Defined 
contribution 
scheme 
Other 
Austria Early 
retirement 
age 
increased by 
1.5 years. 
Pension ages 
for women 
aligned with 
those of men.  
Benefit 
reduction for 
early retirement 
introduced and 
set to increase. 
Tighter access 
to early 
retirement.  
Best 15 years 
to 40 years. 
Introduction of 
sustainability 
factor under 
discussion. 
 Reduction in 
accrual rate. 
Less generous 
indexation for 
higher 
pensions.  
Belgium Pension age 
for women 
aligned with 
that for men.  
 Contribution 
condition for 
early retirement 
at 60 tightened.  
   
Czech 
Rep 
Phased 
increase in 
normal 
pension age 
to 63.  
     
Denmark Phased 
increase in 
normal 
pension age 
from 65 to 
67. 
  Normal pension 
age linked to life 
expectancy. 
  
Finland  Increased 
accrual rate for 
people working 
age 63-67.  
10 last years to 
lifetime 
average. 
Life expectancy 
multiplier (from 
2010). 
 Basic part of 
national 
pension 
income-tested. 
Less generous 
valorisation of 
past earnings 
and indexation 
of pensions.  
France  Changes in 
adjustment to 
benefits for 
early/late 
retirement in 
public and 
occupational 
pensions.  
Minimum 
contribution 
period 
increased.  
Earnings 
measure in 
public scheme 
from best 10 to 
best 25 years.  
Minimum 
contribution 
period to increase 
further with 
changes in life 
expectancy. 
 Targeted 
minimum 
income of 85% 
of minimum 
wage. 
Valorisation 
now effectively 
to prices in 
both plans.  
Germany  Reduction in 
benefits for 
retirement 
before 65.  
 Valorisation and 
indexation cut 
back as system 
dependency ratio 
worsens. 
Voluntary DC 
pensions with 
tax privileges.  
Phased 
abolition of 
favourable tax 
treatment of 
pension 
income.  
Greece Pension age 
rising from 58 
to 65.  
     
Hungary Increase in 
pension age 
55 for women 
and 60 for 
men to 62 for 
both. 
Accrual rates 
linear rather 
than higher for 
earlier years.  
 Through annuity 
calculation in DC 
scheme. 
DC scheme: 
mandatory for 
new entrants, 
voluntary for 
existing 
workers.  
Minimum 
pension to be 
abolished. 
Less generous 
indexation of 
pensions.  
Ireland     Incentives for 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings. 
Pre-funding of 
public 
pensions. 
Increase in 
basic pension. 
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Table 3.6: Reforms to national retirement income systems put in place between 1990 and 
2005, selected OECD countries….cont..   
Country Pension 
eligibility age 
Adjusted 
retirement 
incentives 
Change of 
years in 
benefit 
formula or 
qualifying 
conditions 
Link to life 
expectancy and/or 
financial 
sustainability 
Defined 
contribution 
scheme 
Other 
Italy Pension 
age for 
men from 
60 to 65 & 
women 
from 55 to 
60. Early 
pension 
age for 
men with 
35 years’ 
coverage 
increases 
to 62. 
Adjustment 
to early-
retirement 
benefits 
through 
notional 
annuity 
calculation.  
 
Qualification years for long-
service pension increased 
from 37 to 40 years.  
 
Through 
notional 
annuity 
calculation  
 From DB to 
notional 
accounts. 
Less 
generous 
indexation of 
higher 
pensions.  
Netherlands  Planned 
abolition of 
early 
retirement 
programme. 
Shift from 
final to 
average 
salary in 
many 
occupational 
plans.   
   
Poland Withdrawal of 
early retirement 
for certain groups 
of workers.  
 From best 
consecutive 
10 in final 20 
to lifetime 
average.  
Through notional 
annuity calculation 
in public scheme 
and annuity 
calculation in DC.  
DC scheme 
mandatory for 
new entrants 
and workers 
under 30. 
Abolition of 
basic pension.  
From DB to 
notional 
accounts.   
Portugal Pensionable age 
for women 
aligned with that 
for men at 65. 
Introduction 
of 
increments 
for late 
retirement 
and 
reductions 
for early 
retirement.  
From best 
10 out of last 
15 years to 
lifetime 
average 
earnings 
   
Slovakia Increase in 
pension ages to 
62 for men and 
women.  
 From best 5 
in final 10 to 
lifetime 
average 
earnings.  
 DC scheme 
mandatory for 
new entrants 
and voluntary 
for existing 
workers.  
From DB to 
points system.  
Sweden   Best 15 
years to 
lifetime 
average 
(public, 
earnings-
related 
scheme). 
Through calculation 
of notional annuity 
and annuity in DC 
schemes. Additional 
sustainability 
adjustment in 
notional accounts.  
DC scheme 
mandatory for 
nearly all 
workers. 
Occupational 
plans switch 
from DB to 
DC. 
From DB to 
notional 
accounts.  
UK Women’s 
pension age and 
eligibility for 
guarantee credit 
rising from 60 to 
65 
Increment 
for deferring 
pension 
claim 
increased. 
Lump sum 
option 
added. 
  Employers 
required to 
provide 
access to DC 
(‘stakeholder’) 
pension.  
Increase in 
basic pension. 
Extension of 
means-tested 
supplements. 
Increased 
progressivity 
of earnings-
related 
pension. 
Source: OECD (2007). 
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 Table 3.6 presents a review of these changes, focusing on changes in the eligibility age, 
adjustments in retirement incentives, changes in qualifying conditions or benefit 
determination, the introduction of links to life expectancy or financial sustainability and moves 
toward DC. However rather than focusing on detailed information on the reforms, it is more 
convenient to categorise reforms into two broad sets: parametric and systemic.  The 
parametric reforms maintained unchanged the PAYG nature of pension systems but made 
substantial changes to their underlying rules – such as those on the accrual of pension 
entitlements, the age at which benefits are received, and required contribution periods.
75
  Other 
countries have opted instead for systemic reforms i.e. moving away from the PAYG DB 
structure and adopting DC type schemes.  Here one can discern two main types of reforms: 
World-Bank inspired multi-pillar reforms based on personal accounts (e.g. Slovakia, Estonia 
and Hungary) and the adoption of NDC systems (e.g. Sweden, Italy, Poland and Latvia).  The 
OECD‘s review notes that ―around half of the major pension reforms in OECD countries in 
the last decade have involved fundamental systemic changes‖. 
 The distinction between parametric and systemic reforms has its shortcomings. For 
instance, while Germany and France, have not shifted totally to NDC (and thus they are 
categorised as countries with parametric reforms), but they have introduced features that 
mimic the rules of an NDC model. France has introduced a link between the number of 
contribution years and life expectancy while Germany has adopted a sustainability factor that 
links the level of pension benefits to the dependency ratio.  In the same vein, Austria has also 
significantly modified its public pension plans and could be said to now have a personal 
notional defined benefit account system.
76
 Besides these categorisation issues, one also needs 
to keep in mind the caution made in OECD (2007) that ―systemic pension reform is not an 
indispensable condition for change‖ as ―several countries have cut benefit entitlements 
substantially without changing the fundamental structure of their pension systems‖. 
 
3.21 Parametric reforms 
The main difference between parametric and systemic reform lies not in the financial impact 
on pensioners (or contributors) but in the sharing of risk between the current generation and 
future ones or the state (the custodian of future generations in this respect). Parametric reforms 
maintain the existing set-up of pension systems. This has several important implications, such 
                                               
75
 The impact of parametric reforms can be quite considerable. For instance, whereas in 2001, Germany was 
forecasting an increase of 5.5 percentage points in spending over the next half century, now it expects an 
increase of just 1.8 percentage points. 
76
 For more details, see Knell (2005).   
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as the fact that longevity risk is still borne by the pension provider rather than the pensioner.  
Moreover redistribution is still possible under a DB system, something that is not achievable 
under DC, unless one puts in place subsidies for non-contributory periods (such as care and 
unemployment) and/or minimum income guarantees.       
 Table 3.7 summarises the main parametric reforms that have taken place, or are 
gradually being introduced, in the PAYG DB public pension schemes of the EU25.   In some 
cases, some countries that have made systemic reforms are also listed in the Table, e.g. Italy. 
This is because in these countries the old schemes still apply to older cohorts of workers, and 
governments have sought to reform these also. 
 
  Table 3.7: Countries that had in place parametric reforms between 1995/96 and 2005 
Eligibility Age Contribution 
Rate 
 
Contribution 
Requirement 
Benefit 
Indexation 
Pension 
Formula 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
U.K. 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
U.K. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Austria 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Spain 
Slovakia 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Rep. 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
France 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
U.K. 
  Source: Zaidi et al (2006).    
 
 The most frequent reform has involved increasing the eligibility age.  This reform, 
though politically difficult, tends to be more easily justifiable than reductions in generosity, as 
it can be linked directly to the increase in longevity.  Moreover in many cases, the reform has 
just involved the equalisation of the statutory retirement age between genders. Only Eastern 
European countries and Italy have effectively increased the eligibility age for both genders.  
However, the approaching retirement of the Baby Boom generation is increasing the 
attractiveness of this policy.  Since the reforms summarised in Table 3.6, Denmark, Germany 
and the UK have legislated further increases in the pension age.  This reform is meant to 
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increase revenues, by adding more years of contributions, while decreasing the longevity risk 
borne by the state.  
 The second most common reform has been modifying the contribution rate. Again 
while politically difficult, this reform can be justified as a means to bolster finances ahead of 
the demographic transition.  Given the PAYG-nature of public schemes, this reform, on its 
own, does not necessarily reduce future commitments. Thus, in some cases, such as Ireland, 
this reform has been accompanied by the establishment of reserve funds that will be used to 
finance the projected increase in spending.  In this way, countries are able to conduct tax 
smoothing; increasing contribution rates only gradually over time and by a smaller amount as 
extra funds collected before the system goes in deficit would have earned interest.         
 Another measure that impacts on both revenues and expenditures is changing 
contribution requirements.  Many European countries have scaled back the early retirement 
schemes they put in place in the 1970s and 1980s.  Contribution requirements for early 
retirement, or deductions for taking up pensions before the statutory pension age, have risen in 
many countries.  More crucially, the period of minimum contributions needed to qualify for 
the maximum pension has been increased.  For example, in France after 2009, ―the number of 
contribution years will increase following the increase in life expectancy through a rule 
keeping constant the ratio of the number of contribution years and the number of years in 
pension to the level of 1.79 as in 2003‖.77   
 Turning to benefit determination, during the last decade more countries moved away 
from uprating pensions with earnings.  Austria and Germany at first moved towards linking 
pensions to net earnings, so that the burden of any increases in social security contributions 
would be more fairly shared between workers and pensioners.  More recently they have both 
moved to even less generous indexation: Austria adopted price uprating and Germany 
introduced the ‗sustainability factor‘ to adjust pension benefit indexation.  Other countries, 
like Hungary and Slovakia, went for the so-called Swiss formula (50% price uprating and 50% 
earnings uprating). The UK, conversely, moved in the opposite direction, returning to earnings 
indexation after having adopted price linking in the early 1980s. This reform reflects the fact 
that by 2050 the basic pension would have fallen so much that most pensioners would become 
dependent on means tested pensions, reducing incentives to save.   
 In view of the variety of pension benefit formulae, it is hard to synthesise the main 
changes.  In general, governments have either reduced accrual rates or else moved from linear 
                                               
77
 See Carone (2005).  
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schedules to ones which provide a better return for those who remain in work after a certain 
age.   As for the pensionable salary, most countries used to have schemes that limited the 
determination of this salary to final career years.  In recent years, there has been a considerable 
lengthening of this period.  Portugal and Hungary, for example, have moved towards 
calculating the pensionable income as the average lifetime salary.   
 
3.22 Systemic reforms 
In essence there have been two broad types of systemic reforms – those inspired by the World 
Bank multi-pillar model (described in Chapter 2) and those setting up NDC schemes (see 
Table 3.8).  Though in both cases, the main difference with DB schemes is the structure of 
determination of pension benefits, there are some major differences between the two strands of 
reforms and their impact on pensioners‘ incomes is also likely to be quite distinct. 
 
Table 3.8: Countries that have made systemic reforms 
NDC 
(First or Second Tier) 
Funded Second tier of 
mandatory scheme 
Italy 
Latvia 
Poland 
Sweden 
 
 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania  
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia  
Sweden 
Source: Zaidi et al (2006). 
 
a) World Bank Multi-pillar reforms 
Prior to EU accession, many Eastern European countries enacted multi-pillar pension systems, 
often after assistance from the World Bank.
78
   IEG (2006) reports that eleven of 24 Bank-
supported European and Central Asian countries implemented multi-pillar reforms. However 
reforms in this region differ from those in Latin America, as multi-pillar systems in Europe 
tend to include a fairly substantial contribution-based PAYG pillar, for instance Hungary and 
Latvia.  Moreover reforms tended to be influenced by the NDC reforms of Sweden and Italy 
(particularly in cases when Sweden was also a donor country) and in Poland and Latvia, the 
first pillar was converted from PAYG to NDC.      
 Reform in Eastern Europe took place in a context of transition to a market economy 
system.  The financial and social crisis faced by these countries resulted in large informal 
                                               
78
 These are Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Sweden, an existing 
Member State, also introduced a mandatory DC funded pillar, but this is minor contrasted to its main pillar. 
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sectors and increased tax evasion, while large unemployment and redundancies from 
privatised firms worsened the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries.  In Poland and Hungary the 
number of contributors declined by 15% and 25%. Early retirement, in part, led to an increase 
in the number of pensioners by 10% in the Czech Republic, 20% in Hungary and a massive 
50% in Poland.
79
 This put the PAYG system of financing pensions seriously under question.   
 Setting up systems of individual accounts was seen as an effective means to boost 
financial sector development, help privatisation and spread the values of the market economy 
among the population.
80
  However several studies have noted that in many countries the 
preconditions for administering private systems were not in place and thus there were serious 
implementation problems.
81
 In Hungary and Poland, the number of workers shifting to private 
accounts exceeded expectations and reduced the contributions to the PAYG pillar, reducing its 
sustainability. Recently, in the wake of the financial crisis, some governments have been 
redirecting some of these contributions back. As in Latin America, administrative expenses are 
high
82
 and the industry consolidated in a way that a few companies started to dominate it.  
Markets for annuities proved to be difficult to set up; while pension funds ended up investing 
mainly in government paper (which coupled with the high administrative costs implied by 
their decentralised set-up reduced the potential benefits for contributors).  Moreover in some 
countries, the collection and the management of contribution records was affected by 
administrative and technical hitches.
83
   
 The move to DC implied that contributions and benefits of an individual became 
directly linked and this reduced redistribution possibilities. Progressive elements in pension 
formulae were removed or decreased, cases in point being Hungary and Poland.  This move 
also makes it crucial to have adequate crediting systems for periods during which an 
individual is prevented by circumstances, such as sickness, unemployment, training or child 
and adult caring, from contributing.  However, there is evidence that in many cases this was 
not prioritised.  Fultz and Steinhilber (2003) report that in Hungary contributors to personal 
accounts contribute 6% of their child care benefit to the pension system and their future 
pension benefits will be calculated as a simple return on this contribution. Since this is much 
less than the previous credits, carers will be worse off.    
                                               
79
 See Fultz & Steinhilber (2003).  
80
 See Wehlau & Sommer (2004). 
81
 See Kritzer (2002).  
82
 Whitehouse (2000) reports that countries with similar systems based on individual accounts with individual 
choice of provider have average charges that vary from less than 15% to more than 30%. 
83
 For a full assessment of these problems, see Fultz & Stanovnik (2004).  
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 In many cases, people had the option of staying within the old public DB-type PAYG 
system or move to the personal accounts pillar. Similar to what happened in the UK with the 
introduction of personal pensions in 1988, in many cases people who switched may have 
become less well off as a result. Chlon-Dominczak (2000) shows that surveys in Poland 
showed that ―most people felt they were well informed and that information on the pension 
reform was readily available‖, but then surveys often showed ―that the knowledge of the 
pension system was limited to slogans rather than a deep understanding‖. Moreover while 
there are indications of rational switching, there is ―some evidence that choices made were not 
based on a detailed understanding of the new system‖. The study also notes that ―a significant 
proportion of people simply joined the pension fund of the first agent they came across‖.  In 
recent years, there have been calls for individuals to be given the option to return to their 
previous pension arrangement, and in Slovakia government has allowed this possibility. 
 
b) NDC schemes 
Whereas the multi-pillar personal account systems are based on individual contributions being 
invested in financial markets, in an NDC system contributions are retained by the state and the 
financing structure remains essentially PAYG. However pension benefits are determined 
according to the DC formula, i.e. by the accumulated contributions at retirement.
84
 The rate of 
return faced under an NDC is centrally determined and reflects the formula chosen (normally 
growth in the wage bill), whereas under personal accounts returns depend on the investment 
choices made by individuals and the performance of financial markets. This has significant 
implications in that all face the same risks on return under NDC, and thus there is no income 
inequality resulting from individual choices.   
 The notional return in NDC can, however, differ from the return under PAYG, as NDC 
schemes attempt to ensure that the ‗assets‘ and ‗liabilities‘ of the system balance out.  For 
instance, in Sweden through the operation of the automatic balance mechanism, government 
reviews annually the system and if the calculation reveals an unfunded liability, the notional 
account interest (set at the growth of average wages) and the indexing of annuities is 
reduced.
85
  With the NDC system, the financial risk of changing economic and demographic 
factors is shifted from the state to current and future pensioners.  Besides this, the system also 
adjusts for longevity through changes in the annuity divisor, which converts the notional 
account upon retirement into pension benefits. As retirees‘ life span increases, the monthly 
                                               
84
 For an extensive explanation of how an NDC system operates, see Palmer (2006). 
85
 Note that in the wake of the recent economic crisis, most governments, though not the Swedish one, opted 
to ignore these mechanisms.  
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benefit declines unless individuals delay retirement.  Capretta (2006) reports for the Swedish 
system that ―based on mid-range demographic and economic assumptions, the Government 
projects that the life span adjustment will cut average monthly benefits for those continuing to 
retire at age 65 by 14% by 2055‖. Franco & Sartor (2006) report that ―the Government expects 
the automatic balance mechanism to be triggered only ‗a few times‘ over the next 15 years, 
thus only modestly cutting the rate of return applied to the notional accounts‖.   
 Countries that opted to adopt an NDC system seek to achieve financial sustainability 
without having to go through the costly process of fully funding pension promises. NDCs, in 
fact, operate on the same DC basis as personal account systems, with automatic stabilisers 
intended to keep expenditure consistent with the contributions received, but without the 
requirement of having to pay for implicit pension liabilities. Moreover NDC schemes are less 
expensive to administer than multi-pillar pension systems, in that they do not involve actual 
investment of funds.  This is not to say that multi-pillar systems cannot be organised in a way 
that reduces the administrative charges faced by contributors.  The Swedish pension system 
also includes a relatively small personal account component which due to its centralised 
organisation faces significantly lower costs than those in Eastern Europe.    
 
3.3 Studies which assessed the impact of reforms on pension system outcomes 
A substantial part of the literature which assesses pension reform focuses exclusively on its 
effects on government finances, or rather on spending on pensions. The problems with this 
approach will be dealt with in Chapter 4, but suffice it to say at this stage that it seems strange 
to be assessing changes to a system without evaluating what impact these will have on its 
capability to achieve its set goals.  However, despite the preponderance of studies on the fiscal 
effects of pension reform, there have been studies which have looked beyond this aspect and 
tried to look at how pension reform affects outcomes. This section will try to summarise the 
main types of study, through the use of a simple taxonomy.  
 
3.31 A taxonomy of studies of the impact of pension reform 
When attempting to assess the impacts of a pension system, there are two main considerations. 
Firstly the outcomes of a given set of pension rules will depend on the characteristics of the 
population which the system serves. Thus, for instance, a highly earnings-related pension 
system will have different effects on poverty alleviation when there is high income inequality, 
than it would if it applied to a population with low income inequality. Secondly, if one, on the 
other hand, holds constant the characteristics of the population served by a system, different 
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pension rules would have different outcomes. Stating the above considerations, slightly 
differently, changes in the achievement of the goals of a pension system may be brought about 
by either a change in pension system rules or by a change in the population served by it. 
 This suggests that there are two ways in which one might want to isolate the effects of 
pension systems. One could apply the same set of pension rules to populations with different 
characteristics or one could apply different set of rules on the same population.  If one is not 
concerned in isolating these two effects, another approach would be to assess changes in 
outcomes when both system rules and population characteristics change.  This suggests that 
studies can be broadly divided into three types, as can be seen in Figure 3.1.  Within these 
categories, one can adopt three different approaches, namely studying reforms in just one 
country, carrying out cross-country analysis of reforms and hypothetical reform simulations.       
 
Figure 3.1: A taxonomy of studies on the reforms‟ effects on pension system outcomes 
 
 
Same system, different 
populations 
Cross country studies 
Atkinson et al (2002) 
Soede et al (2004) 
Country-specific studies 
Bottazzi et al (2006) 
Bridgen & Meyer (2005) 
Bridgen & Meyer (2005) 
ILO (2003) 
Simulation studies 
Kotlikoff et al (2006) 
 
 
Same population, different 
systems 
Cross country studies 
ILO (2006) 
ISG (2006) 
Hering (2006) 
Martin & Whitehouse (2008) 
OECD (2007) 
Peaple (2004) 
Zaidi et al (2006) 
Country-specific studies 
Orban & Palotai (2005) 
Van de Coevering et al (2006) 
Simulation studies 
Falkingham & Johnson (1995) 
 
 
Different systems, different 
populations 
Cross country studies 
Dusek & Kopecsni (2008) 
Dekkers et al (2009) 
Economic Policy Committee (2006/09) 
Ferraresi & Monticone (2009) 
Soede et al (2004) 
Country-specific studies 
Fonseca & Sopraseuth (2006) 
Flood et al (2006) 
Goodman et al (2007) 
Harding (2006) 
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3.32 Studies assessing the influence of reforms in the pension system‟s structure 
The most frequently taken approach involves maintaining the population constant and 
modifying the pension system and ascertaining the implications of reforms.  This is the 
approach taken in ISG (2006) and OECD (2007) which estimate changes in replacement 
ratios
86
 (see Table 3.9).  Martin & Whitehouse (2008), on the basis of the OECD calculations, 
argue that the size of the pension promise has declined in many countries, and point out that in 
some countries which introduced a closer link between pensions and earnings – such as Italy, 
Poland and Slovakia – the drop has been mostly felt by those on low incomes. The authors 
argue that the reforms may lead to higher old-age poverty unless stronger safety nets are put in 
place. 
 
Table 3.9: Pension levels pre- and post-reform for low-income workers in 2046* 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
Austria 57.8 53.2 
Finland 45.9 45.1 
France 42.8 42.1 
Germany 39.7 32.0 
Hungary 55.7 55.6 
Italy 55.9 46.7 
Poland 54.0 41.2 
Slovakia 41.8 36.5 
Sweden 53.6 43.7 
UK 29.4 36.0 
* A comparison of the average (post-tax) pension benefit earned by individuals retiring at 65 on half 
median earnings with the post-tax  labour income  of workers on median earnings.   
Source: OECD (2007). 
 
 Hering (2006) also reports significant declines in replacement rates after the different 
kinds of reform put in place in Western Europe by 2004 (see Table 3.10).  Similarly Peaple 
(2004), in his study of pensions in the EU‘s six largest countries, finds large falls in 
replacement rates for France, Germany, Italy and the UK over the next 25 to 50 years.
87
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 A replacement ratio is the measure comparing pension entitlements to previous earning.   
87
 These studies of replacement rates look at a number of countries.  There are several studies which focus on 
one country. For instance, Borsch-Supan & Wilke (2006) looks at the reform in Germany.    
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Table 3.10: Projected pension reform outcomes in Western Europe, 2004* 
 State replacement rate State plus private replacement  
 2002 2050 2020 2050 
Refinancing     
Belgium 36.5 36.6 40.0 48.8 
Ireland 31.4 34.0 66.7 66.7 
Luxembourg 89.5 89.5 89.5 89.5 
Netherlands 32.6 32.6 70.0 70.0 
Retrenchment     
Denmark 41.7 33.6 45.1 68.9 
Finland 57.6 53.8 57.6 53.8 
France 65.0 56.8 65.0 56.8 
Greece 108.0 94.7 108.0 94.7 
Portugal 72.3 64.9 72.3 64.9 
Spain 88.6 83.0 88.6 83.0 
UK 16.6 11.4 66.6 61.4 
Restructuring     
Austria 74.3 66.9 74.3 66.9 
Germany 44.6 37.8 50.1 50.5 
Italy 79.6 64.6 79.6 84.1 
Sweden 57.0 40.1 70.9 54.4 
* The ratio of gross pension benefits for people retiring at 65 on median earnings to their previous 
level of labour income.   
Source: Hering (2006). 
  
 These studies, however, shy away from trying to assess quantitatively the effects of the 
estimated declines in replacement ratios, limiting themselves to qualitative statements on the 
possible implications or not delving into the issue at any great length.
88
 By contrast, Zaidi et al 
(2006) makes a first attempt at using the indicators developed as a result of the EU‘s open 
method of coordination (OMC) in order to assess future risks of poverty. They, first, estimate 
a relationship between aggregate replacement rates and the at-risk-of-poverty rates among EU 
Member States. They then extend the aggregate replacement ratios forwards on the basis of the 
trend in the average benefit ratios derived from Economic Policy Committee (2006), and using 
their estimated relationship between aggregate replacement ratios and the at-risk-of-poverty 
rates project the latter in the future (see Table 3.11).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
88
 ILO (2006) also assesses the impact of pension reforms in Baltic States by using comparisons of pre- and post-
reform replacement rates, but includes a fuller treatment of the possible effects of this decline in generosity on 
poverty rates.     
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Table 3.11: Projections of at-risk-of-poverty rates (%) for 65+, 2025 and 2050 
 Total Men Women 
 Now 2025 2050 Now 2025 2050 Now 2025 2050 
Belgium 21.0 21.3 24.6 20.0 20.3 23.4 21.0 21.3 24.7 
Denmark 17.0 19.5 19.8 16.0 18.5 18.7 18.0 20.6 20.9 
Estonia 17.0 30.0 44.0 7.0 19.4 32.8 22.0 35.4 49.9 
Spain 30.0 25.9 30.2 27.0 23.2 27.2 32.0 26.7 32.3 
France 16.0 24.1 29.5 14.0 21.7 26.8 17.0 25.2 30.6 
Ireland 40.0 33.3 35.9 34.0 27.8 30.2 45.0 37.4 40.4 
Italy 16.0 19.7 34.7 13.0 16.7 31.3 18.0 21.5 35.6 
Cyprus 52.0 52.1 45.3 48.0 48.1 41.8 55.0 55.1 48.1 
Latvia 14.0 22.7 29.9 7.0 16.3 24.0 17.0 26.0 33.5 
Lithuania 12.0 6.1 13.3 5.0 0.0 6.3 15.0 9.1 16.3 
Malta 20.0 23.5 43.6 19.0 22.6 43.6 20.0 22.9 39.3 
Austria 17.0 22.5 36.1 13.0 18.3 31.3 20.0 25.6 39.3 
Portugal 29.0 33.1 32.8 29.0 32.9 32.6 30.0 34.2 33.9 
Slovenia 19.0 23.3 23.6 11.0 15.4 15.7 23.0 27.0 27.3 
Finland 17.0 19.6 21.7 11.0 13.5 15.5 20.0 22.6 24.7 
Sweden 14.0 25.2 27.8 9.0 20.1 22.6 18.0 29.1 31.6 
Source: Zaidi et al (2006). 
 
 The authors conclude that ―the anticipated decline in generosity is expected to result in 
an increase in at-risk-of-poverty rates among the 65+‖. However they also caution that ―this 
analysis should, however, be treated with caution as it is based on the current relationship 
(between aggregate replacement ratios and at-risk-of-poverty rates) holding over time‖ and 
also because ―it is based on a limited number of countries and so results may not be 
statistically very robust‖. Another underlying assumption of the study, which the authors do 
not point out, is that it implicitly assumes that the population structure faced by pension 
systems in the future remains unchanged, and that the distribution of income stays constant. 
This may lead to incorrect predictions if systems are biased against particular groups, e.g. 
people with career breaks, and over time the importance of this group increases.  
 Most cross-country studies of pension reform have focused on looking at replacement 
rates before and after reform. However country-specific research has looked beyond simple 
replacement rates, particularly in the case of systemic reforms. While difficult to reproduce on 
a cross-country basis, such studies present interesting methodologies.  Orban & Palotai (2005), 
for instance, compare ―pension benefits that a typical old-age pensioner in a pure PAYG 
system would receive…with that received by the same individual in the multi-pillar system 
from the government (a reduced PAYG-benefit) and the private pension fund together‖ for 
Hungary. Their objective is to understand what rate of return on private pension contributions 
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is needed for individuals to remain as well off as if they had remained under the public 
scheme, and compare it with actual returns.  They conclude that the ―contingent liability 
arising from potential pressures on government to compensate pensioners for the losses they 
suffer as a result of poorly performing pension fund sector is 102% of GDP‖.  
 Another interesting approach is that taken in Van de Coevering et al (2006), which 
tries to estimate the economic and social welfare impacts of UK pension reforms, in particular, 
the impact of the introduction of a system of low-cost personal accounts on those who are 
currently not saving for retirement. It follows Pension Commission (2004) in arguing that 
individuals on different levels of income will require different replacement ratios (decreasing 
with the level of income). Personal accounts are held to improve individual's welfare as they 
should help people move closer to their 'target' replacement rate in two ways - (i) 60% of the 
contributions to personal accounts are assumed to be new saving and this makes a direct 
advancement towards achieving 'adequacy' of retirement income, (ii) 40% is switched from 
existing savings, but under personal accounts administrative costs are lower and so each £1 
transferred in more 'efficient' in terms of achieving the target replacement. However the 
authors caution that their estimates are highly sensitive to the assumptions on discount 
rates/rates of return on personal accounts and on the latter's management costs. Furthermore 
they are very dependent on the target replacement rates used.      
 By contrast, Falkingham & Johnson (1995) is an example of the simulation variant – as 
it does not study a legislated reform, but rather simulates the effects of a possible reform. The 
authors present the results of a modelling exercise which replaces the current (NI) pension 
system of the UK with a unified funded pension scheme (UFPS), whereby an individual builds 
up a personal retirement fund which is used to buy an annuity upon retirement, supplemented 
by a system of annual tax-financed capital transfers to people with low incomes or not in the 
labour market. They conclude that their proposed system would improve replacement rates 
while still costing less. However as the authors stress their comparisons ―are between a mature 
NI system and a mature UFPS‖ and this ―ignores fifty years or more of the transition between 
systems, and the costs involved in the transition process‖.             
 
3.33 Studies assessing the influence of changes in the system‟s population 
Another approach to analyse the effects of pension reform is to impose the same pension 
structure on different populations at a given point in time, or else look at the effects of a 
pension system on different populations at different points in time.  
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 Atkinson et al (2002) is an example of the former approach. The authors examine the 
implications of a European Minimum Pension (EMP) using a Europe-wide tax-benefit 
microsimulation model (EUROMOD) to determine the distributional impact of such a reform 
in five Member States (comprising 70% of the Union‘s population).  This minimum pension 
would take the form of a non-means tested income supplement if income from pension sources 
falls short of a specified level ―set at the same level in each country in terms of purchasing 
power parity exchange rates‖.89  As shown in Table 3.12, pensioners in the UK and Ireland 
would be the most likely to gain from the introduction of such a measure (between twice or 
three times more likely to benefit from this policy than pensioners in France and Germany), 
pinning this down to ―the relative generosity of existing pension payments compared with the 
EMP, and the coverage of the existing pension systems‖. 
 The authors, however, point out the difficulty in arriving at a conclusive assessment of 
setting this seemingly standard anti-poverty policy. The policy had ―a highly uneven effect 
across countries‖, despite that a common poverty line was used.90  In particular they concluded 
that ―different assumptions about the needs of different households, and about the comparison 
of purchasing power, can change significantly the priority attached to different groups and our 
view of the differential impact across European countries‖. The situation becomes even more 
complex if one wants to continue to track the impact of this policy over time, when the 
targeted poverty population can be expected to change significantly.  At least, the simulation 
of a non-means tested scheme simplifies matters a bit, as one does not have to worry about 
incorporating the impact that means-testing has on economic behaviour over time.     
 
Table 3.12: Aggregate impact of the EMP 
 France Germany Ireland Italy UK Total 
% of pensioner 
households who gain 
29.1 20.5 66.4 44.4 57.6 37.5 
Average % change in 
household income 
0.7 0.6 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.9 
Source: Atkinson et al (2002). 
 
 Soede et al (2004), by contrast, includes a simulation which is an example of how to 
impose the same pension structure on different populations at different points in time.  The 
authors, in one of their scenarios evaluating the future of European welfare states, look at how 
                                               
89
 Note that while the ‗absolute‘ level of this guarantee is equal across the five countries studied in this paper, the 
pension as a proportion of mean income is different. 
90
 Fisher (1970), a study of the adequacy of minimum old-age pensions across ILO countries, had warned ‗against 
the making of sweeping statements and generalisations or the ranking of countries in any but a formal sense‘.    
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ageing, by itself, would affect the levels of poverty, income inequality and government 
spending between 2000 and 2025. Essentially they evaluate what would happen were pension 
systems to remain unchanged over the next quarter of a century (ignoring already legislated 
changes to pension systems).  Their analysis shows that the cost of pension provision would 
increase significantly,
91
 while poverty and income inequalities would increase slightly.
92
          
 International comparisons are not the only example of applying a pension system‘s 
rules to different populations. In effect, any study that looks at the impact of a pension system 
on different subsets of a population does this. Of particular relevance are gender assessments 
of pension reform, particularly those of systemic reforms. ILO (2003), which looks at the 
gender dimension of social security reform in Central and Eastern Europe, is an example of 
such a study. It concludes that ―the first decade of transformation brought greater losses of 
pension protection for women compared to men‖.   
 Country-specific studies also present interesting variants of this approach. For 
example, Bottazzi et al (2006) examines the effects of pension reforms in Italy on different 
cohorts of workers, as changes were phased in.  They find that after the reforms the 
replacement rate of those with over 18 years of contributions before 1995 was relatively 
unchanged, but younger workers faced cuts of over 20%. Quite worryingly they find that 
while these workers ―have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform…the 
adjustment is far from complete‘ and suggest that ―in the coming decades a problem of 
inadequate savings could emerge for the cohorts most affected by the reforms‖.93  Bridgen & 
Meyer (2005) examine the savings level required by a group of seven ‗risk biographies‘ in the 
UK – such as people with child care responsibilities, intermittent employment, self-
employment and redundancy. In doing so, they show the extent to which the same pension 
system can fulfil its goals of income replacement and poverty replacement when faced with 
different individuals. This research indicates that individuals facing social risks ―face savings 
rates significantly above those currently paid by most employees‖ in order to guarantee an 
adequate income during retirement.     
 In another paper published in 2005, Bridgen & Meyer study the impacts of the recent 
shift in UK occupational pension schemes from DB to DC, by simulating the pension 
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 Contribution rates would need to rise by up to 6 percentage points for deficits not to widen.  
92
 However, interestingly, the situation in Mediterranean countries would show an improvement, on the basis 
of increased female participation in formal labour activity. 
93
 Ferrera (2006), while agreeing with the conclusion of most studies that younger Italian workers are particularly 
at risk, also adds that the Italian system will become ―more similar to the British system in terms of inequality‖ 
and this will put at risk the unskilled and women. He argues that ―if Italian workers could be made more familiar 
with the British situation, many of them would probably opt for sticking to the old system‖. 
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entitlements of five hypothetical employees assumed to be working full-time on average 
earnings.  Two of them are lifetime members of final-salary contracted-out occupational 
schemes in the private sector (but one of them changes jobs in line with the current average 
level of job mobility). Another two workers pay into typical occupational DC schemes, with 
one of them being contracted in the State Second Pension. The other worker is assumed to 
depend on the state alone.  The paper finds that there is a significant gap between the pension 
entitlements of workers with access to DB and DC schemes, but they are much better-off than 
those who depend on state pensions alone (who would end up in relative poverty).   
 Finally, one finds examples of studies which simulate possible changes in pension 
system rules on simulated populations. Kotlikoff et al (2006), for instance, examine ―the living 
standard impacts of immediate and permanent 30 percent and 100 percent cuts in Social 
Security benefits‖ to ―illustrate the dependency of the (US) population on Social Security and 
to help policymakers calibrate the cost to Americans of this form of policy adjustment‖.  They 
simulate their policy change on 14 stylised households that differ with respect to their marital 
status, annual labour earnings, assets, housing and college expenses. The main conclusion is 
that ―learning early that one‘s benefits are to be cut can make a big difference to a household‘s 
consumption-saving response and to the associated retirement living standard reductions‖. The 
cuts impact more dramatically on lower income households, with a 30% cut in benefits, that is 
first learned about at age 30, resulting in retirement living standards falling by one quarter for 
low earners, as compared to just 5% for the highest earners 
   
3.34 Studies assessing changes in both pension system‟s structure and population covered 
Dynamic microsimulation models monitor how changes in both the population and the 
structure of the pension system affect income distribution and poverty.  Population ageing has 
been one of the main factors behind the recent flourishing of this field.  Harding (2006), while 
describing the development of a dynamic microsimulation model for Australia, NATSEM, 
outlines 9 other models which have been used across the world to analyse effects of pension 
reforms. Dekkers et al (2009) show initial results from a dynamic microsimulation model 
(MIDAS) which is being developed for Belgium, Germany and Italy. The authors try to 
evaluate the impact on pension adequacy of recent reforms in these countries. They find that 
―in the three countries, the risk as well as the intensity of poverty pertaining to pension benefit 
recipients increases at first, and then decreases again‖. The size of the impact is strongest in 
Italy, most probably reflecting the stronger link between earnings and benefits introduced by 
the transition to an NDC system.        
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 However, to date, dynamic microsimulation models have been mostly used to conduct 
country-specific studies.  Goodman et al (2007), for instance, assess the prospects for 
pensioner poverty in the UK up to 2017-18 in view of the pension reform legislated in 2007. 
The authors find that despite that the private income of the elderly should continue rising 
significantly and in spite of the measures taken to increase state pension generosity, relative 
pensioner poverty will stop falling and will remain fairly stable.
94
 A similar example is 
Fonseca & Sopraseuth (2006) which looks at the distributional effects of pension reforms in 
France and Italy.  The authors find that both reforms redistribute welfare unevenly, with high 
skilled workers being the primary winners of the French reform, while unskilled workers and 
self-employed individuals are the main losers of the Italian switch to NDC.  Flood et al (2006) 
assess how the income of Swedish Baby Boomers should compare with that of other 
generations, particularly in light of the move towards NDC in Sweden. Their main suggestion 
is that there will be ―new and large poverty in Sweden among the very old in the future‖, but 
that the Baby Boom generation in Sweden should not get a dramatic reduction in income, 
immediately after retirement, especially if individuals delay retirement to age 67.  The authors, 
however, report that ―as time passes the indexation of the pension system erodes the 
purchasing power of public pensions, resulting in a lower relative earnings as well as a higher 
incidence of poverty amongst the old‖.  
 Soede et al (2004), by contrast, while not using dynamic microsimulation, develop a 
static model
95
 to study the distributive consequences of population ageing in six representative 
European countries,
96
 while simulating the impact of various pension reform policies.  
Basically the study utilises Eurostat‘s household projections till 202597 and imposes the 
current welfare system to show how inequality, redistribution and poverty rates change due to 
ageing.  The authors then simulate the effects of 4 scenarios (see Table 3.13): unchanged 
policies, achievement of Lisbon employment targets, pension reform scenario,
98
 institutional 
reform (countries make choices among 8 different policy options trying to maintain their 
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 However this study fails to take into account properly the positive effect that less tight eligibility 
conditions to qualify for the full Basic State Pension could have, as it assumes that individuals are constantly 
in employment.  In reality a lot of women stand to gain considerably.  
95
 As Soede et al (2004) point out, ―there are two possible approaches for exploring future poverty, income 
inequality and redistribution processes‖. The first, dynamic microsimulation involves a year-to-year 
estimation of income for each person in a survey based on their projected personal characteristics and 
tax/benefit systems. The second, static microsimulation ―implies the transformation of incomes according to 
projected average future income developments, diversified for each socio-economic group‖, with the sizes of 
the groups adjusted by reweighting in line with demographic projections.   
96
 The countries are Germany, France, UK, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands. They were chosen as being 
representatives of particular types of welfare systems.   
97
 Limiting the study to 2025 is a major weakness, as the peak of ageing occurs after that date. 
98
 This simulates the changes envisaged by EPC (2006). 
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regime type unchanged).  The study finds that current pension reforms should result in a 
significant change in inequality, but if countries opt to change their regime type by enacting 
broader reforms there would be a notable increase. The authors note that increasing labour 
participation helps improve the situation, but does not result in financial sustainability. They 
conclude that ―a policy focusing on financial sustainability is likely to lead to a substantial 
increase in poverty among the elderly in the future‖.  
 
Table 3.13: Poverty rates (%) among the elderly under various scenarios* 
  Unchanged 
policies 
Lisbon 
strategy 
Pension 
reform 
Institutional 
reform 
2000 2025 2025 2025 2025 
Netherlands 10 11 9 9 19 
Germany 13 14 13 15 21 
France 18 19 18 25 25 
Italy 20 24 22 26 24 
UK 28 28 28 35 41 
* These scenarios are respectively (a) unchanged policies – nothing (i.e. pension generosity, 
employment, etc) changes except demography; (b) Lisbon strategy – countries achieve the employment 
targets set in Lisbon; (c) pension reforms – the change in pension generosity set out in EPC (2006) 
takes place; (d) institutional reform: countries adopt a number of pension reforms intended to maintain 
their regime type unchanged.   
Source: Soede et al (2004). 
 
 Ferraresi & Monticone (2009) uses the same approach as Soede et al (2004) but extend 
the analysis to another four countries (Spain, Luxembourg, Latvia and Poland) and cover the 
period up to 2050. Their model is also superior in that it allows for the interaction between 
ageing and macroeconomic developments, and can be modified to reflect the latest 
demographic projections.  They find very interesting divergences between the projections of 
theoretical replacement rates made by the ISG and the pension spending projections made by 
the EPC, and show that despite reforms, and projected improvements in labour participation, 
contribution rates faced by future working age generations will have to rise substantially. 
  Another cross-country approach is taken in Economic Policy Committee (2006 & 
2009), which projects state spending on pensions for EU Member States.  These projections 
take into account both changes in the population of pension benefit recipients and also changes 
in pension systems structures, such as reforms to early retirement schemes, parametric changes 
to PAYG systems, and the like.  On the basis of these projections, the average benefit ratio 
was computed – relating the average pension to output per worker (an approximation of the 
average wage).  In the EU27 countries this is set to decline by more than a quarter by 2060.     
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 Dusek & Kopecsni (2008) study in an innovative way the effects of pension reforms 
since the 1990s in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They calculate what they call 
―the social security wealth‖ of different cohorts of workers by estimating the difference 
between the present value of expected future benefits and contributions promised to workers 
under pre-reform and post-reform legislation, and carry out the computation separately for 
men and women and for representative workers with different levels of education.  They find 
that the reforms ―affected different cohorts and education groups in quite peculiar ways‖. For 
instance, reforms in Hungary favour future working age individuals, while those in Slovakia 
cut the social security wealth of women, particularly those with low education, while raising 
the generosity of the system for young men with university education.
99
 
 
3.35 Considerations on the reviewed studies on effects of pension reform 
The main contribution of the reviewed studies is that they look more broadly at the effects of 
pension reform, beyond fiscal considerations, and try to delve deeper into the implications that 
policy changes might have.  These studies show the other side of the coin of pension reform 
(the one that has not tended to be the primary focus of most reforming governments) – by 
indicating how changes in pension systems or in the population served by the pension system 
could affect poverty risks and relative income conditions of the population aged 65+.  Static 
studies have sought to quantify the extent to which pension reforms could affect income 
conditions, while dynamic studies have qualified these results by providing feedback from the 
reforms and accounting for projected changes in population characteristics.  Moreover some of 
the reviewed country-specific studies were interesting as they shed light on the different kind 
of income risks faced by individuals affected by systemic pension reform.             
 That acknowledged, one is still left with a rather incomplete picture. As with the 
plethora of income survey data examined in Chapter 1, the evidence provided by existing 
studies on the effects of pension reform lacks structure and fails to provide a holistic 
assessment of reforms. In most cases, after going through these studies, one is left without a 
clear opinion of the link (if any) between the capability of a pension system to achieve its 
goals and the fiscal costs of it doing so.  In most studies, one fails to understand precisely the 
benchmarks against which to evaluate the impacts of reform.  These studies do not start by 
setting out the current achievements of pension systems, and assessing how reforms could 
affect these achievements. Rather, they tend to focus on one particular aspect, and so do not 
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allow one to get a complete view of the possible implications of reform. Only in a few cases, 
such as Hering (2006) and Soede et al (2004), is there an attempt to categorise pension 
systems,
100
 but even then, authors do not assess how reforms might change the relative 
achievements of each category.   
 In most cases existing studies fail to answer the crucial question which is of interest to 
policymakers – i.e. will the new systems prove long-lasting given the changes they introduce 
and their impacts on the achievement of pension system goals.  To answer such a question, 
one needs to understand better the interaction of future population characteristics (such as 
increased longevity) with reformed system rules; and compare this with the current situation, 
in order to understand where potentially risky departures from current system achievements 
might arise.  This requires a clear understanding of current system achievements, combined 
with clear measures of how these achievements could be affected by reforms.     
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has sought to describe the main changes in European pension systems which 
occurred since the 1990s. It divided reforms into two branches: parametric and systemic, and 
explained how these differ not in the implications on generosity or financial spending but 
rather in terms of the allocation of risk between the state and the individual. The Chapter also 
outlined the causes for the reforms, pointing out that in most cases the main considerations 
were financial (and in some cases reflected short-term financial problems). Conversely the 
impact of reforms on the capability of pension systems to achieve their aims has tended to be 
ignored.  This does not mean that there have not been studies trying to assess the welfare 
implications of pension system reforms. This Chapter has, in fact, reviewed several of these 
studies, but even these studies suffer from a number of problems, as very few have attempted 
to understand the link between system outcomes or how reforms could change the relative 
achievements of different types of pension systems. The following Chapter will show how this 
defect stems from the lack of a clear definition of sustainability, based on the goals which 
systems are set to achieve.  Any assessment of pension reform must start with clear 
benchmarks against which to evaluate the impact of reforms. Unless these benchmarks are set, 
it is difficult to understand the link between different system outcomes and judge 
comprehensively the effects of pension reforms, be they parametric or systemic. 
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4. Defining a broader concept of sustainability  
 
Having reviewed the pension reforms made in Europe since the 1990s and a number of studies 
on their effects, one feels that both reformers and those studying reforms had a very narrowly 
defined concept of sustainability, where adequacy is seen as a separate (and contrasting) aim 
to sustainability.  This Chapter will evaluate critically this sustainability framework, arguing 
that this criterion is seriously lacking as it fails to take into account the goals of pension 
systems and the reasons why they were established in the first place.
101
 By adopting a narrow 
vision of spending on pensions, this approach fails to take into account potential feedback 
effects on fiscal spending from the impact of reforms on pension system adequacy. This 
Chapter will seek to show that in order to assess pension reforms; one needs to adopt a much 
wider sustainability framework that encapsulates both pension system adequacy and fiscal 
sustainability.  In order to do so, this Chapter will review the various indicators currently in 
use to evaluate pension system adequacy, and relate them to the aims of pension systems. This 
will be used to develop a concept of social sustainability for pension systems. 
 
4.1 Defining sustainability 
While modern consumerist lifestyles seem to be propelling everyone to focus solely on 
the immediate present, policymakers and academics have increasingly become interested in 
being forward-looking and finding definitive solutions to problems and issues.  This has led, 
on the one hand, to a rapid expansion of modelling techniques (seeking to understand what 
might happen in the future) and on the other, to the development of a plethora of sustainability 
indicators. For instance, in public finance, not only has there been large interest in developing 
fiscal models, there also exists a significant literature on measures of fiscal sustainability (such 
as the cyclically adjusted budget deficit and generational accounting).  Pension policy has not 
been immune to these trends.  Spurred by the approaching ageing transition, academics and 
policymakers sounded the alarm about current pension systems.  The previous Chapter 
outlined how the PAYG scheme of financing pensions ran out of favour in the 1990s and 
policymakers around the globe started to conceive state pensions as a grave future risk. Higher 
projected spending on pensions was seen as clear evidence that current pension policies were 
not ‗sustainable‘.102         
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 Sustainability is usually conceived as a state which can be maintained over the 
foreseeable future.  In public finance, sustainability has been defined in many ways but the 
theoretical framework adopted by the different authors is underpinned consistently by a 
representative agent model where government has to fulfil an intertemporal budget constraint 
and, in every time period, a static budget constraint.
103
  Set out in this way, these constraints 
imply that to be solvent the present value of future surpluses must exceed that of future 
deficits enough to cover the difference between the initial debt and the present value of 
terminal debt. Under assumptions of rationality, the latter needs to be zero (as no one will 
want to hold government bonds at some infinite point in the future), and so this boils down to 
saying that future fiscal policy must ensure that the stock of debt is repaid.
104
 Caldarelli et al 
(2000) ―translate‖ this as ―those bills left unpaid by current generations must be paid by future 
generations…this is the hard message of the government‘s intertemporal budget constraint‖.      
 Public pensions have been singled out several times as being one of the main obstacles 
towards achieving long-term sustainability. Thus for instance, in October 2006, the European 
Commission published a communication to the European Council and the European 
Parliament where it noted that ―in the coming decades, the size and age-structure of Europe‘s 
population will undergo dramatic demographic changes…this will make it difficult for 
Member States to maintain sound and sustainable public finances in the long-term‖.105  Similar 
statements have been made by several international institutions, like the World Bank, IMF and 
the OECD. As a result, fiscal sustainability has tended to be the one measure of sustainability 
considered by policymakers when making reforms. 
 Hauner et al (2007) present the standard fiscal sustainability assessment of pension 
policies made by international institutions. The authors assess the (pre-financial crisis) fiscal 
sustainability for each G-7 country through two indicators (see Table 4.1).
106
 The ‗debt target 
primary gap‘ measures the difference between the actual fiscal balance and the fiscal balance 
required to reach a target level of gross public debt-to-GDP in a certain year. The 
‗intertemporal primary gap‘ measures the change in the fiscal balance required so that the 
present value of future balances is equal to the current level of debt – i.e. it measures what the 
current balance needs to be so that debt stays always at the current level.  This study suggests 
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that one should not just focus excessively on the size of projected increases in age-related 
spending. For instance, even though Canada faces a much higher rise in spending than the UK 
and the US, it requires very little fiscal adjustment on account of its pre-funding of pension 
promises and low starting stock of net debt. 
 
Table 4.1: Adjustment (% of GDP) required to achieve fiscal sustainability 
 Debt Target 
Primary Gap* 
Intertemporal Primary Gap* 
Net Debt Gross Debt 
Canada -0.5 -1.4 -2.2 
France -3.5 -3.4 -4.0 
Germany -2.1 -2.7 -3.0 
Italy -2.5 -1.7 -2.2 
Japan -9.0 -6.2 -7.9 
UK -3.6 -4.8 -4.9 
US -6.1 -6.9 -7.3 
Average -3.9 -3.9 -4.5 
* The „debt target primary gap‟ measures the difference between the actual fiscal balance and that 
required to reach a target level of gross public debt-to-GDP in a certain year. The „intertemporal 
primary gap‟ measures what the adjustment in the current balance needs to be so that debt as a % of 
GDP stays always at the current level, either in net or gross terms.   
Source: Hauner et al (2007). 
 
 Schneider (2009) is another example of this approach. The author argues that ―the 
larger the decrease in expected spending on public pensions in 2050 between two base years, 
the more successful a pension reform the country achieved (after controlling for other factors, 
such as demography)‖, and concludes that governments seem to be content with current levels 
of pension spending and only reform their pension systems ―when faced with the threat of 
escalating expenditures‖.  
 The approach of achieving sustainability solely by cutting future spending is, however, 
increasingly being seen as simplistic. While there is consensus that ageing populations are a 
challenge for pension systems, the achievement of reduced growth in pension spending cannot 
be seen as the definitive solution to ageing.  As Zaidi (2006) points out ―policy-makers need to 
remember that pensions were not introduced by chance‖.107  Spending on pensions is but a 
means to an end – the reduction of poverty and income replacement during retirement. Thus 
while spending is an important constraint, having low spending should not be elevated to the 
status of an objective. A pension system is not successful just because it involves little 
government spending – a successful pension system is that which achieves its goals with the 
least cost.  Thus when assessing reforms one cannot solely dwell on their impact on spending 
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but must rather look at a bigger picture that includes the impact of reforms on the capacity of 
the system to achieve its set goals.  
 Howse (2004) argues that most pension reformers are constrained by the belief that 
―the level of public expenditure as a proportion of GDP is already approaching the limits of 
political acceptability and economic efficiency‖ and that thus it is unfeasible to try to maintain 
the current situation by increasing taxes or pension contributions or by using public borrowing 
as a way of funding an increasing negative balance on the PAYG pension scheme. However, 
he argues that even if this were correct, this ―does not mean, of course, that the policy task is 
simply that of ensuring that these limits are not transgressed‖, but that ―the real problem for 
governments is how to ensure that people have adequate income in retirement without 
transgressing these limits‖.  By shifting the costs of providing retirement income off-budget, 
governments will have achieved nothing substantial. This is the main failing of standard fiscal 
sustainability measures. They fail to incorporate the feedback effects from pension reforms. 
Pension spending may be cut, but unless individuals accommodate this by lowering their 
standard of living during retirement or by finding alternative sources of income, the main 
effect of reforms could be to create pressures on other areas of government spending, resulting 
in no overall decline in total outlays.  
 This importance of this argument is increasingly being recognised. In its 2006 report 
on long-term sustainability, the European Commission notes that while declining pension 
generosity can contribute positively to fiscal sustainability, ―such a decrease may raise 
concerns about the adequacy of public pensions that could translate into pressure for higher 
public spending‖. The report also acknowledges that there is no great escape by simply 
reducing public responsibility and recognises that ―the risks to public finances will crucially 
depend on the reaction of individuals regarding their future retirement arrangements‖.108  Aon 
(2007) puts this more starkly; ―The state pension will be the primary source of retirement 
income for most Europeans. If this is inadequate, political pressure will be brought to bear on 
European governments. As old people form an increasingly large proportion of the population 
and have a higher propensity to vote in elections, this pressure will be difficult to resist.‖   
 Holzmann & Hinz (2005) present the revised World Bank position on pension reform, 
moving away from the three pillar approach championed by the Bank in the 1990s.  Besides 
the original three pillars, the Bank now recognises the need for two additional pillars; ― a basic 
(zero) pillar to deal more explicitly with the poverty objective and a nonfinancial (fourth) 
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pillar to include the broader context of social policy, such as family support, access to health 
care, and housing.‖ Also while beforehand the second pillar was seen as set up in close 
resemblance to the one in Chile, the Bank concedes that this individual savings account ―can 
be constructed in a variety of ways‖.  
 The paper also states that:  
―The primary goals of a pension system should be to provide adequate, affordable, sustainable, 
and robust retirement income, while seeking to implement welfare-improving schemes in a 
manner appropriate to the individual country: 
• An adequate system is one that provides benefits to the full breadth of the population that are 
sufficient to prevent old-age poverty on a country-specific absolute level in addition to 
providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption for the vast majority of the 
population. 
• An affordable system is one that is within the financing capacity of individuals and the 
society and does not unduly displace other social or economic imperatives or have untenable 
fiscal consequences. 
• A sustainable system is one that is financially sound and can be maintained over a 
foreseeable horizon under a broad set of reasonable assumptions. 
• A robust system is one that has the capacity to withstand major shocks, including those 
coming from economic, demographic, and political volatility.‖ 
 This broader concept of sustainability recognises that inadequate pensions are a source 
of unsustainability and carry with them the risk of reform reversal, particularly if their social 
impact turns out to be too high.
109
  This concept of a long-term solution through which the 
aims of the system continue to be achieved without putting excessive pressure on future 
generations of workers could be termed as ensuring the ‗social sustainability‘ of a pension 
system.  In this sense, an effective reform would result in the system being both financially 
sustainable and still able to achieve its set objectives, and capable of adjusting to shocks in 
longevity, financial markets and the economy.      
 Returning again to the revised World Bank stance on pension reform evaluation, one 
can adopt the concept of financial sustainability as meaning ―…the payment of current and 
future benefits according to an announced path of contribution rates without unannounced 
hikes in contribution rates, cuts in benefits, or deficits that need to be covered by budgetary 
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resources‖.110 Adequacy, in turn, ―refers to both the absolute level (preventing old-age 
poverty) as well as the relative level (replacing sufficient lifetime earnings) of retirement 
income that the pension system will provide.‖ As a result, ―the goal of any pension reform 
should be to ensure that all people regardless of their level or form of economic activity have 
access to the capacity to remain out of extreme poverty in old age and that the system as a 
whole provides assurances that those individuals who live beyond the expected norms will be 
protected from the ‗risk‘ of extreme longevity‖.111 
 This may seem a Sisyphean task, as ensuring fiscal sustainability and pension 
adequacy have been seen by most reformers as diametrically opposite goals. However, as 
explained above, both are complementary. Measures which reduce pension system adequacy 
below the socially sustainable level create fiscal pressures in the long-term, and vice versa. 
The two need to be considered in conjunction if policymakers are not to face pressures to have 
to go back on their tracks. Clear examples of this can be seen in Chile (where the Bachelet 
government addressed the poverty and redistribution issues of the Pinochet reforms) and in the 
UK (where the New Labour government ended up reversing prime elements of Thatcher‘s 
pension policy such as price uprating and contracting-out).
112
  The financial crisis has also led 
many Eastern European countries to reverse some of their previous personal accounts reforms.   
 Understanding the interdependence between the goals and constraints faced by pension 
systems is crucial to evaluate correctly the broader effects of reforms.
113
 Figure 4.1 presents 
this graphically. On the right side we have pension adequacy, capturing the twin goals of 
pension systems described in Chapter 1.  Policymakers need to consider the system‘s 
adequacy for the average voter – as if a system is not seen as beneficial by the electoral 
majority it would be voted out. Thus if a system in the future fails to generate adequate income 
smoothing, there would be pressure for alternative government support during old age.  
Similarly if a system is not seen as adequate to alleviate poverty, the political pressures that 
led to the setting up of transfers to elderly people during the early part of the 20
th
 century 
might re-emerge.  The presence of widespread poverty among the elderly in European 
countries would create pressures for other forms of state financial support. 
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Figure 4.1: A broader concept of sustainability 
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On the left, we have the constraint of pension systems – the need for intergenerational 
balance. A pension system cannot be judged as adequate simply in terms of the poverty 
alleviation and consumption smoothing it provides to the current generation of pensioners, but 
also on its impact on different generations.
114
 The standard discussions on fiscal sustainability 
look at the pressures governments face if they impose ever-increasing contribution rates to 
finance pension transfers. However another source of political pressures is the desire of 
adjacent generations to enjoy similar living standards. If a younger generation believes a 
previous generation had much larger pension transfers, it might pressure to reverse reforms.  
The pensions system‘s goals and constraints are interdependent. To ensure social 
sustainability, reforms need to take into account the four elements set out in Figure 4.1.  
Moreover reforms need to take into account of the uncertainty in external developments, 
particularly as regards future economic growth and longevity improvements.
115
  
 One potential stumbling block of this approach is that as Eckardt (2005) points out ―as 
long as no reliable prospective income indicators exist, which allow one to evaluate the effect 
of more structural changes on future benefits, the rather short-term policy-making process may 
further favour the principle of financial sustainability‖.  In this light the next section reviews 
currently available indicators to see whether they could serve as measures of pension adequacy 
as defined above.  
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4.2 Indicators used to evaluate pension system adequacy 
The capacity of a pension system to fulfil its goals has been assessed using a number of 
indicators - the most commonly used being replacement rates.  
 
4.21 Replacement rates as measures of adequacy of pension entitlements 
Kolitkoff (1999) argues that ―guaranteeing adequate income for workers when they retire…is 
the most important goal of pension reform‖ and that pensions ―should replace a reasonable 
fraction of pre-retirement income, i.e., they should be consistent with lifetime consumption 
smoothing‖. In fact, the most commonly used pension adequacy measure, the replacement 
rate, tries to ―assess how well older people can maintain their pre-retirement levels of 
consumption once they stop working‖.116 The most economically accurate measure would be 
one comparing someone‘s consumption pre-retirement with that post-retirement. Due to data 
unavailability, this is approximated by comparing incomes collected on a longitudinal basis.  
Goodin et al (1999), for instance, compute the ‗effective replacement rate‘ of public transfers 
in Germany, the Netherlands and the US by finding in national income surveys ―those people 
whose principal source of income in one year was market income and whose principal source 
of income in the next year was public-transfer income‖ and then ―calculate their income in the 
second (public-transfer-dependent) year as a proportion of their income in the first (market-
dependent) year‖.  Bardasi et al (2000) conduct a similar exercise for British individuals 
retiring 1991-97
117
, while Madrian et al (2007) deals with US Baby Boomers.  
 However, this direct measure of adequacy has its limitations. It is a historical measure 
– in that one needs to wait until retirement to be able to assess replacement rates. It is an 
individual measure and thus may not be representative of the whole population. It does not 
give information on future changes in pension rules – replacement rates would reflect rules as 
they related to that individual.  It is data-intensive and such longitudinal data are not usually 
available. It does not provide information on poverty alleviation - a replacement rate of 100% 
for poor individuals would seem generous but would still not reduce the risk-of-poverty.
118
 
Finally it is a single point-in-time indicator, and does not take longevity into account and how 
it affects transfers to the individual. 
 In order to surmount some of these issues, theoretical replacement rates are frequently 
resorted to. Thus, the Indicators Sub-Group (ISG) of the EU‘s Social Protection Committee 
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publishes ―the level of pensions as a percentage of previous individual earnings at the moment 
of take-up of pensions…for a hypothetical worker, with a given earnings and career 
profile…and by taking into account enacted reforms of pension systems‖, shown in Table 
4.2.
119
  In its ‗Pensions at a glance‘ (2005), the OECD present results for the pension for a 
hypothetical individual as a share of lifetime average earnings.  Similarly in the US, the Social 
Security Trustees Report includes sets of ‗policy model‘ estimates for hypothetical individuals 
– namely workers with average earnings equal to 45%, 100% and 160% of the average wage 
index, and someone who has earned the maximum taxable earnings throughout his career.
120
     
 
Table 4.2: Theoretical Replacement rates - ISG 
Gross replacement rate Net replacement rate 
  
At 
65   
After 
10 yrs   
At 
65   
After 
10 yrs 
Estonia  33 Estonia  30 Estonia  41 Estonia  39 
Lithuania  40 Belgium  38 Cyprus  52 Cyprus  45 
Belgium  43 Lithuania  39 Lithuania  55 Lithuania  49 
Germany  43 Cyprus  40 Finland  63 Poland  54 
Cyprus  46 Germany  41 Germany  63 Finland  55 
Denmark  49 Poland  44 Slovakia 63 Slovakia NA 
Slovakia 49 Slovakia NA Belgium  67 Germany  63 
Finland  57 Denmark  47 Denmark  71 Belgium  64 
Czech Rep 61 Finland 49 Sweden  71 Czech Rep 66 
Latvia  61 Czech Rep 51 Ireland  78 France  67 
Poland  63 Austria 54 Latvia  78 Denmark  68 
Austria  64 France 56 Poland  78 Latvia  NA 
Slovenia  64 Hungary 57 Czech Rep 79 Sweden  68 
France  66 Slovenia 60 Austria  80 Austria  70 
Hungary  66 UK 61 France  80 Slovenia  73 
UK 66 Ireland 63 Slovenia  82 Ireland  74 
Ireland  67 Portugal 65 UK 82 UK 76 
Sweden  68 Sweden 65 Italy  88 Portugal  80 
Netherlands  71 Netherlands 67 Malta  88 Italy NA 
Malta  72 Italy 68 Portugal  91 Netherlands  87 
Portugal  75 Latvia 68 Netherlands  92 Hungary  88 
Italy  79 Malta 72 Spain  97 Malta  88 
Luxembourg  91 Spain 82 Luxembourg  98 Spain  88 
Spain  91 Greece 86 Hungary  102 Luxembourg  98 
Greece  105 Luxembourg 90 Greece  115 Greece  99 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the magnitude of their replacement rate. Note that these 
replacement rates are worked out on a gross and net (of income taxes) basis for somebody who worked 
full-time for 40 years on average earnings, and retired at age 65. 
Source: ISG (2006). 
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4.22 Criticisms of theoretical replacement rates 
Blondell & Scarpetta (1999) was one of the first estimates of cross-country theoretical 
replacement rates. However the authors were quick to point out that ―there is no such thing as 
a single pension replacement rate in any national retirement scheme‖. This because even with 
the simplest case – flat-rate universal old-age pensions – the gross replacement rate will still 
differ for individuals as it is determined by their previous earnings, while net replacement rates 
will be affected by the progressivity of the tax system.     
 The fact that there is no single pension replacement rate poses significant hurdles to 
use theoretical replacement rates as pension adequacy measures. To be able to serve this 
purpose, one would need to know to what extent the hypothetical individual, for whom the 
replacement ratio is estimated, is representative of the average pension recipient.  For instance, 
the base ISG case specifies a single male on average earnings, employed full-time for 40 years 
uninterruptedly and retiring at 65.
121
  Leaving aside the issue of gender and marital status, the 
first problem with this base case is very few men work full-time for 40 years and then retire at 
65.  Eurostat estimates the average exit age from the labour force of men in the EU stood at 
61.4 in 2008, and that only 55% of men aged 55-64 were in employment in that year.  
Moreover, its Structure of Earnings Survey (SES)
122
 also indicates that earnings follow a 
pronounced age profile, rising rapidly at first before then dropping after age 60 (see Table 4.3).        
 
Table 4.3: Average annual wages broken by age across the EU 25 (Euros) 
All ages 30,920 
  
Aged less than 30 years 21,129 
Aged between 30 and 39 years 31,372 
Aged between 40 and 49 years 34,427 
Aged between 50 and 59 years 35,200 
Aged 60 years and over 32,432 
Source: SES 2002, Eurostat. 
 
 The ISG is aware of these problems of representativeness and in its first report on 
theoretical replacement rates noted that ―the choice of specific common assumptions about the 
hypothetical worker used for the calculation, such as the age of retirement and length of 
working and contribution period before retirement, inevitably implies that only a share of all 
possible situations are taken into account‖. Moreover when (as in the ISG) one is trying to 
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conduct cross-country analysis, one introduces further complications as imposing the same 
assumptions on the hypothetical worker ―across the 25 Member States will be more or less 
representative in each Member State‖. For instance, the 2006 ISG report indicates that less 
than 3% of Greek pensioners complete 40 contribution years before retirement and the average 
career length is 25 years. Thus while the pension system in Greece appears to be amongst the 
most generous, the poverty rate among the elderly is very high, as in reality people do not get 
that implied generous pension. In fact, only in 6 out of 25 countries, does one find that, on 
average, newly retired males contributed 40 years or more prior to retirement.  
 A further complication for cross-country exercises, such as that of the ISG, is the 
tendency to impose common economic forecasts. This can be a very important determinant of 
replacement rates, particularly for NDC systems and personal accounts-based schemes. For 
instance ISG (2006) set the long run rate of return at 2.5%. By contrast the wage assumptions 
for some countries, such as Poland, are set higher than this rate. As a result of these awkward 
assumptions, that imply dynamic inefficiency, the replacement rate of Poland‘s NDC and 
funded pension systems is shown to decline substantially over time.  In their contribution to 
ISG (2006), the Polish representatives noted that using a scenario based on historical data on 
rates of return and wage growth would result in a diametrically opposite result.    
 These problems with theoretical replacement rates are not specific to the EU.  Mitchell 
& Phillips (2006) assess how replacement rates computed by the US Social Security 
Administration (SSA) differ for actual and hypothetical earner profiles, using the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS)
123.  They find that ―replacement rates based on individual earnings 
lead to higher replacement rates for workers with the median HRS profile compared to the 
SSA medium scaled profile‖ (55% versus 48%). Using the HRS, the authors show that, on 
average, actual HRS workers have substantially lower earnings paths than the medium SSA 
hypothetical profile, and incorporating this would make the US system 15% more generous to 
the average worker than reported by the SSA.    
 Rettenmaier & Saving (2006) also question the replacement ratio definition used by the 
SSA. Firstly they note that ―if the real goal is to maintain consumption during retirement at 
levels comparable to pre-retirement consumption, pre-retirement earnings are not a very good 
guide‖ because ―fringe benefits comprise a growing share of pre-retirement compensation, 
particularly health insurance‖. Moreover they question the practice of computing replacement 
                                               
123
 The University of Michigan‘s HRS surveys more than 22,000 Americans over the age of 50 every two 
years. This longitudinal study covers a wide variety of issues, such as health and cognitive conditions, 
retirement plans, income and net worth.   
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rates by ―converting workers‘ past earnings into today‘s dollars using the rise in average 
wages over time‖ and instead argue that price indexing would be a more accurate measure of 
pre-retirement resources available for consumption.  
 Interestingly, there has been little discussion of a major problem of replacement rates – 
namely their limitation to being single point-in-time indicators.  Isolating incomes at a single 
point-in-time fails to take into account differences in longevity between generations, and also 
ignores how pension payments change over the period in retirement due to indexation. As 
OECD (2005) points out, these are very significant factors, particularly when comparing 
pension policy on a cross-country basis.  A country with low life expectancy could ‗afford‘ to 
pay higher replacement rates to its citizens while imposing the same financial burden on 
workers as a country with higher life expectancy.  Similarly a country where pensions lose 
their relative value significantly over time, can ‗afford‘ to pay a higher replacement rate at 
retirement than a country where pension benefits remain relatively constant.     
     
4.23 Moving beyond the theoretical replacement rate measure 
One could summarise the previous section by saying that theoretical replacement rates suffer 
from two problems; their being limited to a hypothetical individual who might not be 
representative, and their being abstract measures of system generosity that may not play that 
much a role in determining the living standards of individuals.  In fact, researchers that have 
sought to move beyond theoretical replacement rates have come up with two approaches; (a) 
create various hypothetical individuals in order to approximate the actual population, and (b) 
utilise alternative measures using data from general income surveys.    
 
a) Increasing the number of hypothetical individuals 
As already pointed out, the US‘ SSA typically presents results for workers with four different 
earnings levels.  Similarly in its ‗Pensions at a Glance‘, the OECD includes results for workers 
on six different levels of earnings, from half average earnings to two and half times average 
earnings.  This makes a lot of difference for countries where pension systems do not have a 
linear earnings-related profile, particularly those with flat-rate pensions. For instance while the 
net replacement rate for the UK is just 48% compared to an OECD average of 69% looking at 
average earners, for those on half average earnings the respective rates are 78% and 84%.  
 Nevertheless while this increases the usefulness of theoretical replacement rates, it 
does not resolve the problem with the representativeness of the assumptions of a constant 
relative earnings profile (with respect to the average), no interruptions in the career and 
117 
 
                    
differing entry or exit ages. In this light, the ISG mandated EU countries to also present 
variants of theoretical replacement rates that depart from these assumptions; namely variants 
of linear profile of earnings (where earnings grow linearly from 100% of average earnings to 
200%, and from 80% to 120%), a third earning profile with a concave earnings profile 
beginning at 75% of the average and ending at 105% so that working life average earnings are 
100% of the average, and a broken career variant where a worker contributes for two separate 
15 year periods with a career break of 10 years in the middle. Some countries also present 
additional variants, departing from the set macroeconomic assumptions.     
 However while useful, trying to understand the overall impact of a system by having 
more hypothetical individuals raises the problem of how to weight the different cases to have a 
synthetic indicator of adequacy. Similarly one would need to consider how the importance of a 
particular type of hypothetical should be treated over time.  
 
b) Using alternative measures of pension adequacy 
Forster & Mira D‘Ercole (2005), using OECD data on household incomes, compute ‗quasi-
replacement rates‘, defined as ―the mean disposable income of persons aged 66 to 75, relative 
to the mean disposable income of persons aged 51 to 65‖. A rather wider measure, which 
departs from the concept of replacement rates, involves computing the relative disposable 
income of the elderly compared with that of the rest of the population.        
 The ISG has also complemented its measure of theoretical replacement rates with a 
number of indicators from income surveys.
124
 These include the relative median income ratio 
between persons aged 65 years or more and persons aged 0-64 years and the median individual 
pension income of retirees aged 65-74 in relation to median earnings of employed persons 
aged 50-59 excluding social benefits other than pensions.  Another indicator developed by the 
EU Commission is the benefit ratio which relates the average public pension (computed by 
dividing spending by the number of beneficiaries) to the output per worker in that economy.
125
 
Table 4.4 shows that the ranking of the different countries using these four indicators varies 
widely. For instance, the Netherlands has the fourth-lowest median pension relative to median 
earnings, but then has the highest benefit ratio. Similarly Spain has the highest gross 
replacement rate, but its benefit ratio is sixth-from-bottom. 
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 European Commission (2006).   
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 Economic Policy Committee (2006).  
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Table 4.4: Various measures of pension adequacy used by the EU Commission 
  GRR   MP   RI   BR 
Estonia  33 Denmark  38 Cyprus  55 Lithuania  8 
Lithuania  40 Cyprus  42 Ireland  62 Estonia  11 
Belgium  43 Netherlands  42 Denmark  71 Latvia  11 
Cyprus  46 Finland  53 Finland  75 Hungary  13 
Denmark  49 Latvia  54 Belgium  76 Ireland  14 
Finland  57 Austria  58 Estonia  76 Spain  17 
Latvia  61 Portugal  58 Portugal  76 Belgium  18 
Austria  64 Belgium  61 Spain  77 Malta  18 
Slovenia  64 Ireland  63 Sweden  77 Portugal  19 
France  66 Lithuania  63 Latvia  80 Slovenia  19 
Hungary  66 Spain  63 Netherlands  84 Denmark  20 
Ireland  67 Luxembourg  67 Hungary  87 Finland  20 
Sweden  68 Malta  67 Slovenia  87 Italy  20 
Netherlands  71 Sweden  67 Lithuania  89 Austria  22 
Malta  72 Estonia  68 France  90 France  24 
Portugal  75 Slovenia  68 Malta  90 Luxembourg  24 
Italy  79 Hungary  71 Austria  93 Cyprus  26 
Luxembourg  91 France  72 Italy  95 Sweden  26 
Spain  91 Italy  74 Luxembourg  101 Netherlands  29 
Note: GRR – gross replacement rate, MP – median pension relative to median earnings, RI – relative 
income of 65+ to that of working age, BR – benefit ratio. A number of EU countries had to be excluded 
due to them having an incomplete set of indicators.  
Source: EPC (2006), ISG (2006), European Commission (2006). 
 
 To surmount the issue of having no link between poverty and replacement ratios, the 
OECD suggests using ‗the relative pension level‘. This indicates ―what benefit level a 
pensioner will receive in relation to the average wage earner in the respective country‖.126  To 
account for future developments in pension entitlements, the OECD uses ‗pension wealth‘. 
The latter takes into account life expectancy, retirement ages and the indexation of pension 
benefits. Essentially one computes pension entitlements for all the years that an individual can 
expect to live
127
 and discounts them. This discounted flow is then divided by economy-wide 
average earnings. Thus, for example, in a country where pension wealth is 10, the hypothetical 
individual can expect to receive flows that are equivalent to 10 years of average earnings.
128
   
 By contrast, the ISG seeks to address the issue that with replacement rates one is 
making a single point in time comparison, by supplementing its base case results with an 
indicator of the replacement rate for the hypothetical individual ten years following retirement. 
In many cases, the decline is quite substantial, as shown in Table 4.2.  
                                               
126
 See OECD (2005). 
127
 Noting that if entitlements are not indexed to earnings, their generosity drops in relative terms. 
128
 Chapter 5 will include a more comprehensive review of the pension wealth indicator. 
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 Dynamic microsimulation models have been used to estimate the original ‗economic‘ 
conception of pension adequacy – i.e. they should enable one to maintain an optimal 
consumption level.  For example, in the US, the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2006), 
in order to improve the information available to individuals beyond the synthetic replacement 
rates provided by the SSA, has developed a simulation model that aims to ―produce a far more 
inclusive and refined projection of likely retirement income‖.  The model projects private 
pension income, Social Security benefits and net housing equity for Americans born between 
1936 and 1965, and then at retirement ―simulates 1,000 alternative life paths for each family 
unit to assess whether the retirement accumulations will be sufficient to pay for both basic 
(deterministic) and health-related (stochastic) expenditures for the simulated life-path‖.  
Similarly in the UK, the Department for Work and Pensions has developed Pensim2 in order 
to simulate the income of pensioners, particularly to estimate the future distribution of 
pensioner incomes and the possible distributional effects of changes to the pension system.
129
            
 Another interesting development that integrates longitudinal studies and 
microsimulation is Frommert & Heien (2006). They describe preliminary results from two 
detailed surveys carried out in Germany to acquire information on individual work status and 
provisions for old age and life courses. In a second step, the individual pension entitlements of 
respondents are matched with administrative records in order to ascertain the validity of the 
collected information on past life courses and pension provisions. Finally, the individual work 
biographies are projected to retirement age using a microsimulation model, taking into account 
such events as unemployment, long-term illness and caring responsibilities.      
 Hurd & Rohwedder (2008) propose as an alternative to theoretical replacement rates, 
what they call ―the wealth replacement rate‖. This involves simulating consumption paths over 
the remaining life for a household sample observed after retirement, and then assessing 
whether the resources available to each household could support this consumption path. This 
approach not only relies on longitudinal data (very difficult to have on a consistent cross-
national basis) but is also very data intensive. 
 Finally, Borella & Fornero (2009) propose the ―comprehensive replacement (CORE) 
rate‖ - ―the ratio between net disposable income when retired and net disposable income when 
active‖. Income includes wages, self-employment and private income, as well as cash benefits 
from the state. They use survey data to compute current estimates and use projections to 
extend this to 2050. They find that ―on a comprehensive basis, different countries provide for 
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 For more details on Pensim2 see Emmerson et al (2004). 
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almost the same retirement income in relation to pre-retirement income in their own way, as it 
is the composition, much more than the level, that varies across countries/systems‖. On the 
basis of the ISG (2006) projected evolution of theoretical replacement rates they find that 
CORE rates will remain stable in many EU countries (like Germany and the UK), fall 
substantially in France and Poland and improve significantly in Hungary.   
 
4.3 The link between adequacy measures and pension system goals 
The above discussion raises some important points. Though there is great interest in measuring 
pension adequacy, there has not yet been a systematic attempt to define what indicators should 
be measuring. There appear to be two lines of thought; (a) defining adequacy in relation to 
someone‘s previous earnings, (b) assessing adequacy in relation to contemporary income.  
Both concepts are valid – the first reflects the system goal of consumption smoothing while 
the latter reflects the goal of poverty alleviation. The other major undecided point is whether a 
measure should capture the theoretical generosity of a system or else the actual generosity of 
the system.  Some would argue that a measure of generosity needs to keep the metric constant 
and look at how a system performs for a standard person under unchanged conditions. This is 
partly justified in that actual economic behaviour will be affected by generosity (so workers in 
Greece have shorter working lives because their system provides incentives for them to do 
this). However it is debatable how much such a theoretical measure is useful to study how 
pensions affect pensioner poverty.  
 An indication of the limited representativeness of the ISG replacement rate is that fails 
to explain the gap between the risk-of-poverty of the elderly and that of the 15-64 population, 
see Figure 4.2.  Conversely, as can be seen in Figure 4.3, there is a good degree of correlation 
between the gap in poverty rates and the level of relative income. This correlation remains 
relatively strong even when one excludes the data for Ireland and Cyprus, the two points at the 
far right of the cross-plot. The problems faced by the theoretical replacement rate become also 
very evident when one considers that countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, which all 
have a relatively significant positive gap in poverty rates, are shown to have a very high 
theoretical replacement rate while income surveys reveal that the median pension is relatively 
low.
130
 If measures of pension adequacy are meant to shed light on the risk-of-poverty among 
the elderly, such considerations are of particular relevance.   
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 There is a gap of 45 percentage points between the theoretical replacement rate and the median pension 
for Greece, a gap of 28 percentage points for Spain and 17 percentage points for Portugal.  
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Figure 4.2: Gross replacement rate against the gap in the at-risk-of-poverty rate (2005-07) 
y = -0.28x + 65.26
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Note: The gap in risk-of-poverty measures the (percentage point) difference between the risk-of-
poverty faced by the 65+ and that faced by the 15-64. The gross replacement rate is the percentage of 
former wages replaced by pensions for a hypothetical full-career worker. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07) and ISG (2006). 
 
Figure 4.3: Relative income ratio against the gap in the at-risk-of-poverty rate (2005-07) 
y = -0.89x + 83.96
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Note: The gap in risk-of-poverty measures the (percentage point) difference between the risk-of-
poverty faced by the 65+ and that faced by the 15-64. Relative income compares the median income of 
the 65+ with that of the 15-64 in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
 
 The adequacy measure to be adopted depends crucially on the researcher‘s aims. 
Someone interested in looking at poverty trends would define a replacement rate in terms of 
current average earnings of all workers and adjust it for the particulars of the typical retiree (or 
adopt a number of cases to approximate the characteristics of the recently retired population). 
A researcher looking at retirement incentives could stick to a theoretical replacement rate 
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worked out for a hypothetical worker.  More crucially if one is concerned about the overall 
adequacy of pension systems, one cannot simply restrict analysis on a single-point-in-time 
measure like replacement rates, particularly given the impact that longevity improvements 
have on both pension system aims and constraints.                 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has sought to develop a new concept of sustainability which goes beyond the 
standard fiscal sustainability notions adopted by most pension reformers.  In fact, this Chapter 
argued that fiscal sustainability cannot be achieved without ensuring pension system 
adequacy. Ageing will increase the need to have adequate retirement income, and simply 
placing such provision off the government budget is no guarantee that state spending will not 
increase. This is evidenced by the clear change in the World Bank‘s stance on pension reform, 
which now acknowledges that a reformed pension system needs to still ensure poverty 
alleviation and income replacement for broad sections of society. Besides striving towards 
these twin goals, future pension systems need to generate intergenerational balance, both in 
terms of the size of pension transfers to adjacent generations and the contribution rates 
required to finance these transfers.  
 A reformed pension system needs to be assessed jointly against these four criteria.  By 
contrast, up to now, evaluations of pension reform have either focused on spending 
considerations or on effects on replacement rates.  The latter have been widely used as 
measures of pension system adequacy. However, as has been shown above, they suffer from a 
number of important deficiencies, such as lack of representativeness and being limited to 
single point-in-time comparisons.  In order to really assess pension system adequacy, one has 
to move beyond theoretical replacement rates, adopt different definitions and other indicators, 
particularly as they seem not to explain differences in the risk-of-poverty among different 
European countries. The next Chapter will seek to develop four indicators against which to 
assess simultaneously poverty alleviation, income smoothing, fiscal sustainability and 
intergenerational balance, thus enabling a multi-faceted evaluation of pension reforms. 
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5. Developing a multi-faceted framework to assess                                                
the sustainability of pension reforms  
 
The previous Chapter proposed that pension reforms need to be assessed jointly against four 
criteria; namely the future ability of the system to achieve poverty alleviation and consumption 
smoothing, the size of pension transfers for different generations and the contribution rates 
required to finance them.  It also suggested that theoretical replacement rates would need to be 
modified to be able to enable this multi-faceted analysis.    
 This Chapter will propose how this can be done using estimates from the APEX 
pension entitlement model developed by the OECD. This model, which was developed 
explicitly with cross-country comparisons in mind, has been used in OECD, EU and World 
Bank publications on pension policy. Moreover, although not used officially in the ways 
proposed below, its flexibility enables the use of results in innovative ways that go far beyond 
the standard theoretical replacement rates comparisons.  In conjunction with other data, it can 
be used to modify theoretical replacement rate indicators to remedy some of the defects 
described in Chapter 4. After describing APEX in brief, this Chapter will set out the four 
indicators underpinning the proposed multi-faceted evaluation of pension reforms.  However, 
while this Chapter contains some results from APEX, estimates for the four sustainability 
indicators will be presented fully in Chapter 6.  
    
5.1 The OECD’s APEX Model 
The OECD has for several years been involved in the research and analysis of pension 
policies. This interest culminated in 2005 with the first issue of ‗Pensions at a Glance‘, a 
publication aimed at assessing public pension policies across OECD countries.  This 
publication is based on results from the APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across 
Countries) model, adopted by the OECD. Officials from the countries that are modelled collect 
and send information on their countries‘ pension and tax systems at the OECD‘s request.  
Delegates to the OECD Working Party on Social Policy (who are officials from the countries 
modelled) advise on modelling procedures and the development of indicators, provide 
comments on drafts of the OECD‘s reports and validate results.  This model has been used for 
the World Bank‘s ‗Pensions Panorama‘ publication which extended the analysis to 53 
countries, including some low and middle-income countries.  Furthermore, the model has now 
been adopted by the EU Commission as part of the open method of co-ordination (OMC) in 
pensions, to help calculate one of the pension indicators monitored by its ISG – namely the 
prospective change in theoretical replacement rates. 
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 APEX calculates several pension indicators, under a range of different 
assumptions
131
, for hypothetical individuals, such as:  
• Replacement rates in gross and net terms (pension benefit expressed as a percentage of 
pre-retirement earnings; ratios are calculated both excluding and including employers‘ social 
security contributions);  
• Pension value (pension benefit expressed as percentage of average wage, net or gross);  
• Pension wealth (discounted stream of future pension payments using data on country-
specific life expectancy) in both gross and net terms. 
 The indicators assume an individual has earnings which are a constant ratio of average 
earnings in each career year. Indicators are provided for a continuous range of earnings‘ levels 
from 50-250% of the average wage (set according to the OECD‘s harmonised definition of an 
average worker).
132
  The model includes the most important mandatory and quasi-mandatory 
private-sector occupational pension schemes in each country (see Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1: Pension schemes included in APEX calculations  
  Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 
Austria Targeted Earnings-related   
Belgium Targeted Minimum Earnings-related  
Cyprus Social assistance Earnings-related   
Czech Rep Basic Earnings-related   
Denmark Targeted Basic ATP DC 
Estonia Basic Earnings-related DC  
Finland Targeted Earnings-related   
France Targeted Minimum Earnings-related Occupational 
Germany Social assistance Earnings-related   
Greece Targeted Earnings-related Supplement  
Hungary Minimum Earnings-related DC  
Ireland Basic    
Italy Social assistance Earnings-related   
Latvia Minimum Earnings-related DC  
Lithuania Basic Earnings-related DC  
Luxembourg Minimum Basic End-of-year Earnings-related 
Malta Targeted Basic Earnings-related  
Netherlands Basic Occupational   
Poland Targeted Earnings-related DC  
Portugal Minimum Earnings-related   
Slovakia Minimum Earnings-related DC  
Slovenia Targeted Minimum Earnings-related  
Spain Targeted Earnings-related   
Sweden Targeted Earnings-related DC Occupational 
UK Targeted Pension Credit Basic Earnings-related 
Source: OECD APEX User guide. 
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 Assumptions on macroeconomic developments, such as inflation, can be set according to the wishes of the 
researcher, while mortality rates as projected by Eurostat and the UN can be used alternatively. 
132
 This is explained in the OECD‘s ‗Taxing Wages‘ publication. 
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 The model, written in STATA, has been provided to the author by the OECD for the 
purposes of conducting this research.  Although research using this model has been published, 
only officials from the OECD, World Bank and the EU Commission have direct access to this 
model.  Thus the use of this model, validated by national governments but set up centrally by 
an international institution, for purely academic purposes presents an interesting innovation. 
The fact that the model was expressly built to enable cross-country comparisons is a big 
advantage.  Moreover since this model will be kept updated along the years, the proposed 
indicators could be updated regularly. Finally, the fact that this model is already in widespread 
use among international institutions shows its value for policymaking purposes, and presents 
interesting prospects for the future use of the proposed indicators.  
The version of APEX used in this research is based on the policy parameters for old-
age pensions legislated in each country in 2006 (including reforms to be implemented at a later 
date). It further assumes that the tax system in place in 2006 will remain in place, with tax and 
social security thresholds being up-rated in line with earnings. The author has modified APEX 
to reflect pension reforms enacted in Germany and the UK since 2006. Note that the cuts in 
generosity legislated in Hungary in mid-2009 were not modelled.  
 
5.2 Pension indicators available using APEX 
One of the prime advantages of APEX is that when it was being set up in the mid-2000s, the 
modellers also included parameters of previous pension systems for those countries which had 
undergone considerable reforms during the 1990s. These include ten EU countries, namely 
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK. 
The modelling of the pre-reform and post-reform pension systems in these countries presents 
an excellent research opportunity.  Their welfare systems are significantly different and 
include examples of all the usually quoted system typologies and also that developed in 
Chapter 2. This selection includes countries which made parametric reforms (Finland, Austria, 
France, Germany, UK), those which introduced NDC systems (Sweden, Poland, Italy), and 
those which introduced a personal accounts system (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). Thus they 
represent well the spectrum of reforms carried out in Europe described in Chapter 3.     
 These ten countries account for 61 million of the 86 million people in the EU27 who 
currently are aged 65+, 71% of the total. By 2050, according to Eurostat baseline population 
projections, they will have an elderly population of 100 million, 68% out of the total 148 
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million in the EU27.  Thus an analysis of the reforms enacted in these countries sheds 
substantial light on the future of pension provision in the EU. 
 In this section, we will provide examples of the main three types of APEX indicators, 
chosen in relation to three of the social sustainability dimensions described in Chapter 4: 
1. Poverty alleviation adequacy – Change in the net pension level for men who prior to 
retirement earned half mean wages. 
2. Income smoothing adequacy – Change in net replacement rate for men who prior to 
retirement earned the mean wage. 
3. Intergenerational balance – Change in net pension wealth for men who prior to 
retirement earned the mean wage.   
 We will be comparing the first two indicators with arbitrary benchmarks, intended to 
capture possible objectives.  The net pension level indicator for those earning half the mean 
wage will be compared with an entitlement equal to 35% of the average wage.
133
  The net 
replacement rate for those retiring on the average wage will be compared with a benchmark of 
60% of previous income.  All indicators are assessed at 2005 and 2050. When looking at 
pension wealth, projected changes in mortality will be taken into account, i.e. individuals will 
be assumed to live longer in the future.  
 
5.21 Evaluating poverty alleviation 
A possible measure of the poverty alleviation function is the net pension level for those on low 
incomes (here defined as people previously earning half the mean national wage). Note that 
the net pension level is computed by comparing the pension entitlement upon retirement (after 
a full career since age 20) with the average wage in that economy. Thus the indicator estimates 
the relative living standard immediately after retirement of people depending solely on 
mandatory pensions. Table 5.2 shows the pre- and post-reform net pension levels for men on 
low incomes in 2005 and in 2050, and the difference between these and the threshold of 35% 
of current average wages.  These estimates indicate that at present mandatory pensions provide 
a net pension level equal to 35% in all the countries surveyed, except for the UK. Austria and 
Italy have the highest surpluses. Pension reforms appear to have led to the worsening in 
poverty alleviation adequacy in many countries.  The worst development appears to have been 
in Poland, where policymakers introduced personal accounts and an NDC first pillar. Sweden 
and Italy‘s new NDC systems also result in lower net pension levels. The tighter linking of 
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 Chapter 6 will expand on the choice of this benchmark. At this point, suffice to say that this is a proxy for 
the poverty threshold adopted by the EU – which is 60% of median disposable income. 
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benefits to contributions is projected to have a negative impact in Austria, Slovakia and 
Germany. By contrast, in Hungary and the UK generosity improved, while reforms in France 
and Finland have left benefit levels for the lower income group practically unchanged. 
 
Table 5.2:  Net pension level of men previously earning half mean wages 
 Pre-reform 
(2005) 
Surplus  
(2005)* 
Post-reform 
(2050) 
Surplus  
(2050)* 
UK 29.4 -16% 39.0 11% 
Germany 39.7 13% 34.6 -1% 
Slovakia 41.8 19% 35.5 1% 
France 42.8 22% 42.1 20% 
Sweden 44.7 28% 39.0 11% 
Finland 45.7 31% 46.0 31% 
Hungary 45.7 31% 50.5 44% 
Poland 50.0 43% 35.6 2% 
Italy 55.9 60% 46.7 33% 
Austria 57.8 65% 53.2 52% 
Note: Countries ranked according to the size of the surplus pre-reform.   
* Surplus between net pension level and 35% benchmark expressed as a percentage. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
  
5.22 Evaluating income smoothing adequacy 
The starting situation is relatively similar when one looks at net replacement rates (i.e. pension 
entitlements at retirement compared with the previous wage income for that individual, net of 
income tax and social security contributions) for those on the average wage. Net replacement 
rates, in fact, currently exceed the 60% benchmark in all countries except the UK.  
 
Table 5.3: Net replacement rate of men earning the average wage 
  Pre-reform 
(2005) 
Surplus  
(2005)* 
Post-reform 
(2050) 
Surplus  
(2050)* 
UK 41.1 -32% 43.9 -27% 
Sweden 72.5 21% 60.3 0% 
Finland 72.9 22% 70.7 18% 
Poland 76.0 27% 68.6 14% 
Slovakia 76.4 27% 70.9 18% 
France 78.1 30% 63.1 5% 
Germany 79.5 33% 61.7 3% 
Hungary 88.2 47% 101.0 68% 
Italy 98.6 64% 77.9 30% 
Austria 99.5 66% 90.9 52% 
Note: Countries ranked according to the size of the surplus pre-reform.   
* Surplus between net replacement ratio and 60% benchmark expressed as a percentage 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 The reforms impact significantly on most systems‘ income replacement role. The 
‗surplus‘ over the 60% benchmark drops significantly, particularly in Germany, France and 
Italy.  Slightly less pronounced drops are observed for Sweden and Poland.   
 
5.23 Evaluating intergenerational balance 
The most useful indicator available in APEX is pension wealth - the discounted stream of all 
pension payments during retirement.  It is expressed as a multiple of the average wage – e.g. a 
pension wealth of 10 means that at age 65 the individual can look forward to discounted 
pension transfers equal to 10 times the current average wage.  The benefit of this indicator, 
compared to replacement rates or pension levels, is that it captures the length of time during 
which pensions will be paid and also any change in the relative value of pensions over time.
134
   
 Table 5.4 shows the net pension wealth, expressed in terms of the current average 
wage, for individuals retiring at age 65 on mean wages after contributing for 40 years – or the 
expected total pension transfer at point of retirement after a full career.
135
  Given that 
replacement rates and pension levels are generally set to decline, it may be surprising that net 
pension wealth is not projected to drop in many countries. However one must consider that 
between 2005 and 2050, life expectancy will have increased significantly and in most 
countries the enacted increase in state pension age is not high enough to offset this.   
 
Table 5.4: Pre- and post-reform net pension wealth of men previously on mean wage* 
 Pre-reform  
(2005) 
Post-reform  
(2050) 
UK 4.1 4.8 
Poland 6.1 7.2 
Sweden 7.0 6.9 
Finland 7.1 8.0 
Germany 7.3 6.5 
Austria 9.2 9.9 
France 9.3 8.8 
Hungary 9.3 12.3 
Slovakia 9.5 9.3 
Italy 10.0 9.6 
Note: Countries ranked according to the size of the pre-reform pension wealth of men. 
* Expressed in terms of the contemporary average wage.   
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 With price indexation, an entitlement defined in relation to the average wage declines steadily over time, 
as prices tend to grow more slowly than wages. Moreover in countries with sustainability factors, projected 
changes in dependency ratios also decline the relative generosity of pensions over time. 
135
 Note that these calculations are based on Eurostat‘s mortality projections.   
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5.3 An alternative approach to measure the financial sustainability of pension systems    
This section will describe the theoretical underpinnings of the approach taken in Chapter 6 to 
assess the financial sustainability of current and future pension promises.  No results are 
presented here.          
 The usual approach taken to measure the financial sustainability of pension systems is 
macroeconomic fiscal modelling.
136
  This involves making projections of future spending on 
state pensions on the basis of projected demographic and macroeconomic developments.  
 While projected spending on state pensions as a percentage of GDP gives an indication 
of the economic resources being transferred to pensioners, it does not in effect capture the 
financial burden being faced by working generations. Thus some studies
137
 focus on the 
contribution rate which future generations of workers need to pay to finance the projected 
spending on state pensions. The idea here is that in terms of financial sustainability what 
matters is whether the contribution rate will be deemed acceptable by future workers and not 
be too high a disincentive.  
 The mathematics of pension systems is fairly simple.  In any pension system,
138
 the 
following identity holds: 
Total resources transferred to pensioners = Total resources transferred from 
contributors………(1) 
This can be rewritten as: 
Average pension X Number of pensioners = Average Contribution X Number of 
contributors..…(2) 
Both the average pension and the average contribution can be defined in relation to the 
average wage. This reduces identity (2) to: 
Gross pension level X Number of pensioners = Contribution rate X Number of 
contributors…..(3) 
Rearranging identity (3), one has: 
Contribution rate = Gross pension level X System dependency ratio……..(4) 
where the system dependency ratio is the number of pensioners divided by the number of 
contributors. 
                                               
136
 See for example EPC (2006). 
137
 For instance, Soede et al (2004). 
138
 In a PAYG system, total spending must be equal to contributions plus other government revenue or 
borrowing. In a funded system, what changes is that the transfers are conducted through sales of financial 
assets between generations, rather than through taxation or government borrowing. 
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 Thus the higher the pension and the higher the number of pensioners relative to that of 
contributors, the higher the contribution will need to be. Note that what matters here is the 
ratio between contributors and pensioners, rather than the ratio between the population aged 
above state pension age and that of working age.  While most people aged above state pension 
age will be eligible for a pension, it certainly is not the case that all those of working age are 
contributors. Note that the term ‗pensioners‘ is not equivalent to ‗retirees‘. People who stop 
working before state pension age are ‗retirees‘ but not ‗pensioners‘. One becomes a 
‗pensioner‘ only when state pension age is reached. 
 Discussions on financial sustainability have tended to be framed in view of the above 
simple mathematical identities. However, while this approach gives an indication of the 
period-by-period financial balance of a pension system, it may not provide a good indication 
of the long-term financial burden of a pension system.  The gross pension level measures the 
initial average generosity of pension transfers to different generations, rather than the total 
generosity of the pension system to one particular generation.  To measure the latter, one 
would need to replace gross pension levels by measures of pension wealth.  Thus identity (4) 
would become: 
Contribution required = Gross pension wealth X System dependency ratio……..(5) 
 Gross pension wealth multiplied by the system dependency ratio would give the 
number of average wage years required to finance total pension transfers for a generation. For 
example, if in the UK, on average, future pensioners will have an entitlement equal to 5 years 
of average wages, and the ratio of workers to pensioners is projected to be 2 to 1 in 2050, that 
means that in 2050 every worker needs to forgo 2.5 years of average wages in order to finance 
the total pension transfers.  This can then be transformed into a contribution rate by dividing 
the number of average wage contribution years by the number of years worked.  
 The advantage of this approach lies in that it looks at the total pension entitlements of 
particular generations, rather than simply looking at gross pension levels of different 
generations and ignoring the impact of differing lengths of retirement and of indexation on the 
gross pension level over time.  Thus if the gross pension level is projected to decline, but the 
length of time in retirement is set to increase, the first approach would show a more favourable 
financial position than is warranted.  Similarly an increase in the pension age not only 
decreases pension wealth, it also increases the potential number of years worked and thus 
reduces the contribution rate in two ways.  By contrast, an analysis based simply on using 
projected levels of the gross pension level would ignore this important effect on financial 
sustainability of increasing the pension age. 
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5.4 Proposing a set of indicators for the evaluation of pension reforms     
Section 5.2 showed some of the most interesting features of the APEX model. It presented 
estimates of replacement rates, which have been widely used to assess pension adequacy, and 
also the interesting innovation of pension wealth indicators, which are a significant 
improvement on replacement rates in that they cover total pension flows.  This pension wealth 
indicator can be modified to derive an adequacy indicator comparing pension entitlements 
with a general benchmark, e.g, having flows which enable an income equal to 60% of pre-
retirement wages throughout retirement.  Using measures of net pension wealth in conjunction 
with measures of net pension requirements presents a significant improvement over the current 
adequacy indicators used in both cross-country pension system comparisons and in reform 
assessment literature.  Such measures adjust for current and future differences in time spent in 
retirement between countries and also take into account the full pension transfers during 
retirement – and not just those immediately after retirement – which again differ according to 
indexation arrangements and the interplay with minimum income guarantee conditions.  
Section 5.3, moreover, indicated how gross pension wealth indicators can be used to assess 
financial sustainability of pension systems in a more precise way than existing measures, 
particularly when reforms affect the length of retirement but not the generosity of systems.  
  Chapter 4 suggested that the issue of social sustainability needs to be analysed under 4 
different dimensions – poverty alleviation adequacy, income smoothing adequacy, 
intergenerational adequacy and financial sustainability.  To put in mathematical notation, 
policymakers need to maximise the following objective function: 
Max F(PA, CS) subject to G(IB, FS) 
where PA and CS are the system‘s goals - poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing and 
IB and FS are its constraints - intergenerational balance and financial sustainability.     
 This characterisation shows that the four elements are intricately linked.  Total welfare 
would be non-optimal if systems fail to maximise poverty alleviation and consumption 
smoothing and similarly if they fail to minimise pressures on intergenerational balance and 
financial sustainability. Policymakers who fail to understand this when conducting reforms are 
running the risk of seeing them unravel.   
 In order to have a workable assessment method, we require indicators for the system 
goals which can also be used to compute the system constraints. While, as explained in 
Chapter 4, many reform assessments were defective because they focused just on one aspect, 
existing assessments using a number of indicators have also suffered from the major 
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disadvantage that the indicators were not directly comparable. For instance, the EU‘s OMC 
has developed measures of adequacy (prospective theoretical replacement rates) and measures 
of sustainability (projections of pension spending). However these two exercises are separate, 
and though based on the same macroeconomic assumptions, their results are hardly 
reconcilable. By contrast, in our research all indicators will be calculated using the pension 
wealth estimates made by APEX, so to be internally consistent.       
 To measure poverty alleviation, we need to assess how a reform has affected the 
possibility of a system to guarantee a decent standard of living. This is best done by looking at 
pension entitlements defined as a proportion of the average wage in a country. If a pension 
provides less than 35% of the average wage, the person depending on just that income will be 
at-risk-of-poverty. This indicator would be mostly relevant to low-income individuals, who, as 
Chapter 1 indicated, are the most dependent on this source of income.  Conversely the 
consumption smoothing indicator needs to capture the extent to which pension transfers 
replace pre-retirement income. Given this definition, the best indicator would be pension 
wealth expressed as an annual replacement rate, comparing entitlements to one‘s own relative 
level of wages, taking into account some benchmark (say 60%) reflecting a desirable 
replacement rate. In order to increase representativeness, these indicators would be calculated 
at different wage levels and aggregated according to the income distribution of that country.
139
  
 Turning to the constraint function, we need measures to assess intergenerational 
balance and financial sustainability. The former is meant to capture the extent to which 
different generations of pensioners receive similar transfers. Again the best approach is to have 
a stock indicator, like pension wealth, rather than a flow indicator such as replacement or 
pension level rates.
140
 Finally as regards financial sustainability, rather than preparing fiscal 
projections based on macroeconomic modelling, one could simply use aggregated pension 
wealth in conjunction with demographic and macroeconomic projections to arrive at the 
implied contribution rate out of average wages needed to finance these transfers.  
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 By contrast in his theoretical paper on measures of pension system adequacy, Abatemarco (2009) 
proposes that to study poverty alleviation, one should adopt an index defined as the difference between ―how 
much poverty would have been under the hypothesis of an actuarially equivalent pension scheme and how 
much poverty really is‖. To study the impact on consumption smoothing he proposes an index which ―is 
obtained from the aggregation, for each income unit, of income gaps at each period after retirement‖. The 
latter is very similar to what shall be done in following Chapters. As for the former, we believe that while it 
is true that our proposed approach may understate time spent in poverty (as pension flows over the years are 
not constant) we will be able to supply additional indicators to address this issue.  
140
 Abatemarco (2009) presents the two options, but does not choose between them. However using 
replacement rates suffers from one particular defect – it ignores longevity differences between generations.  
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 Basing all the dimensions on the same modelling and indicators presents an interesting 
innovation and appears to be theoretically appropriate. Thus having a high prospective pension 
level and replacement rate would maximise the achievements of goals, but it would also 
maximise (rather than minimise) pressure on constraints, as it would imply more fiscal 
pressures and imperil intergenerational balance. 
 To assess the four dimensions, the OECD‘s APEX model will be used to estimate 
pension entitlements in net terms initially for a full-career worker with career-long stable 
relative wages.
141
  The full-career assumption will be relaxed in Chapters 8 and 9. The analysis 
will be conducted using system rules in place prior and post reforms which occurred between 
1990 and 2006.  Results will be presented for men and women at different wage levels.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has introduced the APEX model – which will provide the data for the proposed 
assessment of pension reforms. It has shown how the model provides data on theoretical 
replacement rates, pension levels, and more importantly pension wealth. The model can be run 
using different macroeconomic and demographic assumptions (thus providing a means to 
assess the robustness of pension systems to economic and longevity shocks), and assumptions 
on the level of earnings and length of contributions can be modified, thus providing the scope 
for a better calibration of theoretical replacement rates.  The pension wealth indicator is the 
main empirical contribution of APEX as it addresses two of the main defects of replacement 
rates by capturing the effects of benefit indexation post-retirement and of longevity. Pension 
wealth can be converted into an overall replacement rate and compared to adequacy 
benchmarks. Moreover it can also be used to assess the financial sustainability of pension 
systems. 
 Finally the Chapter has set out the objective function which policymakers should seek 
to maximise in order to achieve social sustainability. This involves balancing the achievement 
of system goals while operating within the constraints of intergenerational balance and fiscal 
sustainability. By using APEX to measure all four dimensions, the proposed approach would 
be internally consistent while clearly defining the objectives and constraints faced by 
policymakers in pension provision.  The next Chapter will apply this approach to ten European 
countries which have undergone major pension reforms since the 1990s.     
                                               
141
 That is if someone starts working at 20 and earns half the mean wage, he would remain in this relative 
position throughout his 40-year career. 
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6. Assessing the social sustainability of pension reforms in Europe                  
under the assumption of complete full-time careers 
 
The preceding Chapter introduced a multi-faceted framework to assess the social sustainability 
of pension reforms.  It proposed that policymakers who want to achieve an effective response 
to the challenge of population ageing need to ensure that reforms enable pension systems to 
maximise the achievement of their goals while minimising pressure on constraints. This 
approach will be applied in this Chapter and the APEX model will be used to derive indicators 
of the four dimensions of social sustainability described in Chapter 5.  The ten countries that 
will be studied cover 70% of the EU‘s population and span the different pension typologies 
developed in Chapter 2.  They also include examples of both parametric and systemic reforms.  
This Chapter will suggest to what extent these reforms might, or might not, enable countries to 
face population ageing in a socially sustainable manner. It must be emphasised that at this 
stage, the approach, like other existing literature, will assume that there is full-employment 
and standard full-time careers for both genders. It also assumes that there is complete take-up 
of minimum pensions and that no private retirement saving is taking place – important 
assumptions for countries with means-testing and with significant private pension saving.
142
 
These assumptions, while commonly used, are unrealistic, but they are useful for this 
intermediate stage of the analysis.  Some of them will be relaxed in later Chapters.            
 The first part of the Chapter will set out the data underlying the social sustainability 
indicators. The latter will then be estimated for the pre-reform situation – setting out the 
starting point of what systems are achieving at present.  This will be used to give an indication 
of where the selected countries fit in the pension system typology developed in Chapter 2. The 
indicators will then be estimated for 2050 and compared with the current situation. This will 
enable a first assessment of whether reforms are socially sustainable. This, however, presents 
only one way of benchmarking the impact of reforms. The other approach, developed in 
Chapter 7, involves comparing the post-reform scenario for 2050 with what would have 
happened had no reforms taken place.  
 
6.1 Data and assumptions underlying the indicators 
Chapter 5 introduced APEX and gave some examples of the indicators it can estimate. This 
section will explain more comprehensively the assumptions which underlie these calculations 
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 In this research, the main impact is on the UK. Though under the full-career assumption, few individuals 
would qualify for means-tested benefits. 
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and present additional data which will be used to compute the sustainability indicators. All 
modelling will be for single individuals. This may overestimate actual generosity, as many 
times benefits for couples are less generous than those for two single individuals. 
 APEX is based on pension system parameters in 2006, but includes legislated changes 
that are phased in over time.  Since 2006, Germany and the UK have legislated significant 
reforms, which have been modelled by the author.
143
  Hungary also made substantial reforms 
in 2009, as part of an IMF loan agreement, which should reduce pension generosity 
substantially.
144
 These have not been modelled, as some were not yet legislated at the time of 
writing.  APEX models in each country ―all mandatory parts of the retirement-income system, 
including resource-tested benefits, basic pensions, as well as public and compulsory private 
pension schemes‖.145  The standard entitlement calculations assume someone enters the 
system at the age of 20 and retires after a full career.
146
 Note that this implies different career 
lengths according to the pension ages in the 10 countries, shown in Table 6.1 for 2005 and the 
legislated levels for 2050.  Though, as expected the trend in pension ages is upwards in all 
countries, it is quite surprising to note that the situation in 2050 will be even less harmonised 
than in 2005. Then there were only 2 pension ages for men (60, 65) among the 10 countries, 
while by 2050 there will be 5, ranging from 60 to 68. Similarly for women there were 4 
different pension ages in 2005, rising to 5 by 2050. However, by 2050, the pension age gap 
between genders will have nearly disappeared.      
 
Table 6.1: Pension ages in 2005 and 2050 
 2005 2050 
Men Women Men Women 
Austria 65 60 65 65 
Finland 65 65 65 65 
France 60 60 60 60 
Germany 65 65 67 67 
Hungary  60 55 62 62 
Italy 65 60 65 65 
Poland 65 60 65 60 
Slovakia 60 57 62 62 
Sweden 65 65 65 65 
UK 65 60 68 68 
Source: EPC (2007). 
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 These include increases in the state pension age in both countries and the introduction of wage indexation 
of the Basic State pension in the UK. 
144
 They include a pension age rise to 65, less generous indexation and the removal of a bonus pension. 
145
 APEX also includes non-compulsory private systems when they cover at least 90% of employees. This, 
for example, is the case for Sweden, where the main national scheme for private-sector employees is 
modelled. The proposed personal accounts system of the UK is not modelled, as its form is yet unclear. 
146
 For resource-tested benefits, the model assumes full take-up and that only the income test is binding.  
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 APEX allows the calculation of entitlements for different career lengths. Thus, while in 
this Chapter, the full-career assumption will be adopted; later Chapters will include 
calculations for non-standard working careers.  However, all Chapters will assume that an 
individual remains throughout at one point in the relative wage distribution. Thus someone 
earning twice the average wage at age 20 would also earn twice the contemporary average 
wage in the year preceding retirement.  While this may seem unrealistic, in practice it will 
make relatively little difference, as contrary to most existing literature, rather than focusing on 
a single hypothetical individual, this analysis will be based on a balanced set of individuals 
spread over the wage distribution. Hence, instead of looking at the pension entitlement of a 
full-career individual who earns throughout his career the average wage, we will compute the 
aggregate pension entitlement of individuals across the wage distribution earning throughout 
their careers the same relative wage.  This will be done by computing the pension entitlement 
of individuals at each wage decile of that country, and then compute an aggregate pension 
entitlement over all deciles. 
 Table 6.2 presents wage distribution data for full-time workers in Euros in 2002, from 
Eurostat‘s Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). They represent the annual wages of workers in 
sectors C to K of NACE, or most of the private sector workforce in the ten countries, covering 
34.6 million male and 14.1 million female workers.
147
 These data were preferred to more 
recent data from other sources, as they cover the same pay periods and sectors, and are based 
on harmonised definitions.  However they exclude part-timers and workers in farming, fishing 
and the public sector (public administration, health, social work, education). This potentially 
affects the measure of wage inequality, with the exclusion of public sector workers possibly 
increasing the degree of inequality and vice versa for that of part-timers.  In both cases the 
effects could be stronger for women who tend to be more in part-time and public sector 
employment.  Lack of an adequate data series for all countries for these categories, however, 
necessitated their exclusion in this study, as it has in other similar ones. However, Annex 1, 
which compares these data with more comprehensive national data, shows that the degree of 
wage inequality implied by these data seems fairly representative.         
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 NACE is Eurostat‘s classification of commercial activity. Sector C is mining and quarrying, D is 
manufacturing, E is electricity, gas and water, F is construction, G is wholesale and retail, H is hotels and 
restaurants, I is transport, storage and communication, J is financial intermediation, K is real estate, renting 
and business activities.  
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Table 6.2: Wage distribution for full-time private sector workers in thousands of Euros – 
annual wage (2002)  
a) Both genders (male and female) 
Country Mean P_10 P_20 P_30 P_40 P_50 P_60 P_70 P_80 P_90 
Slovakia 5.8 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.5 5.1 5.9 7.1 9.5 
Hungary 5.9 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.9 7.4 10.4 
Poland 7.1 2.7 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.6 6.5 7.6 9.1 12.1 
Italy 25.8 15.1 16.9 18.4 20.0 21.9 24.3 27.4 32.1 39.9 
France 29.4 15.6 17.7 19.7 21.7 24.0 26.7 30.3 35.8 47.2 
Finland 30.8 19.4 21.8 23.8 25.8 27.9 30.5 33.6 38.0 45.3 
Sweden 31.4 17.8 22.0 24.2 26.2 28.1 30.5 33.5 38.3 47.6 
Austria 33.3 16.9 20.7 23.3 25.7 28.2 31.3 35.2 41.3 53.5 
Germany 36.1 17.7 22.9 26.4 29.3 32.2 35.5 39.9 46.1 58.0 
UK 41.8 17.3 21.4 25.1 28.7 32.7 37.4 43.2 51.4 68.6 
b) Male 
Country Mean P_10 P_20 P_30 P_40 P_50 P_60 P_70 P_80 P_90 
Hungary 6.3 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.9 4.5 5.2 6.3 7.9 11.1 
Slovakia 6.6 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.7 6.6 7.9 10.6 
Poland 7.5 2.8 3.7 4.5 5.2 5.9 6.8 8.0 9.6 12.8 
Italy 27.1 15.6 17.6 19.1 20.8 22.8 25.4 28.8 33.8 42.2 
France 31.2 16.4 18.6 20.6 22.7 25.0 27.9 31.8 38.0 50.7 
Finland 33.1 20.9 23.5 25.7 27.9 30.2 32.8 36.1 40.5 47.8 
Sweden 33.3 19.9 23.4 25.4 27.3 29.3 31.7 34.9 40.1 50.1 
Austria 35.8 19.5 22.7 25.1 27.3 29.9 32.9 37.3 43.8 57.9 
Germany 38.4 19.6 24.8 28.1 30.9 33.8 37.4 42.0 48.8 61.7 
UK 45.7 19.2 23.9 27.7 31.6 35.7 40.3 46.4 55.1 74.3 
c) Female 
Country Mean P_10 P_20 P_30 P_40 P_50 P_60 P_70 P_80 P_90 
Slovakia 4.8 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.8 7.7 
Hungary 5.3 2.5 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.3 6.6 9.4 
Poland 6.3 2.5 3.1 3.7 4.4 5.1 5.9 6.9 8.2 10.8 
Italy 22.3 14.0 15.5 16.8 18.1 19.7 21.5 23.9 27.5 33.7 
France 25.3 14.5 16.2 17.8 19.5 21.6 24.1 27.2 31.5 39.1 
Austria 26.1 14.4 16.8 18.7 20.7 22.6 25.3 28.8 33.5 41.3 
Sweden 26.2 11.5 18.4 21.2 23.1 24.9 26.8 29.3 33.0 40.1 
Finland 26.5 17.8 19.8 21.3 22.8 24.3 26.0 28.2 31.4 37.6 
Germany 29.3 13.8 18.8 22.0 24.6 27.2 30.1 33.6 38.3 45.9 
UK 32.1 14.9 17.8 20.4 22.9 25.8 29.3 33.9 41.0 53.6 
Note: For Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Sweden and the UK wages were converted using the average 
exchange rate with the Euro during 2002. Comparisons of the level of wages across countries are 
preferably made in purchasing power parity terms. This has not been done here as the comparative 
interest is in the difference in the degree of wage inequality among these countries, which is not 
affected by the application of purchasing power parities.  
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat‘s 2002 SES.  
 
Wage inequality differs greatly. In Poland those at the bottom decile earn 48% of the median 
wage, while those in Finland earn nearly 70%. By contrast those at the top in Finland earn 
162% of the median wage, whereas those in Hungary earn 247%. The ten countries can be 
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divided into three groups. On the one hand, there are Finland and Sweden where the wage at 
the top decile is between 2.3 and 2.7 times that at the bottom. At the other extreme, there are 
the UK, Hungary and Poland where the ratio lies between 4 and 4.5 times. In between, one 
finds Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Slovakia where the wage ratio is between 3 and 3.5.  
These data indicate that there are significant cross-country gender differences in pay and that 
wage inequality also differs by gender (inequality tends to be smaller among women).  
Consequently, it makes sense to present aggregate entitlements rather than those on mean 
wages, as is mostly done in the literature.  This is also preferable to presenting comparative 
tables of hypothetical cases based on multiples of the average wage,
148
 as the importance of 
these cases varies significantly. For instance, it is misleading to compare the entitlements of 
those on half mean wages in Finland and Poland, because very few Finns have that low a wage 
while those at the bottom two deciles in Poland have even less.  
 To estimate the financial consequences of these entitlements, these aggregate 
indicators will be multiplied by the projected pensioner population. The latter are taken from 
Eurostat‘s population projections; EUROPOP-2008 convergence scenario.  These were also 
used to compute the working age population (based on the pension ages in Table 6.1). These 
projections indicate that despite higher pension ages, the ratio of pensioners to the working age 
population is expected to increase substantially (see Table 6.3). The largest rises are expected 
in Poland and Slovakia, while the UK (mainly on account of having legislated the highest 
pension age among these countries) should have the smallest rise.    
 
Table 6.3: Ratio of pensioners to working age population (%) 
 
Pensioners to 
working age (2005) 
Pensioners to 
working age (2050) 
% change in demographic 
dependency 
UK 30 31 5% 
Hungary 42 64 53% 
Sweden 27 43 58% 
Austria 29 49 67% 
Italy 36 60 69% 
France 35 61 76% 
Germany 27 50 85% 
Finland 24 47 100% 
Slovakia 27 71 160% 
Poland 23 69 200% 
Note: Pensioners defined as the population above pension age, while working age is defined as 20 
to pension age (see Table 6.1). Countries ordered by size of change in dependency.  
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat population projections. 
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 As is, for instance, done in OECD (2007). 
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 Throughout, this research will be utilising Eurostat‘s gender-specific mortality tables 
for 2004 and 2050. Table 6.4 shows life expectancy in period terms
149
 at state pension age for 
the ten countries.  French men and women have the longest period in retirement, at 23 and 28 
years, respectively, rising by 2050 to 28 and 33 years, respectively. By contrast, in a number 
of countries, which are currently equalising pension ages between genders, the number of 
years women spend in receipt of state pensions should decline significantly. In countries 
where the state pension age for men is increasing, like Germany, Hungary and the UK, men in 
2050 could still be spending more years in retirement than they are currently.  Table 6.4 
suggests that the large increase in dependency observed for some countries, such as Poland 
and Finland, is attributable to the large rise anticipated in life expectancy at state pension age. 
 
Table 6.4: Life expectancy at state pension age (on a period basis)    
 
Men Women 
2004 
old rules 
2050 
old rules 
2050 
new rules 
2004 
old rules 
2050 
old rules 
2050 
new rules 
Poland  14 20 20 24 28 28 
Finland  16 21 21 21 25 25 
UK  17 21 18 25 28 20 
Germany  17 22 20 21 25 23 
Austria  17 23 23 26 31 26 
Italy  18 22 22 27 31 26 
Hungary  18 25 23 28 33 26 
Slovakia 18 24 22 26 30 25 
Sweden  18 21 21 21 25 25 
France  23 28 28 28 33 33 
Note: Countries ordered by life expectancy of men at current state pension age. 
Source: Own workings from Eurostat mortality tables.  
   
 Finally, before presenting the sustainability indicators, it is worthwhile to state that the 
economic assumptions of APEX are a 2% real discount rate, a real interest rate of 3.5%, real 
earnings growth of 2%, price inflation of 2.5% and a GDP growth rate of 1.6%. These 
assumptions are selected by the OECD on the basis of its forecasts of economic developments. 
Initially these assumptions will be taken as given, but in Chapter 9, they will be modified, as 
they have a significant impact on the outcomes for certain countries. In particular, system 
outcomes in countries with NDC systems, which base their notional return on contributions on 
either earnings growth or GDP growth, are quite sensitive to changes in these assumptions. 
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 When mortality is expected to continue improving over time, period life expectancy underestimates actual 
life spans. However cohort life expectancy data, which would address this issue, are not available on a 
harmonised European basis.  In the UK there is a gap of 3 years between period and cohort life expectancy. 
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6.2 The social sustainability indicators  
Returning to the objective function set out in Chapter 5: 
Max f(PA, CS) subject to g(IB, FS) 
We propose the following measures: 
 PA (poverty alleviation) = Net pension wealth, defined in terms of the median net 
wage on an economy-wide basis, measured against a benchmark of an annual post-
retirement income equal to 35% of the contemporary annual average net wage.
150
  A 
ratio of 100% would imply that net pension wealth at retirement is able to generate, on 
average, an annual income equal to 35% of the economy-wide contemporary annual 
median net wage. This ratio is calculated for the cases below the median wage and 
then an average is taken as the aggregate indicator.  
 CS (consumption smoothing) = Net pension wealth, defined in terms of the median net 
wage on an individual basis, measured against a benchmark of an annual post-
retirement income equal to 60% of the annual individual median net wage.
151
 A ratio 
of 100% would imply that net pension wealth at retirement is able to generate an 
annual income equal to 60% of the individual‘s annual median net wage. The ratio is 
calculated for all cases and then an average is taken as the aggregate indicator. 
 IB (intergenerational balance) = Difference in the net pension wealth, defined in terms 
of the median net wage on an individual basis, of two successive generations. A ratio 
of 100% would imply that net pension wealth at retirement of a generation is equal to 
that of the previous generation. The ratio is calculated for all cases and then an average 
is taken as the aggregate indicator. 
 FS (financial sustainability) = Change in the contribution rate out of the lifetime 
median wage required to pay aggregate gross pension wealth. A positive change 
implies a higher burden faced by workers to finance pension flows.  
 This section will estimate these social sustainability indicators for the pre-reform 
pension systems faced by current retirees. It will compare these with the situation which 
should face retirees in 2050 under the reformed systems. Note that current and future retirees 
differ not only in terms of the pension rules they face but also in terms of their respective life 
expectancy. For the rest, the economic assumptions are held constant and the wage distribution 
is assumed to remain unchanged over time. The current situation can be viewed as the starting 
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 As will be shown later, this is equivalent to the poverty threshold, on average, across the ten countries.  
151
 The choice of the 60%, as explained later, is inspired by Holzmann & Hinz (2005). 
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point of our analysis – and thus an attempt will be made to compare these results with the 
analysis made in Chapters 1 and 2 on the living standards of current pensioners and pension 
system typologies.    
  
6.21 The poverty alleviation function 
As argued in previous Chapters, one of the prime goals of pension systems is the alleviation of 
relative poverty post-retirement.  Net pension wealth at the point of retirement defined in 
terms of the economy-wide median wage represents the relative value of total pension 
transfers to an individual. This can then be compared to that level of net pension wealth which 
would enable an annual income equal to the poverty threshold for all the years spent in 
retirement. If net pension wealth is higher than this ‗net pension requirement‘, one can say 
that, on average, the pension system would be preventing poverty during retirement for that 
individual. It is important to note, however, that since pension transfers are not constant for all 
post-retirement years, even if net pension wealth is equal to the ‗net pension requirement‘, 
there may be years when the individual has an annual income less than the poverty threshold. 
This point will be expanded later.  
 The net pension wealth indicator is defined in this case in terms of the median wage on 
an economy-wide basis. In order to develop a ‗net pension requirement‘ which would equate 
to an annual transfer equal to the poverty threshold, we need to compare the latter to the 
median wage on an economy-wide basis. The poverty threshold adopted by the EU, as 
indicated in Chapter 1, is set at 60% of median equivalised disposable income in each country. 
The median wage of full-time workers is, however, significantly higher than the median 
equivalised disposable income (see Figure 6.1). The relation between these two variables 
differs by gender and by country. However, for simplicity, it was thought preferable to adopt a 
single value, namely the average across countries, weighted according to the relative size of 
total employment. On average, across the 10 countries (and also all EU25 countries) the 
poverty threshold for single people stands at 35% of the median wage of full-time employees 
of both genders. Note while here we are not imposing a common poverty line across all 
countries, the poverty threshold differs from the national one. 
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Figure 6.1: Poverty thresholds as a % of the median wage*  
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* The poverty threshold for single people (set at 60% of median equivalised income in each country) is 
expressed as a percentage of the median wage in each country. The weight allocated to each country is 
according to its relative share of the total full-time employed population in all countries. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC, LFS and SES. 
 
 Once this threshold is set, one can determine the ‗net pension requirement‘ – the total 
transfers which would generate an income equal to 35% of the net median wage during all 
post-retirement years. Table 6.5, for instance, shows that men in Austria to have annual 
pension transfers throughout retirement equal to the assumed poverty threshold would require 
net pension wealth equivalent to 5.1 years of the contemporary median wage in Austria. This 
requirement is higher for women (7.2), because currently Austrian women retire 5 years earlier 
than men and, like women throughout Europe, they also have a higher life expectancy than 
men. The highest net pension requirements are those for women in France, Hungary and Italy. 
By contrast Polish men have the lowest net pension requirement, at 4.2 years.  
 
Table 6.5: Net pension requirement for poverty alleviation (years of net median wage) in 2005 
 Men Women 
Austria 5.1 7.2 
Finland 4.9 6.1 
France 6.5 7.6 
Germany 5.1 6.0 
Hungary 5.3 7.5 
Italy 5.3 7.4 
Poland 4.2 6.7 
Slovakia 5.3 7.1 
Sweden 5.3 6.2 
UK 5.0 7.0 
Source: Own analysis using Eurostat period life expectancy.       
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 This requirement can then be compared to the net pension wealth of our hypothetical 
full-time individuals. Table 6.6 synthesises this by looking at the average across the 4 
hypothetical individuals for each gender with a below-median wage. It indicates that at present 
in most countries, average net pension wealth is higher than the net pension requirement.           
 
Table 6.6: The pre-reform poverty alleviation function* 
 
Men Women 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net  
Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net  
Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Austria 8.2 5.1 161 8.3 7.2 115 
Finland 6.5 4.9 132 7.0 6.1 116 
France 7.9 6.5 121 8.5 7.6 112 
Germany 5.8 5.1 115 5.5 6.0 92 
Hungary 7.0 5.3 132 9.2 7.5 122 
Italy 8.6 5.3 165 9.8 7.4 132 
Poland 5.5 4.2 129 7.6 6.7 114 
Slovakia 9.0 5.3 170 9.7 7.1 137 
Sweden 6.4 5.3 120 6.2 6.2 100 
UK 4.0 5.0 80 4.7 7.0 68 
* These ratios are the averages for the 4 hypothetical individuals with a below-median wage.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 The next thing to consider is how this will change by 2050. Even in the absence of 
reforms, there would be a change, as longer periods in retirement due to higher longevity 
would increase the net pension requirement, without necessarily bringing about an equivalent 
increase in pension wealth (particularly as most pensions are price-indexed and so lose their 
relative value the longer they are drawn for). Moreover the reforms can affect both net pension 
wealth and net pension requirement as they can change the length of the retirement period, and 
net pension wealth through changes in generosity. 
 Projections for 2050, shown in Table 6.7, suggest that, except in the UK and Hungary, 
the excess of net pension wealth over the requirement for poverty alleviation will decline. This 
drop is more pronounced for men than for women, with the notable exceptions of Poland and 
Slovakia. Many reforms that cut generosity (e.g. the change in pension formula to reflect 
average lifetime earnings rather than final earnings) impact more on those on higher incomes. 
Moreover net pension requirements for women are set to grow by less than those for men 
because in many countries the state pension age for women is increasing faster than that for 
men, while life expectancy for men is set to grow faster than that for women. However note 
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that the adequacy of the poverty alleviation function for women will remain below that for 
men.  
 
Table 6.7: The poverty alleviation function in 2050* 
 
Men Women 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net  
Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net  
Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Austria 9.3 6.5 142 8.3 7.2 116 
Finland 7.4 6.1 120 7.5 6.9 107 
France 7.9 7.7 103 8.4 8.5 99 
Germany 5.6 5.8 97 5.7 6.6 87 
Hungary 8.9 6.6 136 9.4 7.2 131 
Italy 8.2 6.3 130 8.6 7.2 118 
Poland 5.3 5.9 90 5.0 7.7 65 
Slovakia 8.0 6.2 128 7.2 7.0 103 
Sweden 6.5 6.1 106 6.2 6.9 91 
UK 5.4 5.3 101 5.7 5.7 100 
* These ratios are the averages for the 4 hypothetical individuals with a below-median wage.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 A potentially more interesting way of looking at these developments is to translate the 
above into the poverty threshold which each pension system could allow. Table 6.8 shows 
what poverty thresholds can be achieved by the different pension systems now and in 2050. 
Thus, for instance, at present, looking at the average of the 4 individuals considered, the 
pension system is able to generate at the point of retirement net pension wealth which is 
equivalent to a poverty threshold of 48% and 41% for men and women respectively in the UK. 
Post-reform, this should rise to 61% for men and 60% for women. The size of the increase for 
women begs some explanation. Given that pensions are price-indexed, their relative value falls 
quite rapidly over time. The longer the period in retirement, the more inadequate a price-
indexed pension becomes. Between 2005 and 2050, the pension age for women will rise by 8 
years. This not only diminishes this negative effect, but also increases the pension entitlement 
of women as they are assumed to contribute for longer. Moreover in the UK, reforms have 
increased the generosity for those on low income, and these tend to be mainly women. 
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Table 6.8: The poverty threshold (% of national disposable income) that can be covered by the 
pre-reform and post-reform pension systems – average for the cases with below-median wages  
 
Men Women Both Genders 
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 96 85 69 70 83 77 
Finland 79 72 70 64 74 68 
France 73 62 67 59 70 60 
Germany 69 58 55 52 62 55 
Hungary 79 82 73 79 76 80 
Italy 99 78 79 71 89 74 
Poland 77 54 68 39 73 46 
Slovakia 102 77 82 62 92 69 
Sweden 72 64 60 54 66 59 
UK 48 61 41 60 44 60 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 To take an opposite case, in France the pension age is projected to remain stable. 
Despite the average net replacement rate being among the highest in Europe, the length of the 
time spent in retirement (the longest in Europe) reduces adequacy. In France net pension 
wealth covers a poverty threshold of 70%, going down to 60% by 2050, in part reflecting the 
effects of longer retirement, combined with price indexation. However the length of retirement 
is not the sole factor. Generosity is also set to drop in terms of replacement rates, as was 
shown in Chapter 5. Thus, for instance, in Germany despite the increase in state pension age, 
poverty alleviation will decline, as the net replacement rate will drop. Table 6.8 suggests that 
by 2050, on average, pension systems in Germany and, much more so, in Poland will stop 
keeping pensioners above the poverty threshold, and bring pensioners in Sweden and France 
dangerously close to this threshold. Women at the bottom wage deciles in Slovakia and 
Finland will also come close to being at risk-of-poverty. Women in Austria, Hungary and the 
UK, and men in the last two countries, by contrast should be more protected. 
 This preliminary analysis has to be qualified in three ways. First, the above discussion 
has looked at the average of the 4 cases with below-median wages. Secondly it looked at the 
post-retirement period as a whole and not at each year. Thirdly, as emphasised earlier, this is 
only true for the hypothetical case of a full career.  While this last point will be dealt with in 
subsequent Chapters, the first two qualifications will be analysed in more detail here. 
 While looking at the average across the below-median wage distribution suggests that 
reformed pension systems guarantee the achievement of a 60% poverty threshold across 8 
countries, a more detailed analysis reveals that in 6 countries, those at the bottom wage decile 
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will fail to meet this threshold.
152
 Moreover reforms have tended to place closer to, or at, the 
risk-of-poverty those at the 20th wage decile (and women till the 30th wage decile) in 
Germany, France and Sweden.     
 The second qualification to Table 6.8 is that not everyone will be above the poverty 
line throughout retirement, as benefit indexation usually does not maintain the relative 
earnings value of pensions. So there can be individuals who start with an income above the 
threshold, but subsequently fall into relative poverty.  If pensioners consume just enough to 
stay above the threshold and save the rest for future years, one could ignore this. However, this 
is unlikely and so to get a more complete picture of the poverty alleviation function, one has to 
consider how the relative pension level compares with the poverty threshold each year.  Figure 
6.2 shows, for a country in each of the three main pension system groups of Chapter 2, how 
the pre- and post-reform net pension level at the point of retirement compares with the poverty 
threshold.  While there are large differences across countries at this starting point, after the 
reforms none of our hypothetical individuals starts retirement with a net pension level 
significantly below the poverty threshold.         
 
Figure 6.2: Net pension level (as % of median equivalised income) at point of retirement 
compared with poverty threshold: selected countries     
 
Group A: Countries with high replacement and low poverty 
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 A complete distributional analysis of the reforms will be presented in Chapter 8.  
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Figure 6.2: Net pension level (as % of median equivalised income) at point of retirement 
compared with poverty threshold: selected countries (cont…) 
 
Group B: Countries with low replacement and high poverty 
 
            
 
Group C: Countries with low replacement and low poverty 
 
                           
 
 However, this changes over time, as net pension levels decline significantly. Thus for 
example, while at the point of retirement in 2050 the net pension level of someone at the 30
th
 
wage decile in France should be about a sixth higher than the poverty threshold, during the last 
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third of retirement it falls below the threshold. There are two things which are of interest here 
– the extent of time in retirement during which the individual‘s pension would be below the 
poverty threshold and the magnitude of the gap from this level. Table 6.9 presents projections 
for these two elements. The projected number of years at-risk-of-poverty for the hypothetical 
individuals at each wage decile have been added and expressed as a fraction of the total years 
spent in retirement. Similarly, the magnitude of the poverty gap for the different individuals 
has been added and expressed as a fraction of the poverty threshold. For instance, in the UK 
pre-reform our 5 male individuals up to the median wage, would have spent all their years in 
retirement with an income below the poverty threshold, and the average gap during these years 
amounted to nearly a fifth of the threshold.  After the reform, they should spend just a fifth of 
their retirement in poverty and the average size of the gap is just 3%.    
 
Table 6.9: Projected proportion of retirement at risk-of-poverty and depth of poverty  
a) Men  
 
10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles 
 
All deciles 
Proportion of 
retirement at 
risk-of-poverty 
Depth of risk-
of-poverty 
 
Index of risk-
of-poverty* 
 
Index of risk-
of-poverty* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0% 1% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 0% 1% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 11% 41% 7% 11% 0.8 4.5 0.5 2.5 
Germany 21% 40% 12% 15% 2.4 6.0 1.4 3.4 
Hungary 2% 0% 1% 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 0% 2% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Poland 1% 55% 0% 22% 0.0 12.4 0.0 6.9 
Slovakia 0% 8% 0% 5% 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 
Sweden 8% 27% 5% 6% 0.4 1.5 0.2 0.8 
UK 100% 39% 19% 3% 19.2 1.0 11.1 0.6 
* An index value of 100 implies that all those concerned are always without any income during 
retirement, whereas an index value of 0 implies that no one of those concerned ever spends a year in 
retirement with an income below the poverty threshold.       
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Table 6.9: Projected proportion of retirement at risk-of-poverty and depth of poverty (cont..)  
b) Women  
 
10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles 
 
All deciles 
Proportion of 
retirement at 
risk-of-poverty 
Depth of risk-
of-poverty 
 
Index of risk-
of-poverty* 
 
Index of risk-
of-poverty* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 15% 16% 8% 7% 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 
Finland 0% 16% 0% 4% 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 
France 21% 47% 8% 12% 1.8 5.5 1.0 3.1 
Germany 52% 79% 17% 15% 9.1 11.9 5.1 6.0 
Hungary 9% 0% 4% 0% 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Italy 2% 9% 3% 4% 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 
Poland 13% 100% 8% 33% 1.0 33.4 0.6 19.5 
Slovakia 7% 33% 11% 13% 0.8 4.2 0.4 2.3 
Sweden 39% 67% 14% 14% 5.4 9.7 3.0 5.4 
UK 100% 66% 32% 3% 32.2 2.0 22.9 0.5 
* An index value of 100 implies that all those concerned are always without any income during 
retirement, whereas an index value of 0 implies that no one of those concerned ever spends a year in 
retirement with an income below the poverty threshold.  
Note: The proportion of retirement at-risk-of-poverty is estimated by summing up the total number of 
years during which the pension value would be below the poverty threshold for the hypothetical 
individuals, and then expressing as a % of the total number of years spent in retirement. The depth of 
risk-of-poverty is estimated by summing for those years at-risk-of-poverty for the hypothetical 
individuals the difference between the pension level and the poverty threshold, and then expressing it 
as a % of the poverty threshold for those years.   
Source: Own analysis of APEX results.      
 
 The first thing to note from Table 6.9 is that women face a significantly higher 
proportion of retirement at-risk-of-poverty than men.  In most cases this reflects the fact that 
women spend more time in retirement, and thus are more likely to be disadvantaged by price 
indexation. In fact, in countries where the state pension age gap between men and women is 
being phased out – Hungary and the UK, the improvement in the index of the risk-of-poverty 
is much more pronounced for women than for men. 
 The second thing to note is that despite the indicators shown in Table 6.8, in a large 
number of countries, individuals in the bottom half of the wage distribution will still be 
exposed to some years of poverty, despite their average pension transfers being higher than the 
poverty threshold for the post-retirement period as a whole. Thus, while Table 6.8 seemed to 
indicate that men at the bottom deciles in the UK were now clear of the poverty threshold, 
actually they may still be at-risk-of-poverty during their later retirement years. 
 The third thing to notice is that adequacy is not guaranteed by having high initial net 
pension levels. Leaving the length of retirement to rise, while having in place price indexation, 
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undermines adequacy significantly. Thus, for instance, in 2050 France will grant its median 
pensioners a net pension level which is a third higher than that in the UK. Its pensioners will 
also spend in retirement a period which is nearly 60% longer than UK pensioners. However 
the UK price-indexes only the earnings-related part of its state pension, while the whole 
French system is price-indexed. Hence, the number of years pensioners in France can expect 
to spend in poverty is higher.  When looking at those at the bottom five deciles, after reform 
French men will spend, on average, 12 years in poverty (up from 3 under the pre-reform 
system) as against 7 years for UK men (down from 17); while for women the respective 
projections are 16 years (up from 6) in France and 13 years in the UK (down from 25).    
 With the exception of Poland, reforms have not increased significantly the depth of 
poverty.
153
 In most countries, the overall risk-of-poverty appears to be increasing primarily 
because pension entitlements lose value significantly over the period in retirement. This 
indicates the importance for policymakers to consider the implications of their pension 
system‘s indexation rules, particularly for minimum pensions.   
 
Conclusions  
To summarise, the above discussion has indicated that: 
1. Except in Hungary and the UK, recent pension reforms have decreased the poverty 
threshold which pension transfers can, on average, cover. The level of differences 
among countries has remained stable, with very little effective convergence.  
2. While in some countries, the level of provision to those at the bottom wage decile now 
appears to be closer to the poverty threshold, taking the whole post-retirement period 
as a whole, provision remains adequate in many countries.  
3. However, the reforms have increased the years during which we may expect 
individuals at the bottom wage deciles to be at-risk-of-poverty. The resulting depth of 
poverty does not appear to be substantial, except in Poland.  
 
6.22 The consumption smoothing function 
The other main task of pension systems is enabling consumption smoothing. Existing literature 
usually measures this through replacement rates, or comparisons of post-retirement income 
with pre-retirement income. In this section we are going to instead use net pension wealth, in 
order to capture the anticipated total post-retirement income rather than just that at the point of 
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 In the UK and Hungary reforms reduced the depth of the risk-of-poverty, particularly for women. In 
Germany and Austria reforms reduced the time during which pensions fall short of the poverty threshold  
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retirement. Moreover we are going to compare this net pension wealth, defined in terms of the 
individual‘s previous income, with a net pension requirement which implies, on average, a net 
replacement rate over the whole post-retirement period of 60% of the individual‘s pre-
retirement income. Note that this differs from the previous indicator in two ways; namely 
using one‘s own pre-retirement income as a benchmark and the choice of 60% as a 
representative threshold. The first difference inevitably follows from the fact that here we are 
concerned with individuals maintaining their previous level of consumption, rather than 
comparisons with the average economy-wide income level. This should result in some 
interesting differences from the previous section. Moreover we will be looking at the entire 
wage distribution rather than just below-median cases.  
 The threshold used for consumption smoothing differs in an absolute sense across the 
different deciles as it is set at 60% of a decile‘s previous wage, whereas the poverty threshold 
was equal for all cases. As regards the choice of 60% as a representative threshold, this is 
subjective, as there are no internationally agreed thresholds in this area (as against the poverty 
threshold adopted by the EU). One may opt for different thresholds, but we follow the 
convention in Holzmann & Hinz (2005) that systems that offer replacement rates above 60% 
are ―not affordable‖.   
 Table 6.10 shows APEX estimates of the net pension wealth anticipated for men and 
women at the point of retirement in 2050. These indicators are an average for the 9 different 
individuals (by gender) studied. For instance, men in Italy, on average, will at the point of 
retirement have claim to 13.1 years of average wages.  By contrast if they were to receive 60% 
of their average wage for every post-retirement year, they would require net pension wealth 
equal to 10.9 years. Thus their cover ratio is of 121%.  Table 6.10 indicates that most countries 
will be able to generate net pension wealth equivalent to an annual flow of 60% of pre-
retirement individual income. The only exceptions appear to be the UK, France and Poland. 
The strongest levels of cover are found in Austria, Hungary and Italy.    
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Table 6.10: The consumption smoothing function in 2050* 
 
Men Women 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net 
 Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net 
 Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Austria 14.5 11.2 130 16.7 12.3 137 
Finland 12.0 10.5 114 14.0 11.9 117 
France 12.4 13.2 95 15.6 14.6 102 
Germany 11.2 9.9 113 14.1 11.3 119 
Hungary 16.9 11.2 151 18.4 12.3 150 
Italy 13.1 10.9 121 14.8 12.4 122 
Poland 10.6 10.2 104 11.2 13.2 83 
Slovakia 11.9 10.7 112 13.0 11.9 111 
Sweden 10.8 10.5 103 12.7 11.8 107 
UK 7.2 9.1 79 10.1 9.8 100 
* These ratios are the averages for the 9 different hypothetical individuals.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Given the lack of consensus over the required replacement rate, it is useful to transform 
the cover ratios in Table 6.10 to the overall post-retirement replacement rates which can be 
offered by the different systems.  Table 6.11 indicates that except for Hungary and the UK, the 
replacement rate will drop substantially. The median replacement rate for men in 2005 across 
these ten countries was 80% (incidentally quite close to the relative income ratio observed by 
the income survey data reviewed in Chapter 1). By 2050 this should drop to 68%. For women, 
the drop is slightly more pronounced, from 82% in 2005 to 69% in 2050. Note that since here 
we are using individual pre-retirement income, gender comparisons need to be made with 
caution. While women may seem to get better replacement rates, one needs to keep in mind 
that their income level is substantially below that of men. Given the presence of minimum 
pensions and progressive elements in pension structures, the own-wage replacement rate 
earned by women tends to be higher than that for men in the majority of the countries under 
study. Interestingly this appears to be increasingly the case also in Bismarkian countries 
(Austria and Germany), while in countries which moved to NDC (Poland, Italy and to a lesser 
extent Sweden), women appear to be less advantaged.         
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Table 6.11: The replacement rate (% of pre-retirement wage) that can be covered by current 
and future pension systems – average for the 9 different levels of wages 
 
Men Women Both Genders 
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 91 78 83 82 87 80 
Finland 75 69 75 70 75 69 
France 68 57 71 61 70 59 
Germany 85 68 82 71 83 70 
Hungary 85 90 83 90 84 90 
Italy 92 72 82 73 87 73 
Poland 87 63 86 50 87 56 
Slovakia 72 67 83 67 78 67 
Sweden 66 62 71 64 69 63 
UK 40 48 44 60 42 54 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Table 6.11 also suggests some interesting developments in the role of pensions across 
countries. The UK, though it has increased the state-only replacement rate, remains a multi-
pillar country, as the replacement rate which is provided remains low. By 2050, it seems to be 
joined by Poland, which at present is in the high replacement rate group. France‘s position also 
appears to be changing – though here this appears to be the result of policy inaction. Keeping 
the pension age at 60 in spite of increased longevity lowers the generosity of the French 
system substantially. Turning to Germany and Slovakia, the drop in their replacement rates 
results in them converging towards those offered in the Scandinavian countries. Only Austria 
and Hungary remain clearly in the high replacement group category. Chapter 8 will look in 
detail at how replacement rates that can be generated by pension systems differ according to 
one‘s position in the wage distribution, and what, if any, changes the reforms might lead to.  
At this stage, the main thing to report is that the reforms appear to have cut significantly the 
progressiveness of the pension systems in Poland and Slovakia, with replacement rates for 
those on low incomes falling close to the levels of those on high incomes. Conversely the 
French, German and UK systems appear to have become more progressive. 
 Table 6.12 further decomposes the projected development over time of the 
consumption smoothing function. Concentrating on the middle part of the wage distribution, it 
shows that the strength of this function will decline in France, Sweden and Poland (in that 
order). As for the UK, while the reforms appear to have increased replacement rates, they have 
not fundamentally changed the nature of the scheme – which provides high replacement rates 
only for those on low incomes. In fact, the main gain in replacement rates is for women on 
lower incomes who qualify for the more generous accrual of the state second pension.  
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Table 6.12: Projected % of retirement with less than 60% replacement rate and size of gap  
a) Men  
 
30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles 
 
All deciles 
Proportion of 
retirement with 
low 
replacement 
Magnitude of 
replacement 
gap 
 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0% 5% 0% 5% 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.4 
Finland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 23% 71% 9% 12% 2.0 8.6 2.0 9.5 
Germany 0% 2% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Hungary 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Poland 0% 40% 0% 6% 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.5 
Slovakia 3% 9% 1% 2% 0.0 0.2 4.9 0.3 
Sweden 4% 74% 2% 4% 0.1 3.3 2.2 2.0 
UK 100% 100% 34% 23% 33.9 23.1 35.4 23.8 
 
b) Women  
 
30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles 
 
All deciles 
Proportion of 
retirement with 
low 
replacement 
Magnitude of 
replacement 
gap 
 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0.0 0.2 
Finland 0% 2% 0% 3% 0 0 0.0 0.0 
France 10% 54% 4% 11% 0.4 6.1 0.5 5.6 
Germany 0% 3% 0% 1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 0% 2% 0% 4% 0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Poland 1% 100% 1% 24% 0 23.8 0.2 20.1 
Slovakia 0% 5% 0% 1% 0 0.1 0.5 0.2 
Sweden 6% 48% 2% 5% 0.1 2.5 0.5 2.2 
UK 100% 60% 29% 12% 28.7 6.9 28.7 11.6 
* An index value of 100 implies that all are always without any income during retirement, whereas a 
value of 0 implies that no one spends a year in retirement with an income below the 60% threshold.  
Note: The proportion of retirement with low replacement is estimated by summing up the years during 
which the replacement rate would be below 60%, and then expressing this as a % of the total number 
of years in retirement. The magnitude of replacement gap is estimated by summing for those years at 
risk of low replacement for the hypothetical individuals the difference between the replacement rate 
and the 60% threshold, and then expressing it as a % of this threshold for those years.   
Source: Own analysis of APEX results.      
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Conclusion 
To summarise the above discussion: 
1. The consumption smoothing function has weakened significantly in most countries, as 
after reforms, pensions will replace less of pre-retirement income indicating that in 
some countries, individuals may require private saving to maintain pre-retirement 
consumption. 
2. Women tend to face better own-wage replacement rates than men due to the presence 
of minimum income guarantees and progressive benefit formulae. 
3. The weakening of consumption smoothing appears to be stronger than that of the 
poverty alleviation function. This suggests that in some cases, reforms have changed 
the relationship between replacement rates and the individual‘s previous position in the 
wage distribution. Where progressiveness improved, this was done at the expense of 
lower consumption smoothing for those on higher incomes. In a few cases, such as 
Poland and Slovakia, reforms have instead decreased progressiveness.   
 
6.23 The intergenerational balance constraint 
The first two indicators related to the goals part of the objective function set out in Chapter 5. 
The maximisation of these two goals is subject, however, to two constraints. The first one is 
intergenerational balance – namely that the resources transferred to one generation compare 
well with those transferred to a previous generation. As has been argued in previous Chapters, 
a reform that changes substantially the size of pension transfers could result in political 
pressures to reverse these changes. It should be emphasised that it is not just changes in 
pension system generosity which can change the size of transfers.  Longevity also induces 
substantial changes, particularly in the absence of changes in the pension age. The best way to 
capture both the changes in system generosity and the length of retirement is through a 
pension wealth indicator. Moreover since what matters is the net resource transfer to each 
generation, an indicator that measures intergenerational balance should capture pension 
transfers net of taxes.   
 These net pension wealth indicators will be computed in relation to the individual‘s 
pre-retirement wage. The hypothesis here is that individuals will compare the size of the 
transfers they receive to those received by others in a similar relative situation a generation 
earlier, i.e. their aspiration is to have the same consumption smoothing facility as the previous 
generation. In the first two indicators, net pension wealth was compared to benchmarks in the 
form of net pension requirements. By contrast, in this case, the only benchmark will be the net 
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pension wealth of current generations. This may be somewhat subjective, particularly in the 
case of women as these at present tend to have lower state pension ages than men.  Thus 
current pension transfers may be too high a benchmark, particularly as they are a residue of the 
time when most women did not accrue pension entitlements on their own right. However, it is 
also true that in many countries, the equalisation in state pension ages has been accompanied 
by reforms intended to improve the pension prospects of women (e.g. in the UK, eligibility 
conditions have been decreased, while many countries have sought to introduce credits for 
childcare). 
 Table 6.13 compares the net pension wealth (defined in years of contemporary average 
wages) of the 2005 and 2050 pensioner generations. While there are substantial differences 
among countries, it is interesting to note that a simple median across all countries indicates a 
ratio of 109% for men, 95% for women and 101% for both genders. This suggests that while 
the reforms may have decreased the strength of the poverty alleviation and consumption 
smoothing functions, the relative size of pension transfers should remain stable. Women end 
up slightly worse off, but the drop is surprisingly low given that state pension ages for women 
are set to rise at a much faster pace than those for men.               
 
Table 6.13: A comparison of the net pension wealth* of 2005 and 2050 pensioner generations 
 
Men Women Both genders 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2005 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2050 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2005 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2050 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2005 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2050 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 
Austria 13.4 14.5 109% 17.1 16.9 98% 15.3 15.7 103% 
Finland 10.6 12.0 114% 13.1 13.9 106% 11.8 13.0 110% 
France 12.7 12.4 98% 15.5 14.9 96% 14.1 13.7 97% 
Germany 12.2 11.2 92% 14.1 13.5 95% 13.2 12.3 94% 
Hungary 12.9 16.9 131% 17.7 19.8 112% 15.3 18.4 120% 
Italy 13.8 13.1 95% 17.4 15.2 87% 15.6 14.2 91% 
Poland 10.0 10.6 106% 15.8 10.9 69% 12.9 10.8 83% 
Slovakia 11.0 11.9 109% 16.8 13.3 79% 13.9 12.6 91% 
Sweden 10.1 10.8 107% 12.5 12.5 100% 11.3 11.7 103% 
UK 5.7 7.2 127% 8.8 9.8 112% 7.2 8.5 118% 
* Net pension wealth in years of contemporary average wages. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 The only countries where there is a significant drop, of 10% or more, in the size of 
pension transfers are Italy, Poland and Slovakia. In all of these countries most of the drop is 
concentrated among women, with the most substantial drop registered for women in Poland. 
By contrast, in Hungary and the UK, there is a significant improvement for both genders. In 
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the case of the UK, there is slight convergence towards the net pension wealth earned in other 
European countries, while in Hungary the effects of longevity are compounded by the further 
increase in generosity in the pre-2009 pension reforms.
154
  
 Figure 6.3 puts the increase in longevity into perspective by expressing the net pension 
wealth entitlement of the 2005 and 2050 generations as a percentage of the number of years 
they are expected to spend in retirement. Since net pension wealth is expressed in terms of 
years of average wages, this ratio can be seen as a form of overall replacement rate. On this 
measure, the largest drops will be in Poland, France, Germany, Italy and Slovakia (in that 
order). The declines in overall replacement projected for males in Poland, Italy, Germany and 
France are the most pronounced, ranging from a drop of a third in Poland to a fifth in France. 
Sweden, Austria and Finland register significantly lower drops (of about a tenth).
155
  In the UK 
and Hungary, conversely, the overall replacement is set to improve, especially for women 
(where the improvement in generosity is also accompanied by a faster growth in the state 
pension age – which lowers the period during which pensions are required). 
 
Figure 6.3: Net pension wealth divided by the number of years spent in retirement (%) 
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Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 Taking into account the reforms introduced in 2009 in Hungary, particularly the increase in pension age 
and the removal of the thirteenth-month pension, of course, would lead to very different conclusions.  
155
 In the case of Austria, the drop is restricted to men, as policymakers appear to have compensated women 
for state pension equalisation by improving relative generosity. 
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 The discussion, up to now, has focused on the average of all hypothetical cases. 
However, it is useful to look at how the net pension wealth of the two generations differs 
according to their position in the wage distribution.  Figure 6.4 depicts which groups are most 
affected by the reforms. There are three broad categories of countries.  In the first group, 
reforms favoured those in the bottom half of the wage distribution. In France and Germany, 
for instance, those at the bottom two deciles are the only group which in the future will have 
higher net pension wealth relative to the 2005 generation. Similarly in the UK, those in the 
bottom half register the highest gains. In the second group of countries, reforms advantaged 
those in the top half of the wage distribution.  This is very evident in Poland and Slovakia, 
which moved away from very progressive pension structures to highly earnings-related ones.  
In Sweden and Hungary the reforms also favoured those at the top two deciles, but one should 
note that, contrarily to what is observed for Poland and Slovakia, this was not at the expense of 
those at the bottom deciles. Finally, in the third group of countries the reforms were 
distribution-neutral, with the changes for all deciles being nearly equivalent.           
 
Figure 6.4: The intergenerational balance function – comparison of the different income 
groups  
 
Countries where reforms were distribution-neutral 
 
      
 
 
159 
 
                    
Figure 6.4: The intergenerational balance function – comparison of the different income 
groups..continued  
 
Countries where reforms favoured the bottom half of the wage distribution 
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Figure 6.4: The intergenerational balance function – comparison of the different income 
groups…continued  
 
Countries where reforms favoured the top half of the wage distribution 
 
        
 
         
 
 Table 6.14 presents estimates of the percentage of the 2050 pensioner generation for 
which net pension wealth should be smaller than for the 2005 pensioner generation and the 
average loss. One can observe that while there is a considerable proportion who are projected 
to lose out as a result of the reforms, the average loss tends to be relatively marginal when 
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looking at men. The loss for women is much more pronounced and spread across more 
countries, mainly reflecting the fact that women‘s state pension ages are being equalised.  
However, in some cases it also reflects the decline in progressiveness of pension systems, 
which affects women more than men, as they have lower incomes.  In Germany most of the 
losses are registered by those at the higher deciles (while those at the bottom two deciles are 
projected to be better off in 2050). Similarly in Austria and the UK, the only losers are women 
at the top deciles on account of state pension age equalisation. Middle-income individuals are 
the main losers in France and Sweden, while those at the bottom deciles (and thus more 
women than men) are disproportionately hit in Slovakia and Poland. In Italy, by contrast, the 
losses are spread equally across all deciles.    
 
Table 6.14: Projected proportion of the 2050 generation with lower net pension wealth and 
size, on average, of the drop 
 Men Women 
% of 2050 
generation 
with lower 
entitlements 
Average 
% decline 
in pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
% of 2050 
generation 
with lower 
entitlements 
Average 
% decline 
in pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
Austria 0 0 0 22 7 2 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 89 3 3 78 7 6 
Germany 100 8 8 78 9 7 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 100 5 5 100 13 13 
Poland 33 7 2 100 31 31 
Slovakia 56 9 5 89 24 22 
Sweden 22 1 0.2 56 3 2 
UK 0 0 0 22 4 1 
* The index is estimated by multiplying the % of the 2050 generation with lower pension wealth with 
the average % decline in pension wealth compared to the current generation. A value of 0 implies that 
there is no wealth loss, while a value of 100 would imply that all pensioners in 2050 had no net 
pension wealth.  
Note: The proportion of the 2050 pensioner generation with lower pension wealth is the number of 
individuals with projected entitlements smaller than those of the 2005 generation, divided by the 9 
hypothetical cases. The average % decline in pension wealth is the average decline for these 
individuals.   
Source: Own analysis of APEX results.      
 
Conclusion 
To summarise the above discussion: 
1. The net pension wealth of the 2005 and 2050 pensioner generations should be quite 
similar. Women end up slightly worse off, but less than one would have expected 
given state pension age equalisation. 
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2. There are going to be significant drops in overall replacement, however, for men in 
Poland, Italy, Germany and France. The drop for men (from a median across all 
countries of 68% in 2005 to 56% in 2050) is significantly higher than that for women 
(from 64% to 54%) – as large part of the decline in the size of pension transfers to 
women is due to higher state pension ages, rather than lower generosity.    
3. While, on average, the size of pension transfers appears to be quite stable, there are 
significant distributional differences across countries. In Poland and Slovakia, while 
the reforms hurt those in the bottom half, they also favour those in the top half of the 
wage distribution. In most other countries, reforms do not reduce the size of pension 
transfers to those at the bottom two deciles. 
 
6.24 The financial sustainability constraint 
The last indicator suggested by the objective function proposed in Chapter 5 deals with 
financial sustainability. The latter, as has been shown in Chapter 4, tends to be the only 
measure of sustainability against which pension policy tends to be assessed. In the few 
occasions where pension system adequacy and financial sustainability are discussed together, 
this has tended to involve rather different indicators, derived from separate exercises. The 
approach suggested in Chapter 5, by contrast, set out a financial sustainability indicator which 
is determined from the same basis as the pension system adequacy indicators – namely from 
pension wealth estimates. While this approach may not capture the complex interrelationships 
and feedback effects covered by macroeconomic modelling, it has the advantage of clearly 
setting out the trade-offs between pension system adequacy and financial sustainability 
indicators.  
 Chapter 5 sets out the approach to assess the financial sustainability of set levels of 
gross pension wealth.  It essentially argues that a self-financing pension system needs to 
ensure that the average contribution rate is enough to cover the average gross pension wealth, 
given the ratio between the number of contributors and that of beneficiaries. Note that in this 
Chapter we are assuming full employment and thus all those of working age are assumed to be 
contributors, while all those above state pension age are assumed to have accumulated a full 
pension. In later Chapters this assumption will be relaxed and the number of contributors will 
be estimated using demographic data and projections in conjunction with estimates and 
forecasts of labour participation rates.  Another thing to point out is that while for the other 
indicators we used net pension wealth – or the actual net transfers to pensioners – here we use 
the gross measure.  This assumes that the pension system is financed just by worker 
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contributions rather than also by taxes on the same pensioners. Any income taxes levied on 
pensioners are assumed to finance non-pension outlays. 
 Table 6.15 provides estimates for the long-term contribution rates required so that 
gross pension wealth is entirely financed by worker contributions. Looking at the implied 
contribution rates for the current generation of pensioners, there is quite some variation among 
the ten countries, ranging from 6% in the UK to 22% in Hungary. The average contribution 
rate (with each country weighted in accordance to population size) is 11%.  
 
Table 6.15: Long-term contribution rates (% of total lifetime wages) 
 
Pre-reform 
2005 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 14 23 
Finland 8 18 
France 15 24 
Germany 8 14 
Hungary 22 31 
Italy 17 25 
Poland 8 21 
Slovakia 11 25 
Sweden 10 17 
UK 6 7 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations given system dependency ratios.  Note that here we are assuming that all those 
of working age participate in full-time labour market activity.              
Source: Own analysis of APEX results and Eurostat population projections.      
 
 If we were to allocate countries into categories of high, intermediate and low 
contribution rates in line with the approach taken in Chapter 2,
156
 we could check how much 
our hypothetical simulations compare with actual spending patterns. Table 6.16 suggests that 
there is quite a good degree of overlap between these two classifications, with 6 countries 
falling in the same categories. The only major difference lies in Germany and Poland being 
classified as having a low contribution rate, when they are among the high spenders.  However 
this is mainly because the previous classification had dealt with all EU countries, while the ten 
countries on which we are focusing are more biased towards the high-spending category. In 
simpler terms, while Germany and Poland appear to be high spenders when looking at all EU 
countries, they are less so when one looks at these ten countries. Moreover one needs to keep 
in mind that up to now we have restricted analysis to full careers, a major assumption, 
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 In chapter 2, countries who spend between 0.5% of GDP less or more than the EU average on state 
pensions were deemed as average spenders, while those spending more were high spenders and vice versa for 
low spenders. 
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particularly for some countries (like Hungary and Poland) where labour market participation is 
relatively low.       
 
Table 6.16: Categorisation of countries in terms of current pension spending and long-term 
contribution rates 
 
Pension 
spending 
2005 
Contribution 
rate 
2005 
Austria High High 
Finland Average Low 
France High High 
Germany High Low 
Hungary Average High 
Italy High High 
Poland High Low 
Slovakia Low Low 
Sweden Average Average 
UK Low Low 
* Countries where the classification differs are in italics. 
Source: Own analysis.      
 
 That said, Table 6.16 suggests that our simple financial modelling gives a picture 
which is quite similar to actual spending. Thus it is quite discomforting to note that Table 6.15 
implies that contribution rates need to rise dramatically in many countries. In fact, the average 
contribution rate across all ten countries is projected to be 18% in 2050, or more than half as 
much again as the current level. The biggest increases are forecast for Poland and Slovakia, 
which, not surprisingly, Table 6.3 indicated are the countries where dependency is set to 
deteriorate the most between 2005 and 2050. Though Hungary, France, Austria and Italy are 
projected, under this method, to register relatively milder increases, by 2050 they would have 
quite high contribution rates. By contrast, the UK faces only a small increase in financing 
requirements, while contribution rates in Germany and Sweden are projected to remain below-
average.  
 EPC (2009) includes projections of state pension spending in 2050 based on the same 
demographic projections used in our financial sustainability indicators. Thus we can compare 
our 2050 projections with those in this study, using the same categorisation as in Table 6.16. 
This suggests that the degree of overlap between the two categorisations remains similar when 
looking at 2050. The two approaches give very different results with respect to Slovakia and 
Poland and slightly different results for Germany and Finland.           
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Table 6.17: Categorisation of countries in terms of future pension spending and long-term 
contribution rates 
 
Pension spending
1 
2050 
Contribution rate 
2050 
Austria High High 
Finland High Average 
France High High 
Germany Average Low 
Hungary High High 
Italy High High 
Poland Low High 
Slovakia Low High 
Sweden Low Low 
UK Low Low 
1. Classification of future pension spending made according to projections made in EPC (2009) using 
the same approach as in Table 6.16.  
* Countries where the classification differs are in italics. 
Source: Own analysis.      
 
 Having discussed the trend in the long-term contribution rates, it is useful to relate 
them to actual contribution rates.  Figure 6.5 indicates that the estimated long-term 
contribution rates for 2005 are significantly below current national insurance contribution rates 
(derived from EPC (2007)). However, one should note that national insurance contribution 
rates, in general, are not used to finance just state pensions. In most countries they also finance 
disability, sickness and survivor benefits, social assistance and, in some cases, health.  
Moreover at present most countries have surpluses in their national insurance funds, and in 
fact, in recent years many countries have set up reserve funds to finance future shortfalls.  
 
Figure 6.5: Comparison of contribution rates in 2005  
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Source: Actual contribution rates from EPC (2007). 
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 Figure 6.6 indicates that in most countries, except for France, Austria and Hungary, the 
implied long-term contribution rate in 2050 will still be below the existing national insurance 
contribution rates.   It should be stressed that having long-term contribution rates exceeding 
current actual national insurance contribution rates is not the only evidence of financial stress.  
Since these contribution rates may be actually financing other items of expenditure, large 
increases in long-term contribution rates may not be easy to accommodate. Slovakia, Poland, 
Italy and Finland appear to face significant issues in this respect, as they face quite large 
increases in their long-term contribution rates.  Sweden, the UK and Germany appear to be in 
less precarious conditions.   
 
  Figure 6.6: Comparison with contribution rates in 2050 
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 Another source of financial stress comes from international competition. Countries 
with low contribution rates may attract labour and capital and gain an economic advantage 
over those where contribution rates are higher. In our case, the country with the lowest 
contribution rates is the UK. In 2005, the country with the closest long-term contribution ratio 
to the UK was Germany and the one farthest away was Hungary, where the contribution rate 
was nearly 4 times higher. As can be seen in Figure 6.7, by 2050, the gap between the UK and 
most countries will continue to grow.  Austria, Finland, Poland and Slovakia appear to 
experience the highest relative increases. Sweden and Germany have a much less pronounced 
relative worsening. 
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Figure 6.7: Contribution rates expressed as a ratio to those in the UK 
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Conclusion 
To sum up our discussion: 
1. Despite reforms, contribution rates needed to finance pensions are set to increase 
substantially, especially in Poland and Slovakia. The highest rates currently are in 
Hungary and Italy and will remain so in 2050. The UK faces the lowest implied rise. 
2. At present contribution rates are above the long-term contribution rates. This suggests 
that for some countries there is still some leeway before contribution rates need to 
increase. France and Hungary seem to be the less well-placed countries in this respect, 
while the UK and Germany appear to have room to manoeuvre. 
3. The UK has the lowest implied long-term contribution rate and will remain by far 
under less financial stress than other countries. Relatively speaking, Finland, Poland 
and Slovakia are most likely to face financial stress on a competitive basis.         
 
6.3 Overall assessment of the social sustainability of pension system reforms 
Having dealt with the four sustainability indicators separately we can now present an overall 
assessment. At this stage it is important to emphasise two things. First, this analysis has 
focused on the full-career hypothesis and this may not be representative for some countries. 
This assumption will be relaxed in Chapter 8. Second, the benchmarks for future generations 
are the conditions enjoyed by current pensioners. Another approach, adopted in Chapter 7, is 
to compare outcomes for future generations under reformed and unreformed systems.  
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 Figures 6.8 and 6.9 present graphically the changes in the sustainability indicators. 
Figure 6.8 looks at how the achievement of system goals will change, by plotting the 
replacement rate and the poverty threshold achievable, on average, by the pre- and post-reform 
systems in 2005 and 2050. Figure 6.9 looks at the pressure on system constraints, by plotting 
the net pension wealth of the 2005 and 2050 pensioner generations and the contribution rates 
which the respective working age generations have to pay to finance these transfers. 
 Figure 6.8 suggests a good degree of convergence, with only Hungary moving away.
157
 
The direction of the arrows shows whether systems are projected to achieve higher system 
goals. A right-pointing arrow indicates that pension transfers, on average, will cover a higher 
poverty threshold, while an upward-sloping arrow indicates that the system will generate 
higher replacement rates.  Only the UK and Hungary have upward- and right-sloping arrows. 
Other countries have downward- and left-sloping arrows. The length of the arrow indicates the 
scale of the change in these functions. The largest decline is in Poland and the smallest in 
Sweden. A flatter arrow indicates that the decline in the functions is strongest for poverty 
alleviation. Thus the decline in Poland and Slovakia is stronger in the poverty alleviation 
function compared to other countries, such as Germany and Sweden. Contrarily, the 
improvement in the UK is more focused on poverty alleviation than that in Hungary.    
 Figure 6.9 indicates a more varied evolution. In all countries the arrows are upward 
sloping, reflecting the projected increase in contribution rates. Even though Sweden, Austria 
and France should maintain net pension wealth unchanged, they still need to increase 
contributions, on account of the larger relative size of the 2050 pensioner cohort.  Countries 
are evenly divided between those with right- and left-sloping arrows. The countries with left-
sloping arrows are projected to reduce net pension wealth for the 2050 pensioner generation, 
and vice versa. The length of the arrows represents the strength of the pressures on constraints, 
with the UK, Germany and Sweden facing the lowest pressures and at the other extreme, 
Hungary and Poland. The slope of the arrows is more difficult to interpret, mainly because 
both declining and increasing net pension wealth present pressures for policymakers. 
However, politically the more difficult pressure is to have to present future pensioners with 
lower net pension wealth despite improvements in longevity. Thus Slovakia and Poland face a 
tougher challenge than Hungary despite having similar arrow lengths.  
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 Hungary would also be converging if the 2009 reforms are accounted for. 
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of achievement of system goals 
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Figure 6.9: Evolution of pressure on system constraints 
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 Table 6.18 presents a synthesis of the discussion in Section 6.2. The overall trend in 
the four indicators is summarised together with some details on the impact on women, 
different wage categories and considerations about the increases in contribution rates.  For 
example, for Finland it shows that pension transfers will lose 8% of their current value relative 
to the poverty threshold, and a similar amount relative to pre-retirement wages, that Finns in 
2050 will have 10% more net pension wealth, while the contribution rate will have to rise by 
116%. The main conclusion that the Table suggests is that while reforms have reduced the 
strength of the poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing functions, these remain quite 
adequate on an overall basis in most countries. Moreover the reforms will not, in general, 
reduce the relative size of pension transfers to future generations, as longevity increases will 
offset the drops in generosity.  The contribution rates needed to finance these transfers are 
substantially higher than at present, and for some countries this may create fiscal problems.      
 
Table 6.18: Overall assessment of all sustainability indicators (change 2050 over 2005) 
 Poverty 
alleviation
1
 
Consumption 
smoothing
2
 
Intergenerational 
balance
3
 
Financial 
sustainability
4
 
Austria 
-7% overall, 
but still high 
-8% overall, but 
still high 
+3% overall 64% increase, 
little leeway 
France 
-14% overall, 
long retirement 
means some 
years in 
poverty 
-16% overall, 
issues with 
replacement for 
medium to high 
earners 
-3% overall, but 
long retirement 
means low 
replacement 
overall 
67% increase, 
little leeway 
Finland 
-8% overall, 
but still high 
-8% overall, but 
still high 
+10% overall 116% increase, 
possible 
increase in 
relative labour 
costs 
Germany 
-11% overall, 
issues for low 
earners 
-16% overall, 
but still high 
+3% overall 81% increase 
Hungary 
+5% overall, 
system skewed 
towards high 
earners 
+7% overall, 
replacement 
rates appear too 
high 
+20% overall, 
system 
unbalanced 
towards future 
40% increase, 
but contribution 
rate already 
high 
Italy 
-16% overall, 
but still high 
-16% overall, 
but still high 
-9% overall, 
drops spread 
across all income 
levels 
43% increase, 
contribution rate  
already high 
Poland 
-36% overall, 
issues for 
women and for 
those on low 
incomes 
-36% overall, 
issues for 
women and for 
those on low 
incomes 
-20% overall, 
drops for women 
and those on low 
incomes 
147% increase, 
possible 
increase in 
relative labour 
costs 
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Table 6.18: Overall assessment of all sustainability indicators (change 2050 over 
2005)..cont… 
 Poverty 
alleviation
1
 
Consumption 
smoothing
2
 
Intergenerational 
balance
3
 
Financial 
sustainability
4
 
Slovakia 
-25% overall, 
still high but 
issues for 
women 
-14% overall -9% overall, 
issues for women 
and skewed 
towards high 
earners 
121% increase, 
little leeway 
Sweden 
-11% overall,  
issues for 
women but 
poverty depth 
relatively low 
-9% overall, 
possible issues 
with level of 
replacement for 
middle incomes 
+3% overall 65% increase 
UK 
+37% overall, 
still some years 
in poverty 
+29% overall, 
still low 
replacement for 
middle to high 
earners 
+18% overall 15%, relatively 
more leeway 
 
Notes:  
1. The percentage change given for poverty alleviation is the percentage change in the ratio, for 
the average of the hypothetical cases with below-median wages, between net pension wealth 
defined in terms of the economy-wide average wage and the pension requirement of having net 
pension wealth equal to the poverty threshold throughout all retirement.  
2. The percentage change given for consumption smoothing is the percentage change in the 
ratio, for the average of the 9 hypothetical cases, between net pension wealth defined in terms 
of the individual‟s own wage and the pension requirement of having net pension wealth equal 
to 60% of one‟s own previous wage throughout all retirement.  
3. The percentage change for intergenerational balance is the percentage change in the net 
pension wealth, for the average of the 9 hypothetical cases, for the pensioner generation 
retiring in 2050 as against those retiring in 2005. 
4. The percentage change for financial sustainability is the percentage change in the long-term 
contribution rate required to finance net pension wealth of the different pensioner generations.    
 
 Table 6.18 suggests that in most cases, countries have not reformed away from their 
current typology categories. For instance, countries with high replacement rates and high 
poverty alleviation (e.g. Germany and Austria) have maintained this but reduced the future 
cost of their systems. Similarly the UK has tried to maintain a low-cost pension system while 
improving poverty alleviation.  Sweden, even though it adopted a systemic reform, maintained 
most of its emphasis on poverty alleviation (as against consumption smoothing) and kept its 
low-cost characteristics (but given better incentives to high earners). Conversely there has 
been a clear break in Poland and Slovakia with moves away from very redistributive systems, 
which may pose significant problems for women and for those on low incomes.  
 The indicators imply that there remains significant work to be done to ensure that 
European pension systems will remain financially sustainable in the face of the ageing 
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transition. Countries like Italy and Hungary face serious issues, as they already have very high 
cost systems. While Italy has tried to reduce generosity, Hungary improved it but limited the 
financial consequences by increasing the state pension age.
158
 The UK has adopted a similar 
strategy, but more successfully, as it has focused improvements on low income earners. In 
Hungary, by contrast, those at the top get the best outcomes from reforms. Moreover there 
may be an imbalance in favour of future generations. The opposite occurs in Italy where future 
generations will see a significant decline in the size of pension transfers, but the system 
remains under financial stress due to the already high cost structure. This suggests that more 
needs to be done, possibly by bringing forward the reforms to affect pensioners before 2050.      
 In France and Finland, the main issues seem to be related to the fact that pension ages 
are left unchanged in the face of increasing longevity. This raises financial sustainability 
issues for both countries. Moreover in France the lengthening of the retirement period reduces 
substantially the effectiveness of the poverty alleviation function (as many pensioners will 
face an increase in the number of years spent at-risk-of-poverty) and of the state system as the 
main provider of consumption smoothing for medium- to high-income earners. Similarly the 
unchanged state pension age for women in Poland reduces the ability of the pension system to 
achieve its goals. Chapter 9 will show how longer working lives, particularly in countries with 
the flexible retirement ages implied by NDC schemes, could remedy these shortcomings. 
 
6.4 Conclusion       
This Chapter presented preliminary estimates for ten countries of the four sustainability 
indicators described in Chapter 5. Moreover, it sought to supplement these indicators with 
other indicators which looked at the impact of reforms on women and on those on different 
levels of income. The overall assessment showed that while reforms have reduced the poverty 
alleviation and consumption smoothing functions in nearly all ten countries, these remain high 
in many countries. Reforms appear to have mostly followed existing system goals, but with an 
eye to reduce future cost. However there have been some reforms, mostly in Eastern Europe, 
which may have raised adequacy issues for women and those on lower incomes. Furthermore 
with only some exceptions, the reforms still appear to leave pension systems relatively 
unprepared for the financial impact of the ageing transition.  This may potentially reflect the 
fact that reformers have not grasped the full implications of longevity increases, possibly as 
the indicators which they used do not capture this element. 
                                               
158
 Recent reforms have also reduced generosity. 
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 The main methodological contribution of this analysis, in fact, lies in three innovations. 
Firstly, it uses pension wealth – a measure of overall generosity of transfers throughout 
retirement - rather than measures of generosity at the point of retirement. This captures the 
impact of two elements (longevity and indexation), which tend to be ignored despite their 
important consequences for the achievement of system goals and pressure on constraints. The 
second innovation is the explicit use of benchmarks against which to assess pension 
entitlements. Most frequently policymakers have not sought to look at benchmarks in this area, 
preferring to retain a good level of discretion on what constitutes ‗adequate‘ outcomes. While 
the benchmarks used here can be seen as arbitrary, the framework is flexible enough to allow 
the testing of various outcomes. The final innovation is the attempt to measure all elements 
using the same indicators instead of using different models. This increases transparency and 
also clearly illustrates the trade-offs between system goals and constraints. 
 The ability of this framework to incorporate distributional and gender analysis is 
amongst the main empirical contributions of this work. While most of the focus in this Chapter 
has been on aggregate indicators, our framework allows the analysis of various sub-questions 
and can be used to generate a lot of in-depth analysis of the consequences of reforms. The 
framework clearly lends itself to being used across different pension regimes and enables a 
comparison of reforms which are very different in nature. It can also be used to see how 
systems are changing, and to what extent there is convergence in system goals and pressure on 
constraints. This multi-faceted framework is not however to be conceived as some form of 
benchmarking exercise. Rather its main aim is to capture as much as possible the full 
implications of reforms in order to arrive at some understanding of the potential pressures 
policymakers could face in the future. This aim is justified in view of the broader concept of 
sustainability, discussed in previous Chapters, and implies that the framework should be used 
to map the tactical and strategic decisions which policymakers need to take to achieve long-
term stability in this field of social policy.            
 However it is important to emphasise that up to now the analysis has focused solely on 
the full-career hypothesis. As was argued in previous Chapters, this is not very representative 
for the current and future situations in the countries being studied. Moreover the assessment of 
the reforms has used the current situation as the benchmark, when it would be also appropriate 
to compare the anticipated effects of the reform with what would have happened had systems 
remained unreformed. The coming Chapters will seek to address these important issues, in 
order to gain a fuller understanding of the sustainability of pension reforms.      
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Annex 6.1: Comparing the SES data with other wage inequality data 
This Chapter utilises data from Eurostat‘s SES covering full-time workers in NACE sectors C 
to K – which exclude public administration, farming, fishing, social work, health and 
education. This exclusion – necessitated by lack of an adequate data series with harmonised 
definitions and data collection methodologies for all countries – might reduce the accuracy of 
our results. Hence, an effort was made to test the extent to which these data differ from wage 
data covering the entire economy. This comparison, inevitably, had to rely on national data 
sources – which reduce cross-national comparability. Atkinson (2008) includes data on wage 
distribution for several of the countries studied in this Chapter. Table 6.A compares the degree 
of wage inequality in Atkinson (2008) with that implied by the data used in this Chapter. In 
both cases the data is for both genders taken together. 
 
Table 6.A: How the wage earned by P10 and P90 compare with the median wage in selected 
countries (% of median wage) 
 P10 P90 
Atkinson (2008) Data used here Atkinson (2008) Data used here 
Finland 70 69 171 162 
France 67 65 200 197 
Germany 59 53 180 180 
Hungary 51 59 244 248 
Italy 60 69 156 182 
Poland 51 48 206 216 
Sweden 78 63 157 169 
UK 55 53 198 210 
Source: Atkinson (2008), SES (2002). 
 
 As can be seen from this Table, the degree of wage inequality implied by the two sets 
of data is similar, with some exceptions (e.g. the higher ratio shown by national data for P10 in 
Sweden and the lower ratio shown by national data for P90 in Italy).      
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7. Was pre-1990s pension policy in Europe sustainable? 
 
Chapter 6 presented the first application of the proposed social sustainability assessment of 
pension reforms. It compared the performance pre- and post-reform of pension systems, 
looking at how effectively they will continue to achieve pension system goals and to what 
extent they operate within system constraints.  The overall assessment was that while reforms 
reduced poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing in nearly all countries, these remain, 
on average, substantial in most countries – though in some there has been a reduction in 
progressiveness which puts at greater risk women and those on lower incomes. However, the 
Chapter also suggested that reforms still appear to leave some pension systems at considerable 
financial risk, especially where state pension ages fail to keep up with improved longevity. 
 These conclusions were based on a comparison of the sustainability indicators for the 
current situation and the future post-reform situation. This choice of benchmarks, while 
indicative of how the effectiveness of pension systems might change, may, however, belittle 
the achievements of the reforms. The pre-reform and post-reform scenarios, in fact, differ in 
one important dimension – time.  Between 2005 and 2050, not only is longevity expected to 
improve significantly, but also pension systems will face the retirement of the Baby Boom 
generation – which will bring about an abrupt change in the size of the pensioner population 
across Europe. While the latter phenomenon is a one-off shock to pension systems, the 
continued improvement in longevity presents a more dynamic challenge. Moreover, as has 
been argued in Chapter 6, longevity should not be seen as just affecting financial 
sustainability. It impacts on the effectiveness of pension systems in achieving poverty 
alleviation and consumption smoothing – since benefit indexation tends, in most countries, to 
reduce the value of pensions relative to earnings over time.  Longevity also has significant 
implications for intergenerational balance. 
 In this light, this Chapter will present the social sustainability indicators for the pre-
reform systems in 2050. These will be compared to the current situation, so to assess how the 
indicators would have changed had no reforms taken place, and with the 2050 post-reform 
indicators, so as to give an indication of whether the reforms imply better outcomes. 
 
7.1 The social sustainability of the pre-reform pension systems over time 
This section assesses how developments in longevity and the size of the pensioner population 
between 2005 and 2050 would have affected the social sustainability of the pre-reform 
systems – a sort of ‗what-if‘ scenario. As in Chapter 6, this will be done by looking at 
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individuals of both genders and at different levels of income working full careers till state 
pension age. Once again, it must be stressed that this approach suffers from the limitation that 
in reality full careers are not the typical case across the countries being studied, and there exist 
significant differences in labour participation.
159
 However, it presents a good starting point 
when assessing the implications of pension systems and is commonly used in international 
comparative studies. 
 The benchmarks used to assess the poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing 
goals will be the same as in Chapter 6 – i.e. 35% of the economy-wide average wage for 
poverty alleviation and 60% of the individual‘s pre-retirement average wage for consumption 
smoothing.  The only difference with Chapter 6 in this regard will be that net pension 
requirements in some countries will be larger as state pension ages will remain at their current 
position. This is particularly relevant for women, as their state pension age would remain 
below that for men.  
 Another important difference from Chapter 6 will be the assumption on the disposable 
income of the working age generation in 2050. As will be shown in the next section, the pre-
reform pension systems would have cost significantly more than the reformed schemes. We 
will assume that this additional cost would have reduced the disposable income of the working 
age population in 2050. In other words, we are assuming that the burden of maintaining 
current system generosity would have been borne solely by workers in 2050.  Since the 
incomes for the working age generation in 2050 will be lower under the pre-reform systems, 
the relative generosity of the latter will be higher relative to contemporary earnings than the 
post-reform systems. 
 
7.11 Comparing the financial sustainability of the pre- and post-reform systems in 2050 
Given that the difference in the financing burden of maintaining pension systems unchanged is 
assumed to affect the level of disposable income in 2050, we will start by looking at the future 
contribution rates required by the pre-reform systems to finance their implied pension wealth. 
These estimates, presented in Table 7.1, clearly show the substantial contribution towards 
financial sustainability exerted by the pension reforms. Across these ten countries, the 
contribution rate would, on average, have had to more than double from 11% to 24%. The 
pension reforms enacted between the early 1990s and 2008 are estimated to have curtailed the 
required increase in contribution rates, on average, to just 7 percentage points (down from 13 
under unreformed systems). The reforms particularly reduced the pace of growth in financing 
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 This assumption will be relaxed in later Chapters. 
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requirements in Poland and Slovakia, where the pre-reform financing requirement of the 
pension system would have more than tripled. The contribution rates in Hungary and Italy 
would have necessitated rising beyond a third of wages.  
 
Table 7.1: Long-term contribution rates (% of total lifetime wages)* 
  2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 13.8 27.3 22.7 
Finland 8.5 20.4 18.3 
France 14.6 29.6 24.3 
Germany 8.0 17.9 14.4 
Hungary 22.0 43.0 30.8 
Italy 17.3 34.1 24.7 
Poland 8.4 30.4 20.7 
Slovakia 11.1 35.9 24.6 
Sweden 10.1 18.3 16.7 
UK 5.8 7.1 6.7 
Average^  11.1 23.6 18.3 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations given system dependency ratios.  Note that here we are assuming that all those 
of working age participate in full-time labour market activity. 
^ The contribution rate of each country is weighted in line with the relative size of its population.    
Source: Own workings using APEX and Eurostat population projections. 
 
 The reforms have resulted in a substantial improvement in the relative position of some 
countries.  In the absence of reforms, Poland would have slipped from having the third-lowest 
contribution requirement in 2050 to close to being fourth-from-top. Similarly Slovakia would 
have slipped from being one of the countries in the middle of the contribution table to being 
third-from-top. The reforms have also decreased the potential difference in contribution rates 
among the ten countries. If pension systems had remained unchanged, long-term contribution 
requirements in 2050 would have ranged from 7% in the UK to 43% in Hungary. After 
reforms the range lies from 7% in the UK to 31% in Hungary.            
 The higher generosity of pre-reform systems accounts for the bulk of the difference in 
financing requirements in 2050. However it is interesting to note that even in Hungary and the 
UK, where reforms raised generosity, financial sustainability improved. This occurred because 
in both countries the potential size of pensioner cohorts in 2050 was reduced significantly by 
raising the pension age, particularly for women.
160
  This policy greatly diminishes the cost to 
maintain an effective pension system, if the increase in the state pension age is accompanied 
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 In Hungary the age for men and women rose to 62 (from 60 and 55) and to 68 in the UK (from 65 and 60).      
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by extended working lives. In fact, Table 7.1 would be significantly different if this 
assumption is not made. The case for Hungary and Slovakia, in particular, would be less rosy.    
 Table 7.2 presents the drop in disposable income in 2050 had no pension reforms taken 
place – i.e. the difference in 2050 between the financing requirements of the unreformed and 
the reformed systems. This difference in Poland, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia is close to 10 
percentage points, whereas it is close to or less than 2 percentage points in the UK, Finland 
and Sweden.  This suggests that whereas the social sustainability indicators in the first group 
of countries might improve significantly, those in the second will remain similar. 
 
Table 7.2: Fall in disposable income of working age generation in 2050 without reforms 
 % 
Austria 4.7 
Finland 2.1 
France 5.4 
Germany 3.5 
Hungary 12.3 
Italy 9.4 
Poland 9.7 
Slovakia 11.3 
Sweden 1.6 
UK 0.4 
Source: Own workings using APEX and Eurostat population projections. 
 
7.12 The intergenerational balance constraint over time - pre- and post-reform 
After having assessed the cost of maintaining pension systems unchanged, we can evaluate the 
impact on the second constraint - intergenerational balance.  This will be done by comparing 
the net pension wealth of the 2005 and 2050 pensioner generations, the latter under both the 
pre- and the post-reform pension rules. Note that the net pension wealth indicator under the 
pre-reform systems in 2050 is expressed in terms of a lower annual average disposable wage. 
 As can be seen in Table 7.3, the net pension wealth to which the 2050 pensioner 
generation would have been entitled was much greater under the unreformed systems.  Even in 
Hungary, where benefit rules became more generous, there is a loss as the pension age has 
been increased faster than life expectancy. The reforms appear to have broken the strong 
correlation between longevity and net pension wealth in all countries, particularly in Eastern 
Europe where longevity is set to improve significantly.  The biggest losers appear to be 
women in Italy, Slovakia and, particularly, Poland.  On the part of men, the worst relative 
losses are those registered in Italy, Poland and Germany. Aside from the UK and Hungary, 
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where the effects of a higher state pension age are offset by much more generous benefit rules, 
the least affected future pensioners appear to be those in Scandinavian countries. 
 
Table 7.3: The net pension wealth of the 2005 and 2050 pensioner generations^ 
 
Men Women 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2005* 
Pre-
reform 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 (%) 
Post-
reform 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 (%) 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
2005* 
Pre-
reform 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 (%) 
Post-
reform 
Ratio 
2050 to 
2005 (%) 
Austria 13.4 124 109 17.1 115 98 
Finland 10.6 124 114 13.1 117 106 
France 12.7 118 98 15.5 114 96 
Germany 12.2 124 92 14.1 119 95 
Hungary 12.9 139 131 17.7 121 104 
Italy 13.8 120 95 17.4 114 87 
Poland 10.0 131 106 15.8 113 69 
Slovakia 11.0 133 109 16.8 119 79 
Sweden 10.1 117 107 12.5 112 100 
UK 5.7 122 127 8.8 114 112 
^ These ratios are the averages for the 9 different hypothetical individuals.  
* Expressed as a factor of the annual average disposable wage.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 To better illustrate the effect of reforms on pension wealth generosity, Table 7.4 shows 
a synthetic replacement rate, derived by dividing net pension wealth – total pension transfers 
defined in terms of years of contemporary average wages - by the number of years to be spent 
in retirement under the pre- and post-reform systems. This approach, which standardises net 
pension wealth by the length of time it is meant to cover, indicates that except for Hungary 
and the UK, 2050 pensioners will be less well-off under the reformed systems. The main 
losers are pensioners (especially women) in Poland, who are projected to be 30% less well-off, 
followed by those in France, Slovakia, Italy and Germany, where the drop is of approximately 
15%.  By contrast, the 2050 pensioner generation in Austria, Sweden and Finland should be 
between 5% and 10% worse off under the post-reform systems.  
 Table 7.4 also indicates that even under the pre-reform systems, in several countries 
there would have been a slight decline in the ‗overall‘ replacement rate. This is mostly on 
account of the indexation of pensions post-retirement. Most countries have adopted price 
indexation, and as a result, longer periods in retirement result in the relative value of the 
pension falling.  The decline for women is more marginal than that for men, as with longer 
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periods in retirement, relatively more women would end up on minimum pension provisions 
during their later years, which act as a safety net. 
 
Table 7.4: Net pension wealth^ divided by the number of years spent in retirement (%) 
 
Men Women 
2005 
Pre-
reform 
2050 
Post-
reform 
2050 2005 
Pre-
reform 
2050 
Post-
reform 
2050 
Austria 79 72 63 66 64 65 
Finland 66 63 57 62 61 56 
France 55 54 44 55 53 45 
Germany 72 69 56 67 67 59 
Hungary 72 72 74 63 65 71 
Italy 77 75 60 64 64 58 
Poland 71 65 53 66 64 39 
Slovakia 61 61 54 65 67 53 
Sweden 56 56 52 60 56 50 
UK 33 33 40 35 36 49 
 ^ This net pension wealth is the average of those for the 9 different hypothetical individuals. Since 
entitlement is defined as the number of years worth of average wages, by dividing it with the number of 
years expected in retirement, one gets a replacement rate as a % of average wages. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 The fact that nearly all of the 2050 pensioner generation are worse off as a result of the 
reforms does not, however, imply that they will have lower net pension wealth than the 2005 
generation. As was shown in Chapter 6, this is the case only in 6 out of the 10 countries (and 
in 8 countries if one looks only at women). However, comparing the pre- and post-reform 
pension wealth clearly shows that the reforms have been quite comprehensive in limiting the 
potential future growth of these entitlements. Table 7.5 indicates that nearly all of the 2050 
generation lost out as a result of the reforms, and in some cases the decline is quite hefty. In 
Germany, the 2050 male generation lost nearly a third of their potential entitlements, while in 
Poland and Italy the loss was close to a quarter, and a fifth in Slovakia and France.  The 
number of women affected by the reforms is significantly higher, though in some cases their 
average loss is less than that for men. This reflects the fact that most of the reforms involved 
the equalisation of pension ages. Interestingly the loss is highest in Poland, where the pension 
age for women remains below that for men. This suggests that while equalisation may not 
have been legislated, there are now strong financial incentives for women to retire at the same 
age as men.    
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Table 7.5: Projected proportion of the 2050 generation with lower net pension wealth and 
size, on average, of the drop as a result of the pension reforms 
 Men Women 
% of 2050 
Generation 
with lower 
pension 
wealth 
Average 
% decline 
in pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
% of 2050 
Generation 
with lower 
pension 
wealth 
Average 
% decline 
in pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
Austria 100 15 15 100 17 17 
Finland 100 10 10 100 11 11 
France 100 20 20 100 18 18 
Germany 100 32 32 100 24 24 
Hungary 100 8 8 100 17 17 
Italy 100 25 25 100 27 27 
Poland 100 25 25 100 44 44 
Slovakia 89 24 21 100 40 40 
Sweden 78 14 11 89 15 13 
UK 67 9 6 67 17 11 
* The index is estimated by multiplying the % of the 2050 generation with lower pension wealth as a 
result of the reforms with the average % decline in its pension wealth. A value of 0 implies that there is 
no pension wealth loss, while a value of 100 would imply that all pensioners in 2050 had no net 
pension wealth at all as a result of the reforms.  
Note: While the reforms may have lowered the pension wealth of the 2050 generation, this does not 
necessarily imply that the pension wealth of this generation is lower than that of the 2005 generation. 
The cases when this is the case are shown in bold.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Table 7.5 suggests that they are some ‗winners‘ within the 2050 cohort. Figure 7.1 
presents this graphically by showing the change in the ratio of net pension wealth of the 2050 
and 2005 generations pre- and post-reform for the 9 hypothetical full-career individuals. It 
shows that while reforms have reduced the potential generational imbalance by reducing the 
net pension wealth of the 2050 generation closer to that of the 2005 generation, there are 
important distributional differences.  In Austria and France, those on lower incomes register 
the lowest drops in net pension wealth. In Germany, and more especially in the UK, those at 
the bottom deciles end up better off after the reforms. However, those on medium-to-high 
incomes are worse off after the reforms in terms of the growth in their pension wealth.        
 By contrast in the Eastern European states under study, the reforms favour those at the 
higher wage deciles. In Slovakia and Poland, while the net pension wealth of those at the 
bottom deciles in 2050 is projected to be lower, that of those at the top deciles should be 
higher. This distinction would not have arisen under the previous systems. Thus 
intergenerational balance is achieved by disadvantaging those at the bottom of the income 
distribution. In Hungary and Sweden the reforms also favour those at the top deciles, but the 
bottom deciles should still have higher pension wealth than the 2005 pensioner cohort.  No 
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distinctive income distribution differences in the change in pension wealth are evident in 
Finland and Italy.      
 
Figure 7.1: The effect of reforms on intergenerational balance*  
 
Countries where reforms favoured the bottom half of the wage distribution 
 
      
 
      
* This compares the net pension wealth defined in monetary terms for the 2050 generation under the 
pre- and post-reform systems. Note that even if there are losses, this does not imply that the pension 
wealth of the 2050 generation is below that of the 2005 generation. Refer to Chapter 6 for this 
comparison. 
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Figure 7.1: The effect of reforms on intergenerational balance*….continued  
 
Countries where reforms favoured the top half of the wage distribution 
 
      
 
      
* This compares the net pension wealth defined in monetary terms for the 2050 generation under the 
pre- and post-reform systems. Note that even if there are losses, this does not imply that the pension 
wealth of the 2050 generation is below that of the 2005 generation. Refer to Chapter 6 for this 
comparison. 
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Figure 7.1: The effect of reforms on intergenerational balance*…continued  
 
Countries where reforms were distribution-neutral 
 
         
* This compares the net pension wealth defined in monetary terms for the 2050 generation under the 
pre- and post-reform systems. Note that even if there are losses, this does not imply that the pension 
wealth of the 2050 generation is below that of the 2005 generation. Refer to Chapter 6 for this 
comparison. 
 
 
7.13 Poverty alleviation over time under the pre- and post-reform systems 
When considering the impact of reforms on achievement of system objectives, the first thing 
to note is that pre-reform systems in most countries imply longer retirement and hence larger 
net pension requirements to achieve the same aims. This is particularly so for women (see 
Table 7.6).  Under pre-reform systems, on average, across all countries net pension wealth 
would have had to increase by 23% for men and by 13% for women to ensure that individuals, 
on average, have an annual income which keeps them above the poverty threshold of 35% of 
the average disposable wage. The reforms cut this increase down to 18% for men and just 3% 
for women.         
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Table 7.6: The development over time of the net pension requirement* 
 
Men Women 
2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 5.1 6.5 6.5 7.2 8.2 7.2 
Finland 4.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.9 6.9 
France 6.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 8.5 8.5 
Germany 5.1 6.2 5.8 6.0 7.0 6.6 
Hungary 5.3 7.0 6.6 7.5 8.6 7.2 
Italy 5.3 6.3 6.3 7.4 8.2 7.2 
Poland 4.2 5.9 5.9 6.7 7.7 7.7 
Slovakia 5.3 6.7 6.2 7.1 8.0 7.0 
Sweden 5.3 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.9 6.9 
UK 5.0 6.0 5.3 7.0 7.5 5.7 
* The net pension wealth which would guarantee an annual income flow that would keep an individual 
above the poverty threshold over the whole retirement period. 
Source: Own analysis using Eurostat population projections. 
 
Table 7.7 shows the poverty threshold that net pension wealth generates in 2005 and compares 
this with forecasts for 2050 under the reformed and the unchanged systems. A priori one 
would expect that having to cater for longer periods of retirement leads systems to become less 
effective. However, it must be kept in mind that pension systems are underpinned by 
minimum pensions.  Moreover the larger financial cost of pre-reform systems depresses the 
disposable wage and lowers the poverty threshold over time. That said, even under an 
unchanged threshold, retaining the pre-reform systems would, on average, not have resulted in 
a significantly less effective poverty alleviation function.  
 
Table 7.7: The poverty alleviation function over time – the poverty threshold (% of median 
disposable income), on average, covered by pension systems in 2005 and 2050 
 
Men Women 
2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 96 110 85 69 82 70 
Finland 79 83 72 70 74 64 
France 73 82 62 67 76 59 
Germany 69 77 58 55 62 52 
Hungary 79 127 82 73 119 79 
Italy 99 130 78 79 107 71 
Poland 77 88 54 68 81 39 
Slovakia 102 151 77 82 122 62 
Sweden 72 75 64 60 63 54 
UK 48 51 61 41 46 60 
* These ratios are the averages for the 4 hypothetical individuals with below-median wages.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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Table 7.8: Years in poverty under pre-reform systems, assuming unchanged poverty threshold  
a) Men  
 
10
th
 20
th
 30
th
 
Average for 
10
th
 to 50
th
 
Average for 
 all deciles 
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 8 10 4 5 1 2 3 4 1 2 
Germany 17 21 1 2 0 0 4 5 2 3 
Hungary 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 1 12 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 2 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 7 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
UK 17 21 17 21 17 21 17 21 12 13 
b) Women  
 
10
th
 20
th
 30
th
 
Average for 
10
th
 to 50
th
 
Average for 
 all deciles 
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 13 14 5 6 2 2 4 4 2 2 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 16 17 8 9 4 5 6 7 3 4 
Germany 21 25 21 23 11 10 11 12 6 7 
Hungary 9 7 3 3 0 0 2 2 1 1 
Italy 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 18 19 11 12 4 4 7 8 4 5 
Slovakia 4 3 0 0 5 3 2 1 1 1 
Sweden 21 25 13 16 5 6 8 10 5 6 
UK 25 28 25 28 25 28 25 28 22 23 
Source: Own projections using APEX. 
 
 However, with an unchanged threshold, the years at-risk-of-poverty would have 
increased in many countries, especially in Poland, Germany and France (see Table 7.8).  Table 
7.9 looks at the proportion of retirement at-risk-of-poverty and the depth of poverty, again 
assuming unchanged poverty thresholds.  For men, the picture is very clear – the reforms 
(except in the UK) could result in more years at-risk-of-poverty, but except in Poland and 
France the depth of poverty is not projected to increase significantly. For women there is a 
greater variation. In most countries, except in Hungary and the UK (and to some extent 
Austria), the proportion of retirement at-risk-of-poverty is expected to rise – with substantial 
increases in Poland, Germany, Slovakia, France and Sweden. The projected trend in the depth 
of poverty, however, is less striking.  Only in Poland there could be a significant deterioration, 
while in many countries there could be a lower or a stable depth of poverty. This reflects the 
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fact that in most countries, the reforms have been accompanied by better minimum pension 
schemes, which act as a safety net, particularly for women.      
 
Table 7.9: Projected proportion of retirement at risk-of-poverty and depth of poverty in 2050, 
assuming unchanged poverty thresholds  
a) Men  
 
10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles  All deciles 
% of 
retirement at-
risk-of-poverty 
Depth of risk-
of-poverty 
Index of risk-
of-poverty*  
Index of risk-of-
poverty* 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform  
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0% 1% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Finland 0% 1% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
France 12% 41% 0% 11% 1.0 4.5  0.5 2.5 
Germany 21% 40% 11% 15% 2.3 6.0  1.4 3.4 
Hungary 1% 0% 1% 0% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Italy 0% 2% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Poland 14% 55% 8% 22% 1.1 12.4  0.0 6.9 
Slovakia 0% 8% 0% 5% 0.0 0.4  0.0 0.2 
Sweden 6% 27% 5% 6% 0.3 1.5  0.2 0.8 
UK 100% 39% 18% 3% 17.6 1.0  11.1 0.6 
b) Women  
 
10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles  All deciles 
% of 
retirement at-
risk-of-poverty 
Depth of risk-
of-poverty 
Index of risk-
of-poverty*  
Index of risk-of-
poverty* 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform  
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 15% 16% 8% 7% 1.2 1.2  0.6 0.7 
Finland 0% 16% 0% 4% 0.0 0.6  0.0 0.3 
France 21% 47% 8% 12% 1.8 5.5  1.0 3.1 
Germany 52% 79% 17% 15% 9.1 11.9  4.5 6.0 
Hungary 9% 0% 4% 0% 0.4 0.0  0.1 0.0 
Italy 2% 9% 3% 4% 0.1 0.4  0.0 0.2 
Poland 13% 100% 8% 33% 1.0 33.4  1.4 19.5 
Slovakia 7% 33% 11% 13% 0.8 4.2  0.2 2.3 
Sweden 39% 67% 14% 14% 5.4 9.7  3.1 5.4 
UK 100% 66% 32% 3% 32.2 2.0  17.9 0.5 
* An index value of 100 implies all concerned are always without any income in retirement, whereas 
an index value of 0 implies that no one ever spends a year with an income below the poverty threshold.  
Note: The proportion of retirement at-risk-of-poverty is estimated by summing up the total years during 
which the pension would be below the poverty threshold for the hypothetical individuals, and then 
expressing as a % of the total years in retirement. The depth of risk-of-poverty is estimated by summing 
for those years at-risk-of-poverty for the hypothetical individuals the difference between the pension 
level and the poverty threshold, and then expressing it as a % of the poverty threshold for those years.   
Source: Own analysis using APEX.      
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7.14 Consumption smoothing over time under the pre- and post-reform pension systems 
The next step is to see how maintaining pension systems unchanged would have affected the 
strength of the consumption smoothing function. Chapter 6 indicated that at present state 
systems are able to provide, on average, during the post-retirement period an annual income 
flow above 60% of previous income (except in the UK, where income replacement is only 
strong for those on low incomes). Across the ten countries, the projected overall replacement 
rate of the post-reform pension systems in 2050 is projected to be about twelve and eight 
percentage points less than it was in 2005 for men and women, respectively. By contrast, 
Table 7.10 suggests that when one considers the drop in disposable income due to the higher 
cost of unreformed systems, the replacement rate would have increased significantly in most 
cases.  Only in the UK the post-reform replacement rate is higher than it would have been 
under the pre-reform rules.  
 
Table 7.10: The replacement rate, on average, of pension systems in 2005 and 2050 (%) 
 
Men Women 
2005 
Pre-
reform 
2050 
Post-
reform 
2050 2005 
Pre-
reform 
2050 
Post-
reform 
2050 
Austria 91 110 78 83 105 82 
Finland 75 78 69 75 81 70 
France 68 77 57 71 81 61 
Germany 85 96 68 82 95 71 
Hungary 85 162 90 83 158 90 
Italy 92 130 72 82 120 73 
Poland 87 93 63 86 99 50 
Slovakia 72 120 67 83 137 67 
Sweden 66 69 62 71 74 64 
UK 40 44 48 44 51 60 
* These ratios are the averages for the 9 different hypothetical individuals.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 In terms of differential gender impacts, the reforms in Poland and Slovakia appear to 
have mostly affected women. Conversely women in most other countries suffer a smaller 
reduction in consumption smoothing compared to men. This reflects the fact that many 
reforms were progressive, and impacted more on pension generosity for higher earners (and 
these tend to be mainly male). This in a way can be held as compensating for pension age 
gender equalisation.       
 Adopting a 60% replacement rate benchmark, Table 7.11 indicates that reforms have 
tended to weaken income smoothing for the middle part of the wage distribution in France, 
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Poland and Sweden, and marginally also in Slovakia, Austria and Italy.  In France, Poland and 
Sweden, a substantial proportion of the population are no longer projected to have replacement 
rates of 60% throughout their retirement, though in Sweden they will be getting only 
marginally less.
161
 In the UK, despite the improvements in generosity, the income replacement 
function of state pensions remains quite weak, particularly for men.  It is interesting to note 
that the gap for the whole population differs in some cases from that of the middle part of the 
wage distribution. For example, in Poland (and to some extent, in Sweden) when one looks at 
the population as a whole, the decline in the strength of the consumption smoothing function 
due to the reforms is lower than that when one looks at just the middle part of the wage 
distribution. This reflects the improvement in replacement rates for those on higher incomes as 
a result of the reforms.          
 
Table 7.11: Projected proportion of retirement with replacement rate less than 60% and size 
of gap from this threshold 
  
a) Men  
 
30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles  All deciles 
Proportion of 
retirement 
with low 
replacement 
Magnitude of 
replacement 
gap 
 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
  
Index of replacement 
gap* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform  
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0% 5% 0% 5% 0.0 0.3  0.0 1.4 
Finland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
France 0% 71% 0% 12% 0.0 8.6  0.0 9.5 
Germany 0% 2% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.1 
Hungary 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Italy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Poland 0% 40% 0% 6% 0.0 2.6  0.0 2.5 
Slovakia 0% 9% 0% 2% 0.0 0.2  0.0 0.3 
Sweden 0% 74% 0% 4% 0.0 3.3  1.5 2.0 
UK 100% 100% 26% 23% 26.0 23.0  27.4 23.8 
* An index value of 100 implies that all are always without any income during retirement, whereas an 
index value of 0 implies that no one spends a year with an income below 60%.  
Note: The proportion of retirement with low replacement is the number of years during with a 
replacement rate below 60% expressed as a % of the years spent in retirement. The magnitude of 
replacement gap is estimated by summing for the years at risk of low replacement the difference 
between the replacement rate and 60%, and then expressing it as a % of the latter for those years.   
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 Note individuals are assumed to retire at age 65 in 2050, which is unlikely given the incentives of the 
NDC system. Moreover the projections for Poland assume women retire at 60, again unlikely given the 
incentives they face. 
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Table 7.11: Projected proportion of retirement with replacement rate less than 60% and size 
of gap from this threshold…continued 
 
b) Women  
 
30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles  All deciles 
Proportion of 
retirement  
with low 
replacement 
Magnitude of 
replacement 
gap 
 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
  
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform  
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.2 
Finland 0% 2% 0% 3% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
France 0% 54% 0% 11% 0.0 6.1  0.0 5.6 
Germany 0% 3% 0% 1% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Hungary 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Italy 0% 2% 0% 4% 0.0 0.1  0.0 0.0 
Poland 0% 100% 0% 24% 0.0 23.8  0.0 20.1 
Slovakia 0% 5% 0% 1% 0.0 0.1  0.0 0.2 
Sweden 0% 48% 0% 5% 0.0 2.5  0.2 2.2 
UK 100% 60% 16% 12% 16.0 6.9  16.8 11.6 
* An index value of 100 implies that all are always without any income during retirement, whereas an 
index value of 0 implies that no one spends a year with an income below 60%.  
Note: The proportion of retirement with low replacement is the number of years during with a 
replacement rate below 60% expressed as a % of the years spent in retirement. The magnitude of 
replacement gap is estimated by summing for the years at risk of low replacement the difference 
between the replacement rate and 60%, and then expressing it as a % of the latter for those years.   
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
7.2 Overall comparison over time of the pre-reform with the post-reform systems 
In synthesis, the above analysis suggests that while pre-reform systems would have maintained 
the same degree of efficacy in achieving goals,
162
 they would have done so at the risk of 
overstepping constraints. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 clearly illustrate this. Leaving systems 
unchanged in the face of changing longevity and the size of the pensioner population would 
have resulted in notable pressures. For some countries, such as Hungary and Italy, the implied 
levels of taxation would have been staggering. Slovakia, Austria and Poland would have also 
faced very serious financial and generational issues, while Germany, France and Finland 
present a more intermediate, though still worrying, case.  By contrast, the UK and Sweden 
stand out as facing the lowest risks among the ten countries under study.  This reflects partly 
the limited consumption smoothing function of the state pension systems in these countries.      
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 Or indeed, improved on it, if one takes into account the drop in disposable income which would have 
accompanied the lack of reforms. 
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Figure 7.2: Effect of reforms on system goals 
 
Note: Red lines stand for the change in goals which would have occurred had systems remained 
unchanged, while the blue lines show the correction due to the pension reforms. In most cases the 
increase in aims reflects a drop in disposable income due to higher contribution rates.  
 
Figure 7.3: Effect of reforms on system constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Red lines stand for the change in pension system constraints in the absence of reforms, while the 
blue lines show the correction due to the impact of pension reforms. 
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 Note that in most cases, the improvement in system goals of pre-reform systems would 
have simply reflected the lower disposable income of future working generations due to higher 
contributions. Only in the UK, the reforms actually enhance further the improvement in 
poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing over what would have occurred over time had 
the pension system remained unchanged. While the impact of reforms on system goals is 
strongest in Hungary and Slovakia, the difference compared to 2005 is not so large. Italy has 
the third-strongest effect induced by reforms, and this not only offsets the development which 
would have occurred under an unchanged system, but also reduces the achievements of the 
pension system significantly compared to 2005.  By contrast, even though the size induced by 
the change in Poland and Germany would seem intermediate, when one considers the starting 
point, the reforms had a large relative impact. This is also true, to a lesser extent, for Austria 
and France.   
 The reforms in Germany and Italy undid the rise in pressure on constraints of 
unchanged systems. Poland and Slovakia also appear to have offset large part of the 
anticipated stress on system constraints, even though they faced the second- and third-largest 
challenges. Hungary and Finland have managed to redress part of the increased demands of 
the pension system, but face the largest relative pressures among the ten countries.  The 
Austrian reforms also appear to not have reduced the strain on constraints that much.       
 While quite illustrative of the overall changes occurring across the ten countries, 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 are quite difficult to interpret due to the clustering of data points and the 
presence of some outlying cases such as the UK and Hungary.   Hence, Figure 7.4 represents 
these changes on a country-by-country basis.  When looking at the diagrams on the effect of 
reforms on goals, when the post-reform arrow is steeper than the pre-reform arrow, the 
reforms, on average, favour the poverty alleviation function over the consumption smoothing 
one.  That is, the impact of the reforms is stronger on replacement rates than on achievable 
poverty thresholds. This appears to be the case especially in Austria and Germany. By 
contrast, in Poland and Slovakia, but also to some extent in Hungary and Sweden, the loss in 
the poverty alleviation function is relatively stronger than that in consumption smoothing.  
 Turning to the pressure on constraints, the slope indicates the extent to which net 
pension wealth has been lowered. A downward-pointing line would imply a drop in the 
contribution rate, unaccompanied by any decline in net pension wealth. The country that 
comes closest to having this is the UK, where the large increase in state pension age enables a 
decline in the contribution rate while net pension wealth remains relatively unchanged from 
the pre-reform case in 2050 as the shorter retirement period is offset by more generous pension 
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rules. By contrast in other countries, the arrows have a flatter slope. Here the decline caused 
by the reforms in the projected required contribution rate is partially financed by less generous 
pension wealth.        
 
Figure 7.4: Development in social sustainability indicators- country-by-country analysis 
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Figure 7.4: Development in social sustainability indicators- country-by-country analysis..cont 
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Figure 7.4: Development in social sustainability indicators- country-by-country analysis..cont 
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Figure 7.4: Development in social sustainability indicators- country-by-country analysis..cont 
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Figure 7.4: Development in social sustainability indicators- country-by-country analysis..cont 
 
   
 
                                                                                         
 
 In conclusion, this analysis suggests while reforms have, in general, reduced the 
strength of the poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing functions, in most countries 
these remain significant. In Sweden, France and Germany the reforms might result in more 
years at-risk-of-poverty, particularly for women. In Poland and Slovakia, these concerns are 
much more heightened. As for consumption smoothing, the reforms seem to lead to closer 
convergence between countries, with a diminished state role.   
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 The reforms have greatly reduced the required increase in the contribution rate to 
finance pension transfers to the 2050 pensioner cohort. In many cases, these transfers were 
reduced by reforms to levels closer to those of current generations. The equalisation of state 
pension ages, in particular, has turned to be a very useful way of defusing part of the financial 
impact of the retirement of the Baby Boom.  Nevertheless in some countries, cuts in pension 
wealth appear to be high, though policymakers can argue that the decline in potential 
entitlement is offset by the reduced need to increase contribution rates, and is generally not at 
the cost of significantly reduced system goals.  In some other countries, such as Slovakia and 
Poland, policymakers may however need to reconsider the gender impact of reforms.         
      
7.3 Conclusion 
This Chapter evaluated the social sustainability of pension reforms from a different 
perspective than Chapter 6. Rather than comparing the projected implications of the reformed 
system with those of the current system, it first looked at how longevity and the change in the 
size of pensioner cohorts would have affected the cost of financing the current systems as 
against the reformed ones. It then assumed this cost would have decreased future disposable 
income and estimated the social sustainability indicators for the pre-reform systems in 2050 
accordingly. While Chapter 6 suggested reforms had not done enough to maintain systems 
fiscally sustainable, this Chapter revealed they cut substantially the potential rise in long-term 
contribution rates.  It confirmed that in most countries, this was achieved without endangering 
significantly the overall goals of pension systems. In fact, some countries managed to increase 
generosity, while still reducing future financial needs by raising the pension age. However the 
Chapter corroborated the finding that the risk-of-poverty under the reformed systems has 
heightened in countries which reduced substantially the progressivity of their pension systems.  
Furthermore in many countries, the consumption smoothing function of the state pension 
system for middle-to-high earners has diminished in strength. The considerable cuts in 
anticipated pension wealth in some countries may also create intergenerational pressures. 
 Up to now, the analysis has focused solely on the hypothetical full-career case, which 
may not be very representative of actual labour market participation. This assumption will be 
relaxed in the next Chapter and the social sustainability framework will be applied to more 
realistic hypothetical cases. This should result in the indicators becoming more in line with the 
data presented in Chapter 1 and the typologies set out in Chapter 2. Moreover getting a better 
understanding of the actual performance of current pension systems should enable one to make 
a better assessment of the possible impacts of reforms. 
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8. Adjusting social sustainability indicators to reflect                                
incomplete full-time careers, part-time work and inactivity 
 
The social sustainability indicators developed in Chapters 6 and 7, like the existing literature, 
assume economies are characterised by full-employment and complete full-time careers for 
both genders. This assumption, though analytically convenient, is unrealistic and is not 
consistent with the concepts underlying the social sustainability framework.  The latter, in fact, 
seeks to study whether reforms result in systems failing to remain effective and therefore 
becoming unsustainable.  However the assumption of complete working-age full-time 
employment may over-represent the real efficacy of a pension system, by overestimating the 
achievement of system goals (since individuals accrue the maximum theoretical generosity of 
the system) while diminishing the constraints faced (as it boosts the support ratio). Moreover, 
reformers may have based their policy choices in light of labour market developments which 
would offset part of the effects of reforms.  
 Lack of adequate comparable data on contribution records and the difficulty of making 
projections raise significant issues when moving away from the full-careers assumption. 
However, this Chapter will still attempt to present a more realistic estimate of the social 
sustainability indicators, taking into account incomplete full-time careers, part-time work and 
labour market inactivity.  While still subject to significant caveats, the estimates presented 
should present a better assessment of the present and future efficacy of the analysed pension 
systems. The Chapter starts by describing the data used to modify the indicators. Then it 
shows what these imply for the achievement of system aims and pressures on constraints, 
compares these with the results of Chapter 6 and assesses if these new indicators bring us 
closer to the pension system typology of Chapter 2.  Finally some estimates of the individual 
saving required to offset the effects of pension reforms are presented.  However, it is important 
to underline that the results in this Chapter are not to be taken as definitive, as they are 
sensitive to the assumptions taken.  Sensitivity tests will be presented in Chapter 9. 
 
8.1 Developing a better understanding of the interaction of working age individuals with 
their pension system 
Chapters 6 and 7 are based on hypothetical individuals in full-time employment throughout 
their career.  Labour market data, however, clearly indicate that very few individuals fit this 
description.  Moreover, data show that there are very considerable differences in labour market 
activity in the ten countries under question.  Thus, social sustainability indicators based on this 
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assumption probably overestimate the efficacy of pension systems as they are based on the 
maximum theoretical benefit which individuals could extract from the pension system while 
concurrently possibly underplaying pressures on resources.  Also, since countries differ in the 
degree to which they stray from the assumption of complete working-age full-time 
employment, the latter complicates cross-country analysis.     
 Data on the average number of years contributed by workers are not readily available 
on a harmonised basis.  ISG (2009) includes information on the contribution years (including 
credits in some cases) of new flows of retirees.  These data suggest that assuming the same 
labour participation across all countries is unrealistic and creates significant problems on a 
gender level within the same country.  However while these data shed some light on labour 
market participation within countries, their reliability is dubious.  In particular, the data for 
Eastern European countries are suspiciously high, in light of other existing labour market data.   
 
Table 8.1: Seniority (including non contributory periods) at retirement of new retirees (years) 
 Male Female Both genders 
 Period  for 
“full pension” 
Austria NA NA NA 45 
Finland 33.3 30.6 31.9 39 
France 40.0 31.8 35.8 40 
Germany NA NA NA No full pension 
Hungary 39.9 38.0 38.8 No full pension 
Italy 34.9 27.9 32.1 40 
Poland 36.5 33.3 34.3 No full pension 
Slovakia 40.4 34.0 35.8 No full pension 
Sweden 40.0 34.0 37.0 40 
UK 42.0 26.0 35.0 44 (M)/39 (F) 
Source: ISG (2009), MISSOC Tables (2008).  
    
 Table 8.2 shows Eurostat‘s estimates of the average exit age from the labour force163 in 
the ten countries.  These data suggest a smaller gender gap in the contributory period and also 
significantly higher effective contribution periods in some countries (e.g. Italy) than the 
administrative data in Table 8.1.  However the model used by Eurostat is not very useful for 
the purposes of this research, as it fails to capture the overall differences in labour market 
participation between countries.  The model assumes, for instance, that up to the age of 49 
years nobody will have left the labour force.  However, participation rates at age 49 differ 
significantly across countries.  
 
                                               
163
 This measure is based on a probability model considering the relative changes of activity rates from one 
year to another at a specific age. These activity rates are from the harmonised EU LFS.  
202 
 
                    
Table 8.2: Average exit age from the labour force (average for the period 2001-2006) 
 Male Female Both genders 
Austria 60 59 60 
Finland 61 61 61 
France 59 59 59 
Germany 61 61 61 
Hungary 60 59 60 
Italy 60 60 60 
Poland 60 56 58 
Slovakia 60 56 58 
Sweden 63 63 63 
UK 63 62 63 
Source: Eurostat LFS.  
 
 A better approach to understand the interaction of individuals with their pension 
system lies in using labour market participation data. Table 8.3 presents labour market activity 
rates broken down by gender and by age group from Eurostat‘s Labour Force survey (LFS). 
 
Table 8.3: Activity rates by age (2005)     
a) Male (% in age group who are active in the labour market) 
 AU FI FR DE HU IT PL SK SW UK 
15-19 45.1 41.8 17.5 30.2 17.3 6.4 11.5 9.4 28.2 47.3 
20-24 76.7 79.1 64.8 71.4 63.3 53.3 65.0 74.5 71.5 81.5 
25-29 88.1 89.9 93.5 84.0 84.2 88.4 93.0 95.4 87.0 90.8 
30-34 93.8 93.9 95.7 94.5 92.8 91.5 95.8 95.9 92.8 92.8 
35-39 94.3 92.5 95.2 95.9 95.5 90.4 93.9 96.6 93.0 93.1 
40-44 92.5 92.0 95.8 95.8 95.6 86.4 91.5 95.1 91.1 91.7 
45-49 93.0 89.6 94.2 94.2 94.2 80.8 84.2 92.1 89.8 90.2 
50-54 84.3 82.8 89.8 89.9 85.3 73.5 69.6 88.2 88.7 86.3 
55-59 64.3 71.4 65.8 80.3 55.9 56.0 47.9 78.5 83.8 77.4 
60-64 14.7 35.1 14.8 37.8 30.6 19.2 26.2 16.6 65.3 55.6 
65-69 4.7 8.5 3.9 7.2 12.0 5.5 13.2 4.1 16.3 18.3 
15-69 54.4 54.4 50.5 55.0 52.5 47.8 62.1 55.2 54.3 55.6 
b) Female (% in age group who are active in the labour market) 
 AU FI FR DE HU IT PL SK SW UK 
15-19 32.2 46.3 9.9 24.6 3.5 12.7 7.8 8.5 32.4 46.7 
20-24 69.0 71.6 56.9 63.9 41.9 48.8 52.5 60.8 65.1 71.4 
25-29 80.5 76.5 81.4 73.8 63.6 65.5 76.1 73.7 80.7 75.7 
30-34 80.5 82.0 80.1 77.0 64.3 69.7 80.7 80.3 83.6 74.4 
35-39 80.4 81.8 82.0 78.9 74.1 66.9 83.9 89.3 87.1 76.1 
40-44 83.1 89.5 83.8 82.0 79.9 65.4 84.4 92.5 88.2 78.9 
45-49 79.1 89.9 81.7 82.1 75.7 60.1 78.3 89.9 88.3 79.8 
50-54 70.6 86.8 76.0 76.6 68.9 50.7 55.1 81.1 85.4 75.9 
55-59 32.6 72.7 51.7 61.3 40.2 29.8 26.8 22.6 79.0 62.6 
60-64 7.4 28.9 12.4 19.5 8.9 9.1 12.9 5.0 58.0 30.1 
65-69 3.1 .. 2.0 4.1 2.8 3.0 7.0 .. 9.1 9.9 
15-69 42.2 48.0 41.5 42.6 36.0 33.1 47.4 43.5 48.4 45.2 
Note: AU – Austria; FI –Finland; FR- France; DE – Germany; HU- Hungary; IT- Italy; PL – Poland; SK – 
Slovakia; SW – Sweden; UK – United Kingdom. 
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
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 Activity rates for men aged 25-29 to 45-49 are quite similar across all countries.
164
 
There are, however, very substantial differences in labour market participation in the younger 
and older age groups.
165
 The same pattern by age can be observed among women, but there is 
a far greater degree of cross-country variation in female labour market participation.
166
 The 
data in Table 8.3, thus, confirm that assuming a complete career from age 20 to pension age 
misrepresents typical labour market participation and also distorts gender and cross-country 
comparisons. They also indicate that a considerable number of people, especially women, are 
not economically active. 
 Using these activity rates, one can construct an indicator of the average labour market 
participation between age 20 and pension age for the whole population.  For instance, if all 
those aged 20 to 24 were in employment, one would be justified in assuming that individuals 
contribute for 5 years during this period. In reality, however, an average of only 70% of 
individuals aged 20-24 were participating in labour market activity. Thus the average number 
of contribution years between ages 20-24 cannot be assumed higher than 3.5 years. Applying 
the same principle for all ages between 20 and pension age, one can make an estimate of the 
average contribution years in 2005 (see Table 8.4).       
 
Table 8.4: Estimate of contribution years between 20 and pension age using 2005 
participation rates 
 Male Female 
Austria 35.1 28.8 
Finland 36.3 34.0 
France 34.7 29.7 
Germany 37.2 30.8 
Hungary 31.0 23.4 
Italy 34.9 22.8 
Poland 33.4 26.9 
Slovakia 35.8 30.0 
Sweden 38.2 35.8 
UK 38.0 29.7 
Source: Own workings using data from Eurostat LFS.     
 
 In light of the above, Table 8.5 presents our estimate of the average effective age of 
retirement on the basis of 2005 labour activity rates. It differs from Table 8.2 in that it does not 
                                               
164
 The coefficient of variation in activity rates for these ages ranges between 2% and 5%.  
165
 The coefficient of variation for ages 15-19 is 61% and that for ages 60-64 and 65-69 are more than 55%. 
166
 The activity rate of women in Italy is nearly 50% less than that observed in Sweden, against 14% among 
males. 
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assume that everyone is participating in the labour market at age 50.
167
 Rather, it takes into 
account differences in labour market participation.  As a result, the difference among countries 
and genders within the same country becomes quite more significant than that implied by 
Eurostat‘s average exit age indicator.  It is also interesting to note that while there are 
significant differences between the estimates in Tables 8.1 and 8.5,
168
 the intra-country gender 
gap in contribution years is similar.       
 
Table 8.5: Own estimate of the average effective age of retirement (2005) 
 Male Female 
Austria 55 49 
Finland 56 54 
France 55 50 
Germany 57 51 
Hungary 51 43 
Italy 55 43 
Poland 53 47 
Slovakia 56 50 
Sweden 58 56 
UK 58 50 
Source: Own workings using data from Eurostat LFS.     
 
 This approach not only makes the average exit age indicator more representative of 
cross-country and intra-country gender differences.  It also has the benefit of being based on a 
harmonised data source, the LFS.  Moreover, since EU projections of labour market 
participation rates are available, it is possible to create forecasts.  Using an age-cohort 
methodology, EPC (2009) forecasts future participation on the basis of cohort past 
participation and changes in the demographic structure,
169
 and takes into account reforms to 
early retirement schemes and pension ages.  Table 8.6 presents 2005 labour market 
participation data, by gender, and EPC (2009) projections for 2050. Participation is expected 
to increase substantially in nearly all countries, rising by nearly a tenth in Hungary, Italy, 
Austria and Germany.  
 
 
 
                                               
167
 This explains why the estimates in Table 8.5 are all lower than those in Table 8.2 and in some cases are 
below age 50 (which is the starting point of Eurostat‘s average age of exit indicator). 
168
 For instance, the number of contribution years estimated for Hungary is much lower than the data from 
ISG (2009). 
169
 The higher participation rate among current younger women is thus maintained when they get older, while 
the ageing of the workforce reduces participation as participation rates declines with age.  
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Table 8.6: Labour market participation rate (% for 15-64), actual and projected 
 
2005 2050 
Men Women Men Women 
Austria 79.9 64.4 81.9 73.0 
Finland 76.7 72.3 80.0 78.1 
France 75.4 63.3 75.2 67.7 
Germany 79.5 65.4 82.9 76.5 
Hungary 67.5 53.7 69.3 60.5 
Italy 74.9 50.9 78.3 57.1 
Poland 69.8 57.9 71.4 59.6 
Slovakia 76.8 63.4 75.5 65.2 
Sweden 79.4 75.6 84.2 80.5 
UK 82.4 68.3 82.6 74.4 
Source: EPC (2009). 
 
 On the basis of these projections,
170
 the average effective age of retirement for the 
overall population should rise significantly in most countries. The increase among women 
reflects both a cohort effect – the catch-up in gender employment rates – and a policy effect – 
gender pension age equalisation.  The change among men mostly reflects tightening of early 
retirement and disability schemes.       
 
Table 8.7: Own estimate of the average effective age of retirement (2050) 
 Male Female 
Austria 56 55 
Finland 59 58 
France 55 53 
Germany 61 61 
Hungary 52 49 
Italy 57 48 
Poland 55 48 
Slovakia 55 51 
Sweden 62 59 
UK 61 57 
Source: Own workings using data from Eurostat LFS and EPC (2009).     
 
 Labour market participation data are not only useful to arrive at estimates of possible 
contribution years – thereby modifying the expected payouts to future pensioners.  They can 
also be used to modify the projected financial cost of the pension system.  Countries differ not 
only in terms of expected demographic trends and legislated pension ages.  The extent to 
                                               
170
 Adjusted to reflect the legislated increase in pension age in Germany and the UK not considered in EPC 
(2009). We assumed participation for ages 65 to 68 will increase like that for ages 60 to 65.  
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which their working age population participates in formal labour market activity, thus creating 
the means to support the dependent population, also differs.   
 
Table 8.8: Demographic dependency vis-à-vis system dependency (%) 
 
Pensioners 
to working 
age (2005) 
Pensioners 
to workers 
(2005) 
Pensioners 
to working 
age (2050) 
Pensioners 
to workers 
(2050) 
Change in 
old age 
dependency 
Change in 
system 
dependency 
Austria 29 41 49 63 67 56 
Finland 24 32 47 60 100 88 
France 35 50 61 86 76 71 
Germany 27 38 50 63 85 68 
Hungary 42 68 64 98 53 43 
Italy 36 56 60 69 69 24 
Poland 23 36 69 104 200 191 
Slovakia 27 39 71 101 160 159 
Sweden 27 35 43 52 58 49 
UK 30 40 31 40 5 1 
Source: Own analysis of Eurostat population and EPC (2009) participation projections. 
 
 Multiplying labour market participation rates by the working-age population yields the 
number of contributors to pension systems, both current and expected. These estimates can be 
used to calculate the system dependency ratio - the number of beneficiaries divided by the 
number of contributors. This presents a more realistic measure of the demographic ratio which 
a pension system faces. Given that not all of those of working age are in employment, the 
current dependency rate is significantly higher than the demographic dependency ratio (which 
tends to be the ratio most commonly used to assess pension system financial sustainability). 
Moreover since labour participation rates are expected to rise by 2050, the change in the 
system dependency ratio tends to be relatively smaller than that in demographic dependency.  
Nonetheless, the absolute levels of this ratio become worryingly high in many countries, with 
the ratio becoming very close to or over one contributor for each beneficiary in France, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.      
 Another consideration that needs to be made is that a significant proportion of the 
employed are not in full-time employment but work part-time. This is important as part-time 
employees tend to earn significantly lower wages than full-timers and this may reduce their 
pension entitlements (see Table 8.9). Table 8.10 shows very substantial cross-country 
differences in the share of part-time employment.
171
  Part-time employment is quite important 
when looking at female employment in most countries. 
                                               
171
 The coefficient of variation among the part-time share of men is 49% and that among women is 57%.  
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Table 8.9: Hourly wage rates (in euros)  
 Male Female 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Austria 13.3 12.5 10.0 9.4 
Finland 14.9 12.3 12.5 10.3 
France 15.1 16.9 12.6 13.2 
Germany 17.1 13.3 13.4 11.4 
Hungary 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.4 
Italy 11.0 12.4 9.1 8.6 
Poland 3.4 2.8 2.9 2.3 
Slovakia 2.4 1.4 1.8 1.1 
Sweden 16.0 13.4 13.9 12.4 
UK 20.6 13.3 16.1 10.8 
Source: Own workings from Eurostat‘s 2002 SES.  
 
Table 8.10: Share of employed in part-time work in 2005 (% of total employment) 
 Males Females 
Austria 6.1 39.3 
Finland 9.2 18.6 
France 5.8 30.2 
Germany 7.8 43.5 
Hungary 2.7 5.8 
Italy 4.6 25.6 
Poland 8.0 14.3 
Slovakia 1.3 4.1 
Sweden 11.5 39.6 
UK 10.4 42.7 
Source: Own workings using data from Eurostat‘s LFS. 
  
To conclude, this section has indicated that: 
1. A significant part of the working-age population, particularly women, is not active in 
the labour market.  There are very significant cross-country and gender differences in 
the size of the non-active population.  The system dependency ratio is higher than the 
demographic dependency ratio, but since labour market participation is projected to 
rise by 2050, the increase in the system dependency ratio should be relatively smaller.  
2. Most of those who work full-time do not do so for the entire period between age 20 
and the pension age.  In no country, do contribution years, on average, reach 40 (as per 
ISG replacement rate assumptions).  Moreover there are significant cross-country and 
gender differences in the number of contribution years. 
3. In some countries, a very substantial part of those in employment are in part-time work 
and earn lower hourly wage rates than full-timers.  Part-time employment is female-
dominated in all countries.      
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8.2 Modifying the social sustainability indicators to better reflect current and projected 
labour market activity 
The social sustainability indicators presented in Chapters 6 and 7 were based on the 
assumption that everyone of working age is constantly full-time employed till pension age. 
The data in section 8.1 show that this is not the case, particularly for women, and that the 
support ratio underpinning pension systems is much lower than that suggested by a simple 
rendering of demographic data. With this in perspective, the next step is to re-estimate all the 
indicators presented previously, replacing the full-career assumption by our estimates of the 
average effective age of retirement presented in Tables 8.5 and 8.7. Moreover we will 
introduce two new individuals for each gender, one working part-time and the other in receipt 
of the minimum pension in that particular country. The aim of the latter case is to capture the 
protection floor available in each country for someone with no contribution years.  
 To arrive at our aggregate indicators, we compute for each gender an average of the 
indicators for the 9 hypothetical full-timers and the hypothetical part-timer, weighted in line 
with their size out of the active population.  This approach does not address the presence of 
individuals who never participate in labour market activity. Cross-national longitudinal data 
on this population group are not available, but there are data on the proportion of the 
population not currently participating in labour market activity. However we cannot use these 
data to proxy the importance of our hypothetical person in receipt of minimum provision, as 
this information was used to estimate the career length of the other cases.  Nevertheless the 
social sustainability indicators will still be estimated and presented for this case.  Also note 
that minimum provision comes into play if over time the entitlement of our other cases falls to 
this floor due to indexation depressing the relative value of pensions.   
 Throughout we assume that all our hypothetical individuals contribute for the same 
amount of years and that the age at which they retire deviates from the state pension age to 
that effect (see Table 8.11). This assumption raises a number of issues.  
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Table 8.11: Comparison of average effective age of retirement and state pension age 
                  2005 
 Male Female 
 
Average 
effective age of 
retirement 
Legislated 
pension age 
Average 
effective age of 
retirement 
Legislated 
pension age 
Austria 55 65 49 60 
Finland 56 65 54 65 
France 55 60 50 60 
Germany 57 65 51 65 
Hungary 51 60 43 55 
Italy 55 65 43 60 
Poland 53 65 47 60 
Slovakia 56 60 50 57 
Sweden 58 65 56 65 
UK 58 65 50 60 
                   2050 
 Male Female 
 
Average 
effective age of 
retirement 
Legislated 
pension age 
Average 
effective age of 
retirement 
Legislated 
pension age 
Austria 56 65 55 65 
Finland 59 65 58 65 
France 55 60 53 60 
Germany 61 67 61 67 
Hungary 52 62 49 62 
Italy 57 65 48 65 
Poland 55 65 48 60 
Slovakia 55 62 51 62 
Sweden 62 65 59 65 
UK 61 68 57 68 
Source: Own workings using data from Eurostat LFS. 
 
 Firstly we are imposing the average labour market participation of a cross-section of 
generations on a single generation. This might overestimate the labour market participation of 
a generation if activity rates for different generations have been rising. Instead one would need 
longitudinal data which capture the real contributory period of a given generation. However 
these are unavailable on a harmonised basis, and furthermore no projections of the 
contributory periods of the generation retiring in 2050 exist.  Unfortunately this issue cannot 
be dealt with adequately.  
 The second issue is that we are implicitly assuming that all our individuals display the 
average labour market participation trends over their career. This again presents a problem as 
there are well-known differences in labour market participation across the wage distribution. 
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Those on lower incomes tend, for instance, to have lower labour participation.  Unfortunately, 
data limitations prevent the computation of longitudinal income-specific labour market 
participation trends.  However in Chapter 9 we present some evidence as to how results would 
change if we were to assume different contributory periods for our hypothetical individuals 
based on socio-economic differences in labour participation. 
 The third issue is that in many cases, particularly in NDC systems, the generosity of a 
system is very dependent on career length, and thus our results are very sensitive to the 
assumptions made on labour market participation.  Moreover in most countries, certain 
absences from the labour market, such as for caring, are not sanctioned by a decline in pension 
entitlements.  To address these issues, Chapter 9 will present alternative scenarios for the 
career length, showing how results change when one assumes longer careers.  Moreover it will 
also present estimates for how provisions of contribution credits affect the social sustainability 
indicators.  A related issue is that our analysis deals with individual entitlements and ignores 
household formation.  This could raise significant issues in some countries (more on this in 
Section 8.21). 
 Despite our new assumptions on career length, we will still be assuming the same 
length of time spent in receipt of state pensions as in Chapter 6 and 7.  Again this assumption 
raises issue as in many countries individuals are able to access state pensions before state 
pension age.  However the scope of our analysis is to study state pension systems and 
precludes the analysis of early retirement schemes.  Similarly it is pertinent to again stress that 
our analysis does not take into account private retirement saving and non take-up of pension 
benefits.          
 
8.21 The poverty alleviation function 
The indicators presented in this Chapter have the same definitions as in Chapter 6.  Net 
pension wealth and net pension requirement are multiples of the average wage.  Thus, a 
system with 100% poverty alleviation would be generating net pension wealth equivalent to a 
cumulated annual flow in remaining life expectancy above the 60% median disposable income 
poverty threshold.  The only difference is that the aggregate indicators – which represent the 
average for the considered cases – will include the part-time hypothetical case.  For instance, 
the aggregate indicator for the poverty alleviation will be the average of the estimates for the 4 
individuals with below-median wages and the part-time case, weighted in line with the 
respective share in total employment of full-time and part-time employment (see Table 8.10).  
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Table 8.12 compares the aggregate net pension wealth under the actual-careers assumption 
with that required to ensure an average annual income above the 60% poverty threshold.  
These estimates indicate that currently (except in the UK) state pension entitlements by 
themselves are enough, on average, for men to remain out of poverty.  However in most of the 
countries modelled, they do not, on average, provide cumulated annual flows to keep women 
out of poverty throughout retirement.       
       
Table 8.12: The poverty alleviation function in 2005* 
 Men Women 
 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net  
Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Net 
Pension 
Wealth 
Net  
Pension 
Requirement 
Cover 
(%) 
 
Austria 8.1 5.1 159 8.2 7.2 114 
Finland 5.3 4.9 107 5.8 6.1 95 
France 6.8 6.5 105 5.5 7.6 73 
Germany 5.2 5.1 102 4.8 6.0 79 
Hungary 6.2 5.3 116 8.5 7.5 113 
Italy 8.4 5.3 159 8.4 7.4 113 
Poland 4.6 4.2 110 6.2 6.7 92 
Slovakia 8.3 5.3 156 8.7 7.1 123 
Sweden 6.2 5.3 116 6.2 6.2 99 
UK 3.8 5.0 76 4.5 7.0 65 
* These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-career full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 This finding contrasts sharply with that presented in Chapter 6, as can be seen in Table 
8.13.  While the drop for women is very apparent, the strength of the poverty alleviation 
function is also substantially lower for men.  For instance, the estimated generosity of the 
pension system in Poland and Hungary, which have the lowest male labour market 
participation ratios, is significantly reconsidered.  The generosity of the pension system in 
France and Germany is also a lot lower than under the full-careers assumption.  By contrast, 
the drop in Italy, the UK, Sweden and Austria is minor.  The adoption of the actual-careers 
assumption implies a more concentrated distribution of the overall strength of the poverty 
alleviation function of pensions across systems, with the gap between the most generous and 
less generous systems dropping significantly.
172
  Its adoption also reveals a much higher 
gender gap in the generosity of pension systems, particularly for Italy, France and Poland.   
                                               
172
 With full-careers, the gap between the poverty threshold provided in Slovakia and the UK was equal to 48 
percentage points, while under the actual-careers assumption, the gap is 41 percentage points. 
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Table 8.13: The poverty threshold (% of median disposable income) that, on average, is 
covered by the pension system in 2005 under different labour market assumptions  
 Male Female 
 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Austria 96 95 69 68 
Finland 79 64 70 57 
France 73 63 67 44 
Germany 69 61 55 48 
Hungary 79 70 73 68 
Italy 99 95 79 68 
Poland 77 66 68 55 
Slovakia 102 93 82 74 
Sweden 72 70 60 59 
UK 48 46 41 39 
^ These indicators are the average for the 4 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers with below-
median wages.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 At this stage it is useful to benchmark to what extent the move to the actual-careers 
assumption increases the reliability of the poverty alleviation indicator.  This can be tested, for 
instance, by looking at the degree of correlation between this indicator and Eurostat‘s risk-of-
poverty data.  As expected, there is a negative relationship between these two variables with 
the countries with the most generous pension alleviation cover ratio having the lowest poverty 
among the 65+, and vice versa.  The move to actual-careers maintains the correlation 
coefficient between the poverty alleviation indicator and the actual risk-of-poverty rate 
unchanged at -0.4 with regards to men, while it rises from -0.3 to -0.5 for women.  This 
suggests that this approach is better suited than that of Chapter 6 to capture the effectiveness 
of the poverty alleviation function of state pension systems, particularly as regards women.  
 In Chapter 6, the difference between the pre-reform and the post-reform situation was 
due to changing pension system rules and life expectancies.  By contrast, in this Chapter we 
also consider labour market participation trends, which as was shown previously, with a few 
exceptions, should result in higher employment rates, particularly among women.  Table 8.14 
compares the change in achievable poverty thresholds under the full-careers and the partial-
careers assumptions.  Looking at levels, the poverty alleviation threshold across all countries 
under the actual-careers assumption is estimated at 67% for men and 52% for women in 2005, 
or about one-eighth the weighted average in Chapter 6.  By 2050, the gap between the 
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indicators, however, drops to one-thirteenth, as under the actual-careers assumption the 
strength of the poverty alleviation function improves slightly for women, and declines by less 
among men than under the full-careers scenario. 
 
Table 8.14: The poverty thresholds (% of median disposable income) achievable in 2005 and 
2050 under different labour market assumptions  
a) Full-careers assumption^ 
 Male Female 
 2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
Austria 96 85 -11 69 70 +1 
Finland 79 72 -7 70 64 -6 
France 73 62 -11 67 59 -8 
Germany 69 58 -11 55 52 -3 
Hungary 79 82 +3 73 79 +6 
Italy 99 78 -21 79 71 -8 
Poland 77 54 -23 68 39 -29 
Slovakia 102 77 -25 82 62 -20 
Sweden 72 64 -8 60 54 -6 
UK 48 61 +13 41 60 +19 
b) Actual-careers assumption* 
 Male Female 
 2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
Austria 95 74 -21 68 61 -7 
Finland 64 66 +2 57 58 +1 
France 63 59 -4 44 59 +15 
Germany 61 59 -2 48 56 +8 
Hungary 70 65 -5 68 59 -9 
Italy 95 68 -27 68 50 -18 
Poland 66 50 -16 55 35 -20 
Slovakia 93 51 -42 74 41 -33 
Sweden 70 65 -5 59 56 -3 
UK 46 59 +13 39 56 +17 
^ These indicators are the average for the 4 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers with below-
median wages.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Whereas Chapter 6 had implied that the poverty alleviation function in 2050 will be 
significantly below that in 2005 (except in Hungary and the UK), the trend presented in Table 
8.14 is less clear-cut.  In fact, out of the twenty cases (men and women in the 10 countries); 
there is a projected drop of more than 5 percentage points in 9 cases, as against 14 cases under 
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the full-careers assumption.  Excluding the UK, where the strengthening of the poverty 
alleviation function is due to increased generosity, in the remaining 4 cases where there is a 
projected improvement, this reflects the influence of higher labour participation more than 
offsetting the less generous pension rules.  In particular, higher labour market participation 
should strengthen the poverty alleviation function for German and French women.  Similarly 
rising employment rates should result in women in Austria and Italy facing a much less 
pronounced decline in the poverty alleviation function compared to men in these countries.  In 
contrast, in Poland and Hungary, the drop for women is much sharper than that for men, as 
reforms have strengthened the link between contributions and benefits.  
 These results are particularly interesting as they reveal that labour market participation 
can play a large role in modifying the impact of pension reforms.  For instance, in Chapter 6, 
Hungary had appeared as a country where reforms were going to further increase the already 
generous existing system.  However, taking into account actual and projected labour market 
participation, the estimates in Table 8.14 suggest that the generosity of the Hungarian system 
might actually decline over the coming years.  In some countries, reforms have placed a much 
higher penalty on periods spent away from the labour market.
173
  As a result, longer working 
lives can act as a countervailing force against less generous pension rules.  While Chapter 6 
had projected a quite dramatic rise in the poverty risk for French women, the above estimates 
suggest significantly improved prospects for them.   
 While overall generosity has been reduced, minimum pensions have not been cut and 
in some cases, there have been major increases.
174
  This can be seen from Figure 8.1 which 
depicts the poverty thresholds achieved by pension systems in 2005 and 2050 for the 9 
hypothetical individuals working full-time, the hypothetical individual working part-time and 
the person depending on minimum pensions.  The countries are divided into the 3 different 
groups of pension systems developed in Chapter 2.  The first thing that can be noticed is that 
in many countries, pension systems are substantially earnings-related.  Recent reforms have 
increased this in some countries. For instance, in Poland and Slovakia, reforms have decreased 
progressiveness greatly, increasing the link between contributions and benefits. In both these 
countries reforms will impact heavily on those on lower incomes, with those at the bottom 
deciles falling at-risk-of-poverty. Moreover the move to NDC appears to have hit negatively 
women in Poland as they still may retire at 60, and this reduces their notional accumulation.   
                                               
173
 This aspect will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
174
 One should note that our modelling is on the basis of single individuals and ignores household formation. 
Many women would accrue derived pension rights. Furthermore these figures do not consider contribution 
credits. The latter issue will be addressed in Chapter 9. 
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Figure 8.1: Poverty alleviation function – the poverty thresholds (% of median disposable 
income) achieved by pension systems in 2005 and 2050: Actual-careers assumption 
 
Group A: Countries with high replacement and low poverty 
 
0%
40%
80%
120%
160%
Austria - Men
2005 2050 60% threshold
 
0%
40%
80%
120%
160%
Austria - Women
2005 2050 60% threshold
 
 
0%
40%
80%
120%
160%
Germany - Men
2005 2050 60% threshold
 
0%
40%
80%
120%
160%
Germany - Women
2005 2050 60% threshold
 
     
 
 
216 
 
                    
Figure 8.1: Poverty alleviation function – the poverty thresholds (% of median disposable 
income) achieved by pension systems in 2005 and 2050: Actual-careers assumption ..cont… 
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Figure 8.1: Poverty alleviation function – the poverty thresholds (% of median disposable 
income) achieved by pension systems in 2005 and 2050: Actual-careers assumption ..cont… 
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Figure 8.1: Poverty alleviation function – the poverty thresholds (% of median disposable 
income) achieved by pension systems in 2005 and 2050: Actual-careers assumption ..cont… 
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Figure 8.1: Poverty alleviation function – the poverty thresholds (% of median disposable 
income) achieved by pension systems in 2005 and 2050: Actual-careers assumption ..cont… 
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 In the majority of countries, those at the bottom deciles appear to lose significantly less 
than those on median-or-higher wages. There are similar trends for part-time workers, though 
in some cases they face a sharper reduction than that registered for the average full-time 
employee. However it should be noted that the position in the wage distribution of the 
modelled hypothetical part-time worker differs across countries.  For instance the male part-
time worker in Germany and France earn more than median wages, while the female part-time 
workers in the UK and Slovakia are closer to those at the second-from-bottom decile. 
 Figure 8.1shows that minimum pensions in all ten countries do not currently keep 
individuals out of poverty throughout retirement.  At the point of retirement, minimum 
pensions in some countries, like Poland and France, are currently higher than the poverty 
threshold, but due to price indexation their value falls rapidly during retirement, especially for 
women.  Reforms have reduced the point-of-retirement generosity of minimum pensions only 
in Poland, but there has been a significant boost in the UK, Hungary, Germany and France (in 
that order of magnitude).  Thus in 2050, the starting-point generosity of minimum pensions 
will be, on average, better than it is at present.  Moreover, in 5 countries the equalisation of 
state pension ages will ensure that the period spent by women in retirement will be the same or 
less than it is at present.  This will help reduce the gender gap in poverty risk, which will 
remain, however, high.      
 Having seen how the overall strength of the poverty alleviation function varies across 
the different hypothetical individuals, we can now consider the year-on-year strength.  As 
explained in Chapter 6, different indexation rules can have a serious impact on the extent to 
which pensions remain above the poverty threshold throughout retirement.  Table 8.15 shows 
an index of the risk-of-poverty for the entire population
175
 and for full-timers in the bottom 
half of the full-time wage distribution, part-timers and those on minimum pensions.  The index 
of the risk-of-poverty captures both the extent of retirement spent at-risk-of-poverty and the 
extent to which pension transfers differ each year from the poverty threshold.  
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 The different hypothetical individuals are weighted according to their share of the working age population. 
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Table 8.15: Projected proportion of retirement at risk-of-poverty and depth of poverty  
a) Men  
 10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles, Minimum, Part-time All  
 
% of retirement 
at-risk-of-
poverty 
Depth of risk-of-
poverty (%) 
 
Index of risk-of-
poverty* 
 
Index of risk-of-
poverty* 
 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 20 20 6 7 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.5 
Finland 45 33 13 10 6.1 3.5 4.1 2.9 
France 55 66 12 15 6.6 9.9 4.2 6.1 
Germany 52 55 13 13 6.6 7.1 3.7 3.8 
Hungary 51 57 18 16 9.3 9.0 7.4 6.8 
Italy 25 25 11 11 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 
Poland 54 85 11 26 6.0 22.0 4.3 12.9 
Slovakia 23 62 5 13 1.1 7.9 1.1 4.4 
Sweden 24 43 3 11 0.6 4.6 1.1 3.3 
UK 100 92 26 5 25.9 5.0 18.6 2.8 
b) Women  
 10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles, Minimum, Part-time All  
 
% of retirement 
at-risk-of-
poverty 
Depth of risk-of-
poverty (%) 
 
Index of risk-of-
poverty* 
 
Index of risk-of-
poverty* 
 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 47 59 21 17 9.9 10.2 8.5 7.8 
Finland 69 71 22 17 15.1 11.9 11.2 8.0 
France 100 67 35 22 34.7 14.9 27.5 13.1 
Germany 98 72 27 20 26.6 14.4 21.4 12.7 
Hungary 58 77 34 26 19.7 20.2 17.4 15.4 
Italy 58 81 32 30 18.4 24.1 16.9 19.0 
Poland 81 100 34 48 27.2 47.6 19.6 36.4 
Slovakia 52 100 26 35 13.5 35.5 10.0 23.1 
Sweden 39 66 14 18 5.3 12.1 4.2 7.7 
UK 97 100 43 13 41.4 12.8 39.9 11.3 
* An index value of 100 implies that all those concerned are always without any income during 
retirement, whereas an index value of 0 implies that no one of those concerned ever spends a year in 
retirement with an income below the poverty threshold.  
Note: The proportion of retirement at-risk-of-poverty is estimated by summing up the total number of 
years during which the pension value would be below the poverty threshold for the hypothetical 
individuals, and then expressing as a % of the total number of years spent in retirement. The depth of 
risk-of-poverty is estimated by summing for those years at-risk-of-poverty for the hypothetical 
individuals the difference between the pension level and the poverty threshold, and then expressing it 
as a % of the poverty threshold for those years.   
Source: Own analysis of APEX results.      
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 It is interesting to note that there are several differing trends in these data. The most 
striking development is that for the UK where the risk-of-poverty is projected to decline 
substantially – so that it passes from the country with the highest risk to one of the countries 
with the lowest risk (at par with the Scandinavian countries). Similarly there is a significant 
improvement in the prospects for women in France and in Germany. By contrast there is a 
substantial increase in the risk-of-poverty in Poland and Slovakia as regards women.  
However, in general, it appears that the increase in labour market participation, together with 
the strengthening of minimum income pensions, should result in a considerable narrowing of 
the gap in poverty rates among elderly men and women. Italian, and to a lesser extent 
Swedish, women are an exception. This probably reflects the fact that the new NDC systems 
have introduced a more pronounced link between benefits and contributions (and hence 
increased the importance of having credits for periods spent caring or unemployed). As 
regards men, aside from the significant improvement in the UK, the only major development 
is the notable rise in the risk-of-poverty for low-income Polish men.    
 Table 8.16 compares the index of the risk-of-poverty for the entire population under 
the different labour market assumptions. It is evident that the move towards an actual-career 
hypothesis makes this index more realistic.
176
 In Chapter 6, for instance, in the pre-reform case 
there was male pensioner poverty in only 4 countries, whereas now there is male pensioner 
poverty in all countries – as is the case in reality.  More crucially, under the actual-careers 
scenario there is a very pronounced gender gap in poverty rates, which was much less evident 
in the full-career case. However the gender gap implied by this measure is much higher than 
that observed in actual data. This can be traced down to the absence of marital status 
considerations in our modelling. By considering everyone as being single, we overestimate the 
resources available to men and underestimate those of women.  Against that, minimum 
pension rates for singles tend to be much more generous than those for couples. So while we 
are underestimating the risk-of-poverty for those couples on the minimum pension, we are 
overestimating that for couples, where only one partner has worked or where individuals were 
on different incomes. A priori, the latter effect would seem to be the most significant.  
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 In terms of correlation coefficients, though, the move to actual-careers makes little difference, as there 
already was a strong correlation (0.65) between the index of the risk-of-poverty and the proportion of the 65+ 
population at-risk-of-poverty.  
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Table 8.16: The index of the risk-of-poverty under different labour market assumptions for the 
entire population* 
 Male Female 
 Full-career Actual-career Full-career Actual-career 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 8.5 7.8 
Finland 0.0 0.0 4.1 2.9 0.0 0.3 11.2 8.0 
France 0.5 2.5 4.2 6.1 1.0 3.1 27.5 13.1 
Germany 1.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 5.1 6.0 21.4 12.7 
Hungary 0.0 0.0 7.4 6.8 0.2 0.0 17.4 15.4 
Italy 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.6 0.0 0.2 16.9 19.0 
Poland 0.0 6.9 4.3 12.9 0.6 19.5 19.6 36.4 
Slovakia 0.0 0.2 1.1 4.4 0.4 2.3 10.0 23.1 
Sweden 0.2 0.8 1.1 3.3 3.0 5.4 4.2 7.7 
UK 11.1 0.6 18.6 2.8 22.9 0.5 39.9 11.3 
* See note to Table 8.15 
Source: Own analysis of APEX results. 
        
8.22 The consumption smoothing function 
After having refined the analysis on poverty alleviation, we can turn to consider the impact of 
labour market participation on the strength of the consumption smoothing function.  Table 
8.17 compares the replacement rate that pension systems provide to the average individual 
under the full-careers and the actual-careers assumption.  Similarly to what observed for the 
poverty alleviation function, the move to actual-careers generally results in an overall 
reduction in the levels of the consumption smoothing provided by net pension wealth at 
retirement in 2005.  
 The estimates in Table 8.17 also show that while in future in most cases state pension 
systems will provide lower replacement ratios to men, the same cannot be said vis-à-vis 
women.  Higher labour participation, combined with more generous provisions for those on 
lower incomes, should increase the consumption smoothing role of state pensions for women 
in Germany, France and especially the UK.  By contrast, the trend for men is generally 
negative, and in some cases more so than under the full-careers assumption.
177
  Another 
interesting finding is that the trend in the consumption smoothing function in most cases 
mirrors that in poverty alleviation.  However there are exceptions – most notably Poland and 
Slovakia where the drop in poverty alleviation is much higher, as the reformed pension 
systems are less redistributive.   
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 Hungary, Sweden, Italy and Austria. 
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Table 8.17: The consumption smoothing function in 2005 and 2050 under different labour 
market assumptions (average replacement ratios provided by pension system) 
a) Full-careers assumption^ 
 Male Female 
 
2005 
(%) 
2050 
(%) 
Change 
in p.p. 
2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 
in p.p. 
Austria 91 78 -13 83 82 -1 
Finland 75 69 -6 75 70 -5 
France 68 57 -11 71 61 -10 
Germany 85 68 -17 82 71 -11 
Hungary 85 90 +5 83 90 +7 
Italy 92 72 -20 82 73 -9 
Poland 87 63 -24 86 50 -36 
Slovakia 72 67 -5 83 67 -16 
Sweden 66 62 -4 71 64 -7 
UK 40 48 +8 44 60 +16 
b) Actual-careers assumption* 
 Male Female 
 
2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 
in p.p. 
2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 
in p.p. 
Austria 89 66 -23 75 66 -9 
Finland 59 59 0 58 60 +2 
France 56 58 +2 41 51 +10 
Germany 71 69 -2 59 67 +8 
Hungary 74 62 -12 74 64 -10 
Italy 92 67 -33 65 50 -15 
Poland 67 56 -11 65 43 -22 
Slovakia 62 56 -6 75 56 -19 
Sweden 66 59 -7 66 57 -9 
UK 37 53 +16 40 57 +17 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 This can be seen better in Figure 8.2, which shows replacement ratios achievable pre- 
and post- reform for our hypothetical individuals, including those on minimum pensions
178
. 
This Figure reveals three main patterns. In some countries, such as the UK and France, 
replacement rates fall the higher one is in the wage distribution, reflecting progressive benefit 
formulae. The second pattern, found in countries like Italy and Austria involves constant or 
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 The pre-retirement income of those on minimum pensions was taken from EU-SILC as the median 
income of working age persons not in employment.   
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near-constant replacement rates. The third pattern, evident in countries like Hungary, Germany 
(pre-reform) and Slovakia (post-reform), has replacement rates increasing in line with income.    
 
Figure 8.2: Consumption smoothing function – the replacement ratios (% of own wage) 
achieved by pension systems pre- and post-reform: Actual-careers assumption 
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Figure 8.2: Consumption smoothing function – the replacement ratios (% of own wage) 
achieved by pension systems pre- and post-reform: Actual-careers assumption 
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Figure 8.2: Consumption smoothing function – the replacement ratios (% of own wage) 
achieved by pension systems pre- and post-reform: Actual-careers assumption 
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Figure 8.2: Consumption smoothing function – the replacement ratios (% of own wage) 
achieved by pension systems pre- and post-reform: Actual-careers assumption 
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Figure 8.2: Consumption smoothing function – the replacement ratios (% of own wage) 
achieved by pension systems pre- and post-reform: Actual-careers assumption 
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 Interestingly Figure 8.2 shows that there have been significant changes as a result of 
the reforms. For instance, Germany has moved from pattern three to pattern two. Slovakia, on 
the other hand, moved towards pattern three from being a hybrid between patterns one and 
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two. Poland shifted from a very progressive structure to a constant or near-constant 
replacement rate structure, though there still is an element of progressiveness for women at the 
bottom wage deciles.  France and the UK, both, significantly enhanced the progressiveness of 
their pension system.  An interesting change appears to have occurred in Sweden, which pre-
reform was significantly progressive.  Post-reform the downward sloping pattern has changed 
into something of a U-shape with those at the bottom and top wage deciles having similar 
overall replacement rates.  This reflects on the one hand the strong minimum pension in the 
Swedish system, and the positive incentives offered to high income individuals by the NDC 
and DC elements of the new pension system.  It is interesting to note that something similar 
occurs for Poland, where those on higher incomes are the only category with stronger 
consumption smoothing.        
 Turning to Germany, we see that the system will become more redistributive and that 
the relative position of those on lower incomes, particularly women, should strengthen 
considerably.  The same can be said for the UK and France. Changing labour market 
participation and the reforms will make the system much better for women and for those on 
low incomes.  Chapter 6 had indicated that those on low incomes were being spared from most 
of the cuts, but the estimates presented here actually show that those on minimum pensions 
and at the lowest wage deciles will see some improvement in income smoothing.   
 Another interesting case is that of Italy, where the consideration of actual-careers really 
changes the picture. Firstly this assumption brings out the substantial gender gap in 
replacement rates that exists in this country.  The full-careers assumption had suggested that 
the gender gap in Italy was higher than in other countries, but not by much. The new 
estimates, on the other hand, indicate that the generosity of the system to women is very low 
compared to that of men.  This is actually borne out by EU-SILC data, which show that while 
the aggregate replacement rate for men stands at 64%, that for women is 49%.  Secondly, the 
move to adopting an actual-careers assumption shows that the drop in generosity for men is 
significantly higher than when one looks at full-careers. Thirdly, while the full-careers 
assumption seemed to indicate that the gender gap would disappear after the reforms, the new 
estimates suggest that the system will still provide more generous replacement rates to men. 
 More evidence can be seen in Table 8.18, which presents for the actual-careers case the 
projected proportion of retirement with replacement rates less than 60% and the size of the gap 
from this threshold. The same data in Chapter 6 had suggested that there were no gender 
differences in Italy using this system adequacy index, and the reform would have no impact. 
By contrast, Table 8.18 shows the pension system will become much less adequate for women 
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at the middle wage deciles after the reforms.  It also confirms when looking at all women the 
system is already not that adequate.  
 
Table 8.18: Projected proportion of retirement with replacement rate less than 60% and size 
of gap from this threshold 
a) Men  
 30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles All  
 
% of retirement 
with low 
replacement 
Magnitude of 
replacement gap 
(%) 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Finland 55 50 11 4 6.2 2.1 6.7 3.0 
France 86 100 8 21 6.9 21.0 10.8 17.4 
Germany 12 33 4 9 0.4 2.9 0.2 1.5 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 4.4 3.1 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Poland 1 100 0 11 0.0 11.4 2.2 15.6 
Slovakia 3 100 1 16 0.0 15.6 0.7 9.2 
Sweden 13 85 2 7 0.3 6.2 1.9 3.7 
UK 100 100 39 27 39.2 27.3 27.1 16.2 
b) Women  
 30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles All  
 
% of retirement 
with low 
replacement 
Magnitude of 
replacement gap 
(%) 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
Index of 
replacement 
gap* 
 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Pre-
reform 
Post-
reform 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.1 
Finland 61 54 11 4 7.0 2.2 11.3 6.3 
France 100 88 35 18 34.8 15.9 33.7 22.3 
Germany 58 37 12 12 7.0 4.3 3.5 1.3 
Hungary 4 42 2 4 0.1 1.9 14.6 12.5 
Italy 20 100 3 12 0.6 11.7 11.2 15.2 
Poland 47 100 8 34 3.8 33.7 20.0 37.4 
Slovakia 0 100 0 34 0.0 34.1 2.7 20.0 
Sweden 5 94 1 7 0.0 6.9 2.2 10.5 
UK 100 80 38 15 38.1 12.3 31.0 4.2 
* An index value of 100 implies that all concerned are always without any income during retirement, 
whereas a value of 0 implies that no one ever spends a year with an income below the 60% threshold.  
Note: The % of retirement with low replacement is estimated by summing up years during which the 
replacement rate would be below the 60% threshold for the hypothetical individuals, and then 
expressing as a % of retirement. The magnitude of replacement gap is estimated by summing for those 
years at risk of low replacement the difference between the replacement rate and the threshold, and 
expressing it as a % of the threshold for those years.   
Source: Own analysis of APEX results.      
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 The same can be said for many other countries. The index of replacement gap 
presented in Chapter 6 suggested that only in the UK, did the state pension system fail to give 
for a significant proportion of retirement, and by a significant degree, a replacement rate of 
60% to women. Table 8.18, conversely, indicates that the French system is worse placed than 
the UK system at present, and that women in Poland, Hungary, Finland and Italy are not so 
well-served by existing pension provision. As regards men, while Table 8.18 presents a 
deterioration compared to what was shown under the full-career hypothesis, this is relatively 
minor, except for France. 
 Moving to 2050, one observes that the degree of consumption smoothing, as regards 
men at the middle wage deciles, declines significantly in France, Poland, Slovakia, and to a 
much lesser extent in Sweden and Germany.  By contrast there is a marked improvement in 
the UK.  Looking at the entire population, the drop in consumption smoothing is very high in 
Poland and Slovakia, and less so in Sweden and Germany (where those on low incomes are 
less – and not more – affected by the reforms). As regards the French system, while the 
situation for the entire population is better than that for those on middle incomes (as provision 
for those on low incomes has improved), there will still be a deterioration compared to 2005. 
 As for women, the main difference is the relative performance of the UK system.  
From being one of the least adequate systems in 2005, the system improves a lot when looking 
at the entire population.  This is not as much the case for women at the middle wage deciles, 
but even here there is a marked improvement.  These trends were not evident in Chapter 6, as 
the latter did not take into account the high labour participation of women in the UK, as well 
as the substantial improvements in minimum pension provision. 
 The situation for women in the majority of countries is set to improve significantly, as 
projected improvements in labour participation and gender pension age equalisation, 
complemented in some countries with better minimum pensions, offset the deterioration in 
pension system rule generosity.  Table 8.18, however, confirms that Poland and Slovakia, and 
to a lesser extent Italy, may face serious gender pension inequality issues over the coming 
decades. Reforms linking benefits to contributions tend to reduce gender equality, unless 
accompanied by measures to ensure similar labour market outcomes for the two genders.                
 Both Figure 8.2 and Table 8.18 show that adopting the actual-careers assumption is 
crucial to understand the gender inequalities inherent in current pension provision, and try to 
assess how this might change over time. Moreover, the adoption of the actual-careers 
assumption brings the computed average replacement ratios much closer to the aggregate 
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replacement ratio data compiled by Eurostat.
179
 The weighted average
180
 aggregate 
replacement ratio, in 2005, amounted to 55% for men and 50% for women. Under the full-
career assumption, the relative figures would be 75% and 73%, while under the actual-career 
assumption the weighted average replacement rate amount to 67% and 55% for men and 
women, respectively.  There already was a high positive correlation between the EU-SILC 
aggregate replacement ratios and our estimates of the average replacement ratios under the 
full-career assumption, but this increases further more when the actual-career scenario is 
adopted.
181
  The same occurs when one assesses the correlation between EU-SILC relative 
income ratios
182
 and the replacement ratios under both scenarios.           
 
8.23 The intergenerational balance constraint 
Having seen what the adoption of the actual-careers hypothesis implies for the achievement of 
system goals, we can start looking at the impact on system constraints.  Chapter 6 suggested 
that, on average, the 2050 pensioner generation would, despite the reforms, have a similar 
level of net pension wealth to that of the 2005 pensioner generation.  A simple average across 
all countries showed that men retiring in 2050 would have a net pension wealth of 109% that 
of the 2005 generation, while for women the ratio was of 95%.  Table 8.19 presents 
comparative data under the actual-careers assumption.  The simple average ratio for men is 
105%, while that for women is 97%.  Thus, taking into account partial full-time careers and 
part-time employment, in most cases does not lead to a significant reinterpretation of the 
overall impact on intergenerational balance among males, and to a more positive picture for 
women.  Changing labour market participation and improving longevity should result in 
pension entitlements remaining relatively stable in many countries, on average, despite the 
cuts in system generosity. 
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 The aggregate replacement ratio compares the median pension of persons aged 65-74 to the median wage 
of those aged 50-59.  
180
 The aggregate replacement ratio of each country is weighted according to the size of its pensioner 
population. 
181
 There is a correlation of 0.95 and 0.97 between the aggregate replacement ratio and our estimates of the 
average replacement ratio for the ten countries under the full-career scenario. These rise to 0.96 and 0.98 
under the actual-careers scenario.  
182
 Relative income ratios compare the median income of the 65+ population to that of the 0-64 population. 
The relative income ratios tend to be higher than our estimates of replacement rates, but then pensions form 
only one component of pensioner incomes. 
234 
 
                    
Table 8.19: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation under different labour market assumptions (%)  
 Male Female 
 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Austria 109 94 98 87 
Finland 114 125 106 119 
France 98 101 96 141 
Germany 92 104 95 124 
Hungary 131 116 112 82 
Italy 95 77 87 76 
Poland 106 83 69 73 
Slovakia 109 80 79 58 
Sweden 107 112 100 96 
UK 127 127 112 117 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Looking at individual countries, the main reassessments in the intergenerational 
balance following the adoption of the actual-careers hypothesis are for Germany and France 
(particularly for women).  Women in Poland also appear to be in a significantly better position 
than that portrayed in Chapter 6, though they remain one of the groups which are set to lose 
most as a result of the reforms.  The situation for future pensioners in Slovakia, and to a lesser 
somewhat extent Hungary, is, conversely, worse than shown in Chapter 6.  Women in 
Slovakia overtake Polish women as the group which, on average, loses the most net pension 
wealth over time.  Moreover future Italian male pensioners are now clear losers from the 
reforms.    
 Figure 8.3 examines the development in intergenerational balance in more detail, as it 
sets out how the different groups within each country will be affected by the reforms and by 
developments in longevity and labour market participation.  The pattern observed in Chapter 6 
is relatively unchanged.  The development of net pension entitlements in Austria, Germany, 
France and the UK should favour those on lower incomes, particularly women and those on 
the minimum pension.  By contrast, in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent in Sweden, the 
changes favour those on medium-to-high incomes.  The only qualification to the conclusions 
made in Chapter 6 is that those on minimum incomes appear to be better much protected than 
those at the bottom wage deciles.   
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Figure 8.3: The intergenerational balance function – a comparison of the net pension wealth 
of different income groups in 2050 as a % of that in 2005  
 
Countries where reforms favoured the bottom half of the wage distribution 
 
0%
40%
80%
120%
Austria
Men Women 100% threshold
   
0%
40%
80%
120%
France
Men Women 100% threshold
 
 
0%
40%
80%
120%
Germany
Men Women 100% threshold
   
0%
40%
80%
120%
UK
Men Women 100% threshold
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
                    
Figure 8.3: The intergenerational balance function – a comparison of the net pension wealth 
of different income groups in 2050 as a % of that in 2005..cont 
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Figure 8.3: The intergenerational balance function – a comparison of the net pension wealth 
of different income groups in 2050 as a % of that in 2005…cont 
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 Table 8.20 compares for the two labour market assumptions the proportions of the 
2050 generation which are projected to have lower pension wealth compared to the 2005 
generation and the size, on average, of the drop.  The full-careers assumption had implied that 
across these ten countries, 40% and 55% of the male and female pensioner generation, 
respectively, were going to lose out.  By contrast, the actual-careers assumption implies that 
the proportion who stand to lose amounts to 27% among men and 41% among women.  On the 
other hand, the average losses under the actual-careers assumption are significantly higher, 
particularly for men.  Looking at the different countries, while the situation for future French 
and German pensioners, and for Italian and Polish female pensioners, appears to be much 
better than that shown in Chapter 6, the prospects for pensioners in Slovakia and for Italian 
male pensioners are significantly worse.  Female pensioners in Hungary and Austria also 
appear to lose out more.     
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Table 8.20: Projected losses in pension wealth faced by the 2050 generation 
a) Full-careers assumption 
 Men Women 
 % of 2050 
Generation 
with lower 
pension 
wealth 
Average 
% decline 
in 
pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
% of 2050 
Generation 
with lower 
pension 
wealth 
Average 
% decline 
in 
pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
Austria  0 0 0.0 22 7 2.0 
Finland  0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
France  89 3 3.0 78 7 6.0 
Germany  100 8 8.0 78 9 7.0 
Hungary  0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Italy  100 5 5.0 100 13 13.0 
Poland  33 7 2.0 100 31 31.0 
Slovakia  56 9 5.0 89 24 22.0 
Sweden  22 1 0.2 56 3 2.0 
UK  0 0 0.0 22 4 1.0 
 
b) Actual-careers assumption 
 Men Women 
 % of 2050 
Generation 
with lower 
pension 
wealth 
Average 
% decline 
in 
pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
% of 2050 
Generation 
with lower 
pension 
wealth 
Average 
% decline 
in 
pension 
wealth 
Index of 
pension 
wealth 
loss* 
Austria  56 4 2.2 74 10 7.4 
Finland  0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
France  53 2 1.1 0 0 0.0 
Germany  17 3 0.5 0 0 0.0 
Hungary  0 0 0.0 61 17 10.4 
Italy  79 21 16.6 61 18 11.0 
Poland  14 4 0.6 66 22 14.5 
Slovakia  53 27 14.3 69 47 32.4 
Sweden  0 0 0.0 74 5 3.7 
UK  0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
* The index is estimated by multiplying the % of the 2050 generation with lower pension wealth with 
the average % decline in its pension wealth (compared to current pensioners). A value of 0 implies that 
there is no pension wealth loss, while a value of 100 would imply that all pensioners in 2050 had no 
net pension wealth at all.  
Note: The proportion of the 2050 generation with lower net pension wealth is the number of 
individuals at wage deciles with projected net pension wealth lower than the 2005 generation, divided 
by the total number of individuals. The average % decline in net pension wealth is the average decline 
for those where projected net pension wealth in 2050 is lower than in 2005.   
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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8.24 The financial sustainability constraint 
The previous sections suggest that pension generosity is much lower than implied by the full-
careers hypothesis.  That would imply societies face lower fiscal pressures than those 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7.  However, while lower labour participation decreases 
entitlements, it also negatively affects the financing side of the equation.  Benefits are financed 
by the working population – rather than by the working-age population.  This is something 
many fail to grasp, but which can make a lot of difference.  The system dependency ratio (the 
ratio of beneficiaries to contributors in the pension system) is significantly higher than the 
demographic dependency ratio (the ratio of people over pension age to those of working age).  
While, on average, across the ten countries being studied the demographic dependency ratio in 
2005 was estimated to be close to 30%, the system dependency ratio was closer to 45%. 
Moreover there are pronounced differences across countries.  The relative gap between the two 
ratios in Hungary, Poland and Italy is around twice that in Sweden, Finland and the UK        
 The interplay between these two factors - lower entitlements and fewer contributors - 
results in some interesting developments in the fiscal sustainability indicator.  The average 
required contribution rate, across all countries, under the actual-careers hypothesis is estimated 
at 17% as against the 11% shown in Chapter 6 (see Table 8.21). There are several country 
differences in the gap between the estimated required contribution under the actual-careers 
assumption and that under the full-careers assumption.  For instance, for Italy, Poland and 
Slovakia the contribution rate under actual-careers is significantly higher.  
 
Table 8.21: Comparing financial sustainability under the different careers assumptions 
a) Full-careers assumption: Long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages)* 
  2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 13.8 27.3 22.7 
Finland 8.5 20.4 18.3 
France 14.6 29.6 24.3 
Germany 8.0 17.9 14.4 
Hungary 22.0 43.0 30.8 
Italy 17.3 34.1 24.7 
Poland 8.4 30.4 20.7 
Slovakia 11.1 35.9 24.6 
Sweden 10.1 18.3 16.7 
UK 5.8 7.1 6.7 
Average^  11.1 23.6 18.3 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.  Note that here we are assuming that all those of working age participate in 
full-time labour market activity. 
^ The contribution rate of a country is weighted in line with relative population size.  
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Table 8.21: Comparing financial sustainability under the different careers assumptions..cont 
b) Actual-careers case: Long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages)* 
  2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 19.3 47.7 26.8 
Finland 8.7 23.7 20.9 
France 21.0 50.3 41.4 
Germany 11.8 39.6 20.9 
Hungary 37.7 80.9 44.5 
Italy 29.7 67.1 31.6 
Poland 14.4 67.7 34.7 
Slovakia 20.6 85.4 38.7 
Sweden 11.5 30.4 21.5 
UK 9.1 17.6 10.3 
Average^  17.5 47.2 27.2 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.  Note that here we are modifying the demographic data by the actual and 
projected labour participation rates. 
^ The contribution rate of a country is weighted in line with relative population size.    
Source: Own workings using APEX, labour market participation projections and Eurostat 
population projections. 
 
 In some countries, such as Sweden and Finland, high labour participation ensures that 
the required contribution rate when taking into account system dependency ratios, rather than 
demographic dependency, is not much higher than that estimated in Chapter 6.  By contrast, in 
some Bismarkian systems, like Austria, the effect of much lower female labour participation 
on the contribution base is partially offset by the relatively weak state pension provision for 
those with no or little labour market participation, so that the required contribution rate under 
the actual-careers assumption is much lower than one would expect when simply comparing 
their system and demographic dependency ratios.   
 This implies that looking forwards the development of contribution rates under the two 
scenarios differs in line with trends in labour participation and/or in the generosity of 
provision for those with low or no labour participation. Table 8.21 suggests that pre-reform 
systems posed higher fiscal pressures than the full-careers assumption suggested. On average, 
contribution rates would have had to rise to 47% (rather than 24%). The reforms cut this to 
27% in 2050. This is significantly higher than the rate implied by the full-careers assumption, 
but the ratio between the actual- and full-career contribution rates in 2050 remains quite 
similar to that in 2005. By contrast, without reform the gap would have been much higher.         
 Figure 8.4 clearly demonstrates the very important contribution towards financial 
sustainability of the pension reforms. Had the pre-reform systems remained in place, the 
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required increase in the contribution rate, across all countries, would have nearly topped 30 
percentage points. The reforms reduced this to less than 10 percentage points. Under the pre-
reform situation, only the UK would have had such a ‗low‘ required increase. By contrast, in 
the post-reform situation, only France, Finland, Poland and Slovakia require increases that 
exceed 10 percentage points. The Eastern European countries and Italy would be heading 
towards very difficult situations had they kept their old systems. In most cases, the single most 
important contributor to this improvement was gender pension age equalisation. This policy, 
very conveniently, will partly offset the retirement of the Baby Boom generation.   
 
Figure 8.4: Change in Long-term contribution rates by 2050 (% of lifetime wages) 
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            A cursory reading of Figure 8.4 would suggest that Poland and France face similar 
fiscal pressures. However, the increase in the French case reflects a pronounced rise in the 
pension entitlements of women, on account of higher labour participation, and a strong 
improvement in pension provision for those on low incomes. The latter two developments are 
also projected to occur in Germany and the UK, but here the required increase in contribution 
rates is dampened substantially by the legislated pension age rises for both genders.  
 The increase in contribution rates is in some cases much higher than the increase in 
projected pension spending as a % of GDP.  As explained in Chapter 5, this reflects two 
factors. The contribution rate method focuses on the wage base which will finance pension 
transfers, rather than overall GDP.  Moreover it looks at overall transfers to a generation, 
rather than spending in just one year.  Spending in a particular year may not be that high, but 
one needs to keep in mind that with increased longevity it will need to be financed for longer.   
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8.3 Comparing the actual-careers and full-careers social sustainability indicators 
Having looked at the impact of pension reforms on the sustainability indicators, we can now 
evaluate the overall impact and compare this assessment with that made in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show the impact of reforms on the average replacement rate and the 
poverty threshold covered by pensions, and on the contribution rate required and the net 
pension wealth provided by the systems, under the actual-careers assumption. The first thing 
to note is that in terms of system achievements, while there is a general downward movement, 
similar to what was observed in Chapters 6 and 7, there are now more exceptions to this trend 
(namely Germany, France and Finland, besides the UK – as for Hungary, the new estimates 
show a decline in system goals). This results in a greater degree of convergence in system 
outcomes across countries, than that evident under the full-careers case. As for pressures on 
system constraints, there is a general upward movement, but with a clear inflection versus 
higher contribution rates. The upward pressure on contribution rates is much stronger under 
the actual-careers case, as while the number of contributors is lower (reflecting partial careers 
and absence of labour market participation), the number of beneficiaries remains the same. 
Moreover the increase in labour participation of women dampens the drop in net pension 
wealth induced by the reforms. 
 
Figure 8.5: Effect of reforms on system goals (actual-careers assumption) 
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Figure 8.6: Effect of reforms on system constraints (actual-careers assumption) 
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 Adopting the actual-careers assumption also reveals that in most countries, 
policymakers tried to retain the strength of poverty alleviation, with the drop in consumption 
smoothing being more pronounced.  However there are some exceptions, notably Slovakia and 
Poland.  As can be seen from Figure 8.5, these two countries could end up being outliers in 
terms of the poverty threshold they provide to people on below-median wages with incomplete 
contribution records, particularly women.  The pension systems in France and the UK will 
offer the same degree of consumption smoothing on aggregate, but achieve much better 
poverty thresholds than in Poland and Slovakia.  This is an example of how looking at 
complete careers can underestimate considerably the impact of the reforms, particularly for 
women.  The same consideration can be made for Hungary, which in previous Chapters, had 
been portrayed as a very generous system becoming even more of an outlier.  However taking 
into consideration labour market participation, this conclusion is completely reversed and the 
Hungarian system is revealed as converging to average system generosity after reforms.
183
 
Similarly while Chapter 6 had implied that Italy faced a significant increase in the contribution 
rate required to finance future pension entitlements, adopting the actual-careers assumption 
reveals a much lower required rise, as the tighter link between contributions and benefits 
                                               
183
 This raises concerns about the IMF-inspired pension reform announced in 2009 in Hungary, which could 
cut generosity substantially. 
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combines with low labour participation to produce a much stronger effect on system 
generosity than that shown in the full-careers case. 
 The new estimates show Germany and France actually improving the achievement of 
system goals, the exact opposite of what the estimates in previous Chapters suggested. This is 
the consequence of women accruing better pension entitlements on account of growing labour 
participation, complemented by the significant improvement of minimum pensions and 
generosity for those on low incomes. Longer careers, as a result of projected drops in early 
retirement, also play a role.  However the diametrically opposite stances of these countries in 
respect of the state pension age result in very different pressures on system constraints. France 
faces by far more of a fiscal challenge than Germany, as the latter‘s state pension age policy 
reduces the overall increase in net pension wealth of future generations. 
 The consideration of labour market participation has introduced a lot of other issues to 
consider, such as female labour participation, the length of working careers and the presence 
of part-time employment, besides the impact of longevity improvements and changes in the 
size of pensioner cohorts considered up to Chapter 7.  While we leave the overall assessment 
of the challenges faced by pension systems in each country, similar to that made in Table 6.18, 
to the Conclusion; it makes sense at this stage to look into more detail at some country trends. 
 Figure 8.7 presents country-by-country the development in social sustainability 
indicators under the two labour market assumptions. To facilitate cross-country comparisons, 
the same scale was utilised – even though this results in countries with relatively small 
changes (notably the UK) having a bit unclear movements. The countries have been divided 
into two groups. The ‗high-risk‘ group, which comprises Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland and 
Slovakia, would have experienced very dramatic developments had they not enacted reforms 
(with contribution rates rising to over 50%).
184
  The solid blue lines show the change in system 
goals and constraints under unchanged pension systems, while the dashed red lines depict the 
changes induced by the reforms. In the actual-careers case, we assumed that under the 
unreformed systems labour market participation of women would still have increased (but 
ignored the effects induced by pension reforms).  
 As expected from a Bismarkian pension system, the adoption of the actual-careers 
assumption for Austria results in lower generosity. The impact of the reforms on the 
achievement of system objectives is also much more pronounced.  Compared to the full-career 
case, the pre-reform system would have had much more serious fiscal repercussions, bringing 
                                               
184
 The other five countries – who comprise the ‗low-risk‘ group – would have faced contribution rates under 
the pre-reform system of less than 50%. 
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the required contribution rate close to 50% of life-time wages. The actual-careers case also 
reveals that average net pension wealth should decline, reflecting a tighter link between 
benefits and contributions introduced by the reforms.     
 In the currently most expensive systems, Italy and Hungary, the actual-careers 
hypothesis changes significantly the picture. While the cost of the two systems is revised 
upwards considerably, as both countries have low labour participation (especially among 
women), the reforms now appear as constituting a far stronger move towards sustainability 
than evident under full-careers.  However, their pension systems achieve much less under the 
actual-careers case – reflecting the low participation rate of women and the fact that careers 
for men tend to be shorter than in other countries. The reforms reduce these achievements 
further – in contrast to the picture given using full-careers. This confirms the criticisms of the 
full-careers approach discussed in Chapter 4. When policymakers or researchers use this 
approach to assess the impact of reforms, they could end up with misleading analysis, 
particularly of measures introducing tighter links between benefits and career length. 
 Similar considerations could be made for the two other ‗high-risk‘ countries – Poland 
and Slovakia.  In both, the replacement rates and poverty thresholds that pension transfers can 
sustain are much less pronounced than in Chapter 6 and 7, and the effects of the reforms are 
larger.  The actual-careers assumption reveals that the expected outcomes for Slovakia are 
quite close to those in Poland, while the full-careers approach had implied higher relative 
generosity.  Net pension wealth is also now projected to drop by more in both countries, but 
despite this, their fiscal cost still grows on account of the worsening system dependency ratio.  
 Turning to the low-risk countries, we have already observed the different trends for 
France and Germany under the actual-careers case.  Much the same can be said of the UK, 
where the consideration of partial careers makes pension transfers slightly more expensive but 
the way the reforms were structured (i.e. a further increase in progressiveness), underpinned 
by a higher pension age, not at the expense of the system‘s relative performance. As regards 
the two Scandinavian countries, the trends for the actual-careers and the full-careers cases are 
similar, reflecting high labour participation rates and strong protection for those without full 
careers, but the effects are larger for the former.  The Swedish system appears to be the more 
stable of the two, in terms of financing pressures, as its net pension wealth, on average, is 
stable.  By contrast, this increases in Finland, compounding the fiscal pressures brought by the 
ageing transition.  
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
High-risk countries: Austria 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis..cont 
 
High-risk countries: Hungary 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis..cont 
 
High-risk countries: Italy 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
High-risk countries: Poland 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
High-risk countries: Slovak Republic 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
Low-risk countries: Finland 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
Low-risk countries: France 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
Low-risk countries: Germany 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
Low-risk countries: Sweden 
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Figure 8.7: Development in social sustainability indicators under the two labour market 
assumptions: country-by-country analysis 
 
Low-risk countries: UK 
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8.4 Change in individuals’ pre-retirement savings required to offset the impact of the 
pension reforms 
One way in which individuals can counter the impact of the pension reforms is by extending 
their working lives.  This would not only increase their pension entitlements, but would also 
reduce their pension requirements.  In fact, many governments have framed reforms with the 
intention of creating incentives for extended working lives.  The sensitivity of pension system 
aims to an increased contributory record will be studied in Section 9.1 of the next Chapter.  
 The other way in which individuals could accommodate changes in state pensions is by 
changing their pre-retirement saving behaviour.  Again, most governments have based their 
reforms on the assumption that individuals would react by increasing private retirement 
provision.  Thus, for instance, in the theoretical replacement rate projections presented by 
governments to the European Commission (see ISG (2009)), private pensions‘ share of future 
retirement income is forecast to grow significantly, particularly in Germany and Italy.  The 
‗privatisation‘ of the pension systems of most Eastern European countries was also seen as a 
means to generate a fast-growing private pension industry in this region.  Figure 8.8 shows 
how aside from Finland and the UK, the size of pension funds in most countries is marginal. 
 
Figure 8.8: Size of pension funds (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2008). 
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they allow consumption smoothing will decrease.  Moreover we have seen how the reforms 
reduce the growth in net pension wealth which would have occurred in light of increased 
longevity. Individuals could counteract these ‗losses‘ by increasing their pre-retirement 
saving.  In this section we will estimate the size of this required saving.  Two targets present 
themselves.  In one, the individual would try to get the same level of overall replacement rate 
as under the pre-reform system (i.e. redress the downward adjustment in the consumption 
smoothing function of the state pension).  In the other, the individual would attempt to get the 
same net pension wealth as per the pre-reform scenario.  
 The two scenarios differ in one important perspective – the former takes as granted the 
reduction in the retirement period brought by any increases in state pension age, whereas the 
latter assumes that individuals ignore the signal provided by government and attempt to retire 
at the same age as under the pre-reform system.  The second target is harder to achieve, as in 
most countries the state pension age is set to rise significantly, particularly for women.  Note 
that in some cases, for instance for the UK and Finland, post-reform replacement rates are 
more generous than under the pre-reform system.  This implies that UK
185
 and Finnish 
workers (and other such workers) would not need to save more to achieve the first target. 
However since in the UK the state pension age is set to rise, even though year-on-year 
replacement rates are higher, some individuals would still need to increase their saving if they 
wanted to have the same net pension wealth as before the reforms.  
 Table 8.22 presents estimates of the required additional saving individuals would need 
to make in order to maintain the same net pension wealth in 2050 as under the pre-reform 
pension system. Since most countries will be equalising gender state pension ages during this 
period, women would face particularly steep saving rates to undo the new pension rules.  For 
instance, women in Slovakia face an increase in the pension age from 57 to 62, together with a 
large drop in replacement rates due to a very significant reduction in system progressiveness. 
To fully undo the effect of these changes on net pension wealth, women working full-time and 
earning the median wage would need to save 30% of their wage (assuming a nominal net rate 
of return of 5.5%). Even in the UK, where system generosity is increasing substantially, the 
increase in the state pension age for women would require some women to save part of their 
income to have the same level of net pension wealth.      
 
                                               
185
 The UK, as part of its reforms, is implementing auto-enrolment in workplace-based pensions and/or a 
newly introduced system of personal accounts. This is intended to provide a quasi-mandatory minimum level 
of private provision. The impact of this reform is not modelled in this dissertation, but should generally 
improve replacement rates for those currently without private provision who do not opt-out of this system.  
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Table 8.22: Required additional saving (% of wages) to maintain same net pension wealth in 
2050 as under pre-reform system – assumed net rate of return of 5.5%  
a) Men 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.2 8.0 8.7 
Finland           
France   2.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.1 
Germany  5.4 5.6 6.1 6.5 7.0 7.7 8.5 9.9 6.4 
Hungary 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.9 7.7 8.2 6.6 
Italy 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.2 13.6 
Poland 8.9 7.2 6.3 4.7 4.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 0.6 6.4 
Slovakia  17.2 17.6 17.8 17.8 17.7 17.4 17.3 17.5 17.8 17.7 
Sweden 3.4 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7    
UK           
b) Women 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 13.9 15.9 16.5 16.9 18.1 19.5 21.2 23.1 26.1 19.9 
Finland           
France           
Germany  6.8 13.6 15.7 18.8 21.8 22.7 24.1 25.9 17.6 
Hungary 17.9 18.1 19.1 19.2 19.9 20.4 21.1 23.3 26.4 19.4 
Italy 17.3 17.6 19.6 20.1 21.0 21.9 23.2 24.7 26.5 22.2 
Poland 15.4 14.6 13 12.5 11.9 11.0 9.7 8.3 6.7 12.6 
Slovakia  28.3 29.1 29.6 29.9 30.3 30.4 30.6 24.1 12.5 29.9 
Sweden 5.0 5.1 4.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 0.7 3.9 
UK   0.4 1.2 2.0 2.8 3.5 4.2 3.6 1.3 
Source: Own workings using APEX. 
 
 The above results seem to imply that achieving the same net pension wealth as under 
pre-reform systems is probably beyond the possibilities of most.  Note that these estimates, 
implicitly, assume that individuals in 2050 will have better contributory records than in 2005, 
with women, in particular, spending more time in formal labour market activity.  If one 
assumes unchanged careers, the required saving rates would be much higher for women in all 
countries, and also for men in some countries, particularly Germany, Poland and Finland. 
 Table 8.23 presents an easier target.  Here individuals are assumed to take as granted 
the reduction in pension wealth due to higher pension ages, and instead try to accommodate 
the change in year-on-year generosity.  In other words, they try to boost the new state 
replacement rate by private saving to get the same overall replacement rate as before the 
reforms.  This reduces the required increase in private saving considerably, particularly among 
women.  For example, the median female full-timer in Slovakia would need to save 19% of 
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her salary, rather than 30%. Similarly women in Austria would need to save 3%, as against the 
double-digit rate required to undo the effects of pension age equalisation.  
 Italy, Slovakia and Poland appear to face the toughest challenges to redress the drop in 
the strength of state pension consumption smoothing.  Given that the replacement rates 
provided by these systems pre-reform were among the highest in Europe, one might argue that 
individuals in these countries could accept a cut in their replacement rates.  While this may be 
the case for men in Italy and higher-income individuals in Slovakia and Poland, the argument 
is not so clear-cut for women and those on low incomes as their post-reform replacement rates 
could possibly fall below the poverty threshold.  Moreover Table 8.23 suggests that those on 
lower incomes, in general, will face the highest additional saving requirements.  Given that 
private pension provision has tended to be more common among medium- to high-income 
individuals, this might present particular policy issues.   
 
Table 8.23: Required additional saving (% of wages) to maintain same level of consumption 
smoothing in 2050 as under pre-reform system – assumed net rate of return of 5.5%  
a) Men 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7 8 8.5 9.2 8 8.7 
Finland           
France   2.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.7 4 5.1 
Germany  0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.3 3 4 1.4 
Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3     
Italy 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.2 13.6 
Poland 8.9 7.2 6.3 4.7 4.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 0.6 6.4 
Slovakia  12.6 12.9 13.1 13 11.5 7.5 3.6   12.9 
Sweden 3.4 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7    
UK           
b) Women 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 2.2 3.8 4 3.2 3 3 3 3.1 3.8 3.3 
Finland           
France           
Germany        0.2 1  
Hungary 7.8 5.3 6.8 5.6 5.8 6 6.3 5.9 5.6 6 
Italy 6.3 5.2 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.4 5.8 
Poland 15.4 14.6 13 12.5 11.9 11 9.7 8.3 6.7 12.6 
Slovakia  17.7 18.2 18.5 18.7 18.9 18.9 19 16.3 6.6 18.7 
Sweden 5 5.1 4.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 4 0.7 3.9 
UK           
Source: Own workings using APEX. 
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 Rather than focusing on pre-reform replacement rates and net pension wealth, one 
could concentrate on assessing what saving rates would be required to ensure net pension 
wealth is enough to, on average, keep individuals above the poverty threshold during 
retirement. These estimates, presented in Table 8.24, confirm that women in Poland and 
Slovakia face considerable additional saving requirements. Men in the countries studied, 
broadly speaking, appear to be well protected in terms of poverty alleviation, and in contrast to 
the picture shown in Tables 8.22 and 8.23 would need to save less than women. The risk posed 
by the reforms to men is mostly to the strength of the consumption smoothing function.  
 
Table 8.24: Required additional saving (% of wages) to remain, on average, above the poverty 
threshold throughout retirement – assumed net rate of return of 5.5% 
 a) Men 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
Part-time 
Austria       
Finland 0.1      
France 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5   
Germany 0.5 0.5     
Hungary 1.6 0.1     
Italy       
Poland 5 3.5 1.8 0.1   
Slovakia  3.4 1.4     
Sweden 1      
UK 0.5 0.3 0.2    
b) Women 
 10th 
Decile 
20th 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
Part-time 
Austria 3.3 1.8 0.2    
Finland 1.2 0.8 0.8    
France 0.1 0.1 0.1    
Germany 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Hungary 4.1 3 1.5    
Italy 4 2.3 1.9 0.6   
Poland 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.3 5.5 7.2 
Slovakia  8.6 6.9 5.9 4.8 3.6 4.8 
Sweden 3.8 2.4 1.5 0.8 0.3  
UK 1.1 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Source: Own workings using APEX. 
  
 One may question whether a nominal rate of return of 5.5% is appropriate for countries 
like Poland and Slovakia which are still catching up to the level of economic development in 
Western Europe. However, even if higher rates of return are used, the saving requirement for 
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those on low incomes remains considerable.  With a rate of return of 7.5%, women at the 
bottom wage decile in Poland and Slovakia would need to save 5% and 6% of their income 
respectively. In contrast if the rate of return falls to 5%, the saving requirement would rise to 
8% and 9.5% respectively.  Moreover one needs to keep in mind that Section 8.24 suggests 
that in future workers in these countries will also need to pay much higher contribution rates to 
finance state pension transfers.  As shall be shown in Chapter 9, extending working lives 
provides a surer way of improving the achievement of pension system objectives.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The existing comparative literature assessing the effects of reforms on pension adequacy has 
tended to focus on the effects on those with full careers. This Chapter has sought to address 
this gap, by taking into account labour market participation. This was shown to be particularly 
important as labour participation rates, particularly among women, differ greatly across 
countries.  This has important implications for the current and future achievements of pension 
systems, particularly in terms of fiscal sustainability.   
 This Chapter has led to a major reassessment of the effectiveness of pension systems in 
achieving goals.  It confirmed that the interaction between the labour market and the social 
protection system needs to be considered.  A system may look very generous on paper, but in 
practice have only very few individuals qualifying for these benefits.  This is particularly true 
when trying to assess gender gaps in provision.  For instance, the strength of the poverty 
alleviation function shown in this Chapter is lower than that shown in Chapters 6 and 7, and 
the results in this Chapter are more in line with the actual risk-of-poverty and gender gaps in 
poverty risks.  Much the same can be said in regard of the consumption smoothing function. 
The replacement rates make more sense in terms of absolute levels and are more closely 
correlated with the replacement rates one finds using income survey data.       
 While these are important contributions, potentially the most interesting finding is that 
labour market trends can act as a countervailing force offsetting partly the pension reforms. 
This is particularly true in those countries, such as those introducing NDC, where reforms link 
more closely contributions and benefits.  Chapters 6 and 7 had shown women as the main 
losers of the reforms, with very substantial losses anticipated in some countries.  This Chapter 
reverses to some extent this finding.  Higher labour participation might actually result in 
improvements in pension entitlements despite the reforms, cases in point being France and 
Germany.  Moreover in most countries, cuts in the general pension system‘s generosity were 
accompanied by a strengthening of minimum pensions.  This has the potential to reduce the 
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impact of reforms on pensioner poverty. Gender gaps in replacement rates should also decline, 
as men (with their fuller contributory records) lose more in actual entitlements than women. 
 The Chapter also presented estimates of the additional saving requirement by which 
individuals would be able to redress the changes in pension system generosity. These 
estimates suggest that in most countries individuals would need to save relatively high 
amounts in order to get the same net pension wealth as per the pension systems of the 2005 
generation.  A more likely objective is to generate the same replacement rates but accepting 
the adjustment of state pension ages.  This appears to be within the possibilities of most men, 
but in many countries women would probably need to supplement this saving by also 
equalising more their contributory record to that of men.  However this analysis also 
confirmed that women and those on low incomes in Poland and Slovakia face very significant 
challenges in terms of remaining above the poverty threshold during retirement.  
 Returning once again to the impact of moving away from the full-careers assumption 
on the social sustainability indicators, this did not result in any significant reinterpretation in 
the development of intergenerational balance.  Rising labour participation and increasing 
longevity should result in pension wealth rising slightly from current levels.  In Chapters 6 and 
7, women were seen to lose out, on account of the equalisation of pension ages. Against this, 
in this Chapter they gain higher entitlements as their labour participation increases by 2050. 
Turning to financial sustainability, the estimates of the financing requirements of pension 
systems are significantly higher, on average a contribution rate of 17% is required as against 
the 11% estimated in earlier Chapters.  Moreover in the absence of reforms, fiscal pressures 
would have increased substantially more than estimated in previous Chapters.  The impact of 
the ageing transition, in fact, would be complemented by the impact of increasing women‘s 
entitlement to pensions.  The reforms, however, partially address this so that the increase in 
fiscal pressures by 2050 is not substantially higher that shown in previous Chapters.  
 The Conclusion will include further analysis, particularly on an individual country 
basis of the impacts of reforms, taking in consideration the potential impact of labour market 
participation in offsetting the effects of reforms.  However given the significant limitations of 
the assumptions on career lengths, the next Chapter will study the sensitivity of the social 
sustainability indicators to different assumptions on career lengths, to the provision of 
contribution credits for caring and to socio-economic differences in labour market 
participation and longevity. Chapter 9 will also seek to further explore the sensitivity of the 
social sustainability indicators to shocks in economic and demographic developments.  
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9. The sensitivity of the social sustainability indicators to                        
behavioural, economic and longevity changes  
 
The main contribution of Chapter 8 was to set out how significantly labour market 
participation affects pension entitlements.  For instance, it showed that in many countries 
rising entitlements accruing to women due to increased labour market participation will offset 
declines in pension system generosity.  Moreover the increase in participation should result in 
improved financial sustainability by shoring up contributions at a time of deteriorating 
demographics.   
 Unfortunately the static nature of APEX does not allow the direct interaction between 
changes in system rules and labour market behaviour.  However the model can be used to 
study the sensitivity of indicators to different assumptions of labour market behaviour.  This 
will be done in the first section of this chapter.  These simulations will help to understand the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the conclusions made in Chapter 8 and also indicate to what 
extent promoting longer working lives may result in improvements in the social sustainability 
of recent pension reforms.  
 Given that longevity is possibly the main challenge facing pension systems, in the 
second section of this Chapter, we test the impact that a different assumption on future 
longevity would have on the development of the social sustainability indicators for the 
different pension systems.  The remaining three sections of this Chapter study other factors 
which may affect the reliability of the social sustainability indicators, namely the impact of 
different assumptions for wage growth and future interest rates, the provision of contribution 
credits for periods spent in unemployment or providing care, and the presence of socio-
economic differences in longevity and labour participation.  In these sections we will, 
however, be looking at only a sub-set of the ten systems.  In the case of wage growth, 5 
countries – representative of the taxonomy developed in Chapter 2 – are selected as the impact 
tends to be similar across systems of the same typology.  Unfortunately APEX does not model 
pre-reform contribution credits, and so the pre- against post-reform analysis cannot be carried 
out reliably.  However we will be showing estimates for the projected situation in 2050 and 
some indication of the degree of sensitivity of results to presence of different credits.  
Different assumptions for market returns only affect entitlements in the pension systems of 
Sweden and Poland, while the Italian system is affected by different assumptions for GDP 
growth.  Finally lack of data severely limits the analysis of the impact of socio-economic 
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differences in mortality and labour market participation, and thus the analysis will focus on 
just Germany and the UK. 
 At the outset, it should be emphasised that while the evidence presented in this Chapter 
will enable a better understanding of the accuracy of the indicators shown in Chapter 8, it will 
still not provide precise and definitive answers.  In particular, the absence of any modelling of 
the impact of household formation and private retirement saving raises a number of concerns 
in some countries (particularly those which rely more on means-tested benefits).  While other 
approaches, such as dynamic microsimulation, could address these issues, they would 
themselves face other difficulties (notably it would be difficult to achieve the same degree of 
understanding of the direct effects of reforms).  Besides the construction of a dynamic 
microsimulation model for ten countries is a task beyond the scope of this research.    
 
9.1 The impact of future labour market participation on social sustainability  
Chapter 8 compared the social sustainability indicators under the full-career hypothesis with 
assumptions better reflecting actual labour market participation.  In this section, we will delve 
more into this topic by developing four different scenarios (set out in Table 9.1) to assess the 
sensitivity of the indicators to assumptions on future labour market participation.  In the first 
one, labour market participation in 2050 remains at its 2005 level.  This isolates the change in 
the social security indicators induced by the pension reforms.  It can be considered as our 
worst-case scenario.  The other three scenarios assume that working lives in 2050 are extended 
by an additional one, three and five years, respectively, over the Chapter 8 assumptions.
186
 
Note that in all these scenarios the change would affect all hypothetical cases equally.  For the 
sake of brevity, results are only presented for the aggregate situation, rather than for all the 
different hypothetical individuals in each country, but important variations are mentioned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
186
 Chapter 6 presents another labour market assumption – namely that of complete full-time careers. 
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Table 9.1: Different assumptions on the average effective age of retirement (2050)* 
a) Men 
 
Chapter 8 Worklife  
as in 2005 
Worklife  
1 year 
more than 
Chapter 8 
Worklife  
3 years 
more than 
Chapter 8 
Worklife  
5 years 
more than 
Chapter 8 
Austria 56 55 57 59 61 
Finland 59 56 60 62 64 
France 55 55 56 58 60 
Germany 61 57 62 65 66 
Hungary 52 51 53 55 57 
Italy 57 55 58 60 62 
Poland 55 53 56 58 60 
Slovakia 55 56 56 58 60 
Sweden 62 58 63 65 67 
UK 61 58 62 64 66 
 
b) Women 
 
Chapter 8 Worklife  
as in 2005 
Worklife  
1 year 
more than 
Chapter 8 
Worklife  
3 years 
more than 
Chapter 8 
Worklife  
5 years 
more than 
Chapter 8 
Austria 55 49 56 58 60 
Finland 59 54 60 62 64 
France 53 50 54 56 58 
Germany 61 51 62 64 66 
Hungary 49 43 50 52 54 
Italy 48 43 49 51 53 
Poland 48 47 49 51 53 
Slovakia 51 50 52 54 56 
Sweden 59 56 60 62 64 
UK 57 50 58 60 62 
*As in Chapter 8, the average effective age of retirement is computed using labour participation rates 
by age and captures the years spent contributing to pensions.  
 
 Table 9.2 presents the poverty threshold (as a percentage of median disposable income) 
which entitlements at pension age would permit, on average for the 4 hypothetical individuals 
of each gender with below-median wages and the part-time worker, weighted by the respective 
share of full-time and part-time employment now and in 2050.
187
  The first thing to notice is 
that as expected, having higher contributory periods improves generosity in most pension 
systems.  Thus, for example, in Italy if in 2050 men were to still have the same number of 
contribution years as in 2005, the pension system would support a poverty threshold of 64%, 
instead of the 68% shown in Chapter 8.  Similarly for women there would be a drop of 28 
                                               
187
  Eurostat and EPC demographic and labour market projections are used for 2050. 
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percentage points in the poverty threshold, instead of a drop of 18 percentage points.  Table 
9.2 suggests policymakers do not expect future workers to have the same career length as 
current workers.  However, the loss in generosity for those on low incomes is smaller (and in 
France and the UK they remain better off even if they retain the same career length). 
 
Table 9.2: The poverty thresholds (% of median disposable income) achievable in 2005 and 
change by 2050 under different labour market assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Worklife 
as in Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife  
as in 
2005 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
1 year 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
3 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
5 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Austria 95 -21 -26 -20 -17 -15 
Finland 64 +2 -3 +3 +10 +11 
France 63 -4 -6 -2 +2 +5 
Germany 61 -2 -7 -2 -1 +1 
Hungary 70 -5 -10 -4 +2 +5 
Italy 95 -27 -31 -25 -23 -21 
Poland 66 -16 -20 -14 -13 -11 
Slovakia 93 -42 -45 -38 -32 -26 
Sweden 70 -5 -9 -4 -1 0 
UK 46 +13 +11 +13 +14 +15 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Worklife 
as in 
Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife  
as in 
2005 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
1 year 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
3 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
5 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Austria 68 -7 -15 -6 -4 0 
Finland 57 +1 -3 +2 +3 +8 
France 44 +15 +13 +16 +19 +23 
Germany 48 +8 0 +8 +8 +9 
Hungary 68 -9 -18 -7 -5 -3 
Italy 68 -18 -28 -17 -15 -11 
Poland 55 -20 -25 -19 -18 -16 
Slovakia 74 -33 -44 -31 -25 -19 
Sweden 59 -3 -6 -1 0 +2 
UK 39 +17 +15 +18 +19 +20 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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  The absence of improvements in labour participation would be significant in terms of 
the strength of poverty alleviation.  Women, in particular, would be hit.  This mostly reflects 
the fact that state pension ages for women are being equalised for men.  In fact, the largest loss 
would occur to women in Slovakia, where the pension age is being increased the most. 
However, it is not only pension age equalisation which drives this result.  In many countries, 
the link between contributions and benefits has been strengthened considerably. 
 The relative change in the poverty threshold induced by an additional 5 years is 
strongest in Poland, Slovakia, France and Finland and smallest in Germany and the UK.  
When looking at just women, the pension incentive in Austria and Italy to work longer is also 
quite strong.  The system in Hungary is more generous for those with fuller contribution 
records, while individuals in Poland, Italy and Slovakia, and men in Austria, still stand to lose 
a lot even if they work an extra 5 years.  It is interesting to note that if working lives increase 
by 5 years, a slight majority of men and women would see outcomes improve, whereas if they 
stay unchanged at 2005 levels, this would only be true for the UK (and women in France).  
 We find similar impacts for consumption smoothing, but with some important 
differences (see Table 9.3).  In previous Chapters, we observed that reforms weaken 
consumption smoothing noticeably more than poverty alleviation.  The estimates presented in 
Table 9.3 suggest that even with longer career lengths, the reforms will have a larger relative 
effect on replacement rates than on achievable poverty thresholds.  In fact, out of the twenty 
cases (the weighted average for men and women for the ten countries), an increase of 5 
contribution years would lead to better replacement rates in ten cases, whereas under the same 
conditions poverty thresholds improve in twelve cases.  In most countries, those at the bottom 
of the wage distribution face lower penalties for shorter working lives. 
 The objectives of policymakers are evident from the estimates in Table 9.3.  They have 
imposed significant financial disincentives for maintaining career lengths unchanged and 
considerable rewards for extending working lives.  However it is interesting to note that in 
some countries, notably Italy and Austria (in both cases for men), Poland and Slovakia, 
generosity still declines considerably even if contributory records improve noticeably.  In 
these cases, the presence of very large pension outlays may have led policymakers to focus on 
cutting financial burdens, rather than overly rewarding longer working careers.  The extent of 
the cuts faced by men in Italy and, slightly less so, by women in Poland, is very high.  By 
contrast, the Swedish system maintains unchanged generosity if individuals, on average, retire 
around age 65.  The same applies to the French and German cases, where replacement rates 
remain stable at 2005 levels if individuals retire at the legislated pension age.  One point to 
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note is that while there are considerable financial advantages to working beyond pension age, 
in practice, even with an additional 5 years of contributions, most people would still not be 
accessing these bonuses, as working lives would still fall short of legislated pension ages.    
 
Table 9.3: The overall replacement ratio (% of pre-retirement wage) achievable in 2005 and 
change by 2050 under different labour market assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Worklife 
as in Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife  
as in 
2005 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
1 year 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
3 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
5 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Austria 89 -23 -27 -22 -20 -18 
Finland 59 0 -4 +1 +2 +3 
France 56 +2 -2 +3 +7 +8 
Germany 71 -2 -3 -1 +1 +3 
Hungary 74 -12 -16 -11 -6 -3 
Italy 92 -33 -36 -32 -29 -29 
Poland 67 -11 -15 -10 -8 -7 
Slovakia 62 -6 -9 -5 -3 -2 
Sweden 66 -7 -9 -4 +1 +6 
UK 37 +16 +15 +16 +17 +17 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Worklife 
as in 
Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife  
as in 
2005 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
1 year 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
3 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
5 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Austria 75 -9 -16 -8 -6 -3 
Finland 58 +2 -6 +2 +1 +2 
France 41 +10 +7 +10 +12 +15 
Germany 59 +8 +7 +9 +11 +13 
Hungary 74 -10 -19 -9 -5 -4 
Italy 65 -15 -21 -14 -13 -10 
Poland 65 -22 -26 -21 -21 -20 
Slovakia 75 -19 -23 -18 -15 -14 
Sweden 66 -9 -17 -7 -2 +2 
UK 40 +17 +14 +17 +19 +19 
* This represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full-time and part-time work in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 One of the most interesting findings of previous Chapters was that in most cases, the 
reforms do not have a significant impact on the size of intergenerational transfers.  Cuts in 
pension wealth due to changes in system generosity tend to be offset by increases due to 
higher longevity.  Table 9.4 investigates whether this still applies with different assumptions 
on working lives.  
 
Table 9.4: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation as a percentage of that of the 2005 
generation under different labour market assumptions  
a) Men^ 
 
Worklife 
as in Ch8 
Worklife  
as in 2005 
Worklife 1 
year more 
than Ch8 
Worklife 3 
years more 
than Ch8 
Worklife 5 
years more 
than Ch8 
Austria 94 91 97 100 103 
Finland 125 118 127 136 138 
France 101 102 105 109 112 
Germany 104 99 106 107 109 
Hungary 116 110 121 127 133 
Italy 77 76 82 84 86 
Poland 83 77 84 87 89 
Slovakia 80 79 87 92 100 
Sweden 112 106 114 116 119 
UK 127 124 128 129 130 
 
b) Women^ 
 
Worklife 
as in Ch8 
Worklife  
as in 2005 
Worklife 1 
year more 
than Ch8 
Worklife 3 
years more 
than Ch8 
Worklife 5 
years more 
than Ch8 
Austria 87 81 91 93 97 
Finland 119 113 121 124 132 
France 141 135 138 142 146 
Germany 124 111 124 123 125 
Hungary 82 76 88 92 88 
Italy 76 74 82 84 87 
Poland 73 67 74 75 77 
Slovakia 58 57 68 72 77 
Sweden 96 91 98 101 103 
UK 117 114 119 121 122 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 The immediate impression is that, particularly for men, longer working lives could 
result in considerably higher entitlements.  However, in the UK and Finland, the net pension 
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wealth of the 2050 generation would still be considerably higher than that of the 2005 
generation even if the length of the contributory period remains unchanged at 2005 levels. 
German and French women also appear to have considerably higher overall pension transfers. 
Table 9.4 shows that longer working lives would dampen the risks of pension wealth loss 
faced in Austria, Slovakia and Italy.       
 While these bigger pension transfers may raise intergenerational concerns, Table 9.5 
shows that extended working lives would help reduce the financing problem of state pensions. 
An additional five years of contributions would cut the increase in the financing requirement 
of state pensions by about a quarter, on average, across all countries.  An increase of three 
years in working lives would cut the required increase in contributions by a tenth.  What is 
quite striking in Table 9.5 is that if labour participation were to remain unchanged at 2005 
levels, the financial burden of pension systems would not increase as much as anticipated in 
Chapter 8.  Essentially this reflects the fact that in most countries, the increase in female 
labour participation results in considerably higher pension entitlements at a time when the size 
of this group is growing.  Since pension reforms have linked more directly benefits and 
contributions, if women were to retain their current labour participation, the cost to 
governments of future pensions would not increase.  However as shown in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 
this would exacerbate the already worrying pension adequacy gender gap.  
 
Table 9.5: Long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages) in 2005 and change by 2050 
under the different labour market assumptions* 
 
2005 Worklife 
as in 
Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife  
as in 
2005 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
1 year 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
3 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Worklife 
5 years 
more 
than Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Austria 19.3 +7.5 +5.4 +7.2 +6.7 +5.5 
Finland 8.7 +12.2 +10.7 +11.9 +12.2 +11.1 
France 21.0 +20.4 +19.7 +19.6 +18.5 +16.2 
Germany 11.8 +9.1 +7.1 +8.8 +7.9 +7.1 
Hungary 37.7 +6.8 +1.6 +5.6 +4.7 +1.2 
Italy 29.7 +1.9 +1.2 +1.8 +1.6 +1.4 
Poland 14.4 +20.3 +17.1 +19.7 +18.2 +16.1 
Slovakia 20.6 +18.1 +14.5 +17.3 +18.2 +15.8 
Sweden 11.5 +10.0 +8.8 +9.6 +8.9 +7.8 
UK 9.1 +1.2 +1.0 +1.1 +0.9 +0.8 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.   
Source: Own workings using APEX, labour market participation projections and Eurostat 
population projections. 
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9.2 The impact of higher future longevity on social sustainability  
Chapter 3 showed how most recent pension reforms have been driven by concerns about 
demographic developments.  Initially the retirement of the Baby Boom generation was the 
issue at the forefront of these concerns, but increasingly policymakers have become more 
aware of the impact of longevity.  While the retirement of the Baby Boom generation presents 
a temporary (though substantial) challenge for pension systems, longevity improvements are a 
dynamic and long-term test.  Moreover while the size of the potential pension entitlements of 
the Baby Boom generation can, to some extent, be measured, longevity improvements are 
notoriously hard to predict.  This raises the prospect that policymakers will have to reassess 
their reforms ever so often that new evidence of longevity improvements is observed.  In some 
cases, notably in countries which introduced NDC systems, policymakers have sought to 
escape this conundrum by introducing automatic mechanisms which maintain the pension 
system in balance.  In this section, we will attempt to assess what would happen to the social 
sustainability indicators were longevity to be 2 years higher than assumed in Chapter 8 (see 
Table 9.6).  The choice of an additional rise of 2 years is to bring longevity improvements by 
2050 more in line with those registered in recent decades (rather than the deceleration assumed 
in projections).        
 
Table 9.6: Different assumptions for longevity (period life expectancy) at pension age in 2050 
(years) 
 
a) Men 
 
Longevity in 
Chapter 8 
Longevity  
2 years more 
than Chapter 8 
Austria 23 25 
Finland 21 23 
France 28 30 
Germany 20 22 
Hungary 23 25 
Italy 22 24 
Poland 20 22 
Slovakia 22 24 
Sweden 21 23 
UK 18 20 
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Table 9.6: Different assumptions for longevity (period life expectancy) at pension age in 2050 
(years)..cont 
 
b) Women 
 
Longevity in 
Chapter 8 
Longevity  
2 years more 
than Chapter 8 
Austria 26 28 
Finland 25 27 
France 33 35 
Germany 23 25 
Hungary 26 28 
Italy 26 28 
Poland 28 30 
Slovakia 25 27 
Sweden 25 27 
UK 20 22 
 
 A priori, one would expect that in countries which have not introduced mechanisms 
that automatically insulate their pension system from the effects of longevity improvements, 
longer lives should result in higher-than-expected transfers to pensioners and greater financial 
pressures.  The probable effect on system goals is less obvious.  In systems where benefits are 
uprated in line with prices, longer lives would result in benefits losing relative value during the 
additional years in retirement.  The presence of minimum benefits could limit this effect, 
however.    
 Table 9.7 presents the impact of a two year larger increase in longevity on the poverty 
thresholds (as a % of median disposable income) which net pension wealth at the point of 
retirement could finance, on average.  In the majority of cases, the poverty thresholds that can 
be financed decline.  This development mainly reflects the indexation of pension benefits 
(refer to Section 9.41 for details of each country).  In countries where benefits are mostly 
indexed to wages, such as Germany, Hungary and Slovakia there is little if any decline.  Note 
that the biggest losses are felt by those with relatively high pension entitlements – for instance, 
Austrian and Italian men – as below-wage indexation over a longer period impacts them 
relatively more.  The somewhat stronger effects shown for men also reflect the fact that a two-
year increase in longevity comprises a larger relative increase in retirement than that for 
women (as they live longer than men).   
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Table 9.7: The poverty thresholds achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points (p.p.) 
by 2050 under different longevity at retirement assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Longevity as in Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Longevity 2 years 
more than Ch8 (p.p.) 
Austria 95 -21 -23 
Finland 64 +2 +1 
France 63 -4 -5 
Germany 61 -2 -2 
Hungary 70 -5 -5 
Italy 95 -27 -29 
Poland 66 -16 -17 
Slovakia 93 -42 -42 
Sweden 70 -5 -6 
UK 46 +13 +12 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Longevity as in Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Longevity 2 years 
more than Ch8 (p.p.) 
Austria 68 -7 -8 
Finland 57 +1 0 
France 44 +15 +14 
Germany 48 +8 +8 
Hungary 68 -9 -9 
Italy 68 -18 -19 
Poland 55 -20 -21 
Slovakia 74 -33 -33 
Sweden 59 -3 -4 
UK 39 +17 +16 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 These estimates are for a synthetic average (of our hypothetical individuals with 
below-median wages and our part-time worker) and show whether on average during 
retirement they would stay above the threshold.  As explained in earlier Chapters, the latter 
fact does not necessarily mean that they will always be above it.  In fact, in a significant 
number of cases, the individual would start above the poverty threshold but then fall into 
poverty with age due to indexation being below the increase in average wages.  As shall be 
seen in Section 9.41, only in Germany are all state pension elements indexed to wages.  As a 
result, increased longevity would result in a longer period in poverty for those at the bottom 
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deciles in most countries.  Dependence on minimum pensions would also increase, particularly 
among women.  
 There is a similar overall picture with regards to the impact on the strength of the 
consumption smoothing function. However since the loss induced by reforms in replacement 
rates is generally stronger than that in achievable poverty thresholds, the effect of longer 
longevity is slightly less pronounced.   
 
Table 9.8: The overall replacement ratio achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points 
(p.p.) by 2050 under different longevity at retirement assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Longevity as in Ch8  
(p.p.) 
Longevity 2 years more 
than Ch8 (p.p.) 
Austria 89 -23 -25 
Finland 59 0 -1 
France 56 +2 +1 
Germany 71 -2 -2 
Hungary 74 -12 -12 
Italy 92 -33 -34 
Poland 67 -11 -12 
Slovakia 62 -6 -6 
Sweden 66 -7 -8 
UK 37 +16 +15 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Longevity as in Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Longevity 2 years 
more than Ch8 (p.p.) 
Austria 75 -9 -11 
Finland 58 +2 +1 
France 41 +10 +9 
Germany 59 +8 +8 
Hungary 74 -10 -10 
Italy 65 -15 -16 
Poland 65 -22 -23 
Slovakia 75 -19 -19 
Sweden 66 -9 -10 
UK 40 +17 +16 
* This is the replacement rate in terms of pre-retirement income throughout retirement which net 
pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Thus it seems that higher-than-expected longevity should not result in substantial 
changes in the degree of system goal achievements.  However longer lives put significant 
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pressures on system constraints.  As can be seen in Table 9.9, the relative size of pension 
transfers to the 2050 pensioner generation rises significantly, notably in Hungary.  In those 
countries where reforms lowered the size of net pension wealth of future generations, higher 
longevity would undo a lot of the effects of the reforms.   
 
Table 9.9: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation under different longevity at retirement assumptions (%) 
a) Men^ 
 
Longevity as  
in Ch8 
Longevity 2 years 
more than Ch8 
Austria 94 104 
Finland 125 137 
France 101 110 
Germany 104 118 
Hungary 116 133 
Italy 77 87 
Poland 83 92 
Slovakia 80 91 
Sweden 112 121 
UK 127 141 
 
b) Women^ 
 
Longevity as  
in Ch8 
Longevity 2 years 
more than Ch8 
Austria 87 92 
Finland 119 124 
France 141 146 
Germany 124 128 
Hungary 82 104 
Italy 76 89 
Poland 73 78 
Slovakia 58 68 
Sweden 96 100 
UK 117 122 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 When looking at financial sustainability, these effects are complemented by the fact 
that higher longevity worsens the system dependency ratio.   Table 9.10 presents an estimate 
of the increase in the long-term contribution rates induced by a 2 year higher longevity 
improvement.  On average across all countries, the contribution rate would need to rise by an 
additional 1.5 percentage points, quite an increase in the absence of any improvement in the 
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achievement of system goals.  The worst hit would be the Eastern European countries, with 
Hungary requiring a further increase of 6 percentage points, while Poland and Slovakia would 
need to raise contributions by an additional 3 percentage points.  Italy and the UK, by contrast, 
would require an additional rise of less than one percentage point.  One needs to keep in mind 
that an unanticipated rise in longevity would pose financing issues also to NDC systems as the 
initial pension level would be set in terms of the expected longevity of the cohort.  However 
these systems have automatic adjustments which would lessen this impact over time.
188
 
 
Table 9.10: Long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages) in 2005 and change in 
percentage points (p.p.) by 2050 under different longevity assumptions* 
 
2005 
(%) 
Longevity as in Ch8 
(p.p.) 
Longevity 2 years 
more than Ch8(p.p.) 
Austria 19.3 +7.5 +8.6 
Finland 8.7 +12.2 +13.6 
France 21.0 +20.4 +21.9 
Germany 11.8 +9.1 +10.6 
Hungary 37.7 +6.8 +13.3 
Italy 29.7 +1.9 +2.5 
Poland 14.4 +20.3 +23.7 
Slovakia 20.6 +18.1 +20.9 
Sweden 11.5 +10.0 +11.3 
UK 9.1 +1.2 +1.5 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.   
Source: Own workings using APEX, labour market participation projections and Eurostat 
population projections. 
 
 To sum up, the estimates presented in this section indicate that unexpected longevity 
improvements would result in substantial pressures on system constraints, while leaving the 
achievement of system objectives relatively unaffected.  This suggests that the best reaction to 
longevity improvements lies in raising labour market participation in line.  Longer working 
lives would reduce the increase in pension wealth requirements due to higher longevity and 
also generate the resources to finance them.  Given the repeated revisions of longevity 
projections, this implies that policymakers need to either set up automatic mechanisms to 
adjust the pension system in line with longevity or else to repeatedly reconsider elements of 
the pension arrangement – notably the pension age.  While having automatic mechanisms may 
facilitate implementing changes, there is, however, the risk that the system will be harder to 
                                               
188
 Our analysis has ignored the presence of automatic balancing mechanisms, such as those in Sweden and 
Germany. These result in a reassessment of benefit levels in reaction to changes in system dependency ratios. 
The operation of these mechanisms is difficult to model precisely, but they would result in less generous 
benefits and lower financing needs.   
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understand and that unannounced changes in entitlement conditions will not be accompanied 
by the appropriate labour market reactions.  Ad-hoc periodic reforms, though politically more 
difficult and harder to sustain over the long-term, might, conversely, be more visible and result 
in desired labour participation responses.         
 
9.3 Contribution credits for childcare and unemployment 
In Chapter 8 we moved away from the standard full-career comparisons and adjusted the 
social sustainability indicators for actual and projected labour market participation.  This was 
done by assuming that contribution histories could be approximated by the labour market 
activity rates of a generation of working-age individuals.  Aside from the ―data-induced‖ 
issues with this approach mentioned in Chapter 8,
189
 there are two ―rules-induced‖ issues.  Our 
approach has implicitly assumed that unemployment does not result in losses in pension 
entitlement.  Moreover our approach has ignored whether pension rights accrual is protected 
through contribution credits for periods spent out of the formal labour market to provide care.  
 Table 9.11 shows that unemployment rates are significantly high in some countries, 
particularly between the ages of 15 and 24 (e.g. over a quarter of young Poles were 
unemployed in 2005).  Women tend to have higher unemployment rates during the peak 
working age (25-49).  Unemployment rates decline after age 50, as older unemployed 
individuals tend to become inactive.  Taken as a whole, there is a significant difference in 
unemployment levels among the ten countries, with the overall unemployment rate in the UK 
being 3 times lower that in Poland and Slovakia.    
 
Table 9.11: Unemployment rate (% of the active population) by age and gender-2005 
 Men Women 
15-24 25-49 50-64 15-24 25-49 50-64 
Austria 10.7 4.0 3.8 9.9 5.0 3.5 
Finland 20.6 6.6 6.7 19.5 7.2 6.9 
France 19.1 7.0 5.5 21.5 9.3 6.3 
Germany 16.8 10.4 12.0 13.9 9.8 12.0 
Hungary 19.6 6.3 4.5 19.0 7.1 4.6 
Italy 21.5 5.4 3.3 27.4 9.5 4.0 
Poland 35.7 14.2 13.8 38.3 17.8 13.1 
Slovakia 31.0 13.4 12.7 28.8 16.0 14.4 
Sweden 23.3 6.6 5.0 22.4 6.8 3.5 
UK  14.3 3.6 3.4 11.0 3.4 2.2 
 Source: Eurostat LFS. 
                                               
189
 We are imposing the average labour participation of a cross-section of generations on a single generation 
(problematic if activity rates have been changing). We are also assuming that all individuals display the 
average participation trend over their career (no socioeconomic differences in activity).  
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 While women tend to have higher unemployment than men, this is not the primary 
determinant for their low activity rate.  On average, women have an inactivity rate which is 
nearly double that of men, with the exception of Scandinavian countries, where the gender gap 
in inactivity is closer to a third, and to a lesser extent Eastern European countries (gap is close 
to two-thirds).  A big cause of this gap tends to be the unequal division of caring 
responsibilities in families.  Table 9.12 presents data from Eurostat‘s Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) on the proportion of the inactive who attributed their inactivity to caring 
responsibilities.  Of all men aged 25-64 who were inactive in 2001, on average, only 3% 
declared they were inactive because they had caring responsibilities, as against over a third of 
women. 
 
Table 9.12: Proportion of inactive population (%) by age and gender who attributed inactivity 
to caring responsibilities - 2001 
 Men Women 
15-24 25-49 50-64 15-24 25-49 50-64 
Austria NA NA 0.8 4.2 69.9 21.4 
Finland NA NA NA 11.3 53.5 4.8 
France 0.2 3.3 NA 0.8 24.7 1.8 
Germany 1.2 5.2 0.5 8.3 68.0 18.9 
Hungary NA 3.8 0.6 10.5 41.7 2.5 
Italy 1.5 6.6 1.7 7.9 77.7 51.0 
Poland NA 1.9 0.6 7.6 59.4 9.7 
Slovakia NA NA NA 13.3 64.1 1.3 
Sweden 11.1 11.4 12.0 15.1 31.1 24.4 
UK  NA 13.3 4.5 27.5 65.6 18.6 
Note: NA stands for not available. Eurostat deem these data not to be reliable. 
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
 
 There are very pronounced cross-country differences in care responsibilities 
undertaken by women.  These tend to be lowest in Sweden and France and highest in Italy, 
Germany and Austria.  Interestingly men in Sweden (and to a lesser extent the UK) report 
having a considerable family caring role.  After age 49, inactivity due to caring tends to 
decline significantly in most countries (except in Italy and Sweden).       
 The impact on pension entitlements of unemployment or periods spent outside the 
workforce because of caring responsibilities varies across countries.
190
  The particular pension 
scheme details can be accessed from MISSOC and are modelled in APEX.  Recently there 
have been reviews of the impact that childbearing can have on the pension entitlements of 
women in EU countries, such as Kotowska et al (2008).  ISG (2009) also looked on a cross-
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 Monticone et al (2008) describes in some depth the entitlement rules affecting women in EU countries. 
For an example of an in-depth country study, see DWP (2005). 
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country basis at the impact unemployment can have on pension entitlements.  In this section 
we will use the ISG (2009) simulations on the impact on theoretical replacement rates of 
periods of childcare and of unemployment to modify our social sustainability indicators.
191
  
This choice is motivated by the fact that the ISG study utilised APEX and the definition of 
their full-time base case is the same as the one adopted in Chapter 6.  
 Table 9.13 shows the change in the net replacement rate from state pensions for a 
woman, earning the average wage and with an otherwise full contributory record, who spends 
some years caring.  The first thing to note is that the pension systems of France, Germany and 
Italy boost pension generosity for women with children, even if they do not leave the labour 
force.  By contrast, Eastern European countries do not appear to have significant contribution 
credits.  Interestingly only the French system rewards women for periods of more than 2 years 
of childcare, while in Austria, Finland, Germany and Italy there is a significant disincentive 
for women to carry on caring responsibilities beyond 2 years.  
  
Table 9.13: Percentage point change in state pensions net replacement rate for full-career 
woman on average wages by number of years spent in childcare 
 One child and 
0 years spent 
caring 
One child and 
1 year spent 
caring 
One child and 
2 years spent 
caring 
One child and 
3 years spent 
caring 
Austria 0.0 +2.5 +0.8 -1.0 
Finland 0.0 +0.3 +0.5 -0.5 
France +1.3 +1.0 +0.4 +0.2 
Germany +1.4 +0.6 -0.1 -0.8 
Hungary 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 
Italy +0.5 +0.4 +0.4 -0.9 
Poland 0.0 -1.0 -2.1 -3.1 
Slovakia 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 
Sweden 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 
UK 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Source: Adapted from ISG (2009). 
 
 ISG (2009) reports that ―in most countries unemployment results in a loss of pension 
entitlements‖, though in most cases, the drop is small due to ―considerable protection of 
pension entitlements in the unemployment benefit system in most Member States‖.  Table 9.14 
shows the change in the net replacement rate from state pensions due to unemployment for an 
average earner with an otherwise full career.  The decline tends to be low during the first year 
of unemployment, except in Slovakia, Finland and Poland.  However as ISG (2009) reports 
                                               
191
 Women are also heavily engaged in care for the elderly. This aspect is not studied here. In some countries 
care of all dependents is treated equally. Kotsadam (2009) provides a cross-country review of the impact of 
eldercare on labour participation, finding strong effects for women in Southern Europe.    
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―the decrease in replacement rates due to breaks in the career due to unemployment increases 
and often at an increasing rate the longer the individual is away from the labour market‖.    
 
Table 9.14: Percentage point change in state pensions net replacement rate for full-career 
man on average wages by number of years spent unemployed 
 1 year in 
unemployment 
2 years in 
unemployment 
3 years in 
unemployment 
Austria -0.6 -1.3 -2.0 
Finland -2.8 -5.4 -6.0 
France -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
Germany -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 
Hungary -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 
Italy 0.0 -1.5 -3.0 
Poland -1.0 -2.4 -3.7 
Slovakia -2.2 -4.3 -6.3 
Sweden -0.3 -0.9 -1.5 
UK -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 
Source: Adapted from ISG (2009). 
 
 Given the above, the assumption taken in Chapter 8 that unemployed periods are 
equivalent in pension accrual terms to employed periods overestimates pension wealth 
particularly in Poland and Slovakia, where one-seventh and one-sixth, respectively, of the 
male active population is unemployed (and mostly for more than a year – see Table 9.15). 
Moreover in France and Italy where there are pronounced gender differences in 
unemployment, ignoring the latter‘s impact may underestimate the gender pension gap. 
Conversely, the approach taken that periods spent inactive due to childcare do not accrue 
entitlements underestimates generosity, particularly in Austria, France and Germany.     
 
Table 9.15: Percentage of the unemployed (aged 15-64, both genders) by duration of 
unemployment spell in 2005 (% of total) 
 1 year or less Between 1 and 2 years More than 2 years 
Austria 75 12 13 
Finland 74 13 12 
France 59 20 21 
Germany 47 19 34 
Hungary 55 24 21 
Italy 52 18 30 
Poland 42 28 30 
Slovakia 28 21 51 
Sweden 89 7 4 
UK 79 11 10 
Source: Eurostat LFS. 
 
 Since our analysis is based on the impact of reforms on hypothetical individuals, it is 
difficult to make a straightforward adjustment to incorporate the possibility of these 
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individuals being unemployed or having children.  We again have to resort to assumptions.  In 
respect of childcare, we assume that all our hypothetical women have children and care for 
each child for 2 years.  The number of children they are assumed to have is determined by the 
national fertility rate used in Eurostat‘s population projections.192  As for unemployment, we 
base our assumptions on duration of unemployment data from Eurostat‘s LFS.  This suggests 
that in Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK most unemployed spend 1 year or less out of 
work (therefore we assume our individuals are unemployed for 1 year).  By contrast in 
Slovakia, unemployment spells last for more than 2 years (so we assume our individuals spend 
3 years unemployed).  For the other countries, we assumed a 2-year unemployment break.  In 
practice these assumptions mean that women accrue up to 4 years of credits for childcare, but 
lose some entitlement due to unemployment; while men lose part of their entitlement due to 
unemployment.  As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, we do not have complete details 
of pre-reform contribution credits in all countries.  We will thus be adjusting the results for 
2005 and 2050 in line with current crediting arrangements. 
 Table 9.16 shows the poverty threshold which could be financed by the net pension 
wealth at retirement, using the approach taken in Chapter 8 and the adjustment for periods 
spend in unemployment or childcare.  Taking an average, weighted by relative population size, 
across the ten countries, the new estimates show that in 2005 pension systems offer a threshold 
of 66% instead of 67% for men, and 55% instead of 52% for women, implying a smaller 
pension gender gap.  The unemployment assumption lowers state pension generosity for men, 
with the strongest losses in Slovakia and Finland.  By contrast in the UK, Sweden and France 
the decline is marginal.  The compounding of the unemployment and childcare effects reduces 
generosity for women in the Eastern European countries studied.  Conversely the pension 
wealth of women in Austria, Germany and France can sustain a higher poverty threshold. 
 Looking forwards to 2050, the unemployment assumption does not change much the 
magnitude of the projected impacts for men.  By contrast, there are considerable differences 
for women.  In some cases, such as France and Germany, generosity is not set to improve that 
much.  In these countries, the forecast increase in female labour participation was projected to 
increase the effective generosity of the system, but once childcare assumptions are taken into 
account, this effect becomes less strong as inactivity bears down less strongly on generosity. 
Conversely, in countries where pension reforms have linked more benefits to contributions, 
one has the opposite effect.  For instance in the NDC systems of Italy and Sweden, the fact 
                                               
192
 These range from 2 for women in France to 1.3 for women in Slovakia. 
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that women now contribute for more years than was assumed in Chapter 8 means that they 
face better prospects after the reforms.  The only NDC country where the change in generosity 
by 2050 is worse for women is Poland (but this reflects the high penalty on unemployment).  
  
Table 9.16: The poverty thresholds achievable in 2005 and 2050 taking into account credits 
for unemployment and childcare* 
a) Men ^ 
 2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 2050-2005  
(percentage points) 
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Austria 95 94 74 73 -21 -21 
Finland 64 60 66 62 +2 +2 
France 63 63 59 59 -4 -4 
Germany 61 60 59 58 -2 -2 
Hungary 70 69 65 64 -5 -5 
Italy 95 93 68 66 -27 -27 
Poland 66 63 50 48 -16 -16 
Slovakia 93 83 51 44 -42 -39 
Sweden 70 70 65 65 -5 -5 
UK 46 46 59 59 +13 +13 
 
b) Women ^ 
 2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 2050-2005 
(percentage points) 
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Austria 68 72 61 65 -7 -7 
Finland 57 57 58 59 +1 +2 
France 44 55 59 64 +15 +10 
Germany 48 51 56 56 +8 +5 
Hungary 68 65 59 59 -9 -6 
Italy 68 69 50 52 -18 -17 
Poland 55 53 35 32 -20 -21 
Slovakia 74 69 41 42 -33 -27 
Sweden 59 59 56 58 -3 -1 
UK 39 41 56 58 +17 +17 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. Weights reflect the share of full- and part-time workers. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 The impact of these modelling adjustments on consumption smoothing is similar. 
Table 9.17 shows the Chapter 8 estimates of the replacement rate financed by net pension 
wealth and revised figures taking into account periods in unemployment and providing 
childcare.  On average, across the ten countries, the replacement rate for men in 2005 is one 
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percentage point lower than shown in Chapter 8 (64% instead of 65%), whereas that for 
women is nearly two percentage points higher (57% instead of 55%).  By 2050, the relative 
strength of this effect for women drops significantly, as higher labour participation increases 
the influence of the unemployment effect on pension entitlements.  For men the effect remains 
constant through time.  Similarly to what happens to poverty thresholds, one finds that 
contribution credits tend to reduce the impact of the reform on women in Sweden, Slovakia 
and Italy, while women in France and Germany gain less from the projected increase in their 
participation rates. 
 
Table 9.17: The overall replacement ratio achievable in 2005 and 2050 taking into account 
credits for unemployment and childcare* 
a) Men ^ 
 2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 2050-2005 
(percentage points) 
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Austria 89 88 66 65 -23 -23 
Finland 59 55 59 56 0 +1 
France 56 56 58 58 +2 +2 
Germany 71 70 69 68 -2 -2 
Hungary 74 73 62 61 -12 -12 
Italy 92 90 67 65 -33 -25 
Poland 67 65 56 54 -11 -11 
Slovakia 62 55 56 49 -6 -6 
Sweden 66 66 59 59 -7 -7 
UK 37 37 53 53 +16 +16 
 
b) Women ^ 
 2005  
(%) 
2050  
(%) 
Change 2050-2005 
(percentage points) 
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Austria 75 80 66 70 -9 -9 
Finland 58 58 60 61 +2 +3 
France 41 48 51 54 +10 +5 
Germany 59 62 67 67 +8 +5 
Hungary 74 70 64 64 -10 -6 
Italy 65 66 50 52 -15 -14 
Poland 65 63 43 39 -22 -24 
Slovakia 75 69 56 55 -19 -14 
Sweden 66 64 57 58 -9 -6 
UK 40 41 57 58 +17 +17 
* This represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full- and part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 Table 9.18 compares the net pension wealth of the 2050 generation with that of the 
generation retiring in 2005, taking into account contribution credits.  On average, across all 
countries there is little change for men, but the improvement in net pension wealth for women 
decreases when one takes into account credits.  This follows from the fact that the inclusion of 
contribution credits boosts the net pension wealth of women in 2005 more considerably than 
in 2050, as systems were generally more generous.  This effect is mostly felt in Germany, 
France and Poland.  By contrast, the inclusion of childcare credits improves the position of 
women in 2050 in Sweden, Slovakia and Hungary.    
 
Table 9.18: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation taking into account credits for unemployment and childcare (%) 
a) Men^ 
 Chapter 8 Incl credits 
Austria 94 94 
Finland 125 127 
France 101 101 
Germany 104 104 
Hungary 116 116 
Italy 77 77 
Poland 83 82 
Slovakia 80 78 
Sweden 112 112 
UK 127 127 
 
b) Women^ 
 Chapter 8 Incl credits 
Austria 87 86 
Finland 119 120 
France 141 127 
Germany 124 117 
Hungary 82 85 
Italy 76 77 
Poland 73 69 
Slovakia 58 61 
Sweden 96 101 
UK 117 116 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Having seen that taking into account contribution credits improves significantly the 
generosity of pension systems to women, but marginally lowers that for men, it comes to no 
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surprise that the contribution rates needed to finance pension transfers are higher than 
originally estimated (see Table 9.19).  In Chapter 8, on average across all countries, the 
required contribution rate in 2005 was estimated at 17%, but our adjustment for contribution 
credits raises this to 19%.  There are some interesting differences in the impact of contribution 
credits, with the cost of the system dropping or remaining stable in Finland, Hungary, Italy 
and Slovakia while there are significant upward revisions in the cost of the French, German, 
Polish, Swedish and UK systems.  This reflects the relative importance of the unemployment 
penalty compared to the childcare gain (e.g. in countries with low female labour participation 
the unemployment effect is stronger) and the current degree of progressiveness (as women on 
low incomes tend to gain a lot by having contribution credits).  
 
Table 9.19: Evolution of long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages) over time taking 
into account credits for unemployment and childcare* 
 2005 2050 Change 2050-2005 
(percentage points) 
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Chapter 
8 
Incl 
credits  
Austria 19.3 19.8 26.8 27.6 +7.5 +7.8 
Finland 8.7 8.8 20.9 21.2 +12.2 +12.4 
France 21.0 23.4 41.4 46.8 +20.4 +23.5 
Germany 11.8 14.0 20.9 26.0 +9.1 +12.0 
Hungary 37.7 37.0 44.5 44.1 +6.8 +7.1 
Italy 29.7 29.7 31.6 31.7 +1.9 +2.0 
Poland 14.4 15.9 34.7 37.8 +20.3 +21.9 
Slovakia 20.6 19.2 38.7 36.6 +18.1 +17.4 
Sweden 11.5 13.0 21.5 26.2 +10.0 +13.2 
UK 9.1 10.8 10.3 12.6 +1.2 +1.8 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.   
Source: Own workings using APEX, labour market participation projections and Eurostat 
population projections. 
 
 Chapter 8 suggested that the required contribution rate would rise by nearly 10 
percentage points by 2050.  The modelling adjustments made here imply a stronger rise, of 
11.5 percentage points.  Countries with generous crediting provisions face significantly higher 
costs, with France, Germany and Sweden, particularly affected.  
 In conclusion, this attempt to model in a more sophisticated way the possible impact of 
contribution credits for unemployment and childcare has suggested that, on the basis of the 
assumptions made, pension systems might be less generous than previously estimated for men 
and conversely for women.  The impact on pension system constraints is more mixed.  On the 
one hand, the increase in the relative size of pension transfers to future generations is reduced 
286 
 
                    
slightly (as the size of current transfers is revised upwards).  On the other, the required rise in 
contribution rates is higher as pension entitlements increase without any rise in labour market 
activity.   
 Finally it is important to stress the limits of this exercise.  What has been done here is 
only a pale shadow of what could be achieved through dynamic microsimulation.  Looking at 
a limited number of hypothetical individuals has its advantages, as it makes interpretation of 
results easier and impacts of reforms more understandable.  However it is very difficult to 
make realistic assumptions about life-course events like unemployment or childcare.  In this 
section a number of simplifying assumptions were taken.  Estimates should therefore be, in the 
main, used to benchmark the results of Chapter 8 and give some indication of the potential 
revisions that could be made.     
 
9.4 The impact of different assumptions on growth in macroeconomic variables  
In the first two sections of this Chapter we simulated the impact on the social sustainability 
indicators of a change in the employment and longevity assumptions – two very important 
determinants of the strength of pension entitlements. However the latter also depend on 
several macroeconomic variables.  In this section we will be looking at some of them, but as 
pointed out earlier, we will be carrying out simulations for only a sub-set of systems. In the 
case of wage growth, 5 countries – France, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK – were selected. 
These are broadly representative of the taxonomy developed in Chapter 2,
193
 and the impact of 
different wage assumptions is similar across systems of the same typology. In the second part 
of this section we will look at the impact of different interest rate and GDP growth 
assumptions on the NDC/personal pension systems of Italy, Sweden and Poland. 
 
9.41. The impact of different wage growth assumptions 
One would expect, a priori, that wage growth is a very important determinant of pension 
entitlements, particularly in countries with high replacement rates. Faster wage growth would 
result in higher pensions. However the social sustainability indicators are all defined in 
relative wage terms. Thus while faster wage growth may lead to higher nominal pension 
levels, particularly in countries with a strong earnings link, the starting pension level would be 
the same percentage of the contemporary wage as before. 
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 This had 4 main groups. France and Poland were classed among countries with high replacement and low 
poverty. The UK and Italy both have low replacement and high poverty; but Italy has high spending. Sweden 
was among countries with low spending, low replacement and low poverty.  
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 For instance, the poverty threshold adopted is not based on some nominal absolute 
value, but as a percentage of the national average wage. Different wage growth does not 
change the earnings relative value of the pension entitlements required to meet this poverty 
threshold. This reasoning applies to the other 3 indicators.  The only reason why different 
wage growth assumptions could affect the build-up of pension entitlements is the presence of 
system parameters which are not uprated with nominal wage growth.  Thus, for example, if 
there is a maximum pensionable income which is uprated in line with prices, having a higher 
wage growth assumption would result in entitlements hitting the maximum earlier (and 
thereby decreasing the achievement of system goals).  These elements tend to be quite rare in 
practice.  
 More important, however, is what happens to the relative earnings value of pension 
entitlements after retirement.  In most countries, pension benefits are no longer, or were never, 
uprated in line with wages, as was documented in Chapter 3.  Table 9.20 taken from ISG 
(2009) provides details on the uprating arrangements expected to be in force by 2046 across 
the ten countries and shows that full wage indexation is only expected in Germany.
194
  The 
relative strength of benefits decreases significantly over time if they are not uprated in line 
with earnings.  This negative impact increases the longer the period spent in receipt of this 
benefit and the faster the pace of wage growth relative to the uprating factor applied.
195
        
 
Table 9.20: Indexation of pension benefits in the different components of pension systems in 
2046 
  Minimum pension Other state pension 
Austria Prices Prices 
Finland Prices 20% wages 
France Prices Prices 
Germany Wages Wages 
Hungary 50% wages 50% wages 
Italy Prices Prices 
Poland Prices Prices 
Slovakia 50% wages 50% wages 
Sweden Prices Wages - 1.6% 
UK Wages Wages* 
* State Second Pension is uprated with prices 
Source: Adapted from ISG (2009). 
  
                                               
194
 However in Germany benefit levels will be affected by the so-called sustainability factor (based on 
changes in the dependency ratio). 
195
 See for example, Sutherland et al (2009). 
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 Thus, one would expect that higher wage growth should have a negative impact on the 
achievement of system aims.  If wage growth is higher than assumed in Chapter 8, the poverty 
threshold that needs to be met by pension entitlements grows faster than the pension 
entitlements themselves.  Similarly for the strength of the consumption smoothing function, if 
wages grow faster than previously assumed, replacement rates decline over the retirement 
period at a quicker pace than shown in Chapter 8.   
 Table 9.21 shows the effect on change in the poverty threshold achievable, on average, 
in 2050 under different wage growth assumptions.  The first and second columns reproduce 
the results presented in Chapter 8 where a nominal wage growth rate of 4.5% was assumed. 
The third and fourth columns, by contrast, show the change if one assumes 3% and 5.5% 
nominal wage growth, respectively. 
 
Table 9.21: The poverty thresholds achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points (p.p.) 
by 2050 under different wage growth assumptions* 
a) Men^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Wage growth 
as in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 
1.5 p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 63 -4 -1 -7 
Italy 95 -27 -12 -34 
Poland 66 -16 -4 -20 
Sweden 70 -5 -2 -5 
UK 46 +13 +15 +12 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Wage growth 
as in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 
1.5 p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 44 +15 +19 +16 
Italy 68 -18 -4 -20 
Poland 55 -20 -14 -21 
Sweden 59 -3 -1 -3 
UK 39 +17 +18 +17 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 As anticipated, higher wage growth results in the system being less effective in 
tackling post-retirement poverty.  For example, in Poland if wage growth is 1 percentage point 
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higher, the poverty threshold achieved, on average, by men would decline by 20 percentage 
points, rather than by 16 percentage points.  By contrast, the decline for women grows only 
slightly to 21 percentage points, instead of 20 percentage points.  This might strike one as 
being a counter-intuitive result, as surely if pension indexation is the same for both genders, 
the impact of higher wage growth should be the same.  However one needs to keep in mind 
that the entitlements of women are lower than those of men, and so the relative loss if these 
entitlements lose value is smaller.  Higher wage growth results in less women being dependent 
on the minimum pension, as they manage to build up higher pension entitlements.  Since the 
minimum pension in most countries has less generous indexation (see Table 9.20), higher 
wage growth is beneficial to women.
196
  
 The interpretation of the results of the simulation for lower wage growth is more 
straightforward.  Lower wage growth results in pension benefits maintaining their value 
relative to average wages better during the post-retirement period.  From Table 9.21 one can 
note that the change induced by different wage assumptions is least strong in the UK and in 
Sweden, reflecting the fact that they have the most generous post-retirement indexation 
regimes among the 5 countries.  
 Table 9.22 presents the impact on consumption smoothing, by comparing the change in 
the replacement rate which would, on average, be achieved post-retirement in 2050.  The 
trends are very similar to those described for poverty alleviation.  Pensioners in Sweden and 
the UK are the best-protected post-retirement.  On average, pensioners are better off if wage 
growth is low.  It is important to note, though, that we are assuming constant wage growth 
rates during the entire simulation period.  Thus the wage growth faced by individuals when 
they were of working age is the same that is observed while they are of pension age.  One 
would have very different results if one assumes breaks in wage growth rates.  Individuals are 
inevitably worse off if the wage growth they experience during their working age is lower than 
that occurring during their retirement years, and vice versa.  For instance, pensioners in many 
Eastern European countries ended up being much better off, relatively speaking, in retirement 
than one would have anticipated, as wages dropped significantly post-transition.  
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 In the UK one does not find this effect, as the minimum pension is indexed to wages.  
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Table 9.22: The overall replacement ratio achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points 
(p.p.) by 2050 under different wage growth assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Wage growth 
as in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 
1.5 p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 56 +2 +5 0 
Italy 92 -25 -14 -31 
Poland 67 -11 -1 -14 
Sweden 66 -7 -5 -7 
UK 37 +16 +18 +15 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005 
(%) 
Wage growth 
as in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 
1.5 p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 41 +10 +14 +11 
Italy 65 -15 -1 -17 
Poland 65 -22 -15 -23 
Sweden 66 -9 -7 -9 
UK 40 +17 +18 +17 
* This rate represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 While the achievement of system objectives worsens with faster wage growth, pressure 
on constraints lessens. Table 9.23 compares the net pension wealth of the 2050 and 2005 
generations under different assumptions. If wage growth is lower than assumed in Chapter 8, 
the net pension wealth at the point of retirement would be significantly higher, notably in Italy, 
Poland and France.  This reflects the fact that in these countries cuts in generosity are quite 
strong for those on middle- to high-incomes. If wage growth is slower than expected, this 
results in the cuts in generosity not coming that much into effect. By contrast, with faster wage 
growth the pressure on intergenerational balance tends to decline.  The effects are more 
strongly felt for men as they are in the income bands which are mostly affected by the reform 
cuts. 
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Table 9.23: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation under different wage growth assumptions (%) 
a) Men^ 
 
Wage growth as 
in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.5 
p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 101 112 100 
Italy 77 93 73 
Poland 83 97 79 
Sweden 112 116 111 
UK 127 132 125 
 
b) Women^ 
 
Wage growth as 
in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.5 
p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 141 143 139 
Italy 76 94 75 
Poland 73 79 72 
Sweden 96 98 95 
UK 117 119 116 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
Turning to fiscal pressures, Table 9.24 shows that higher wage growth dampens the burden on 
future working generations in Italy and Poland. The effect in Sweden and the UK is marginal 
as pensions retain their relative value.  Low wage growth results in a large increase in the 
contribution required, especially in Italy, Poland and France. 
 
Table 9.24: Long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages) in 2005 and change in 
percentage points (p.p.) by 2050 under the different wage growth assumptions* 
 
2005 Wage growth as 
in Ch8-4.5% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.5 
p.p. less-3% 
(p.p.) 
Wage growth 1.0 
p.p. more-5.5% 
(p.p.) 
France 21.0 +20.4 +23.3 +20.1 
Italy 29.7 +1.9 +7.7 -1.1 
Poland 14.4 +20.3 +24.3 +19.4 
Sweden 11.5 +10.0 +10.4 +9.8 
UK 9.1 +1.2 +1.4 1.1 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.   
Source: Own workings using APEX, labour market participation projections and Eurostat 
population projections. 
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9.42. The impact of different interest rate and GDP growth assumptions 
 Chapter 3 reviewed how some countries adopted NDC schemes where pension 
entitlements depend on accumulated contributions (and credits) and on the notional interest 
accorded them. The NDC systems of Poland and Sweden use wage growth to calculate this 
interest, while in Italy GDP growth is used. In section 9.41 we modelled the impact of 
different wage assumptions on pension entitlements in Poland and Sweden. However our 
pension wealth estimates for these two countries also include returns from mandatory personal 
pensions, which depend crucially on the assumed rate of return. In this section we move away 
from the OECD assumptions on real interest rates (3.5%) and real GDP growth (1.6%) 
adopted in other Chapters, in order to understand the impact of different GDP growth 
assumptions on the social sustainability indicators for Italy and of different interest rate 
assumptions on those for Sweden and Poland.
197
 We simulate a one-percentage point 
deviation, upwards and downwards, from the OECD assumptions throughout the forecast 
period.  One should note that interest rates in Sweden are lower than in Poland, and may 
remain so for some time in the future. No attempt was made in this exercise to simulate this 
country difference.  Estimates here are meant to just give an idea of the potential impact of 
changes in assumptions and not provide definite predictions.    
 Table 9.25 shows the poverty threshold which net pension wealth in 2005 sustains, 
together with the change in percentage points by 2050 under different GDP growth and market 
interest rate assumptions. This suggests that a one-percentage point deviation in long-term 
GDP growth would have very strong implications for the poverty alleviation function in Italy. 
There are two interesting things to note. First, women are less affected then men as they have 
smaller pension entitlements to begin with. Second, the impact of lower GDP growth is 
slightly smaller than that of higher GDP growth. This reflects the fact that the NDC system is 
underpinned by a minimum pension system, which would sustain net pension wealth in 
periods of low accrual of NDC entitlements. The same impact is observed in respect of lower 
interest rate assumptions in Sweden and Poland. Lower interest rates decrease further poverty 
alleviation by 2050, and vice versa. However there is a significant difference in the size of this 
impact in both countries, as in Poland a larger component of pension entitlements depends on 
the income from personal accounts than in Sweden. 
 
                                               
197
 Changes in GDP growth rates would also impact estimates in Sweden and Poland. However given our 
static modelling framework, it is not possible to calculate this impact, as we cannot impute the extent to 
which the change in GDP growth changes wage growth or interest rates.  
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Table 9.25: The poverty thresholds achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points (p.p.) 
by 2050 under different interest rate and GDP growth assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005 3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% 
GDP growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% 
GDP growth  
Italy 95 -27 -15 -38 
Poland 66 -16 -8 -21 
Sweden 70 -5 -1 -8 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005 3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% 
GDP growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% 
GDP growth  
Italy 68 -18 -7 -28 
Poland 55 -20 -15 -23 
Sweden 59 -3 0 -5 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 The same trends emerge when one looks at the impact of the different assumptions on 
consumption smoothing. To return to the point made earlier, the fact that interest rates in 
Poland are higher than in Sweden, one could argue that the estimates of the drop in generosity 
made in previous Chapters for Poland could be significantly over-stated.
198
 However the 
Tables above indicate that even with higher interest rate assumptions, the reforms in Poland 
have had a significant gender impact, placing women more at-risk-of-poverty during 
retirement, unless their labour participation increases significantly (particularly at older ages).     
 
Table 9.26: The replacement ratio achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points (p.p.) 
by 2050 under different interest rate and GDP growth assumptions*  
a) Men^ 
 
2005 3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% 
GDP growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% 
GDP growth  
Italy 92 -25 -13 -35 
Poland 67 -11 -3 -16 
Sweden 66 -7 -4 -9 
 
                                               
198
 The interest rate on a ten-year government bond in Poland was 1.5 percentage points higher than in 
Sweden in 2007, while the inflation rate was around a percentage point higher.  
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Table 9.26: The replacement ratio achievable in 2005 and change in percentage points (p.p.) 
by 2050 under different interest rate and GDP growth assumptions*…cont..  
b) Women^ 
 
2005 3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% 
GDP growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% 
GDP growth  
Italy 65 -15 -5 -24 
Poland 65 -22 -17 -26 
Sweden 66 -9 -6 -11 
* This represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full- and part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Table 9.27 shows the impact of the different assumptions on the pension wealth for the 
2050 pensioner generation. The first thing to note is the substantial change induced by GDP 
assumptions to future pension wealth in Italy.  If GDP growth in Italy is lower than projected, 
the pension entitlements of future generations will fall very significantly, and vice versa.  The 
impact of different interest rate assumptions for Sweden and Poland is less marked – reflecting 
the fact that net pension wealth in these countries is significantly lower than in Italy.  The 
second thing to note is that there is a clear difference in the impact on gender pension gaps of 
different interest rate assumptions in Sweden and Poland.  The greater dependence on personal 
accounts makes women in Poland more at risk of fluctuations in their pension wealth.      
 
Table 9.27: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation under different interest rate and GDP growth assumptions (%) 
a) Men^ 
 
3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% GDP 
growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% GDP 
growth  
Italy 77 90 65 
Poland 83 96 75 
Sweden 112 118 107 
 
b) Women^ 
 
3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% GDP 
growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% GDP 
growth  
Italy 76 90 63 
Poland 73 82 67 
Sweden 96 102 92 
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full and part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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 All this has implications for financial sustainability, as can be seen in Table 9.28.  
Some of the results may be counterintuitive.  For instance, high GDP growth may result in 
greater fiscal pressures in Italy, as a direct result of the notional interest rate formula adopted 
by the Italian reformers.  Note that this is only true if this GDP growth were not due to higher 
growth in the wage bill (as we have seen in the previous section that higher wage growth 
reduces fiscal pressures in Italy).  The second interesting thing to note is that while claims on 
future workers are decreased if the pace of pension accrual is lower than expected, the drop 
will not be linear, as minimum pensions provide significant underpins to pension expenditure. 
         
Table 9.28: Long-term contribution rates (% of lifetime wages) in 2005 and change in 
percentage points (p.p.) by 2050 under different interest rate and GDP growth assumptions* 
 
2005 3.5% Interest 
rate/1.6% GDP 
growth (Ch8) 
4.5% Interest 
rate/2.5% 
GDP growth  
2.5% Interest 
rate/0.5% 
GDP growth  
Italy 29.7 +1.9 +7.9 -3.2 
Poland 14.4 +20.3 +24.5 +17.6 
Sweden 11.5 +10.0 +11.2 +9.1 
* This gives the proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the net pension wealth of different 
pensioner generations.   
Source: Own workings using APEX, labour market participation projections and Eurostat 
population projections. 
 
9.5 The effect of socio-economic differences in mortality and labour participation  
In Chapter 5 we argued that the best way to assess the sustainability of pension reforms is by 
means of pension wealth rather than replacement rates.  We also argued that rather than 
looking at hypothetical individuals with full careers, one should look at individuals across the 
wage distribution and try to take into account labour market participation. 
 However our approach still remains a proxy. This is because the two main 
determinants of pension transfers – namely labour participation and longevity – are still 
assessed on an average basis, rather than on the socio-economic group being studied.  To a 
large extent, this reflects the lack of adequate cross-country longitudinal data and harmonised 
socio-economic categories – a defect which surveys like EU-SILC and classification 
harmonisation projects like the European Socio-Economic Classification will help to gradually 
address. Yet, even within countries, it is not easy to determine from the same data source 
socio-economic differences in both labour market participation and longevity, as longitudinal 
studies frequently are not comprehensive enough or have not been in place long enough. 
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 The presence of these data difficulties may excuse the lack of consideration given to 
socio-economic differences in previous Chapters.  Nevertheless in view of the potentially large 
impact which they might have, it is appropriate to try to investigate the sensitivity of the social 
sustainability indicators to these differences.  In this respect, the seminal paper by Whitehouse 
& Zaidi (2008) is very relevant, as it presents the OECD‘s assessment of the extent to which 
APEX estimates of pension wealth are affected by socio-economic differences in mortality.  It 
points out, for example, that if those on low incomes die much younger than those on high 
incomes, assuming everyone has the same life expectancy overstates progressiveness.  
 Huisman et al. (2004) look at mortality differences by education level for those aged 
50-90 in eleven European countries, including four on which our research has focused (see 
Table 9.29).  These suggest that inequalities differ significantly across countries and patterns 
change also according to the age bracket being compared.  Overall, Finland appears to have 
the smallest relative inequalities and Austria the highest.             
 
Table 9.29: Relative educational inequalities in mortality between men in the lower educated 
group and the combined middle and higher educated groups*   
 50-59 60-69 70-79 
Austria 1.86 (8.73) 1.56 (21.95) 1.39 (50.96) 
England/Wales 1.36 (9.80) 1.61 (27.99) 1.17 (71.65) 
Finland 1.49 (11.79) 1.41 (30.96) 1.25 (73.21) 
France 1.58 (8.40) 1.31 (19.39) 1.36 (42.45) 
* The figures in brackets represent the total rate, or the mortality rate of the total population in that 
age group (given per 1000 person years at risk). The relative risk ratio compares the mortality rate of 
the lower educated group with the rate of the combined middle and higher educated groups.       
Source: Huisman et al (2004). 
 
 Due to lack of data, Whitehouse & Zaidi (2008) look at three country-specific 
longitudinal household panel studies, covering the UK, Germany and the US, to determine the 
link between income and life expectancy.  They find a gap in life expectancy at age 40 
between the bottom-third and the top-third of the income distribution of 5 years in the UK and 
less than 4 years in Germany.  
 The pension wealth indicator shows in present value terms the total pension transfers 
expected during retirement.  Instead of defining this in money terms, the transfers are defined 
in terms of the current average wage.  The calculation of pension wealth thus involves two 
components – the annual payment in terms of the current average wage multiplied by a value 
that represents the expected duration of payment.  The latter value, known as the annuity 
factor, gives the present value - in terms of the current average wage - of one payment paid for 
each of the years spent receiving the pension.  If the discount rate were zero or pension 
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payments rose in line with the discount rate, and average wages remained stable or pension 
payments over time amounted to the same percentage of average wages, the annuity factor 
would be equivalent to life expectancy.  However since the value of pension payments tends to 
decline relative to wages, the annuity factor is lower than life expectancy at pension age.           
 Table 9.30 shows the Whitehouse & Zaidi (2008) estimates of the annuity factors for 
men by tertiles of household income. This indicates that compared to the assessment made 
using the life tables for the average person, socio-economic differences in longevity mean that 
pensions are worth 5% less for the poor and 5% more for the rich.  The differential for German 
men is less pronounced, with pensions being worth 3% less for the poor and 5% more for the 
rich.  This suggests that the degree of pension system progressivity is in reality lower. The 
authors conclude that ―socio-economic differences in mortality therefore suggest that lower-
income workers should receive higher pension replacement rates than high earners to avoid the 
poor cross-subsidising the rich‖.  Bismarkian and actuarially fair systems, like NDC schemes, 
may therefore be sub-optimal in social welfare terms, and vice versa for progressive systems.   
 
Table 9.30: Annuity factors at age 65 for men by tertile of household income    
 Low Middle High Average* 
Germany 14.4 14.7 15.6 14.9 
UK 11.9 12.5 13.2 12.5 
* The “average” represents the annuity factor for the average person as presented in the standard life 
tables.  
Source: Whitehouse & Zaidi (2008). 
 
 The sustainability indicators do not simply look at the size of pension wealth.  Rather 
they relate it to the transfers required to achieve set goals – e.g. keeping income above the 
poverty threshold.  Thus if the poor live for less, their pension requirements are also lower.  In 
fact, since pensions tend to lose over time their value relative to the poverty threshold or to 
previous lifetime wages, having lower life expectancy, by definition, makes systems more 
‗effective‘.  The rich, we have found, tend to be well-provided for in terms of the poverty 
alleviation function, though not so much in terms of consumption smoothing.  Having longer 
life expectancies, a priori, would suggest a further weakening of the latter function. 
 Another issue, which is not studied in Whitehouse & Zaidi (2008) as they stick to full-
careers, is the impact of socio-economic differences in the accrual of pension entitlements.  
Here comparative administrative data problems are currently insurmountable, but national data 
can be used to study differences in labour participation.  Table 9.31, for instance, shows data 
on economic activity by age, gender and wealth quintile from the English Longitudinal Study 
of Ageing (ELSA)‘s first wave. This suggests that those in the poorest wealth quintile remain 
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active for significantly less than those in the middle of the wealth distribution. Interestingly 
this seems to be the case also among the rich, though less so at advanced ages.                     
 
Table 9.31: Percentage economically inactive by age and wealth quintile - ELSA (%) 
 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 
Men (Total) 16.7 27.1 51.7 83.5 
Poorest wealth quintile 44.1 49.6 67.6 91.4 
Second wealth quintile 13.2 26.6 47.6 90.7 
Middle wealth quintile 6.0 14.3 47.7 79.3 
Fourth wealth quintile 10.0 20.8 51.1 83.6 
Richest wealth quintile 15.7 25.6 44.9 72.8 
Source: Banks & Casanova (2004).  
 
 In Chapter 8, using the labour participation rates from the LFS, we suggested that men, 
on average, in the UK accrue entitlements till the age of 58. Using the socio-economic 
differences implied by ELSA data, and calibrating average labour participation in ELSA to 
that in the LFS, one could conclude that the average age of exit for the bottom tertile of the 
wealth distribution lies somewhere around 54, while that for the middle tertile and top tertile is 
close to 60 and 59, respectively.
199
      
 On the basis of these assumptions about socio-economic differences in labour 
participation, together with the annuity factors by tertile computed by Whitehouse & Zaidi 
(2008), one can compute revised measures of net pension wealth for men of pension age in 
2005 in the UK.  We have formed the income tertiles as: the bottom income tertile - those at 
the bottom three deciles of the full-time workforce, the middle tertile - those in part-time 
employment and those at the fourth and fifth deciles of the full-time workforce, the top tertile - 
those at the sixth to the ninth decile of the full-time workforce.  
 Table 9.32 presents revised indicators for the current entitlements of men of state 
pension age in the UK taking into account different assumptions on labour participation and 
longevity post-pension age.  The bottom tertile is assumed to accumulate entitlement till age 
54 and lives nearly three years less post-retirement than the middle tertile. This results in net 
pension wealth at pension age amounting to just 3.1 years worth of the average wage. This is 
enough to purchase an annuity equivalent to a poverty threshold of 39% and a replacement 
rate of 56% till death. Due to the flat rate nature of the UK system, the replacement rates 
achieved by those in the middle and top tertiles lie far below this, but the strength of the 
poverty alleviation function for them is significantly stronger.   
                                               
199
 The average age of exit for each tertile was determined as that age where more than 50% of that group are 
no longer economically active. The average of the three exit ages was set to equal that shown by the LFS.  
299 
 
                    
 Table 9.32: Revised indicators for the current UK pension system taking into account 
different assumptions on labour market participation and longevity of men    
 Net 
pension 
level 
Annuity 
factor 
Net 
pension 
wealth 
Poverty 
threshold* 
Overall 
replacement 
rate^ 
Bottom tertile 25.8 11.9 3.1 39% 56% 
Middle tertile 31.4 12.5 3.9 47% 38% 
Top tertile 37.0 13.2 4.9 54% 26% 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ This overall replacement rate represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement 
income) throughout retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Comparing these new estimates of net pension wealth with those made in Chapter 8, as 
is done in Table 9.33, one finds that the bottom tertile accrue significantly less pension 
entitlements than originally thought. However, those in the middle and top tertiles do not 
accrue considerably more than before. This reflects the fact that the UK pension system is not 
very earnings-related, thus lengthier periods of contributions do not result in significant 
increases in the level of state pensions. Moreover the pre-reform UK pension system was 
entirely price-uprated, and so assuming lengthier periods of retirement results in a relative 
stronger weakening of the value of pensions relative to the average wage.    
 
Table 9.33: Net pension wealth in 2005 using different mortality and labour market 
participation assumptions  
 Different mortality & labour 
market participation 
Same mortality & labour 
market participation 
Bottom tertile 3.1 3.5 
Middle tertile 3.9 3.8 
Top tertile 4.9 4.8 
Note: Net pension wealth is defined in terms of multiples of the net average wage at pension age. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Table 9.34 compares the estimates of the strength of the poverty alleviation and 
consumption smoothing functions under the two sets of assumptions on labour market 
participation and longevity.  This is done by looking at the variation in the poverty threshold 
and in the overall replacement rate which the different estimates of net pension wealth imply. 
This shows that the estimates made in Chapter 8 over-estimated the strength of these functions 
– though only slightly when one looks at the middle tertile. As expected, lower pension 
entitlements for those on lower incomes do not result in a significant decrease in the 
effectiveness of the pension system, as the reduction in the expected number of years in 
retirement reduces their ‗pension requirements‘. By contrast, in a price-uprated pension system 
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like the pre-reform UK system, the longer periods in retirement of those on high incomes do 
not translate in significant increases in pension entitlements as the relative value of benefits is 
reduced by the difference between price and wage inflation.    
 
Table 9.34: Strength of the poverty alleviation & consumption smoothing functions in 2005 
using different mortality and labour market participation assumptions 
 Different mortality 
& labour market 
participation 
Same mortality & 
labour market 
participation 
Poverty threshold achievable (%) 
Bottom tertile 39% 41% 
Middle tertile 47% 48% 
Top tertile 54% 58% 
   
Overall replacement rate achievable (%) 
Bottom tertile 56% 58% 
Middle tertile 38% 39% 
Top tertile 26% 30% 
* This represents the poverty threshold (defined as a % of median disposable income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance. 
^ This represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 While this analysis provides an interesting example of how having different 
assumptions on longevity and labour participation according to socio-economic class might 
affect the social sustainability indicators, it must be emphasised that the above conclusions 
relate specifically to the pension system modelled – i.e. the pre-reform UK system.  This 
system was chosen as it was easier to find data which could be used to define assumptions.  
However, unfortunately this system is not representative of other European pension systems – 
which tend to be significantly more generous and much more earnings-related.  In these 
systems – for example in NDC systems - having differential mortality and labour market 
participation might have much more serious implications.  In the absence of adequately 
harmonised data on socio-economic current and future differences in mortality and labour 
participation, one cannot attempt a more in-depth quantitative analysis of this important 
matter.  Thus this very important topic must be left as a topic for future research. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 8 sought to refine the estimates made in Chapters 6 and 7, by moving from a full-
careers full-employment situation to something more approaching the real world, with partial 
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careers, part-timers and labour market non-participation. However given the assumptions 
taken in constructing this ‗real world‘, it was crucial to study the sensitivity of results.  Related 
to this, Chapter 8 had failed to study the impact of periods spent out of the labour market, due 
to unemployment or childcare provision, on pension entitlements.  Similarly in order to move 
towards this ‗real world‘ one would need to take into account socioeconomic differences in 
labour participation and longevity.  In the same vein, it is important to test the sensitivity of 
pension systems to a number of broader assumptions underpinning the estimates, such as those 
on longevity and wage growth, which are particularly difficult to divine with any degree of 
certainty so far ahead in the future.  This sheds light on the resilience of pension systems to 
shocks in demography and the macroeconomic environment. 
 Chapter 9 attempted to do all this, and in the process generated some interesting (and 
in some cases counterintuitive) results.  Thus, for instance, if working lives were to remain at 
their 2005 level, pension systems would be less expensive.  This is mainly as the growth in 
female pension entitlement would halt.  As a result, pension systems in 2050 would achieve 
much less in terms of poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing.  The size of future 
pension transfers would decline significantly, particularly for women and those on low 
incomes, particularly in countries with a strong link between contributions (and/or earnings) 
and benefits.  This suggests that policymakers framed reforms on the assumption that more 
women would be getting their own entitlement to pensions (thus making up for the decline in 
system generosity).  Another interesting result is that if higher female participation is 
complemented by longer working lives, there would be a positive impact on both system aims 
and constraints, with generosity rising without requiring increases in contribution rates. 
 Table 9.35 gives an overview of how labour participation impacts on the social 
sustainability indicators.  It shows only those countries where effects are the strongest.  The 
two main insights it provides are that labour market participation impacts more strongly the 
poverty alleviation function than consumption smoothing and that losses are very high if 
individuals in 2050 do not have longer working lives.  The reformed systems would fail to 
deliver unless individuals work longer.  The other consideration to make is that policymakers 
have focused their pension systems more on poverty alleviation – as longer working lives 
make more of an impact on the poverty threshold achievable rather than on the replacement 
rate on pre-retirement income. The gender impacts also differ interestingly, suggesting 
policymakers may have structured pension incentives to specifically reward higher female 
labour participation.  
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Table 9.35: Overview of labour market impacts on system sustainability* 
Poverty alleviation Consumption 
smoothing 
Intergenerational 
balance 
Financial 
sustainability 
If individuals in 2050 work an additional 3 years over anticipated increase 
Slovakia (+20%) Sweden(W) (+13%) Slovakia(W) (+19%) Poland (-6%) 
Hungary (+9%) Hungary (+9%) Hungary (+11%) Germany (-6%) 
France (+8%)  Italy (+10%) France (-5%) 
Finland(M) (+8%)   Sweden (-5%) 
If individuals in 2050 work the same number of years as now 
Slovakia(W)(-15%) Hungary(W) (-10%) Poland (-8%) Hungary (-12%) 
Italy(W) (-12%) Finland(W) (-10%) Germany(W) (-8%) Germany (-10%) 
Poland(W) (-11%) Sweden(W) (-9%)  Poland (-9%) 
Germany(W)(-11%) Austria(W) (-8%)  Slovakia (-9%) 
Hungary(W)(-11%) Hungary(W) (-8%)   
Austria(W) (-10%) Poland (-8%)   
* This table shows the countries where the social sustainability indicators are most susceptible to 
changes in the length of the contributory period (i.e. those with a change of close to or over 10%). It 
looks at the situation if working lives are 3 years longer than modelled in Chapter 8 and that if they 
remain unchanged at 2005 levels. Where impacts are principally felt by one gender, this is pointed out. 
A positive change means that the achievement of an aim or pressure on a constraint increases by that 
percentage over the Chapter 8 result, and vice-versa for a negative change.   
  
 Changing longevity assumptions has very significant impacts on the social 
sustainability indicators, particularly for those countries which have not adopted features in 
their pension systems which automatically take into account improvements in life expectancy. 
However as pointed out in OECD (2009), these features ―although they protect the finances of 
the pension scheme, they do so at the cost of varying individual retirement incomes‖.200  Table 
9.36 shows that longevity mainly affects constraints – particularly intergenerational balance. 
The impact on financial sustainability is also notable; particularly as even after reforms the 
required increases in contribution rates are quite steep.  One may note that Poland is the 
second most affected country. This may be counterintuitive as it is an NDC system which 
should take into account longevity improvements.  However, one needs to keep in mind that 
NDC systems take time to adjust.  An unanticipated increase in longevity still has a cost, as 
pension benefits are computed according to projected longevity at the time of retirement.  
Pension benefits are then adjusted downwards gradually through lower indexation, particularly 
in systems with automatic balance mechanisms.  The latter were not, however, modelled in 
this study.  Moreover in the case of Poland, our modelling assumes many women will be on 
the minimum pension, which we assume would not be revised downwards because of higher 
longevity. 
 
                                               
200
 This earns them the name of ―automatic destabilisers‖. 
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Table 9.36: Overview of longevity impacts on system sustainability* 
Poverty alleviation Consumption 
smoothing 
Intergenerational 
balance 
Financial 
sustainability 
If individuals in 2050 live for an additional 2 years over anticipated increase 
  Hungary(W) (+20%) Hungary (+15%) 
  Italy (+15%) Poland (+10%) 
  Slovakia (+15%) Finland (+7%) 
  Poland (+9%) Slovakia (+7%) 
  Germany(M) (+8%) Germany (+7%) 
  Austria(M) (+8%)  
  Finland(M) (+7%)  
* This table shows the countries where social sustainability indicators are most susceptible to changes 
in longevity (i.e. those with a change of close to or over 10%). It analyses the case of longevity being 2 
years higher than in Chapter 8. Where impacts are mostly felt by one gender, this is pointed out. A 
positive change means that the achievement of an aim or pressure on a constraint increases by that 
percentage over the Chapter 8 result, and vice-versa for a negative change.   
 
 Turning to the treatment of contribution credits, the main finding is that the degree of 
pension rights protection afforded to childcare provision differs greatly across countries, but is 
generally better than that for unemployment. Incorporating these two effects, the estimates in 
this Chapter suggest that the pension system gender gap is less pronounced in some countries 
than shown in previous Chapters, and that the poverty alleviation function is stronger.  
Contribution credits can provide strong underpins to retirement incomes, particularly for 
countries with strong contribution-benefit links, such as NDC systems. 
 The design of pension systems also affects the impact of macroeconomic 
developments. For instance in Sweden, changes in wage growth should not result in 
considerable changes in social sustainability. By contrast, in countries like France and Italy, 
lower wage growth would impact very negatively on system constraints. The Swedish system 
is also less exposed than the Polish one to the effects of changes in interest rates.  The UK 
with its modest and increasingly flat pension system is also not that affected by shocks.     
 This Chapter has shown that while the estimates of the social sustainability indicators 
can be further refined as they are sensitive to the modelling assumptions taken, broadly 
speaking their general trend and level do not change significantly.  In terms of resilience to 
shocks, the simulations in this Chapter revealed that countries differ markedly. For instance, 
while Hungary would need an additional 6 percentage point increase in the required 
contribution rate to finance pensions if longevity rises by 2 years, the effect in Sweden would 
be limited to one percentage point. Similarly the length of working careers exerts very 
different effects. Thus in Slovakia, if working lives among men lengthen by 5 years, the 
projected loss in the strength of the poverty alleviation function would be cut by nearly a third.  
The same development in Italy would cut the projected drop in generosity by only a one-fifth.  
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Table 9.37: Changes in contribution rates (% of wages) 
 Increase per additional  
year of longevity 
Reduction per additional 
working year contributed 
Austria  0.6 0.4 
Finland  0.7 0.2 
France  0.8 0.8 
Germany  0.8 0.4 
Hungary  3.2 1.1 
Italy  0.3 0.1 
Poland  1.7 0.8 
Slovakia  1.4 0.5 
Sweden  0.7 0.4 
UK  0.2 0.1 
Source: Own analysis. 
 
 NDC systems appear to be resilient to ‗negative‘ shocks (e.g. higher longevity) in 
terms of the effect on system constraints. In countries without automatic adjustments, shocks 
have stronger impacts. For instance, the Hungarian system is very exposed to longevity 
improvements, even if accompanied by higher labour participation.   
 
Table 9.38: Change in working lives required to retain contribution rates unchanged if 
longevity increases by an additional 2 years 
 Years 
Austria  3 
Finland  6 
France  2 
Germany  4 
Hungary  6 
Italy  6 
Poland  4 
Slovakia  6 
Sweden  3 
UK  4 
Source: Own analysis. 
 
 To conclude, the resilience of the strength of poverty alleviation to shocks seems to be 
dependent on minimum pensions. The strength of the consumption smoothing function is 
closely linked to the length of working lives, particularly in NDC countries or systems which 
have linked closer contributions and benefits. The pressure on constraints depends crucially on 
the presence of automatic features, particularly in relation to the impact of longevity. In 
countries like Sweden, Austria and France the fiscal impact of a two-year increase in longevity 
can be offset by an increase by a three-year increase in working lives. In others, such as 
Hungary, Finland and Slovakia, the required increase would be twice as high. 
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Conclusion 
 
Over the last two decades, the pension landscape in Europe has changed substantially. 
Policymakers across the continent devoted particular attention to reforming pension systems, 
with the express objective of achieving sustainability.  While the pace of reform has varied 
across countries, and in some the effects are not yet apparent, the scope of the reforms and 
their potential impact is such as to merit an in-depth assessment.  In this light, this dissertation 
has tried to understand the contribution reforms may have made to achieving sustainability.     
 To tackle this question adequately, two theoretical issues need to be addressed: 
III) Can one develop a concept of sustainability encompassing pension system adequacy 
within a context of fiscal sustainability? 
IV) Which are the best measures for judging pension system adequacy? 
On an empirical level, the relevant research questions are: 
III) What is the current importance of state pensions in supporting living standards?  How 
do reforms impact on generosity and system design? 
IV) Are the changes socially sustainable and what changes are required in saving and 
working longer for individuals to maintain living standards?  
 
C.1 State pensions and their changing role 
In our opening Chapter we tackled the first part of empirical question (I), by analysing the role 
of pensions in sustaining the income of elderly people. Our review showed that while there are 
significant differences in the size and design of systems, state pensions tend to be by far the 
main component of retirement income provision.  This not only reflects market failures (such 
as adverse selection, moral hazard, myopia and imperfect capital markets) but also recognition 
of the economies of scale that come from collective state organisation of pension provision. 
Data on incomes show that while they fall with age, the drop following retirement is not 
dramatic in most European countries.  State pensions appear to be especially important for 
those on lower incomes, women and the very old.  The data, however, indicate that there are 
noticeable differences in the poverty alleviation and income replacement effects of different 
state pension schemes, and suggest that having similar institutional designs does not 
necessarily lead to similar income smoothing or poverty reduction.  
 Consequently, Chapter 2 sought to discover how the outcomes of pension systems are 
linked, so to understand better the real differences between countries‘ pension systems and 
help determine how reforms may change system performance.  Given that the analysis made in 
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Chapter 1 indicated that pension spending is the largest item in government budgets and that 
its main goals are income replacement and poverty alleviation, we categorised pensions 
systems focusing on three dimensions - state spending, income replacement and the risk-of-
poverty among the elderly population.   
 
 
Group 
A 
Group 
C 
 
Group 
B 
 
Austria,  
France,  
Germany 
 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Luxembourg   
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Netherlands 
Malta, 
Czech Rep, 
Slovakia 
 
 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Sweden 
Italy, 
Greece, 
Portugal 
 
     Belgium 
      
Spain 
Cyprus, 
UK, 
Ireland 
Lithuania, 
Latvia, 
High 
poverty 
Figure C.1: Three-dimension pension system categorisation 
High 
spending 
Low 
spending 
Low 
poverty 
Note: Groups B and C are both coloured in yellow, as countries classified in these groups have low 
replacement rates; while those in Group A have high replacement rates. Countries placed above the 
horizontal line are high spenders on state pensions. Countries placed to the left of the vertical line have 
higher-than-average elderly poverty.  
 
 This process resulted in the identification of 4 relatively distinct groups of countries, 
depicted in Figure C.1. Group A (e.g. Germany, France, Austria, Poland, Hungary) are 
characterised by high levels of income replacement and low pensioner poverty, but high 
spending. At the other extreme, Group B countries have both low levels of income 
replacement and high rates of pensioner poverty. Countries in this group can be further divided 
into those with high (e.g. Italy) and low levels (e.g. UK) of state pension spending.  Group C 
(e.g. Sweden, Finland, Slovakia) is at an intermediate position, with relatively low levels of 
spending and low rates of relative poverty among pensioners, but also low levels of income 
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replacement in retirement.  The importance of this new taxonomy is that it helps in 
understanding the possible sources of system stress – namely high spending in Group A, high 
poverty in Group B, and low replacement in Group C.  Thus, a priori, one might expect that 
reforms in countries of Group A would have focused on curbing expenditure; reforms in 
countries of Group C to have concentrated on improving income replacement; and reforms in 
countries of Group B to have been focused on two aspects: in countries with high spending – 
the curbing of spending followed by measures to tackle poverty and income replacement, and 
in countries with low spending – the expansion of the pension system.        
 By contrast, the review of evidence on the pension reforms in Europe since the 1990s, 
presented in Chapter 3, shows that in most cases the main consideration was long-term 
financial cost (and in some cases, especially in Eastern Europe, short-term financial problems 
and a desire to reduce the state‘s role). The impact of reforms on the capability of pension 
systems to achieve their aims has tended to be ignored or not given primary importance.  
There have been some studies trying to assess the welfare implications of pension system 
reforms, but these have also adopted a very limited concept of system sustainability. 
   
C.2 Defining and measuring pension system sustainability    
In Chapter 4 we attempted to answer theoretical question (I) – how to develop a broader 
concept of sustainability encompassing pension system adequacy within a context of financial 
sustainability.  We did not contest that financial sustainability is an important factor 
underlying the sustainability of a reform, but rather argued that simply focusing on it alone is 
seriously inadequate as by doing so, one fails to take into account what pension systems are 
expected to achieve. By adopting a narrow vision of spending on pensions, this approach fails 
to take into account potential feedback effects on fiscal spending from the impact of reforms 
on pension system adequacy. Fiscal sustainability and pension system adequacy are not 
conflicting aims, but rather two sides of the same coin. Real fiscal sustainability cannot be 
achieved without ensuring pension system adequacy. If pension systems fall short, there could 
be strong political pressure for higher government spending on other support. 
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Figure C.2: Fiscal sustainability and pension adequacy - Two sides of the same coin 
 
 
Income 
smoothing 
adequacy 
Poverty  
alleviation  
adequacy 
Pension 
transfers 
across 
generations 
Pension 
contributions 
across 
generations 
 
 Ageing will increase the required size of retirement provision, and simply placing such 
provision off the government budget is no guarantee that spending will not eventually 
increase. This is evidenced by the change in the World Bank‘s stance on pension reform, 
which now acknowledges that a reformed pension system needs to ensure poverty alleviation 
and income replacement for broad sections of society, while limiting fiscal pressures.  Besides 
achieving these twin goals subject to the fiscal constraint, pension systems need to take into 
consideration the balance of transfers between different generations.  Political pressures for 
reform can arise either because systems are not achieving the goals that individuals expect of 
them or because individuals are concerned about the deal they are getting compared to 
previous generations.  Individuals can be concerned about the level of taxes they pay to 
finance the system but also by the level of their pension transfers compared to previous 
generations.  Social sustainability can only be achieved if policymakers understand these 
tradeoffs and optimise pension systems in this light.  Moreover policymakers must be able to 
do this in the presence of uncertainty, particularly as regards economic growth and longevity. 
 Chapter 5 set out the objectives policymakers should maximise to achieve social 
sustainability.  A reformed pension system needs to be assessed jointly against four criteria – 
the achievement of the system goals of poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing across 
the whole population, and the pressure on the system constraints of intergenerational balance 
and financial sustainability.  By contrast, up to now, evaluations of pension reform have either 
focused on spending or on the effect on theoretical replacement rates for full-career 
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individuals on average earnings.  The latter have been widely used as measures of adequacy. 
However, they suffer from a number of important deficiencies, such as being limited to single 
point-in-time comparisons and failing to capture the impact of changes in longevity.  This 
brings us to theoretical question (II) – how best to measure system adequacy.                 
 Chapter 5 argued that this could be done by estimating pension wealth – i.e. the 
discounted stream of future pension payments during retirement, weighted by the probability 
that the individual will still be alive at that particular age. This measure captures the total 
pension transfer to an individual and is superior to replacement rates, as it captures the effects 
of benefit indexation post-retirement and of longevity.  Pension wealth can be used to assess 
whether these transfers would result in individuals, on average, having an annual income that 
keeps them out of relative poverty during retirement,
201
 and also to calculate more accurately 
the degree of consumption smoothing that pension systems allow.
202
  Replacement rates at the 
point of retirement cannot do this as they fail to consider changes in the relative value of 
pensions over the retirement period.  By comparing the pension wealth of two successive 
generations one can also arrive at an intuitive measure of intergenerational balance.
203
 
Moreover, in conjunction with demographic and labour market data, pension wealth can be 
used to assess the long-term contribution rate needed to keep the pension system in financial 
balance across generations.
204
  This is a better measure of financial sustainability than focusing 
on projected spending on pensions (as a % of GDP) in one particular year as it takes into 
account the fact that longer-lived generations will require this spending for more years.   
 Having developed this framework to address the two theoretical questions set at the 
start of this research, we then proceeded in Chapter 6 to answer the second part of our 
empirical question (I) – namely assessing how reforms impact pension system generosity and 
design.  This was done by estimating measures of pension wealth pre- and post-reform using 
the OECD‘s APEX pension entitlement model. These were then used to derive indicators of 
the four dimensions of social sustainability, described above, for ten countries. The latter, 
                                               
201
 The relative poverty threshold was set at 35% of the average full-time wage in each country, which is 
broadly equivalent to the 60% of median equivalised disposable income threshold adopted by the EU.  Note 
that in this case the pension wealth indicator, defined net of income taxes and social security contributions, 
was the average for the hypothetical individuals of each gender with below-median wages.   
202
 We assessed how the annual average transfers implied by pension wealth at retirement would compare to 
pre-retirement income. Here the pension wealth indicator, defined net of income taxes and social security 
contributions, used was an average for all our employed hypothetical individuals.  
203
 We compared the net pension wealth (average for all our employed hypothetical individuals) of the 2005 
and 2050 pensioner generation defined in terms of the contemporary average wage in 2005 and 2050.  
204
 To do this, one computes the average gross pension wealth (average for all our employed hypothetical 
individuals) of a generation and multiplies this by the system dependency ratio. This gives the percentage of 
the average wage which needs to be contributed by a generation of working age individuals to finance the 
pension transfers to a pensioner cohort.  
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namely Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the 
UK, not only cover 70% of the EU‘s population, but also span the four different pension 
typologies developed in Chapter 2, and include examples of various types of reforms.   
 At this intermediate stage, the analysis, like most other literature, assumed full careers 
in full-time employment. It also assumed that there is full take-up of minimum pensions and 
that no private retirement saving is taking place – strong assumptions for countries with 
means-testing and significant private pension saving as take-up of benefits and the level of 
savings clearly affect state entitlements. However, in contrast with many other studies which 
just look at average male earners, the four sustainability indicators were calculated looking at 
9 hypothetical individuals for each gender at the different deciles of the full-time wage 
distribution in each country. Looking at different individuals is important as many pension 
systems are non-linear, and one cannot discern the poverty alleviation function of pensions by 
looking at average male earners. The benchmark for comparison was taken to be the situation 
in 2005 – when the pensioner generation was retiring under the pre-reform systems. By 2050, 
individuals were assumed to retire under the post-reform systems, while living longer lives.               
 The overall assessment, at this stage, showed that while reforms have reduced the 
poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing impacts in nearly all countries, generosity 
remains high in most of them.  Reforms have mostly followed existing system goals, but with 
an eye to reduce future cost.  However there have been some reforms, mostly in Eastern 
Europe, which may have raised issues about the future adequacy of pension systems for 
women and those on lower incomes as the degree of progressiveness has been reduced 
considerably.  Moreover with only some exceptions, the reforms still appear to leave pension 
systems relatively unprepared for the financial impact of the ageing transition.  This may 
potentially reflect the fact that reformers have not grasped the full implications of longevity 
increases, possibly as the sustainability indicators which they used do not capture this element. 
 The main contribution of this analysis lies in four methodological innovations. Firstly, 
it uses pension wealth – a measure of overall generosity of transfers throughout retirement - 
rather than measures of generosity at the point of retirement.  This captures the impact of two 
elements, namely longevity and indexation rules, which tend to be ignored despite that they 
have important consequences for the achievement of system goals and pressures on system 
constraints.  The second innovation is the explicit use of benchmarks against which to assess 
pension entitlements.  Most frequently policy makers have not sought to look at benchmarks in 
this area, preferring to retain a good level of discretion on what constituted ‗adequate‘ 
outcomes.  While the benchmarks used here can be seen as arbitrary, the framework is flexible 
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enough to allow the testing of various outcomes.  The third innovation is to attempt to measure 
all elements using the same indicators instead of using different models.  This increases 
transparency and also clearly illustrates the trade-offs between system goals and constraints. 
Finally this framework is able to incorporate distributional and gender analysis – an element of 
pension reform assessment that has frequently not been given enough importance by 
policymakers.  
 This modelling framework allows the analysis of various sub-questions and can be 
used to generate a lot of in-depth analysis of the consequences of reforms.  The framework 
lends itself to being used across different pension regimes and enables comparison of reforms 
which are very different in nature.  It can also be used to see how systems are changing and 
the extent of convergence in system goals and pressure on constraints.  This multi-faceted 
framework is not however to be conceived as some form of benchmarking exercise.  Rather its 
main aim is to capture as much as possible the full implications of reforms in order to arrive at 
some understanding of the potential pressures policymakers could face in the future.  This aim 
is justified in view of the broader concept of sustainability, developed in Chapter 4, and 
implies that the framework could be used to map the tactical and strategic decisions which 
policymakers have taken or need to take to achieve long-term stability in this field. 
 The conclusions in Chapter 6 were based on a comparison of the sustainability 
indicators for the current situation and the future post-reform situation.  This benchmark, while 
capturing how the effectiveness of pension systems will change over the future, may, however, 
belittle the achievements of the reforms.  The pre-reform and post-reform scenarios, in fact, 
differ in one important dimension – time – which is expected to bring about considerable 
stresses on the effectiveness of pension systems.  Between 2005 and 2050, not only is 
longevity expected to improve significantly, but also systems will have to face the retirement 
of the Baby Boom generation – which will bring about an abrupt change in the size of the 
pensioner population across Europe.  
 Chapter 7 looked at how these two effects would have affected the cost of financing 
the current systems as against the reformed systems.  It then assumed that this increased cost 
would have decreased the relative disposable income of the working age generation of 2050. 
The other social sustainability indicators for the pre-reform systems in 2050 were then 
estimated in this light.  In contrast to what Chapter 6 had suggested, Chapter 7 revealed that 
the reforms have cut substantially the implied increase in long-term contribution rates.  It 
confirmed that in most countries, this was achieved without endangering significantly the 
overall adequacy of pension systems.  In fact, the UK managed to increase generosity, while 
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not overburdening future finances by legislating significant increases in the state pension age. 
However the Chapter further corroborated the finding that the risk-of-poverty under the 
reformed systems has significantly heightened in some countries – mainly those East 
European countries which have reduced substantially the progressivity of their pension 
systems.  It also appears that in many European countries, the consumption smoothing 
function of the state pension system for middle-to-high earners has diminished in strength and 
may need to be supplemented by other means.  The increased financial sustainability of the 
reformed pension systems, moreover, has resulted in considerable cuts in pension wealth in 
some countries, which may create future political pressures. 
 
C.3 More realistic modelling of pension system sustainability 
Up to this stage, analysis focused solely on the hypothetical full-career cases in full time 
employment for both genders.  This assumption, though analytically convenient, is unrealistic 
and poses problems for our proposed sustainability framework.  The assumption of complete 
full-time employment over-represents the real efficacy of existing pension systems, by over-
estimating the achievement of goals, since it implies that individuals benefit from the 
maximum generosity of the system, while diminishing the constraints faced, as it boosts the 
support ratio.  Moreover, reformers may have based their policy choices on the understanding 
that there would be developments in the labour market which would offset part of the effects 
of their reforms.  Thus while the results of Chapter 6 and 7 provided answers to empirical 
question (I) – how reforms impact on pension system generosity and design, they fail to 
provide an adequately effective answer to empirical question (II) – namely whether changes 
are socially sustainable and the required changes for individuals to maintain living standards. 
To answer these questions, one needs to move away from the full-career assumption and adopt 
more representative labour market assumptions.  This was done in Chapter 8. 
 Lack of comparable data on contribution records raises significant issues when moving 
away from the assumptions of Chapters 6 and 7.  Nevertheless, Chapter 8 sought to present a 
more realistic estimate of the social sustainability indicators, by adding two hypothetical 
individuals for both genders – one engaged in part-time employment and another who has 
never engaged in any formal employment and thus is dependent on the minimum pension.  
Moreover instead of assuming full-careers for those in employment, estimates of the number 
of years spent in the labour market were constructed using EU LFS data on employment rates 
by age.  Finally to construct aggregate indicators, results for the full-time and part-time 
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employed individuals were weighted in accordance with their relative importance in LFS data. 
While still subject to significant caveats, these estimates should present a more realistic view 
of the present and future efficacy of pension systems being studied. 
 In fact, current and projected labour participation rates, particularly among women, 
differ greatly among the ten countries.  There are also interesting cross-country differences in 
part-time employment.  The new estimates confirmed that the interaction between the labour 
market and the social protection system needs to be considered by researchers and 
policymakers alike.  A system may look very generous on paper, but not be so in reality if 
only few individuals qualify for full benefits.  This tends to be particularly pertinent for 
women.  The estimates in Chapter 8 of the strength of the poverty alleviation function are far 
lower than in Chapters 6 and 7 (see Table C.1).  For instance, the poverty threshold currently 
provided, on average, by the French pension system
205
 drops to 63% from 73% among men 
and from 67% to 44% among women.  Overall, the results in this Chapter are more in line 
with current data on the actual risk-of-poverty and gender gaps in poverty risks.  For example, 
under the full-career assumption, Italian women were among the best provided for across 
Europe.  The estimates in this Chapter show that this is not the case.  
 While these are important contributions, potentially the most interesting finding is that 
labour market trends can act as a countervailing force that offsets part of the effect of the 
pension reforms.  This is particularly true in those countries where the reforms created closer 
links between contributions and benefits.  Chapters 6 and 7 had shown women as being the 
main losers of the reforms, with very substantial losses anticipated, for instance, among 
women in Poland and Slovakia.  The more realistic assumptions in this Chapter reverse this 
finding for some countries, as can be seen from Table C.1, though it should be noted not for 
those countries with the strongest losses.  Growing labour participation might actually result in 
improvements over time in pension entitlements for women despite the reforms, cases in point 
being France and Germany.  Moreover in many countries, cuts in the general pension system‘s 
generosity have been complemented by a strengthening of minimum pensions.  This has the 
potential to reduce the impact of the reforms on pensioner poverty.  Gender gaps in 
replacement rates should also decline, as men (with their fuller contributory records) will lose 
more in actual entitlement than women. 
 
 
                                               
205
 This is estimated by comparing the average pension wealth for the hypothetical individuals with below-
median wages with the median equivalised disposable income in that country. 
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Table C.1: The poverty thresholds (% of median disposable income) achievable in 2005 and 
2050 under different labour market assumptions  
 
a) Men  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 96 85 -11 95 74 -21 
Finland 79 72 -7 64 66 +2 
France 73 62 -11 63 59 -4 
Germany 69 58 -11 61 59 -2 
Hungary 79 82 +3 70 65 -5 
Italy 99 78 -21 95 68 -27 
Poland 77 54 -23 66 50 -16 
Slovakia 102 77 -25 93 51 -42 
Sweden 72 64 -8 70 65 -5 
UK 48 61 +13 46 59 +13 
 
b) Women  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 69 70 +1 68 61 -7 
Finland 70 64 -6 57 58 +1 
France 67 59 -8 44 59 +15 
Germany 55 52 -3 48 56 +8 
Hungary 73 79 +6 68 59 -9 
Italy 79 71 -8 68 50 -18 
Poland 68 39 -29 55 35 -20 
Slovakia 82 62 -20 74 41 -33 
Sweden 60 54 -6 59 56 -3 
UK 41 60 +19 39 56 +17 
^ These indicators are the average for the 4 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers with below-
median wages.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and 
part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
315 
 
                    
Table C.2: The average replacement ratios (% of pre-retirement wages) achievable in 2005 
and 2050 under different labour market assumptions 
 
a) Men  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 91 78 -13 89 66 -23 
Finland 75 69 -6 59 59 0 
France 68 57 -11 56 58 +2 
Germany 85 68 -17 71 69 -2 
Hungary 85 90 +5 74 62 -12 
Italy 92 72 -20 92 67 -33 
Poland 87 63 -24 67 56 -11 
Slovakia 72 67 -5 62 56 -6 
Sweden 66 62 -4 66 59 -7 
UK 40 48 +8 37 53 +16 
 
b) Women  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 83 82 -1 75 66 -9 
Finland 75 70 -5 58 60 +2 
France 71 61 -10 41 51 +10 
Germany 82 71 -11 59 67 +8 
Hungary 83 90 +7 74 64 -10 
Italy 82 73 -9 65 50 -15 
Poland 86 50 -36 65 43 -22 
Slovakia 83 67 -16 75 56 -19 
Sweden 71 64 -7 66 57 -9 
UK 44 60 +16 40 57 +17 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce in 
each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 By contrast, the consideration of labour market participation did not result in any 
significant reinterpretation of the development of intergenerational transfers.  Rising labour 
participation and increasing longevity should result in net pension wealth expanding slightly. 
While in Chapters 6 and 7, women were seen to lose out compared to men, on account of the 
equalisation of pension ages, the analysis in Chapter 8 shows them (in some countries) as 
losing less as their entitlements are buoyed by their rising labour participation (see Table C.3).  
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Table C.3: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation under different labour market assumptions (%)  
 Male Female 
 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Austria 109 94 98 87 
Finland 114 125 106 119 
France 98 101 96 141 
Germany 92 104 95 124 
Hungary 131 116 112 82 
Italy 95 77 87 76 
Poland 106 83 69 73 
Slovakia 109 80 79 58 
Sweden 107 112 100 96 
UK 127 127 112 117 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full- and part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Turning to fiscal sustainability, the estimates of the financing requirements of pension 
systems are significantly higher, on average, a contribution rate of 17% is required as against 
the 11%, as can be seen from Table C.4.  Moreover in the absence of reforms, fiscal pressures 
would have increased substantially more than hypothesised in previous Chapters.  The impact 
of the ageing transition, in fact, would be compounded by the impact of increasing women‘s 
entitlement to pensions. The reforms, however, partially address this factor so that the increase 
in fiscal pressures by 2050 is not as high as one could expect.  
 
Table C.4: Comparing financial sustainability under the different careers assumptions* 
 
Full-careers assumption Actual-careers assumption 
 2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050  2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 13.8 27.3 22.7 19.3 47.7 26.8 
Finland 8.5 20.4 18.3 8.7 23.7 20.9 
France 14.6 29.6 24.3 21.0 50.3 41.4 
Germany 8.0 17.9 14.4 11.8 39.6 20.9 
Hungary 22.0 43.0 30.8 37.7 80.9 44.5 
Italy 17.3 34.1 24.7 29.7 67.1 31.6 
Poland 8.4 30.4 20.7 14.4 67.7 34.7 
Slovakia 11.1 35.9 24.6 20.6 85.4 38.7 
Sweden 10.1 18.3 16.7 11.5 30.4 21.5 
UK 5.8 7.1 6.7 9.1 17.6 10.3 
Average^  11.1 23.6 18.3 17.5 47.2 27.2 
* The proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the pension wealth of different generations.   
^ The contribution rate of a country is weighted in line with relative population size.    
Source: Own estimates using APEX, EU labour market and population projections. 
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 While Chapter 8 refined the estimates made in Chapters 6 and 7, by moving from a 
full-careers full-employment situation to something more approaching the real world, with 
partial careers, part-timers and labour market non-participation, it did not consider the impact 
of unemployment and periods spent providing childcare on pension entitlements.  Similarly it 
did not take into account socioeconomic differences in labour participation and longevity.  
This was done in Chapter 9, where the social sustainability indicators were modified to reflect 
contribution credits for unemployment and childcare provision.  Incorporating these two 
effects, the estimates in Chapter 9 suggest that the pension system gender gap is less 
pronounced in some countries than shown in previous Chapters, and that the strength of the 
poverty alleviation is stronger.  Contribution credits can provide strong underpins to retirement 
incomes, particularly for countries with strong contribution-benefit links.   
 Modifying the social sustainability indicators to reflect socio-economic differentials in 
labour participation and mortality was only possible for the UK, due to data limitations.  This 
indicated that while the pension entitlements of those on low incomes may be lower than 
previously estimated, and vice versa for those on higher incomes, this does not affect the 
social sustainability indicators that much.  Thus while the estimates of the social sustainability 
indicators can be further refined as they are sensitive to the modelling assumptions taken, 
broadly speaking their general trend and level do not change significantly. 
 That said, it should be emphasised that while the evidence presented in this research 
provides clearer insights on pension system sustainability than that found in most existing 
literature, it still does not provide precise and definitive answers.  In particular, the absence of 
any modelling of the impact of household formation raises a number of concerns in some 
countries (particularly those which rely more on means-tested benefits). While other 
approaches, such as dynamic microsimulation, could address these issues, they would 
themselves face other difficulties (notably it would be very difficult to achieve the same 
degree of understanding of the direct effects of reforms).  Besides the construction of a 
dynamic microsimulation model for ten countries would be a very daunting task, and results 
would still be subject to considerable uncertainty.   
  
C.4 Pension system resilience to shocks and impact of changes in economic behaviour 
To complete the system sustainability analysis, one final element remained to be studied - the 
resilience of pension systems to different types of shocks. Moreover changes in individual 
economic behavior could also help ensure pension system sustainability – as implied in the 
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second theoretical question posed at the start of this research.  Estimates presented in Chapter 
8 suggest that in most countries individuals would need to save relatively high amounts in 
order to get the same net pension wealth as from the pension systems of the 2005 pensioner 
generation.  A more likely objective is to generate the same replacement rates but accepting 
the adjustment of state pension ages (see Table C.5).  In most countries, notably Poland and 
Slovakia, this task is, however, quite difficult as individuals will also be called upon to pay 
higher contribution rates to pay for contemporary pension transfers.  Longer working lives 
may present a more likely way of maintaining consumption smoothing possibilities. 
 
Table C.5: Required additional saving (% of wages) to maintain same level of consumption 
smoothing in 2050 as under pre-reform system – assumed net rate of return of 5.5%  
a) Men 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40
th
 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60
th
 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.2 8.0 8.7 
Finland           
France   2.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.1 
Germany  0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.3 3.0 4.0 1.4 
Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3     
Italy 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.2 13.6 
Poland 8.9 7.2 6.3 4.7 4.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 0.6 6.4 
Slovakia  12.6 12.9 13.1 13 11.5 7.5 3.6   12.9 
Sweden 3.4 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7    
UK           
 
b) Women 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40
th
 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 2.2 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.8 3.3 
Finland           
France           
Germany        0.2 1.0  
Hungary 7.8 5.3 6.8 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.3 5.9 5.6 6.0 
Italy 6.3 5.2 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.4 5.8 
Poland 15.4 14.6 13 12.5 11.9 11 9.7 8.3 6.7 12.6 
Slovakia  17.7 18.2 18.5 18.7 18.9 18.9 19.0 16.3 6.6 18.7 
Sweden 5.0 5.1 4.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 0.7 3.9 
UK           
Source: Own workings using APEX. 
           
 Chapter 9 looked in more detail at the impact of different contribution periods on 
pension system sustainability, with a number of interesting, and in some cases 
counterintuitive, results (see Table C.6).  Thus, for instance, if working lives were to remain at 
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their 2005 level, pension systems would be less expensive.  This is mainly because the growth 
in female pension entitlement would halt.  As a result, pension systems in 2050 would achieve 
much less in terms of poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing.  The size of future 
pension transfers would also decline significantly, particularly for women and those on low 
incomes, particularly in those countries with a strong link between contributions (and/or 
earnings) and benefits.  This suggests that policymakers framed pension reforms on the 
assumption that more women would be getting their own entitlement to pensions (thus making 
up for the decline in pension system generosity).  Another interesting result is that if higher 
female participation is complemented by longer working lives, there would be a positive 
impact on both pension system aims and constraints, with replacement rates rising without 
requiring increases in contribution rates.  This provides potential answers to the second part of 
our empirical question (II) – namely what are the required behavioural changes for individuals 
to maintain pre-reform levels of living standards during retirement.  
 
Table C.6: Overview of labour market impacts on system sustainability* 
Poverty alleviation Consumption 
smoothing 
Intergenerational 
balance 
Financial 
sustainability 
Austria (+5%) 
Finland (+8%) 
France (+8%) 
Austria (+5%) 
Finland (+1%) 
France (+6%) 
Austria (+7%) 
Finland (+7%) 
France (+4%) 
Austria (-3%) 
Finland (0%) 
France (-5%) 
Germany (+1%) Germany (+4%) Germany (+1%) Germany (-6%) 
Hungary (+9%) Hungary (+9%) Hungary (+11%) Hungary (-5%) 
Italy (+6%) Italy (+6%) Italy (+10%) Italy (-1%) 
Poland (+6%) Poland (+4%) Poland (+4%) Poland (-6%) 
Slovakia (+20%) Slovakia (+6%) Slovakia (+19%) Slovakia (0%) 
Sweden (+6%) Sweden (+13%) Sweden (+4%) Sweden (-5%) 
UK (+3%) UK (+3%) UK (+2%) UK (-3%) 
* This table shows the impact on the social sustainability indicators of working lives in 2050 being 3 
years higher than modelled in Chapter 8. A positive sign means a higher achievement of system 
objectives and more pressure on constraints, and vice versa for negative signs. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
 Returning to the issue of resilience to shocks, Chapter 9 showed that different 
longevity assumptions have significant impacts on the sustainability indicators, particularly for 
those countries which have not adopted features in their pension systems which automatically 
take into account improvements in life expectancy.  The resilience of poverty alleviation to 
shocks seems to be very dependent on the generosity of minimum pensions, while that of 
consumption smoothing is linked to the length of working lives, particularly in systems which 
have linked closer contributions and benefits.  As for the pressure on constraints, this depends 
on the presence of automatic features.  In countries like Sweden, Germany, and France the 
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fiscal impact of a two-year rise in longevity can be offset by a three-year increase in working 
lives, while in others, such as Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia a six-year increase would suffice. 
 
Figure C.3: Change in working lives (years) required to retain contribution rates unchanged 
if longevity increases by an additional 2 years with no change in pension age 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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ar
s
 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
C.5 Policy considerations and further research  
The achievement of sustainability has been the main objective that policymakers have set 
themselves when reforming pension systems.  While this research acknowledges, and its 
findings confirm, the importance of achieving long-term sustainability of pension systems 
given the significant challenges they face, it has argued that policymakers need to adopt a 
more comprehensive definition of sustainability.  When looking into the future, policymakers 
need to reassure themselves not only that pressure on constraints is being managed properly, 
but also that the pension system remains effective and is in a position to achieve the goals it is 
expected to.  To do this, policymakers need to be able to map out the impact of reforms on the 
strength of the poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing functions, particularly for 
groups with low incomes and/or partial careers, together with the influence reforms have on 
relative size of transfers between generations, both in terms of the net pension wealth accruing 
to future generations and the contribution rates required to finance these transfers. 
 Figures C.4 and C.5, taken from Chapter 8, present an example of how this mapping 
out can be made. They compare how the achievement of the twin goals of pension systems and 
the pressure on system constraints should change by 2050 when looking across the aggregate 
pensioner population. This approach allows one to understand whether one aim is being 
sacrificed for better results on the other, and provides an indication of how the role and scope 
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of state pension systems will evolve. The fact that this comparison is done on a cross-country 
basis also allows one to understand how different policymakers reacted to similar challenges.  
There are some quite striking similarities. For instance, only countries which faced a very 
substantial fiscal challenge due to ageing put in place reforms that cut the relative size of total 
pension transfers to future generations. In most countries, the reforms offset only part of the 
effect on pension wealth of the projected rise in longevity, and accommodate the projected 
change in the relative size in the pensioner population by a rising (implied) contribution rate.  
 Figure C.4 points out how most countries will converge towards providing pension 
wealth which keeps individuals above the 60% poverty threshold throughout retirement. The 
only exceptions appear to be Poland and Slovakia. Despite these radical cuts, these countries 
will still experience large increases in their financing costs (see Figure C.5), on account of 
steeply declining support ratios. Improving employment rates could help stem these 
developments. In a similar vein, in France the system seems to face significant fiscal 
challenges, which could be partially addressed by increasing employment at older ages.
206
        
 
Figure C.4: The development of system achievements (actual-careers assumption) 
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Note: The indicators presented show the poverty threshold (as a % of the national median disposable 
wage) that could be achieved, on average, throughout retirement by our estimates of the average net 
pension wealth of our 4 hypothetical individuals of each gender with below-median wages in each 
country. They also show the replacement rate (% of the individuals‟ pre-retirement wage) that could be 
achieved, on average, throughout retirement by our estimates of the average net pension wealth of our 
9 hypothetical full-time workers and our part-time worker of each gender (weighted in line with the 
share of full-time and part-time employment in that country).     
                                               
206
 Hungary also faces pressures, but these may have been addressed by recent reforms not modelled here.  
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Figure C.5: The development of system constraints (actual-careers assumption) 
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Note: The indicators presented show the average net pension wealth (in terms of the contemporary 
average wage) of our 9 hypothetical full-time workers and our part-time worker of each gender 
(weighted in line with the share of full-time and part-time employment in that country).They also show     
the contribution rate (% of lifetime wages) required to finance this average net pension wealth given 
the ratio of pension beneficiaries to contributors.  
 
 The above analysis can be deepened by looking more closely at the social 
sustainability indicators, and zooming to particular sections of the population. For instance, the 
poverty alleviation function mainly targets those on lower incomes, whereas the income 
smoothing function is particularly relevant for those on middle-to-high incomes. In Table C.7, 
we show how the relative poverty risk and income smoothing adequacy could change by 2050, 
together with the associated change in the relative size of pension wealth and in the 
contribution rate required to finance these transfers. These show that in some countries, like 
Poland and Slovakia, pensioner poverty could become an issue, while in others future 
pensioner generations may be seen to be favoured at the expense of current pensioner 
generations (e.g. Finland, UK) and/or future generations of workers (e.g. France). At the same 
time, it is important to stress that these considerations are valid only if the assumptions on 
future employment growth and longevity prove correct. In some countries, the assessment 
would be very different if working careers remained unchanged (particularly among women) – 
e.g. poverty risks in Germany and Italy would be higher – or if longevity were to improve at a 
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faster pace – e.g. the contribution rate in France and Hungary would need to rise by 
substantially more.      
          
Table C.7: The social sustainability of pension systems in 2050*   
 Change in  
poverty 
alleviation(1) 
Change in 
income 
smoothing (2) 
Change in net 
pension wealth 
(3) 
Change in 
contribution 
rate (4) 
Sensitivity to 
shocks 
Austria +0.2 0.0 -10% +7.8 Employment – 1 
Finland -2.9 -4.5 +22% +11.0 Employment – 4 
France -8.3 -2.4 +21% +18.8 Longevity – 4 
Germany -5.9 -0.1 +14% +8.6 Employment – 1 
Hungary +0.1 +0.9 -1% +8.0 Longevity – 4 
Italy +2.8 +5.6 -24% +1.5 Employment – 1 
Poland +18.2 +20.7 -22% +17.7 Employment – 1 
Slovakia +14.4 +24.9 -31% +17.4 Employment – 1 
Sweden +5.4 +6.4 +4% +8.2 Employment – 2 
UK -24.8 -18.9 +22% +1.3 Longevity – 3 
(1) The change in relative poverty captures the change by 2050 in the proportion of the individuals at 
the 10
th
 to 50
th
 wage deciles, in part-time work and those on minimum incomes who would be at risk of 
relative poverty and the depth of this risk. An index value of 0 implies that no one of those concerned 
ever spends a year in retirement with an income below the poverty threshold. Negative values mean 
that the risk will be lower in 2050. 
(2) The change in income smoothing captures the change by 2050 in the proportion of the individuals 
at the 30
th
 to 70
th
 wage deciles who would have a replacement rate less than 60% and the size of the 
gap from this threshold. An index value of 0 implies that no one of those concerned ever spends a year 
in retirement with a replacement rate of less than 60%. Negative values mean that the risk will be 
lower in 2050. 
(3) The change in net pension wealth captures the % change in the relative size of net pension wealth 
(defined in terms of the contemporary average wage) by 2050.  Negative values mean that future 
generations will be entitled to a lower net pension wealth in relative terms. 
(4) The change in contribution rate captures the change in percentage points of the average wage in 
the contribution rate required to finance the pension transfers to the 2050 generation. 
(5) Sensitivity to shocks captures the external factor that would most put at risk the social sustainability 
indicators for the pension system in question. In brackets, the most affected social sustainability 
indicator is noted. E.g. Employment – 1 means that the primary risk to the system is for poverty 
alleviation to be low because employment does not grow. 
 
 Figure C.6 attempts to show how the composition of the different pension system 
categories might change by 2050 as a result of reforms. The first thing to keep in mind is that 
the world in 2050 will be very different than in 2005, as can be inferred from the averages for 
the four indicators shown in Figures C.6 and C.7. In particular, the horizontal line (spending) 
will be higher up, the degree of replacement rate will diminish (so intersections between 
Groups may grow) and the vertical line (poverty) will possibly be slightly more to the right.   
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                Hungary 
 
Slovakia 
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 Finland, 
Sweden 
Italy 
Poland 
Slovakia 
 
 
      
 
 
 
UK 
 
High 
poverty 
Figure C.6: Evolution of pension systems by 2050 
after reform 
High 
spending 
Low 
spending 
Low 
poverty 
 
Note: Groups B and C are both coloured in yellow, as countries classified in these groups have low 
replacement rates; while those in Group A have high replacement rates. Countries placed above the 
horizontal line are high spenders on state pensions. Countries placed to the left of the vertical line have 
higher-than-average elderly poverty.  
 
 The estimated changes in the social sustainability indicators suggest that while there 
will be three general groups of countries; the composition of the groups could change 
significantly.  For instance, Poland and Slovakia could go to join Italy in Group B, as their 
level of pensioner poverty could be negatively affected by the pension reforms they have put 
in place, while at the same time the lack of labour participation combined with ageing will 
result in a substantial increase in their pension financing cost. Group B will, however, 
probably lose one member, the UK. By focusing resources even more on those on low 
incomes and women, the UK pension system should make inroads on pensioner poverty while 
maintaining spending low on account of the planned increase in pension ages. The UK could 
join the Scandinavian duo, Finland and Sweden, but these might be moving closer to the red 
line to somewhere close to the position held at present by Slovakia, as their financing cost will 
increase. In Group A, besides the movement of Poland, we have Hungary moving slightly 
downwards, and getting closer to the green line, as the reforms leave some groups at-risk-of-
325 
 
                    
poverty. The position of Austria, Germany and France will also change, as they move closer to 
Group C in terms of the replacement rates they provide. One could argue that France will 
separate from the other two, as it faces much higher projected increases in spending, and join 
Hungary, but at the same time the French system appears to have a much more effective 
poverty alleviation function than the Hungarian one.  The only country that might still be in 
the same place it occupies today is Italy. While the reforms mean that it will be less of an 
outlier in spending terms, low labour participation among older workers and women, together 
with lack of pension protection for the unemployed could keep pensioner poverty levels high 
while the reforms have cut the replacement rates individuals can look forward to in 2050.       
 Systems with automatic adjustments appear to be resilient to ‗negative‘ shocks (e.g. 
higher longevity and unchanged working careers) in terms of the effect on system constraints. 
The impact on achievement of system objectives – particularly the strength of the poverty 
alleviation function, by contrast, varies in line with the generosity of the minimum pension 
schemes. Thus the losses in the Italian and Swedish systems are less pronounced than in 
Poland. In countries without automatic adjustments, shocks inevitably result in stronger 
impacts, though the UK with its relatively modest and increasingly flat pension system is also 
not that much affected by shocks. The Hungarian system is the one that appears least resilient. 
By contrast the French system appears to be one of the systems which would gain the most if 
working lives rise, with each additional year cutting the required increase in contribution rates 
by nearly one percentage point.  The analysis in this research reinforces the increasingly 
standard policy recommendation that the best response to rising longevity is raising the 
pension age, rather than tampering with benefit levels or raising tax rates.  
 In this light, Table C.8 provides a final overview of the reforms and the remaining 
issues that policymakers in these countries need to address. In some countries, e.g. Hungary, 
the crucial first step is to address the financial sustainability of the system. In others, e.g. 
Poland, the emphasis is on providing better safety nets, particularly for women. In others, e.g. 
France, the vital thing is that policymakers ensure employment grows as expected or, e.g. in 
the UK and Italy, that they entrench for the long-term the principles introduced by recent 
reforms.     
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Table C.8 Overview of the reforms and remaining issues 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Austria Generosity cut but 
system remains quite 
adequate and gender 
outcomes more equal; 
those on high incomes 
require private saving 
to achieve previous 
income smoothing.  
Reformed system 
reduces slightly future 
pension wealth, but 
contribution rate still 
needs to rise. 
There may be scope for 
further reductions in 
system generosity for 
high earners but at the 
same time try to raise 
labour participation 
among those aged 50+. 
Finland Achievement of system 
aims to improve 
slightly; but very high 
penalties for periods 
spent unemployed, 
minimum pensions 
relatively low. 
Very substantial rise in 
required contribution 
rate reflecting the fact 
that pension wealth to 
increase at same time 
that number of 
pensioners will rise. 
Need to extend working 
lives so that effective 
retirement age rises; 
provide a better safety 
net for those on low 
incomes and 
unemployment credits; 
private saving needs to 
provide the income 
smoothing that state 
system does not allow. 
France Better poverty 
alleviation because of 
higher minimum 
pensions and credits for 
childcare and 
unemployment; but 
drop in previous 
income smoothing 
through state alone. 
Very strong rise in 
required contribution 
rate, with net pension 
wealth rising notably 
on account of longevity 
rise. 
Employment rates 
among the over 50 and 
women are an issue; 
raise SPA to induce 
longer working lives; 
need to sustain state 
system with private 
saving. 
Germany Reform makes system 
more progressive and 
makes gender outcomes 
more equal. 
Women set to receive 
much higher pension 
wealth, and together 
with ageing this will 
raise fiscal cost of the 
system significantly. 
Income smoothing may 
require more private 
saving; need to extend 
working lives beyond 
age 60. 
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Table C.8 Overview of the reforms and remaining issues..cont.. 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Hungary Reforms have made a 
generous system even 
more generous for 
those on high incomes 
while provision for 
women and those on 
low incomes seems 
lacking, particularly in 
terms of contribution 
credits. 
The pension system 
faces a very substantial 
fiscal challenge; while 
pension wealth remains 
stable despite state 
pension age rise. 
Make the system more 
progressive and cut 
generosity for those on 
high incomes while 
redirecting some of the 
savings to provide 
better protection for 
women and those on 
low incomes; introduce 
automatic adjustments 
so that longevity and 
other shocks do not 
overburden the system; 
employment rates 
among those aged 55+ 
are very low. 
Italy Reform has decreased 
generosity substantially 
and could result in a 
significant rise in 
poverty among women; 
unemployment carries a 
very heavy price in 
pension terms.  
Pension system quite 
expensive at present, 
but reform reduces 
future rises in 
contribution rates by 
decreasing pension 
wealth very 
significantly for future 
pensioners. 
Employment rates 
among the young, those 
aged 50+ and women 
are very low and if 
increased would help 
address financial cost; 
adequate income 
smoothing requires by 
private saving; provide 
better protection for 
unemployment and 
improve outcomes for 
those on low incomes, 
possibly by making 
system more 
progressive; make sure 
automatic adjustments 
are enforced. 
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Table C.8 Overview of the reforms and remaining issues..cont.. 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Poland Reform has reduced 
significantly system‘s 
progressiveness and 
there are serious 
poverty concerns for 
women and those on 
low incomes; very little 
protection for women 
with children and the 
unemployed. 
System faces a very 
substantial fiscal 
challenge, even though 
future net pension 
wealth has been 
reduced. 
Employment rates 
among the young, those 
aged 50+ and women 
are very low and if 
increased would 
address part of the 
financial cost while 
improving adequacy; 
lower pension age for 
women combined with 
NDC system makes 
women worse off – 
SPA for women should 
rise; need to improve 
minimum pensions and 
provide contribution 
credits – possible 
finance: cut generosity 
to those on high 
incomes. 
Slovakia Reform has reduced 
significantly system‘s 
progressiveness and 
there are serious 
poverty concerns for 
women and those on 
low incomes, unless 
labour participation 
rises in older ages. 
Reform has reduced the 
required increase in 
contribution rates, but 
system still faces big 
rise. Pension wealth cut 
for future generations, 
particularly women and 
those on low incomes. 
Increase labour 
participation among 
those aged 50+, revisit 
the extent of cuts made 
for those on lower 
incomes – by providing 
better minimum 
pensions and/or credits 
for periods spent 
unemployed  
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Table C.8 Overview of the reforms and remaining issues..cont.. 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Sweden Post-reform system 
aims achievement 
remains adequate but 
this is now more 
dependent on extending 
working lives, some 
concern for those 
dependent on minimum 
pension – uprated by 
prices. 
Achieves good degree 
of intergenerational 
balance; limits fiscal 
pressure by cutting 
benefits if people retire 
at same age. 
Continue to support the 
pension system with an 
active labour market 
policy; ensure 
individuals are aware 
of the need of working 
longer, earnings uprate 
the minimum pension; 
supplement state 
system with private 
saving to achieve better 
income smoothing. 
UK Improvements in 
pension alleviation 
function – particularly 
among women; state 
system on its own, 
however, is just a 
foundation for adequate 
retirement provision. 
Financial pressure 
relatively low, on 
account of rising SPA 
Ensure private pensions 
fulfill income 
smoothing role; reduce 
reliance on means-
tested benefits – where 
non take-up could 
reduce effectiveness of 
poverty alleviation; 
ensure SPA policy 
remains linked to 
longevity. 
   
 The main analytical contribution of the above analysis is the holistic and internally 
consistent way in which reforms are evaluated.  By looking at the various elements together, it 
is easier to understand the trade-offs which can be exploited and the risks that particular 
policies may pose. While most literature has focused solely on how best pension systems can 
face the challenge posed by the ageing transition, this analysis has refocused the discussion on 
the really central question – what do pension systems achieve and at what cost. Just looking at 
one part of the phrase – ‗at what cost‘ – is counterintuitive.  Rather policymakers need to focus 
on what realistically systems can achieve, and act in a way as to change individual behaviour 
so that any changes in public provision are accommodated by private actions.  
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 This analysis has shown that pensioner poverty may once again reemerge as an 
important issue in some countries where at present its low level does not attract much political 
attention. Moreover in some cases, such in Eastern European countries, moves to link benefits 
with contributions may have serious gender equality implications. Policymakers need to be 
well aware of these risks and take them into account when designing sustainable reforms. 
Pension reforms of this kind need to be sustained by effective measures to increase labour 
market participation and to make sure individuals are aware of the new financial 
incentives/costs embedded in new pension systems.  While clearly linking benefits to 
contributions makes sense to provide an effective and sustainable income smoothing function, 
policymakers also need to remain aware of the crucial poverty alleviation function of state 
pensions.  
 While this analysis has shed some light on these risks, there is scope for much more 
research. The hypothetical individuals used in this dissertation are an improvement on the 
standard full-career hypothetical cases, but they still fail to capture the intricacies of the real 
world.  Policymakers would need to look at a wider variety of cases, particularly for different 
types of broken careers, and model more refined socio-economic differences in labour 
participation.  Another important modelling issue that this research has skirted is household 
formation and to what extent this makes a difference to the social sustainability indicators. For 
instance, no assessment was made of whether women‘s position would be better in some 
countries if one were to consider entitlement to their partners‘ pension.  Similarly no attempt 
was made to allow non take-up of minimum pensions, or consider their interaction with 
private saving. Private provision was also assumed non-existent and this is a major 
simplification, particularly for some countries, notably the UK. Current provision and 
expected developments in this field have very important implications for the social 
sustainability of state pension systems.                 
 Despite these very important analytical considerations, the social sustainability 
framework developed in this research has enabled us to arrive at an improved understanding of 
whether the reforms conducted in Europe during the last decade will prove to be sustainable. It 
confirmed that in many cases, there remains more to be done to address the financial 
requirements brought by the rapid ageing of Europe‘s population. It showed that when 
pressed, policymakers, particularly in Western Europe, were more willing to sacrifice the 
income smoothing function of pensions rather than poverty alleviation.  This is a decision that 
makes considerable sense as middle- to high-income individuals are possibly in a better 
position to accommodate the effect of state pension reforms by increasing their private saving.  
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In this regard, in view of the need to potentially decrease in absolute size the net pension 
wealth of future generations, policymakers should consider further increases in state pension 
ages, complemented with an improvement in the labour market participation of older working 
age individuals.  By maintaining the proportion of life spent in retirement unchanged across 
generations, policymakers would be better able to achieve similar system aims as under 
current systems.  This would minimise the required increase in future financing requirements. 
At the same time, this analysis suggests that in some cases, notably in Eastern Europe, 
policymakers may not have fully considered the full impact of their policies on those on low 
incomes, on those with incomplete careers and on women.  Having a state pension which is 
able to alleviate poverty and provide a solid foundation for individuals to pursue their desired 
level of consumption smoothing will become even more important as the ageing transition 
progresses.     
 If tackled in a socially sustainable way, pension reform need not be as tortuous a 
process as it has been over the last decades.  If policymakers agree on the aims they want their 
pension systems to achieve, and have the good sense to get political acceptance or at least 
make sure citizens are well informed of these aims, they will be able to set in place reforms 
that stand the test of time.  The framework developed in this research presents one way in 
which policymakers can determine how best to structure their reforms.  It shows the 
interaction between the achievement of system goals and pressure on system constraints, and 
is able to shed light on the effects of reforms on all groups of society.  Pension systems have 
proven to be one of the most treasured social constructs of the twentieth century.  There is 
little reason why they should not remain so also during the twenty-first century, if 
policymakers make the necessary modifications to assure their social sustainability. 
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